EACC

European Commission | Commission Updates EU Competition Rules for Technology Licensing Agreements

The European Commission has today adopted the revised Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (‘TTBER’) and Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty to technology transfer agreements (‘Guidelines’), following a thorough review of the rules that have been in place since 2014.
Technology transfer agreements are agreements by which a firm that owns technology rights (such as patents, design rights or software copyright) authorises another firm – usually by granting a licence – to use the rights to produce goods or services. Because these agreements facilitate the dissemination of technology and incentivise research and development, they are often pro-competitive, but some (restrictions in these) agreements can also have negative effects on competition.
The TTBER exempts technology transfer agreements from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements in Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), subject to certain conditions. The Guidelines help businesses to interpret the TTBER and provide guidance on the assessment of technology transfer and other technology-related agreements that fall outside the block exemption.
The revised TTBER and Guidelines provide businesses with up-to-date rules and guidance to help them assess the compliance of their technology licensing and related agreements with EU competition rules. The changes to the rules address two key features of the digital economy: the strategic importance of data and the increased use of standard-essential technologies to enable interoperability between products.
The new rules will enter into force on 1 May 2026.

Data licensing agreements. Given the strategic importance of data, the revised Guidelines include a new section on the assessment of data licensing for production purposes, under Article 101 TFEU. This section, explains, for instance, that the licensing of databases protected by copyright or the EU database right is generally pro-competitive and that the Commission will assess this type of data licensing by applying the same principles as for technology transfer agreements.
Licensing negotiation groups (LNGs). These are arrangements between technology implementers to negotiate jointly the terms of the technology licences that they wish to obtain from technology owners. For example, product manufacturers may need access to patents that form part of a technology standard. The Guidelines now contain a section that explains the possible pro- and anti-competitive effects of LNGs, the distinction between genuine LNGs and buyer cartels, and the relevant factors for assessing whether an LNG is likely to restrict competition. It also highlights measures that LNGs can take to reduce the risk of infringing Article 101 TFEU.

Further changes have been made to clarify and simplify the application of the rules.
In particular, the application of the TTBER’s market share thresholds has been simplified for situations where licensing takes place before a technology has been commercialised. In addition, certain conditions of the safe harbour for technology pools, found in the Guidelines, have been further specified to ensure that the benefit of the safe harbour is reserved for pools that comply with Article 101 TFEU. Technology pools are arrangements under which multiple technology owners contribute their technology rights to a package, which is licensed out to the contributors and to third parties. Pools often support technology standards, such as telecommunications standards.
More detailed information on the changes can be found in an explanatory note accompanying the revised rules.
Background
Article 101(1) TFEU prohibits agreements between companies that restrict competition. However, under Article 101(3) TFEU, such agreements are compatible with the single market, provided they contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits and without eliminating competition.
In November 2024, the Commission published a Staff Working Document setting out the results of its evaluation of the 2014 TTBER and the accompanying Guidelines. The evaluation confirmed that these instruments remain useful and relevant, but it also highlighted areas for possible improvement in terms of legal certainty and the need to reflect market developments. In January 2025, the Commission launched an impact assessment to gather evidence on options for revising the rules. This included an open public consultation, a stakeholder workshop, meetings with interested parties and national competition authorities, and an expert study on data licensing.
In September 2025, the Commission published drafts of the revised TTBER and Guidelines for consultation. The consultation feedback was taken into account in the new TTBER and Guidelines.
The results of the various consultation activities are summarised in the Impact Assessment Report.
For More Information
More information is available on the webpage for this review on the Commission’s competition website, including summaries of the various consultation activities, stakeholder feedback, studies commissioned from external experts, the Evaluation report and the Impact Assessment report.
 
 
Compliments of the European Commission The post European Commission | Commission Updates EU Competition Rules for Technology Licensing Agreements first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | War Darkens Global Economic Outlook and Reshapes Policy

Blog | The Middle East conflict halted growth momentum. The right policies and stronger global cooperation are needed to contain the damage.  

Despite major trade disruptions and policy uncertainty, last year ended on an upbeat note. The private sector adapted to a changing business environment, while powerful offsets came from lower US tariffs than originally announced, some fiscal support, and favorable financial conditions coupled with strong productivity gains and a tech boom. Despite some downside risks, the momentum was expected to carry over into 2026, lifting the pre-conflict global growth forecast to 3.4 percent.

War in the Middle East has halted this momentum. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz and serious damage to critical facilities in a region central to global hydrocarbon supply raise the prospect of a major energy crisis should hostilities continue.

War’s economic impact
The shock’s ultimate magnitude will depend on the conflict’s duration and scale—and how quickly energy production and shipment normalize once hostilities end.
This impact will depend on three channels.

First, higher commodity prices are a textbook negative supply shock, raising costs for energy‑intensive goods and services, disrupting supply chains, lifting headline inflation, and eroding purchasing power.
Second, these effects could be amplified as firms and workers try to recoup losses, risking wage‑price spirals, especially where inflation expectations are poorly anchored.
Third, heightened macro risks and the prospect of tighter monetary policy could trigger a sudden repricing by financial markets—with much lower asset valuations, higher risk premia, more capital flight, and dollar appreciation—tightening financial conditions and dampening aggregate demand.

