Only 21% of enterprises responding to a recent multicountry Deloitte survey report having mature governance in place to manage the risks of agentic AI
Only 21% of enterprises responding to a recent multicountry Deloitte survey report having mature governance in place to manage the risks of agentic AI
The Presidents of the European Parliament, Council and Commission signed a Joint Declaration committing to achieve the “One Europe, One Market” roadmap.
On the sidelines of the Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Cyprus, the President of the Republic of Cyprus as the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and the Presidents of the European Parliament and the European Commission, signed the “One Europe, One Market Roadmap”. This agreement demonstrates the resolve of the three institutions to move forward together on a clear path.
Against the backdrop of sustained geopolitical and economic volatility, this Roadmap represents a decisive step to urgently strengthen Europe’s competitiveness, with concrete actions and targets for agreements, at the latest by end 2027.
A commitment to delivery
The Roadmap is both a political and operational commitment.
It includes:
Targets for legislative proposals and agreement by the co-legislators
Quarterly review to monitor progress
Clear institutional responsibilities for all EU institutions in line with their prerogatives
Regular stock taking for full transparency
Building on the existing monitoring process, the institutions will ensure regular stocktaking to oversee and guide the implementation of this Roadmap.
Roberta Metsola, President of the European Parliament said: “This Roadmap reflects what the European Parliament has been calling for: a stronger, more competitive and resilient Europe. It is ambitious, it strengthens our capacity to withstand shocks, and it provides predictability to our citizens and businesses. We said we would take bold decisions and we are doing it. This is Europe responding to what it needs.”
Nikos Christodoulides, President of the Republic of Cyprus as the Rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union said: “This Roadmap marks a turning point in advancing Europe’s competitiveness agenda. Moving forward with its implementation is not merely a regulatory exercise. It is a strategic necessity to reinforce Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, and long-term prosperity, within the framework of a truly integrated Single Market and a stronger, more cohesive European Union.”
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission said: “These actions will boost Europe’s economic growth, guarantee our digital transformation, and strengthen industrial resilience. This is an absolute priority of this Commission and with this Roadmap, we have the way forward.”
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Why is the European Commission putting forward Accelerate EU?
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East is heavily impacting global energy markets, with a knock-on effect on the economy, industry and households. Since the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East, the EU has spent an additional €24 billion on energy imports, mainly fossil fuels. Even if hostilities ceased immediately, disruptions to energy supplies from the Gulf will persist for the foreseeable future. Member States using more renewable and/or nuclear energy, and with more flexible grid systems with sufficient capacity and storage, are generally less impacted by the current energy crisis and sharp price fluctuations. The AccelerateEU Communication therefore underlines the importance of accelerating the transition to homegrown clean energy sources. In this context, the Communication focuses on five sets of measures with both short-term and long-term effects:
Greater EU coordination: The Commission will facilitate coordination in areas such as gas storage filling, oil stock releases, adoption of national emergency measures and ensuring the availability of jet fuel and diesel.
Protecting consumers and industry from price shocks: The Commission will assist Member States in the design of targeted, timely and temporary measures to address the crisis, including a temporary State aid framework to support the most exposed economic sectors.
Accelerating the shift to homegrown clean energy and electrification: The Commission will publish an Electrification Action Plan and set an electrification target, alongside other initiatives to increase the uptake of geothermal, biomethane and hydrogen.
Stepping up our energy system: the Commission calls on Member States to accelerate the negotiation of the European Grids Package for a swift adoption before summer 2026 and will adopt a legal proposal on network charges and taxation
Boosting investment:By mobilising both public and private financing for the transition to clean energy.
What is the Commission proposing to protect households and industry from the effects of the crisis?
Household budgets are increasingly tight as high energy costs, including household bills, are reducing disposable income. The Communication presents measures that Member States can take to protect consumers and industry from sudden high price hikes, thereby limiting the subsequent socio-economic impact.
EU rules and initiatives, including the Citizens Energy Package, already set out actions Member States can take to give consumers immediate relief. They include income support, energy vouchers (including for replacing boilers), social tariffs, reducing excise duties on electricity, and VAT reductions for heat pumps, solar PV panels and related small-scale batteries, and tax incentives for e-vehicles.