Our reference forecast, which assumes a short-lived conflict and a moderate 19 percent increase in energy commodities prices in 2026, still puts global growth at only 3.1 percent this year and headline inflation at 4.4 percent, a sharp deviation from the global disinflation trend in recent years.
A longer shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz and further damage to drilling and refining facilities would disrupt the global economy more deeply and for longer. In an adverse scenario, assuming a sharper increase in energy prices this year coupled with rising inflation expectations and some tightening of financial conditions, growth falls to 2.5 percent this year and inflation rises to 5.4 percent.
In a severe scenario where energy supply dislocations extend into next year, inflation expectations become markedly less anchored, and financial conditions tighten sharply, global growth would decline to 2 percent this year and next, while inflation would exceed 6 percent. Despite the recent news of a temporary ceasefire, some damage is already done, and the downside risks remain elevated.

Countries will feel the impact differently. As in past commodity-price surges, importers are highly exposed. Low-income and developing economies—especially those with vulnerabilities and limited buffers—are likely to be hit hardest. Gulf energy exporters will face economic fallout from damaged infrastructure, production disruptions, export constraints, and weaker tourism and business activity. Remittances will fall in countries that supply migrant workers to the region.

Lessons from 2022 crisis
Today’s shock echoes the 2022 commodity price surge following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which helped push global inflation to the highest since the 1970s. In that episode, the subsequent synchronized tightening and disinflation without a recession is widely seen as a major policy success.
Can we expect the same outcome now? There are reasons to doubt it. In 2022, inflation pressures were already elevated coming from post‑pandemic supply-demand imbalances, tight labor markets, and abundant liquidity. Today, softer labor markets and normalized balance sheets have eased underlying pressures, though inflation remains above target in some countries, notably the United States. If the shock remains modest, inflation may be more contained, consistent with our reference scenario.
Still, the last episode left scars. Permanently higher price levels have raised cost‑of‑living concerns and made inflation expectations more sensitive to new price increases. Moreover, the 2022 surge reflected an unusually steep aggregate supply curve, with strong demand running into supply bottlenecks, allowing central banks to achieve disinflation with limited output losses. Evidence now suggests a return to a flatter supply curve, making disinflation more costly.
Policies
How should central banks react? Obviously, the best way to limit economic damage is an early and orderly end to the war. Beyond that, central banks can generally look through an energy-price surge but only as long as inflation expectations remain well-anchored. The energy shock already weakens activity while raising prices, and no central bank can influence global energy prices on its own. But if medium- or long-term inflation expectations drift up as prices and wages pick up, restoring price stability must take precedence over near-term growth, with a swift tightening. While exchange rate flexibility allows monetary policy to focus on price stability, foreign exchange interventions or capital flow management measures may be considered in some cases, in line with our Integrated Policy Framework.
What should fiscal policy do? Untargeted measures—price caps, subsidies, and similar interventions—are popular. But they are frequently poorly designed and costly. Given the lack of fiscal space with still elevated budget deficits and rising public debt, any fiscal support should remain narrowly targeted and temporary—with clear sunset clauses, and consistent with medium-term fiscal plans to rebuild buffers. Avoiding fiscal stimulus is also critical when inflation is rising, so as not to complicate central banks’ task.
Preserving price signals is important: high prices signal scarcity, encouraging demand restraint and supply expansion. Price controls and export restrictions cannot change that fact. Worse, such measures often backfire by raising underlying prices, leading to rationing and shifting adverse spillovers to other countries. If needed, direct, targeted transfers to vulnerable households and firms typically provide greater relief at lower fiscal cost than broad subsidies. Too often, this lesson was missed in 2022; countries should do better this time.
Finally, if financial conditions tighten sharply and global activity deteriorates markedly, monetary and fiscal policy should stand ready to pivot to support the economy and safeguard the financial system, alongside appropriate financial and liquidity policies.
Resilience amid challenges
The latest war underscores that the international order is under growing strain, with fraying alliances, new conflicts, and national-security concerns shaping economic policy. Our analytical chapters examine the macroeconomic effects of defense buildups and draw lessons for economies in conflict or reconstruction. The conclusion is sobering: beyond its human toll, war imposes large, persistent economic costs and difficult trade-offs.
Beyond active conflicts, geopolitical tensions are reshaping an increasingly multipolar world with waves of trade restrictions imposed by all major economic blocs, harming international cooperation and growth. While these shifts may reinforce inward-looking policies, we also see trade being rerouted through new partners and regional agreements that do not necessarily align with old geopolitical boundaries.
The conflict in the Middle East commands immediate attention, but it should not distract from the pursuit of durable growth. Advances in artificial intelligence—especially agentic AI—offer the potential for large productivity gains, the ultimate driver of living standards. Yet the transition may be bumpy: markets may be ahead of fundamentals, risking corrections, and rapid change could displace workers and weigh on demand. Policymakers should promote diffusion and adoption while investing in skills to ease the labor-market transition. The war should also spur faster adoption of renewable energy, which can strengthen resilience to energy shocks, improve energy security, and support the climate transition.

The world economy faces another difficult test. And while it may become more multipolar, it need not become more fragmented. We should keep strengthening global cooperation; with the right policies—including a swift cessation of hostilities and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—the damage can remain limited. International financial institutions such as the IMF were born out of a vision, forged in the aftermath of war and great destruction, to advance economic and financial cooperation and integration for the benefit of all. Today, those principles are more vital than ever to preserve global prosperity.
—This blog is based on the April 2026 World Economic Outlook, “Global Economy in the Shadow of War.”