The Communication also underlines the need to make it easier for individuals to join energy communities, for households to produce more energy themselves and for consumers to be able to compare and switch energy suppliers. To help the most vulnerable, EU rules already enable Member States to bring in a temporary, or full, ban on disconnecting households from energy grids following payment issues. As the cheapest energy is the energy we do not use, the Communication also focuses on energy savings and energy efficiency.
The Commission will also increase the financial support available to industry for their clean energy transition through the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank, mobilising €100 billion of funding, including an Investment Booster financed by 400 million EU ETS allowances aiming to enhance investment certainty to step up decarbonisation investment by EU energy-intensive industries.
What is the Commission presenting for the transport sector?
Measures to ensure that the EU’s transport sector remains competitive and resilient are also included. To ensure sufficient availability of transport fuels and preserve the effective functioning of the single market, the Commission will step up European coordination on the optimisation of fuel distribution across Member States. The Commission will establish a Fuel Observatory, tracking EU production, imports, exports and stock levels of transport fuels. This will enable swift identification of potential shortages and inform targeted measures to maintain a balanced fuel distribution across all regions and airports.
To mitigate the impact of possible fuel shortages on the EU aviation sector, the Commission will provide clarity on existing flexibilities within the EU aviation framework to address the consequences of flight cancellations and other disruptions. The Commission is also committed to further driving the uptake of EU-produced sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) and sustainable maritime fuels (SMF).
More immediate support may be needed due to the pressure on fossil fuel imports and volatile energy prices. Such support should be targeted, timely and temporary and they should be tied to longer-term solutions.
What is the role of the Commission to ease the immediate pressure of fossil fuel imports and support long-term stability?
The Commission is working intensively with Member States, regulators and industry to gather timely information necessary for an effective, coordinated, EU-wide response. Coordination Groups on oil and gas now take place on a weekly basis. Chaired by the Commission, the two fora are well-placed for exchanges of information, for instance, on stocks, refining capacity and alternative import routes, across the EU.
The Commission is collecting national data on available oil stocks and market conditions to provide an EU-wide regional assessment of the situation, as mandated by Energy Ministers at the extraordinary Transport Telecommunications and Energy Council of 31 March. Looking ahead, AccelerateEU foresees closer, and more immediate, coordination of:
Filling of gas storage facilities by Member States and using the flexibility in filling rules.
Oil stock releases to ensure stocks effectively meet EU demand and that Member States’ emergency measures don’t negatively impact the Single Market.
National emergency measures and ensuring the availability of jet fuel and diesel, including oil refinery production capacities, across the EU.
What is the EU doing to protect vulnerable consumers?
High energy prices hit the most vulnerable the hardest. The Citizens Energy Package prioritises energy costs and consumers’ access to energy. It places a strong focus on protecting vulnerable and energy-poor households, with safeguards against disconnections and structural reforms to tackle the root causes of high energy costs.
Electricity taxes and levies make up about 25% of household bills, and the Commission works closely with Member States in reducing them.
In implementing the Citizens Energy Package, the Commission is publishing Recommendations as guidance to further empower and protect consumers, from disconnections for example, and to improve transparency. The aim is to make it easier for consumers to switch to cheaper, more sustainable, contracts that are best suited to them. More flexible contracts can lower costs and reduce exposure to price volatility, especially when combined with energy efficient improvements or pooling energy in energy communities.
EU funds have an important role to play in advancing the clean energy transition. Member States can already use Cohesion Funds for decarbonisation, energy efficiency, and other clean energy projects. Support is also available from EU sources such as the Social Climate Fund to support vulnerable households. In parallel, the Commission looking into additional support for Member States, not least by making maximum use of the current EU budget.
What is the EU doing to protect the industry?
The measures proposed in Accelerate EU aim at bringing immediate relief to both consumers and industry and to have lasting benefits. For instance, the Commission encourages Member States to explore the use of revenues from the ETS for targeted measures that accelerate investments in electrification (e.g. in transport or electrification of heating), industrial decarbonisation and to investments that help reduce electricity prices including through increased renewable electricity capacity. The Commission will also give Member States more space to develop and implement targeted temporary emergency measures to support the most exposed sectors by adopting a State aid temporary framework.