 
 
Compliments of the International Monetary Fund The post IMF | War Darkens Global Economic Outlook and Reshapes Policy first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

European Council | Council and European Parliament Strike Deal to Protect EU’s Steel Industry from Global Overcapacity

Today, the Council presidency and the European Parliament have reached a provisional agreement on a regulation aimed at addressing the negative trade-related effects of global overcapacity on the EU steel market.
The regulation will introduce a new framework to protect the EU steel sector from global excess production and trade diversion, while ensuring that the measure remains compatible with the EU’s international trade obligations and sufficiently flexible for economic operators, including downstream industries. It will replace the current EU steel safeguard measures, which are due to expire on 30 June 2026, thereby ensuring continued protection for the EU’s steel market without regulatory gaps.
The new rules introduce a revised tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system designed to better address structural global overcapacity in the steel sector, including a significant reduction of import quotas and higher duties for imports exceeding those quotas.
“The European steel industry is a strategic sector for our economy, our security and our green transition. Today’s agreement provides the EU with a stronger and more effective instrument to address global overcapacity while maintaining a rules-based approach and ensuring fair competition and long-term resilience for Europe’s steel producers and value chains.”- Michael Damianos, minister for energy, commerce and industry of the Republic of Cyprus
Main elements of the agreement
The provisional agreement maintains the core architecture of the Commission proposal while introducing several adjustments reflecting the goal to address structural global steel overcapacity while safeguarding the stability of EU supply chains.
Tariff-rate quota system and carry-over
The regulation introduces a revised tariff-rate quota (TRQ) system governing steel imports into the EU.
The new system reduces the overall volume of steel import quotas by approximately 47% compared to the 2024 safeguard quotas (18.3 million tonnes of import volumes per year) and increases the out-of-quota duty to 50%. These measures are designed to discourage excessive imports while maintaining controlled market access for traditional suppliers.
The agreement also clarifies aspects related to the management of quotas and their allocation among exporting countries. The agreement provides that, during the first year of application, unused import quotas may be carried over from one quarter to the next for all product categories, in order to provide flexibility for economic operators and support supply chains .
From the second year onwards, the Commission will determine whether such quarterly carry-over should be allowed for specific product categories, based on certain criteria. These include factors such as the level of import pressure, the rate of quota utilisation and the availability of supply for downstream industries, with a view to preventing market disturbances while ensuring adequate supply.
‘Melt and pour’ requirement
To avoid circumvention and increase supply chain transparency, the regulation introduces provisions concerning the ‘melt and pour’ principle, which identifies the country where the steel was originally melted and poured – that is, the country where the steel was first produced in liquid form in a furnace and then cast into its first solid shape.
Under the compromise reached by the co-legislators, the country where the steel is melted and poured will be used as one of the factors when allocating quotas to third countries. This approach helps address global overcapacity while ensuring that the regulation remains compatible with existing trade rules, including rules of origin, and with the EU’s international commitments under the WTO and its free trade agreements.
Within 2 years, the Commission will have to assess whether to designate the country of melt and pour as the basis for country-specific tariff quota allocations and, if necessary, will present a new legislative proposal to that effect.
Product scope and review
The regulation maintains a product scope broadly aligned with the existing EU steel safeguard measures, ensuring legal certainty and administrative manageability. At the same time, the co-legislators have agreed on a reinforced and time-bound review mechanism:

within six months of the entry into force of the regulation, the Commission will assess whether the scope should be extended to cover additional steel products, including tubes and pipes, certain types of wire and forged bars, and may propose legislative amendments where appropriate
a second review will take place within 12 months, allowing the Commission to assess whether further adjustments are needed, in particular with regard to products made of or containing a significant amount of steel, in light of market developments and possible risks of circumvention. Consecutive scope reviews will take place every 2 years thereafter.

The regulation introduces monitoring, reporting and review provisions to ensure that the instrument remains effective and proportionate over time. The Commission will regularly assess the functioning of the measure and may propose adjustments where necessary in response to market developments or evolving global overcapacity conditions.
Steel imports from Russia
In a joint declaration accompanying the regulation, the co-legislators and the Commission reaffirm their commitment to reducing economic dependencies on Russia, emphasising ongoing efforts to diversify steel imports, with the gradual phase-out of Russian steel products.
Next steps
The provisional agreement will now be submitted to the member states’ representatives in the Council and to the European Parliament for endorsement. Once formally adopted by both institutions, the regulation will apply as from 1 July 2026.
Background
Steel is an essential material for the EU economy, including for its green transition and strategically important sectors such as defence. The EU steelmaking industry is the world’s third largest producer, directly employing around 300,000 people and sustaining regional economies across member states.
This key industry is currently facing significant pressure from unsustainable levels of global overcapacity, which is projected to grow to 721 million tonnes by 2027, more than five times the EU’s annual consumption. This overcapacity, combined with trade-restrictive measures from third countries that limit imports into their markets, has made the EU market the primary recipient of global excess steel. This has led to increasing imports, low-capacity utilisation (67% in 2024), high EU manufacturing costs, and ultimately threatens the industry’s long-term ability to invest in decarbonisation.
To address these critical challenges, including the loss of some 65 million tonnes of capacity and up to 100,000 jobs since 2007, the Commission announced its intention to prepare a new steel measure in March 2025.
 
 
Compliments of the European CouncilThe post European Council | Council and European Parliament Strike Deal to Protect EU’s Steel Industry from Global Overcapacity first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

European Commission | Commission consults Member States on proposal for a Temporary Crisis Framework

The European Commission is gathering the views of Member States on a draft proposal for a State aid Temporary Crisis Framework to support the EU economy in the context of the Middle East crisis, as announced on 13 April 2026 by President Ursula von der Leyen. The draft proposal is based on Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which allows aid to develop specific economic sectors also in view of specific unexpected economic risks.
The Commission is consulting Member States to seek their views on a targeted and temporary framework to address the effects of the crisis on some of the most exposed sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, fishery, road transport and intra-EU short sea shipping. The draft proposal also includes a temporary adjustment to the Clean Industrial Deal State aid Framework (CISAF) allowing for higher aid intensities to address electricity price spikes.
The draft proposal under consultation proposes to allow Member States to grant:

Calibrated temporary support for the most exposed sectors:

covering part of the price increases for fuel or fertilisers, as compared to before 28 February 2026, based on beneficiaries’ consumption, and
a simplified measure allowing a limited amount of aid per company (except for EU short sea shipping). On this basis, Member States may rely on relevant statistics to avoid individual tracking of actual consumption.

An increased maximum aid intensity for the electricity costs for energy-intensive industries under Section 4.5 of the CISAF, above the existing maximum of 50%.

In addition, the Commission stands ready to assess, on a case-by-case basis and subject to several requirements, temporary measures that may include subsidising the fuel cost of gas-fired electricity generation to reduce overall electricity costs.
The Commission is also asking additional questions to Member States about the measures in the draft framework and on whether any further measures are required to address the effects of the crisis. Member States now have the possibility to comment on the Commission’s draft proposal and answer these questions. The Commission will quickly assess the responses, with the aim of adopting a Temporary Framework by the end of April.
Background
State aid rules enable Member States to take swift and effective action to support citizens and companies, in particular SMEs, facing economic difficulties due to current situation in energy markets.
The proposed Temporary Energy Crisis Framework would complement the ample possibilities for Member States to design measures in line with existing EU State aid rules, in particular those under the CISAF.
Member States also continue to be able to implement State aid measures under the General Block Exemption Regulation, without the need to notify them to the Commission.
 
 
 
Compliments of the European CommissionThe post European Commission | Commission consults Member States on proposal for a Temporary Crisis Framework first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | Cushioning the Middle East War Shock

Speech by IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva at the 2026 Spring Meetings in Washington, DC
Good morning.
A resilient world economy is being tested again by the now-paused war in the Middle East. The conflict has caused considerable hardship around the globe. My heart goes out to all people affected by this war and all wars.
When we welcome ministers and central bank governors to our Spring Meetings next week, our focus will be on how best to weather this latest shock and ease the pain on economies and people.
This requires understanding the nature of the shock, the channels through which it affects the economy, the size of the impact, and the policies that can mitigate it.
So what hit us? A supply shock that is:

Large, with the world’s daily oil flow cut by some 13 percent, and its LNG flow by some 20 percent;
Global, with all of us now paying more for energy and with supply chains disrupted across the world;
And asymmetric, with its impact depending on proximity to the conflict, whether you are an energy exporter or importer, and your policy space.

As always, a negative supply shock pushes prices up. As a point of reference, Brent jumped from $72 per barrel on the eve of hostilities to a peak of $120. Thankfully, oil prices have fallen, but they remain much higher than before the war—and many countries are paying high premiums for access to precious supplies.
Spare a thought for the Pacific Island nations at the end of a long supply chain, wondering if fuel will still reach themin the wake of such a severe disruption.
The supply interruptions have had—and will for some time continue to have—ripple effects, such as:

Oil refinery disruptions given the need to maintain minimum flow rates, with warning lights flashing red in many far-flung places;

Shortages of refined products including diesel and jet fuel, which have disrupted transportation, trade, and tourism in a world more interconnected than ever;

Food insecurity for another 45 million people given the transport issues—taking the total number of people in hunger to over 360 million—with the problem potentially worsening over time because of higher fertilizer prices;
And supply chain disruptions given industrial dependencies such as on sulfur, helium for silicon chipmaking and MRI imaging, and naphtha for plastics.

The second question is: how can this shock play out? Through three main channels:

First: the price impact and supply shortages. Higher prices for key inputs feed into many consumer goods, lifting inflation. This, coupled with shortages, reduces demand by brute force.
Second channel: inflation expectations. These can break anchor and ignite a costly inflation process. Here is the distribution of near-term inflation forecasts for the U.S.; notice how the curve has moved to the right, indicating higher short-run inflation expectations. And here is the curve for the euro area; it also moves right, and it widens, indicating higher uncertainty. Fortunately, longer-run expectations have not budged—this is very good and very important.

Third channel: financial conditions. From a highly supportive starting point, these tightened, in an orderly manner. Emerging market bond spreads widened substantially; equity prices adjusted; and the dollar appreciated. And now we see some easing.

We have been here before in the 1970s and earlier this decade. We know eventually a significant part of the shock will dissipate, leaving us in a new equilibrium. Supply recovers and demand adjusts. New capacity comes on stream. Energy efficiency rises.
As proof, please appreciate how the world has become progressively less energy intensive since the 1980s, which cushions the shock. Renewable energy increased its share, yet oil remains our number one fuel.

As the world responds, it is important that we maintain our collective quest for energy efficiency and energy diversification. Different countries have different paths to energy security, but all must strive for it.
Let me move to the third question: how large is the growth impact?
The answer very much depends on whether the ceasefire holds and leads to lasting peace and how much damage the war leaves in its wake.
Given the uncertainties, our World Economic Outlook, to be published next week, will include a range of scenarios, going from a relatively swift normalization, to a middle scenario, to one where oil and gas prices stay much higher for much longer and second-round effects take hold.
All these scenarios start from a situation where strong AI and tech investment, supportive financial conditions, and other factors were driving considerable momentum in the world economy.
In fact, had it not been for this shock, we would have been upgrading global growth.
But now, even our most hopeful scenario involves a growth downgrade. Why? Because of significant infrastructure damage, supply disruptions, losses of confidence, and other scarring effects.
Take Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex—a tremendously important example of strategic investment done right; producer of 93 percent of the Gulf’s LNG, some 80 percent of it going to Asia-Pacific, a region that now endures serious fuel shortages. Ras Laffan has essentially been shut since March 2, took direct hits on March 19, and could take 3‒5 years to restore to full capacity.