What measures is the EU taking to promote electrification and increase the use of homegrown clean energy sources?
The EU is taking a number of measures in different areas. For instance:
Grids Package: Grids are needed to let power flow at the lowest price from where it is produced to where it is consumed. Investing in the EU grid infrastructure is a crucial step towards further electrification and the increase of homegrown clean energy sources. Grids are the backbone of Europe’s energy system and a prerequisite for a well-functioning, integrated electricity system that delivers clean, reliable, affordable electricity to industry and households. The European Grids Package, proposed by the Commission in December 2025, addresses structural issues by introducing more effective cross-border and cross-sectoral energy infrastructure planning through better coordination at EU level. It also strives to upgrade and digitalise existing infrastructure and to ensure it is used in the most efficient way. The Commission proposal also aims at streamlining permit-granting procedures for both grids, renewable energy and flexibility assets to speed up implementation of projects. The Commission calls on and will support the co-legislators to conclude negotiations on the grids package before the summer
Electrification target: Amongst others, the Commission will set an electrification target and publish an electrification action plan to accelerate the electrification needed to complete the shift to an energy system based on clean and homegrown energy and move away from our dangerous dependency on fossil fuels.
How will public and private investments boost resilience to future energy crises?
It is vital to speed up investment in the clean energy transition now, not least to break EU dependence on fossil fuels and make the EU resilient to future energy crises. Member States that have already invested in the clean energy transition are reaping the benefits, with electricity prices generally below the EU average.
The EU already provides significant funding, including €219 billion under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).
Member States can already use Cohesion Funds for decarbonisation and energy efficiency, as well as instruments like the Social Climate Fund to support vulnerable households. The Commission will work with Member States to maximise the use of available EU funding and reallocate EU funds where feasible and in line with Member States’ preferences to energy-related investments, including by expanding measures to reduce energy demand and accelerated the deployment of clean technologies such as heat pumps, solar, wind and batteries.
Public funding alone will not be sufficient. To mobilise private capital, the Commission adopted a Clean Energy Investment Strategy in March 2026 and will convene a Clean Energy Investment Summit bringing together the financial services industry, institutional investors, including insurers and pension funds, project developers and public financiers to scale up financing for high-impact solutions such as batteries, charging infrastructure and electrification.
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Blog | Artificial intelligence (AI) can help track inflation risks in real time. A new ECB model based on machine learning informs experts how likely it is that inflation will be much higher or much lower than they expect.
In times of growing economic and political uncertainty, prices can change more rapidly and more strongly. This is why monetary policy decisions rely not only on the most likely path for inflation, which economists like to call the “baseline”, but also on an assessment of the risks surrounding it.[1] In other words, how likely it is that inflation will turn out to be higher or lower than the baseline. Estimating this has become much more complicated in a world of growing uncertainty. This blog post shows how the ECB is applying new AI-based tools to cope with this increased complexity.
The Eurosystem (the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area countries) utilises a comprehensive toolkit to analyse the risks surrounding inflation forecasts.[2] For example, market-based sensitivity analysis focuses on how surprise developments in key economic variables, such as oil prices, would affect the euro area economy. In addition, model-based analysis examines how a wide range of potential developments could shape the entire distribution of future macroeconomic outcomes. This offers a broader perspective than the sensitivity analysis. However, the standard economic models used in this context are typically based on only a handful of economic indicators. They may also rely on restrictive assumptions.[3]
The machine learning model described in this blog post comes with two major advantages for the risk analysis.[4] First, it is able to handle a greater number of economic indicators. Second, machine learning models are able to capture very general and complex data patterns. This allows it to detect and cope with non-linearities, which more traditional economic models often exclude.[5],[6]
Machine learning to assess inflation risk
The machine learning tool we use to assess the risks surrounding future inflation is based on a quantile regression forest (QRF) model.[7] It serves a dual purpose. First, it produces inflation forecasts. Second, it provides a comprehensive assessment of the risks surrounding a given baseline outlook, drawing on a large set of economic variables that are routinely monitored by Eurosystem inflation experts.[8] The model produces outputs based on the historical experience on which it has been trained and the most recent data available on key inflation determinants, such as wage developments and selling price expectations.