Even in the best case, there will be no neat and clean return to the status quo ante.
Another relevant fact: see how ship passages through Bab-el-Mandeb on the Red Sea have never quite recovered  from the devastating disruptions there—they remain stuck at about half their 2023 level.

So the reality is, we don’t truly know what the future holds for transits through the Strait of Hormuz or, for that matter, for the recovery of regional air traffic.
What we do know is that growth will be slower—even if the new peace is durable.
And we also know there are significant variations across the world. Countries able toexport oil and gas undisturbed are the least affected. In contrast, countries directly disrupted by the war—including oil and gas exporters who suffered the blockade—and countries relying on imported oil and gas, still bear the brunt of the impact.
How bad this impact will be will depend, in no small measure, on how much policy space countries have, including oil and gas reserves, given the five-week gap we have seen in tanker traffic from the Gulf.
Let me walk you through a few key charts to illustrate three points of differentiation:

First, let’s separate the world into oil importers on the left and oil exporters on the right. As the pile-up of dots on the left shows, over 80 percent of countries are net oil importers.

Second, let’s highlight countries directly hit by this war. Note how the hits have disproportionately fallen on major oil exporters—although the red dots on the left remind us of the war’s toll on regional non-oil economies as well.
Third, let us add a vertical scale for countries’ sovereign credit ratings, as a proxy for policy space. The bottom left is where we find vulnerable oil importers. Let’s color Sub-Saharan Africa in yellow, and small-island nations in orange. Notice how these two sets of countries largely fill that quadrant of vulnerability—they will very much be in our focus next week.

And yet, with oil being a global commodity, even oil exporters far from the affected region and enjoying terms-of-trade gains have felt the effects of costlier oil.
Let me move to the last question: what should countries do?
A word of caution upfront: this being a classic negative supply shock, demand adjustment is unavoidable.
Policymakers can help in multiple ways, and—certainly—they must be careful not to make things worse. So here I appeal to all countries to reject go-it-alone actions—export controls, price controls, and so on—that can further upset global conditions: don’t pour gasoline on the fire.
Beyond that, as in past shocks, alertness and agility are key. The challenge will be to detect if and when changing conditions take us from one state of the world to another:

For now, there is value inwaiting and watching, with central banks stressing their commitment to price stability but otherwise staying on hold—with a stronger bias to action if credibility is in question. Fiscal authorities should provide targeted and temporary support to the vulnerable, aligned with their medium-term fiscal frameworks.
Next, if inflation expectations threaten to break anchor and ignite a costly inflation spiral, then central banks shouldstep in firmly with rate hikes. Fiscal support should remain targeted and temporary. Rate hikes, of course, would further dampen growth—that’s how they work.
Finally, if a severe tightening of financial conditions adds a negative demand shock to the supply shock, then monetary policy returns to a delicate balancing act while fiscal policy—if and only if there is fiscal space—switches to well-calibrated demand support.

Let us have a quick look at what hasactually been happening out there.
In monetary policy, markets have been expecting major central banks to tighten their policy stance. Here we see four key market-implied policy rate paths, each showing an upward shift.

In energy policy, we see many countries putting in place emergency conservation measures—from general campaigns, to limits on private vehicle use, to remote work. These and other steps are well-documented in the International Energy Agency’s energy policy tracker, which is summarized here.

Such information-sharing, let me add, underscores why we have joined forces with the IEA and the World Bank to form a coordination group within which the IMF will lead on the macroeconomics.
And finally, coming back to fiscal policy, we see that most countries have appropriately held the line, avoiding untargeted tax cuts, energy subsidies, and price-based measures, although a few have chosen to deliver broad-based support. Again we see the IEA summary here.
We will point out that measures that mute the price signal also mute the necessary demand response, resulting in higher global energy prices. And we will work with countries to help them target their fiscal support and craft effective sunset clauses for temporary measures.
As we do so, we will also stress that it is important for fiscal and monetary policies to not pull in opposite directions.
Already, the world has seen benchmark yield curves rising, driving up the cost of debt. Adding deficit-financed stimulus to this mix at this moment would increase the burden on monetary policy and amplify such shifts. It would be like driving with one foot on the accelerator and one on the brake—not good.

As we will flag in our forthcoming Fiscal Monitor, the world has a fiscal space problem. Public debt is generally much higher than 20 years ago—including in most G20 countries—reflecting widespread neglect of fiscal consolidation in the periods when conditions permitted it.

As a result, interest payments are rising as a share of revenue at all income levels. The implication is clear: all countries must deploy their limited fiscal resources responsibly, and most must move decisively to rebuild fiscal space after this shock. I cannot emphasize this enough.

Let me move to financial sector policies. As our Global Financial Stability Report will insist, it is essential that financial regulators and supervisors be alert, nimble, and responsive to a fluid situation.
Financial conditions have been highly accommodative for some time, spurred by tech optimism and new financial intermediaries, many of them nonbanks. While this has lifted growth, it also creates risks of reversal. If investors were to start worrying about energy insecurity holding back the growth of AI, for example, given AI’s huge energy needs, then we could find ourselves in a spot of trouble.
Micro- and macro-prudential policies must work to reduce financial stability risks and ensure a resilient system.
With that, I want to stress the most important lesson of all: good policies make a difference. There are forces countries can’t control, but they do have authority over their own policies and institutions.
Take heed: the strength and agility of your fundamentals is your best defense when shocks come—and come they will.
And, as you deal with the long tail of the current shock, do not forget to steer the great global transformations in technology, demographics, geopolitics, trade, and climate and build a better future. Your structural and regulatory policy choices underpin productivity and long-run growth—and growth potential matters enormously for stability.
For us at the IMF, supporting you to build strong policies and institutions, this is our raison d’être. And, as the firefighter, we are here for you when crisis hits.
Once more, let’s take into our lens the vulnerable oil importers of the world, those rated in the speculative grade, and let’s color in blue all countries with IMF-supported programs. We can scale these programs up if needed and—be sure—there are more programs to come.

Given the spillovers of the Middle East war, we expect near-term demand for IMF balance-of-payments support to rise by somewhere between $20 billion and $50 billion, with the lower bound prevailing if the ceasefire holds.
Two points worth noting here. One, this range would be much higher were it not for the sound policymaking of many emerging market economies—including some of the largest ones—over the decades. And two, we are well resourced to meet this shock.
So, yes, our 191 member countries can count on us to support them with financing if needed. And they can count on us to bring them together to find a path forward through the fog of uncertainty. This is what next week will be about.
Thank you, and let us hope for lasting peace in the Middle East and everywhere—because war takes away everything that we work for.
 
 
Compliments of the International Monetary FundThe post IMF | Cushioning the Middle East War Shock first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

World Bank | Joint Statement by the Heads of the International Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank Group

 The Heads of the International Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank Group have agreed to form a coordination group to maximize their institutions’ response to the energy and economic impacts of the war in the Middle East. They issued the following joint statement:
The Middle East war has caused major disruptions to lives and livelihoods in the region and triggered one of the largest supply shortages in global energy market history. The impact is substantial, global, and highly asymmetric, disproportionately affecting energy importers, in particular low-income countries. It is already transmitted through higher oil, gas and fertilizers prices, and is triggering concerns about food prices as well. Global supply chains—including of helium, phosphate, aluminum, and other commodities—are affected, as is tourism due to flight disruptions at key Gulf hubs. The resulting market volatility, weakening of currencies in emerging economies, and concerns about inflation expectations raise the prospect of tighter monetary stances and weaker growth.
At these times of high uncertainty, it is paramount that our institutions join forces to monitor developments, align analysis, and coordinate support to policymakers to navigate this crisis. This is especially the case for countries that are most exposed to the downstream impacts from the war and those confronting more limited policy space and higher levels of debt. To ensure a coordinated response, we have jointly agreed to form a group that will:
(i)  Assess the severity of impacts across countries and regions through coordinated data sharing on energy markets and prices, trade flows, fiscal and balance of payments pressures, inflation trends, export restrictions of key commodities, and supply chain disruptions.
(ii)  Coordinate a response mechanism that may include: targeted policy advice, assessment of potential financing needs and related provision of financial support (including through concessional financing), and use of risk mitigation tools as appropriate.
(iii)  Mobilize relevant stakeholders, including other multilateral, regional, and bilateral partners, to deliver a coordinated and efficient support to countries in need.
The group will work with, and draw on, other international organizations’ expertise as needed.
We are committed to working together to safeguard global economic and financial stability, strengthen energy security, and support affected countries and people on their path to sustained recovery, growth, and job creation through reforms.

About the International Energy Agency
The International Energy Agency, the global energy authority, was founded in 1974 to help its Member countries coordinate collective responses to major oil supply disruptions. Its mission has expanded and evolved since, and rests today on three main pillars: working to ensure global energy security; expanding energy cooperation and dialogue around the world; and supporting a secure, affordable and sustainable energy future. For more information, visit https://www.iea.org/.
About the International Monetary Fund
The IMF is a global organization that works to support economic growth and prosperity for all of its 191 member countries. It does so by supporting economic policies that promote financial stability and monetary cooperation, which are essential to increase productivity, job creation, and economic well-being. The IMF is governed by and accountable to its member countries. For more information, visit  https://www.imf.org
About the World Bank Group
The World Bank Group works to create a world free of poverty on a livable planet through a combination of financing, knowledge, and expertise. It consists of the World Bank, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). For more information, please visit www.worldbank.org, ida.worldbank.org/en/home, www.miga.org, www.ifc.org, and www.icsid.worldbank.org.The post World Bank | Joint Statement by the Heads of the International Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank Group first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