The ECB has already used the QRF model to help produce the short-term inflation forecast and the risk assessment around the baseline. Since the end of 2022, the model has become part of the broader analytical toolkit used for monetary policy preparation.[9]
Importantly, the potential of the QRF model extends beyond forecasting, and it can help identify which factors drive inflation risks over time.[10] In 2025, for example, wages and selling price expectations were the key forces behind revisions to our projections for core inflation (HICPX).[11]
Risk signals in real time
In recent years, the insights from the QRF model have been especially relevant. In particular, the model was useful in detecting – in real time – emerging inflation risks across different components of our main inflation measure (HICP). This made a tangible difference, because the volatile environment after the pandemic made it much harder to interpret the potentially conflicting messages emerging from the large number of indicators that we traditionally monitor for our analysis. Traditional economic models struggled with these conflicting messages, but QRF helped us to make sense of them.[12]
In the following, we focus on the performance of the QRF model in the course of 2025, comparing it to the ECB/Eurosystem projections produced around the same time.[13] The shaded area in Chart 1 captures the QRF density forecasts prepared on selected dates around each ECB Governing Council meeting held during the sample period. This shows the range in which HICPX inflation is likely to fall according to the model. For example, the QRF forecasts for the first quarter of 2025 were produced on 17 October 2024 and updated on 29 November 2024 and 28 January 2025 as more information became available. The ECB/Eurosystem projections for HICPX inflation for each quarter of 2025 are shown by the dashed red line. For all quarters displayed, the projections are prepared using the information available on the mid-date of the range reported on the x-axis. Finally, the actual outcome, which is generally released soon after the end of the reference quarter, is shown by the solid black line.
Chart 1
Core inflation projections in 2025
(percentages)
Source: ECB staff calculations.
Notes: The chart compares ECB/Eurosystem projections with selected vintages of QRF density forecasts for core inflation around relevant Governing Council meetings. The QRF model is based on Lenza et al. (2025). The shaded areas represent the 16th and 84th percentiles of the QRF forecasts, the dotted line represents the mean forecast.
How big risks around the ECB/Eurosystem baseline inflation projections are can be derived from how far the QRF analysis deviates from the ECB/Eurosystem projections. For example, if the ECB/Eurosystem projection falls in the lower part of the shaded area, or even outside its lower range, the projection carries an “upside risk”, i.e. the QRF analysis identifies a considerable likelihood that the final outcome for inflation will be higher than predicted. Comparing the QRF-based risk signals with how actual inflation subsequently turned out suggests that these signals were informative. For example, for the second and fourth quarters of 2025, the QRF range lies mostly or entirely above the ECB/Eurosystem projections and inflation was indeed 20 basis points above the projections. Hence, the upside risks identified by the model did materialise. At the same time, when the projections were closer to the mid-point of the range (indicating that no meaningful risks were detected by the model), the projections turned out to be more in line with the final outcomes. The shaded area of the QRF model area shrinks in the course of each quarter while, at the same time, still generally encompassing the final outcome. This shows that the QRF predictions become more precise as new information becomes available over the course of the quarter.
Implications for economic and inflation analysis and the road ahead
The examples above show that the QRF model is a helpful tool to navigate uncertain macroeconomic conditions. The ECB’s experience in developing and exploiting this model points the way for future uses. First, machine learning tools can complement traditional models by providing timely information about risks, including their magnitude, orientation and determinants. Second, these new tools are valuable not only for their forecasting accuracy but also for their ability to reveal complex data patterns, such as non-linearities and sector-specific dynamics, that have become increasingly relevant for monetary policy in recent years.
The QRF framework also allows growing data volumes to be handled more efficiently. This makes it possible to assess economically interpretable risk in real time, which in turn allows changes in the baseline or the associated risks to be detected swiftly. The QRF analysis provides explanations of how key variables of interest, such as inflation or output, evolve based on the evolution of their core determinants (e.g. wages, import costs or expectations). Hence, we believe these new tools will play a growing role in forecasting, monitoring economic and inflation trends, and informing monetary policy decisions.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
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In this update, we address the Cybersecurity Act and the Critical Entities Resilience Act adopted by the House of Representatives, the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus legislative package and the Dutch government’s response, the AI Omnibus proposal, and the consultation launched by the Dutch Data Protection Authority on its draft enforcement policy.
The European Commission has today adopted the revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (‘TTBER’) and Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty to technology transfer agreements (‘Guidelines’), following a thorough review of the rules that have been in place since 2014.
Technology transfer agreements are agreements by which a firm that owns technology rights (such as patents, design rights or software copyright) authorises another firm – usually by granting a licence – to use the rights to produce goods or services. Because these agreements facilitate the dissemination of technology and incentivise research and development, they are often pro-competitive, but some (restrictions in these) agreements can also have negative effects on competition.
The TTBER exempts technology transfer agreements from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), subject to certain conditions. The Guidelines help businesses to interpret the TTBER and provide guidance on the assessment of technology transfer and other technology-related agreements that fall outside the block exemption.
The revised TTBER and Guidelines provide businesses with up-to-date rules and guidance to help them assess the compliance of their technology licensing and related agreements with EU competition rules. The changes to the rules address two key features of the digital economy: the strategic importance of data and the increased use of standard-essential technologies to enable interoperability between products.
The new rules will enter into force on 1 May 2026.
Data licensing agreements. Given the strategic importance of data, the revised Guidelines include a new section on the assessment of data licensing for production purposes, under Article 101 TFEU. This section, explains, for instance, that the licensing of databases protected by copyright or the EU database right is generally pro-competitive and that the Commission will assess this type of data licensing by applying the same principles as for technology transfer agreements.
Licensing negotiation groups (LNGs). These are arrangements between technology implementers to negotiate jointly the terms of the technology licences that they wish to obtain from technology owners. For example, product manufacturers may need access to patents that form part of a technology standard. The Guidelines now contain a section that explains the possible pro- and anti-competitive effects of LNGs, the distinction between genuine LNGs and buyer cartels, and the relevant factors for assessing whether an LNG is likely to restrict competition. It also highlights measures that LNGs can take to reduce the risk of infringing Article 101 TFEU.
Further changes have been made to clarify and simplify the application of the rules.
In particular, the application of the TTBER’s market share thresholds has been simplified for situations where licensing takes place before a technology has been commercialised. In addition, certain conditions of the safe harbour for technology pools, found in the Guidelines, have been further specified to ensure that the benefit of the safe harbour is reserved for pools that comply with Article 101 TFEU. Technology pools are arrangements under which multiple technology owners contribute their technology rights to a package, which is licensed out to the contributors and to third parties. Pools often support technology standards, such as telecommunications standards.
More detailed information on the changes can be found in an explanatory note accompanying the revised rules.
Background
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements between companies that restrict competition. However, under Article 101(3) TFEU, such agreements are compatible with the single market, provided they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits and without eliminating competition.
In November 2024, the Commission published a Staff Working Document setting out the results of its evaluation of the 2014 TTBER and the accompanying Guidelines. The evaluation confirmed that these instruments remain useful and relevant, but it also highlighted areas for possible improvement in terms of legal certainty and the need to reflect market developments. In January 2025, the Commission launched an impact assessment to gather evidence on options for revising the rules. This included an open public consultation, a stakeholder workshop, meetings with interested parties and national competition authorities, and an expert study on data licensing.
In September 2025, the Commission published drafts of the revised TTBER and Guidelines for consultation. The consultation feedback was taken into account in the new TTBER and Guidelines.
The results of the various consultation activities are summarised in the Impact Assessment Report.
For More Information
More information is available on the webpage for this review on the Commission’s competition website, including summaries of the various consultation activities, stakeholder feedback, studies commissioned from external experts, the Evaluation report and the Impact Assessment report.