ECB | Europe’s Fossil Fuel Dependence Poses Risks to Price Stability

Blog | Europe’s energy dependence increasingly complicates the task of maintaining price stability. Meeting the continent’s clean‑energy targets would weaken the link between volatile global markets and domestic prices. Crucially, the tools to make this transition are already within reach.
Europe’s energy dependence has become one of the critical vulnerabilities of our economy. Recent energy price shocks have transferred vast resources out of Europe, prompted emergency interventions and strained public finances. These costs are real, recurring and largely wasted.
Energy policy is the responsibility of elected governments, and rightly so. But Europe’s energy dependence also has profound implications for the ECB. Our primary mandate is price stability. Yet repeated energy price shocks make achieving this objective increasingly difficult.
Why do central banks care?
Europe remains among the advanced economies most reliant on imported fossil fuels. This vulnerability was starkly exposed following Russia’s unjustified invasion of Ukraine, when energy prices surged, pushing euro area inflation up to 10.6% in October 2022 and giving rise to what some aptly described as “fossilflation”.
Recent geopolitical tensions have highlighted how little this dependence has changed, with the conflict in the Middle East triggering another surge in European energy costs. The March 2026 ECB staff macroeconomic projections outline how this external shock could increase inflation and decrease growth.
This is a complex scenario for us to manage. Tightening monetary policy to contain inflation can deepen an economic slowdown, while loosening policy to support growth can entrench inflation.
In theory, central banks can look through temporary supply shocks, provided they do not spill over into broader and more persistent price pressures, inflation expectations remain anchored and wage-price spirals do not emerge. But repeated and persistent energy shocks test all these conditions, as ECB President Christine Lagarde highlighted in her recent speech.
Transition now – or pay more later
Europe cannot eliminate geopolitical risk, but it can significantly reduce its exposure to it. The most effective way to do that is by cutting reliance on imported fossil fuels and accelerating an orderly shift to home‑grown clean energy. If Europe were to meet its sustainable energy targets, the link between domestic energy prices and volatile global energy markets would weaken substantially.
Spain’s transition to renewable energy demonstrates the benefits of clean energy investment: estimates from the Banco de España indicate that wholesale electricity prices in early 2024 were approximately 40% lower than they would have been had wind and solar generation remained at 2019 levels.
Broader implementation of these strategies would mean fewer shocks to households, firms, public finances and financial markets – and ultimately greater macroeconomic and price stability.
Some argue that such a transition is prohibitively expensive. It is true that according to the European Commission, investment will need to reach around €660 billion per year between 2026 and 2030. But focusing only on these costs is profoundly misleading.
Investing in clean, sustainable energy replaces substantial spending on fossil fuels. Today, Europe spends nearly €400 billion each year on fossil fuel imports. By contrast, the marginal cost of producing home‑grown renewable energy is structurally lower. Once the infrastructure is in place, the energy itself is virtually free.
As a result, the adoption of domestically produced, clean and sustainable energy delivers far more than just climate benefits. It strengthens macroeconomic stability, lowers long‑term costs, supports economic growth, delivers health benefits and enhances Europe’s strategic autonomy – as recently highlighted in a speech by President Lagarde.
New analysis from the UK Climate Change Committee shows that for every pound invested in sustainable energy, the benefits outweigh the costs by a factor of 2.2 to 4.1. So it is no surprise that recent reports, including Mario Draghi’s “The future of European competitiveness”, identify decarbonisation as a core pillar of Europe’s long‑term economic strategy.
The choice is clear, if not easy
Fortunately, the tools needed to make this transition are within reach. It requires large upfront investments, deep and well‑functioning capital markets, and a predictable policy environment. Progress on the savings and investments union will be essential to mobilise capital at the necessary scale.
Policy certainty, combined with the right incentives, is essential to ensure that long-term perspectives are prioritised over short-term gains, and public and private objectives reinforce rather than undermine one another. This starts with delivering on existing decarbonisation targets and preserving the Emissions Trading System as a credible, market‑based instrument for carbon pricing.
None of this is easy. But the real question is no longer whether Europe can afford to make the energy transition. It is whether it can afford not to. From a central banking perspective, the answer is clear.
 
 
Compliments of the European Central Bank The post ECB | Europe’s Fossil Fuel Dependence Poses Risks to Price Stability first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | Global Imbalance: Old Questions, New Answers?

Blog | Widening global current account imbalances are best addressed by simultaneous domestic policy adjustments. Industrial policy and tariffs offer a costly fix with unreliable effects on imbalances.
Global current account imbalances are widening again, reversing a decade of steady decline following the global financial crisis. History suggests a clear risk: widening imbalances have often been accompanied by concentrated and lower-quality growth, triggered sectoral dislocations across trading partners, and preceded financial crises or abrupt reversals of capital flows. With the global economy already absorbing multiple shocks, such a disorderly adjustment could be exceptionally costly.
This renewed widening has revived questions about which policy tools can meaningfully impact external positions. In particular, the recent expansion of industrial policies and the proliferation of trade restrictions have diverse economic and non-economic motives, but are often justified by the objective of reducing current account imbalances. Yet there is limited analytical and empirical clarity on how these policies affect external balances.