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While tax may not always sit at the forefront of public EU policymaking debates, developments over the past year point to a clear conclusion: 2026 is shaping up to be a pivotal year for EU tax policy, with implications that extend well beyond technical tax compliance. Ongoing discussions on simplification, the taxation of the digital economy and the financing of EU ambitions place taxation firmly at the intersection of policy design, competitiveness and fiscal stability.
Blog | The Middle East conflict halted growth momentum. The right policies and stronger global cooperation are needed to contain the damage.
Despite major trade disruptions and policy uncertainty, last year ended on an upbeat note. The private sector adapted to a changing business environment, while powerful offsets came from lower US tariffs than originally announced, some fiscal support, and favorable financial conditions coupled with strong productivity gains and a tech boom. Despite some downside risks, the momentum was expected to carry over into 2026, lifting the pre-conflict global growth forecast to 3.4 percent.
War in the Middle East has halted this momentum. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz and serious damage to critical facilities in a region central to global hydrocarbon supply raise the prospect of a major energy crisis should hostilities continue.
War’s economic impact
The shock’s ultimate magnitude will depend on the conflict’s duration and scale—and how quickly energy production and shipment normalize once hostilities end.
This impact will depend on three channels.
First, higher commodity prices are a textbook negative supply shock, raising costs for energy‑intensive goods and services, disrupting supply chains, lifting headline inflation, and eroding purchasing power.
Second, these effects could be amplified as firms and workers try to recoup losses, risking wage‑price spirals, especially where inflation expectations are poorly anchored.
Third, heightened macro risks and the prospect of tighter monetary policy could trigger a sudden repricing by financial markets—with much lower asset valuations, higher risk premia, more capital flight, and dollar appreciation—tightening financial conditions and dampening aggregate demand.
Our reference forecast, which assumes a short-lived conflict and a moderate 19 percent increase in energy commodities prices in 2026, still puts global growth at only 3.1 percent this year and headline inflation at 4.4 percent, a sharp deviation from the global disinflation trend in recent years.
A longer shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and further damage to drilling and refining facilities would disrupt the global economy more deeply and for longer. In an adverse scenario, assuming a sharper increase in energy prices this year coupled with rising inflation expectations and some tightening of financial conditions, growth falls to 2.5 percent this year and inflation rises to 5.4 percent.
In a severe scenario where energy supply dislocations extend into next year, inflation expectations become markedly less anchored, and financial conditions tighten sharply, global growth would decline to 2 percent this year and next, while inflation would exceed 6 percent. Despite the recent news of a temporary ceasefire, some damage is already done, and the downside risks remain elevated.
Countries will feel the impact differently. As in past commodity-price surges, importers are highly exposed. Low-income and developing economies—especially those with vulnerabilities and limited buffers—are likely to be hit hardest. Gulf energy exporters will face economic fallout from damaged infrastructure, production disruptions, export constraints, and weaker tourism and business activity. Remittances will fall in countries that supply migrant workers to the region.
Lessons from 2022 crisis
Today’s shock echoes the 2022 commodity price surge following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which helped push global inflation to the highest since the 1970s. In that episode, the subsequent synchronized tightening and disinflation without a recession is widely seen as a major policy success.
Can we expect the same outcome now? There are reasons to doubt it. In 2022, inflation pressures were already elevated coming from post‑pandemic supply-demand imbalances, tight labor markets, and abundant liquidity. Today, softer labor markets and normalized balance sheets have eased underlying pressures, though inflation remains above target in some countries, notably the United States. If the shock remains modest, inflation may be more contained, consistent with our reference scenario.
Still, the last episode left scars. Permanently higher price levels have raised cost‑of‑living concerns and made inflation expectations more sensitive to new price increases. Moreover, the 2022 surge reflected an unusually steep aggregate supply curve, with strong demand running into supply bottlenecks, allowing central banks to achieve disinflation with limited output losses. Evidence now suggests a return to a flatter supply curve, making disinflation more costly.
Policies
How should central banks react? Obviously, the best way to limit economic damage is an early and orderly end to the war. Beyond that, central banks can generally look through an energy-price surge but only as long as inflation expectations remain well-anchored. The energy shock already weakens activity while raising prices, and no central bank can influence global energy prices on its own. But if medium- or long-term inflation expectations drift up as prices and wages pick up, restoring price stability must take precedence over near-term growth, with a swift tightening. While exchange rate flexibility allows monetary policy to focus on price stability, foreign exchange interventions or capital flow management measures may be considered in some cases, in line with our Integrated Policy Framework.
What should fiscal policy do? Untargeted measures—price caps, subsidies, and similar interventions—are popular. But they are frequently poorly designed and costly. Given the lack of fiscal space with still elevated budget deficits and rising public debt, any fiscal support should remain narrowly targeted and temporary—with clear sunset clauses, and consistent with medium-term fiscal plans to rebuild buffers. Avoiding fiscal stimulus is also critical when inflation is rising, so as not to complicate central banks’ task.
Preserving price signals is important: high prices signal scarcity, encouraging demand restraint and supply expansion. Price controls and export restrictions cannot change that fact. Worse, such measures often backfire by raising underlying prices, leading to rationing and shifting adverse spillovers to other countries. If needed, direct, targeted transfers to vulnerable households and firms typically provide greater relief at lower fiscal cost than broad subsidies. Too often, this lesson was missed in 2022; countries should do better this time.
Finally, if financial conditions tighten sharply and global activity deteriorates markedly, monetary and fiscal policy should stand ready to pivot to support the economy and safeguard the financial system, alongside appropriate financial and liquidity policies.
Resilience amid challenges
The latest war underscores that the international order is under growing strain, with fraying alliances, new conflicts, and national-security concerns shaping economic policy. Our analytical chapters examine the macroeconomic effects of defense buildups and draw lessons for economies in conflict or reconstruction. The conclusion is sobering: beyond its human toll, war imposes large, persistent economic costs and difficult trade-offs.
Beyond active conflicts, geopolitical tensions are reshaping an increasingly multipolar world with waves of trade restrictions imposed by all major economic blocs, harming international cooperation and growth. While these shifts may reinforce inward-looking policies, we also see trade being rerouted through new partners and regional agreements that do not necessarily align with old geopolitical boundaries.
The conflict in the Middle East commands immediate attention, but it should not distract from the pursuit of durable growth. Advances in artificial intelligence—especially agentic AI—offer the potential for large productivity gains, the ultimate driver of living standards. Yet the transition may be bumpy: markets may be ahead of fundamentals, risking corrections, and rapid change could displace workers and weigh on demand. Policymakers should promote diffusion and adoption while investing in skills to ease the labor-market transition. The war should also spur faster adoption of renewable energy, which can strengthen resilience to energy shocks, improve energy security, and support the climate transition.
The world economy faces another difficult test. And while it may become more multipolar, it need not become more fragmented. We should keep strengthening global cooperation; with the right policies—including a swift cessation of hostilities and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—the damage can remain limited. International financial institutions such as the IMF were born out of a vision, forged in the aftermath of war and great destruction, to advance economic and financial cooperation and integration for the benefit of all. Today, those principles are more vital than ever to preserve global prosperity.
—This blog is based on the April 2026 World Economic Outlook, “Global Economy in the Shadow of War.”
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Today, the Council presidency and the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on a regulation aimed at addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the EU steel market.
The regulation will introduce a new framework to protect the EU steel sector from global excess production and trade diversion, while ensuring that the measure remains compatible with the EU’s international trade obligations and sufficiently flexible for economic operators, including downstream industries. It will replace the current EU steel safeguard measures, which are due to expire on 30 June 2026, thereby ensuring continued protection for the EU’s steel market without regulatory gaps.
The new rules introduce a revised tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system designed to better address structural global overcapacity in the steel sector, including a significant reduction of import quotas and higher duties for imports exceeding those quotas.
“The European steel industry is a strategic sector for our economy, our security and our green transition. Today’s agreement provides the EU with a stronger and more effective instrument to address global overcapacity while maintaining a rules-based approach and ensuring fair competition and long-term resilience for Europe’s steel producers and value chains.”- Michael Damianos, minister for energy, commerce and industry of the Republic of Cyprus
Main elements of the agreement
The provisional agreement maintains the core architecture of the Commission proposal while introducing several adjustments reflecting the goal to address structural global steel overcapacity while safeguarding the stability of EU supply chains.
Tariff-rate quota system and carry-over
The regulation introduces a revised tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system governing steel imports into the EU.
The new system reduces the overall volume of steel import quotas by approximately 47% compared to the 2024 safeguard quotas (18.3 million tonnes of import volumes per year) and increases the out-of-quota duty to 50%. These measures are designed to discourage excessive imports while maintaining controlled market access for traditional suppliers.
The agreement also clarifies aspects related to the management of quotas and their allocation among exporting countries. The agreement provides that, during the first year of application, unused import quotas may be carried over from one quarter to the next for all product categories, in order to provide flexibility for economic operators and support supply chains .
From the second year onwards, the Commission will determine whether such quarterly carry-over should be allowed for specific product categories, based on certain criteria. These include factors such as the level of import pressure, the rate of quota utilisation and the availability of supply for downstream industries, with a view to preventing market disturbances while ensuring adequate supply.
‘Melt and pour’ requirement
To avoid circumvention and increase supply chain transparency, the regulation introduces provisions concerning the ‘melt and pour’ principle, which identifies the country where the steel was originally melted and poured – that is, the country where the steel was first produced in liquid form in a furnace and then cast into its first solid shape.
Under the compromise reached by the co-legislators, the country where the steel is melted and poured will be used as one of the factors when allocating quotas to third countries. This approach helps address global overcapacity while ensuring that the regulation remains compatible with existing trade rules, including rules of origin, and with the EU’s international commitments under the WTO and its free trade agreements.
Within 2 years, the Commission will have to assess whether to designate the country of melt and pour as the basis for country-specific tariff quota allocations and, if necessary, will present a new legislative proposal to that effect.
Product scope and review
The regulation maintains a product scope broadly aligned with the existing EU steel safeguard measures, ensuring legal certainty and administrative manageability. At the same time, the co-legislators have agreed on a reinforced and time-bound review mechanism:
within six months of the entry into force of the regulation, the Commission will assess whether the scope should be extended to cover additional steel products, including tubes and pipes, certain types of wire and forged bars, and may propose legislative amendments where appropriate
a second review will take place within 12 months, allowing the Commission to assess whether further adjustments are needed, in particular with regard to products made of or containing a significant amount of steel, in light of market developments and possible risks of circumvention. Consecutive scope reviews will take place every 2 years thereafter.
The regulation introduces monitoring, reporting and review provisions to ensure that the instrument remains effective and proportionate over time. The Commission will regularly assess the functioning of the measure and may propose adjustments where necessary in response to market developments or evolving global overcapacity conditions.
Steel imports from Russia
In a joint declaration accompanying the regulation, the co-legislators and the Commission reaffirm their commitment to reducing economic dependencies on Russia, emphasising ongoing efforts to diversify steel imports, with the gradual phase-out of Russian steel products.
Next steps
The provisional agreement will now be submitted to the member states’ representatives in the Council and to the European Parliament for endorsement. Once formally adopted by both institutions, the regulation will apply as from 1 July 2026.
Background
Steel is an essential material for the EU economy, including for its green transition and strategically important sectors such as defence. The EU steelmaking industry is the world’s third largest producer, directly employing around 300,000 people and sustaining regional economies across member states.
This key industry is currently facing significant pressure from unsustainable levels of global overcapacity, which is projected to grow to 721 million tonnes by 2027, more than five times the EU’s annual consumption. This overcapacity, combined with trade-restrictive measures from third countries that limit imports into their markets, has made the EU market the primary recipient of global excess steel. This has led to increasing imports, low-capacity utilisation (67% in 2024), high EU manufacturing costs, and ultimately threatens the industry’s long-term ability to invest in decarbonisation.
To address these critical challenges, including the loss of some 65 million tonnes of capacity and up to 100,000 jobs since 2007, the Commission announced its intention to prepare a new steel measure in March 2025.
Compliments of the European CouncilThe post European Council | Council and European Parliament Strike Deal to Protect EU’s Steel Industry from Global Overcapacity first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
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