Saving and investment
For any economy, the current account reflects the difference between what its people, businesses, and government save and invest. This concept anchors the IMF’s long-standing analytical framework for external sector assessments.
Policies affect the current account to the extent that they alter saving or investment. This depends not just how policies affect activity today, but also how they shift expectations. Personal saving rises when people expect income to decline, and it falls when they expect increased income. Companies invest based on their outlook for returns, not just today’s profitability. This insight is central to understanding why many trade and industrial policies often have limited or counterintuitive impacts on the current account.
We can see how standard macroeconomic policies have driven some of the recent increase in global imbalances: bigger budget deficits and robust consumer spending have lowered saving in the United States, while weaker demand and higher saving in China have followed its real estate slowdown.
Of course, positive or negative current account balances are not inherently undesirable, as they can reflect structural factors such as countries saving more as their population ages. It is also important to bear in mind that the relevant metric for assessing imbalances is the overall current account position of a country against the rest of the world, not bilateral or sectoral balances. Nor are imbalances simply about misaligned exchange rates and price competitiveness. A meaningful diagnosis requires a full macroeconomic assessment of influences on saving and investment, including policy drivers and structural forces.
Policy details matter 
Tariffs have been justified as a way to narrow trade deficits. However, our analysis finds that they have only small and unreliable effects on the current account because they are often perceived as permanent or are frequently retaliated against. In such cases, people do not adjust saving in anticipation of future price changes. The result is a nearly unchanged current account.
There is one important exception: temporary tariffs can raise saving by encouraging people to postpone consumption. In theory, this can increase the current account balance, though such episodes are rare, and empirical evidence suggests the effects are modest and short-lived.
Industrial policies are more diverse—and so are their effects. We distinguish two types of industrial policies: micro, which target specific companies or sectors, and macro, which are economy-wide policies that are often combined with financial or capital account restrictions.
Micro industrial policies—such as subsidies for a specific industry or targeted tax incentives—generally have ambiguous and limited effects on the current account. When they succeed in raising aggregate productivity, they tend to boost investment and consumption, often lowering the current account balance. When they fail, for example by misallocating resources and depressing productivity, they can increase the current account balance, but at the cost of lost output. Either way, large and systematic effects on external balances are uncommon.
Macro industrial policies, by contrast, can have larger effects. These strategies, often associated with export-led growth models, combine foreign asset accumulation, capital flow restrictions, financial repression, or other mechanisms that boost national saving. These policies work not by improving efficiency but by forcing saving, often at the expense of economic welfare. The current account balance increases, but mainly because domestic demand is restrained and resources are redirected toward external surpluses.
The conclusion is clear: industrial policies and tariffs are not shortcuts to external rebalancing. When they affect the current account, they often do so by suppressing consumption or investment—hardly a recipe for sustainable growth. Durable rebalancing still depends on sound domestic policies, not trade barriers.
Future imbalances and output
Applying our findings to the current economic picture, scenario analysis shows that global imbalances could widen further if trends persist. This would reflect continued large fiscal deficits and strong domestic demand in the United States, additional government support to exporters in China alongside weaker safety net provision and consumption, and subdued investment and weak productivity growth in Europe. In this setting, an escalation of tariffs does little to change current account positions, largely because these measures are reciprocated or perceived as permanent, but it does lower output across regions.
By contrast, an alternative scenario anchored in domestic rebalancing—fiscal consolidation in deficit countries, more consumption‑led growth in surplus economies, and productivity‑enhancing investment elsewhere—would narrow global imbalances and raise global output.
This synchronized adjustment would lead to the best outcome for the global economy. The economic drag from US fiscal tightening would be offset by stronger demand from China and Europe. But even if such coordination proves difficult, the best course of action for each country is clear: start addressing domestic imbalances now, regardless of what others do. Delaying adjustment poses a threat to domestic and global economic stability. Unilateral adjustment will also add pressure for other economies to adjust. Stronger domestic demand in China, by lifting global demand, would increase global interest rates and make fiscal adjustment more likely in other regions such as the United States. Fiscal consolidation in the United States could further stoke deflationary forces in China and incentivize efforts to boost consumption.
What is clear is that global imbalances will be shaped by domestic macroeconomic trajectories and policies rather than by tariffs or narrowly targeted industrial policies. It’s also evident that reducing global imbalances works best when countries move together. The IMF, though its analysis, policy advice, and convening power, can help its members move toward this better outcome.
 
 
Compliments of the International Monetary FundThe post IMF | Global Imbalance: Old Questions, New Answers? first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

ECB |How Banks Are Adjusting to Declining Reserves

As the Eurosystem normalises its balance sheet, central bank reserves – banks’ most liquid asset – keep declining. This post examines how banks adapt to lower levels of reserves and explains why take-up in the Eurosystem’s standard refinancing operations (SROs) is expected to increase.[1]
 
Central bank reserves have almost halved from a peak of €4.9 trillion in 2022 to €2.6 trillion in early 2026 (Chart 1a). While still abundant, they are unevenly spread across banks. This implies that, as the Eurosystem continues to shrink its balance sheet, some banks may need to source reserves sooner than others. At the same time, money market rates at which banks lend and borrow have moved closer to the deposit facility rate (DFR) – the main policy rate through which the ECB steers its monetary policy stance. In fact, secured money market – repo – rates last traded this close to the DFR in 2020. This blog post examines the implications of these trends.
In an annual Eurosystem survey, bank treasurers were asked about the preferred level of reserves they wish to hold. When compared to actual reserve holdings, we find that banks representing 26% of all euro area banking assets now operate close to what was indicated as their preferred level of reserves, up from 15% a year earlier (Chart 1b).[2] The group includes large banks, such as globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs), as well as custodians and asset managers – institutions that generally manage their liquidity more actively.
Looking ahead, reserves are projected to decline by about €470 billion per year, though this projection is subject to high uncertainty (Chart 1a).[3] While at present most banks are still holding abundant reserves, the share of banks nearing their preferred reserve levels is expected to increase. By the end of 2026, banks accounting for 50% of total banking assets are projected to reach their preferred level (Chart 1b). In other words, banks will have to more actively manage their liquidity.

Chart 1
Reserve positions of euro area banks

a) Projected path of reserves

b) Share of banks close to their preferred reserve level

(EUR billions)

(percentage of banking assets)

Sources: ECB (Eurosystem market operations data and the Eurosystem Bank Treasurer Survey for the fourth quarter of 2025).
Notes: The left panel shows the projected path of euro reserves assuming take-up in standard refinancing operations is in line with the median SMA respondent. The uncertainty area around the projections is based on a range of alternative assumptions. The right panel classifies banks by the relative distance between their reserves in fourth quarter of the relevant year and their preferred reserve level indicated in Bank Treasurer Survey. Banks are classified as close to their preferred level if their reserve holdings are within a distance equivalent to 1% of total assets of the reserve target they indicated in the Eurosystem Bank Treasurer Survey. All other banks are classified as banks with abundant reserves. The projection for the fourth quarter of 2026 assumes that the aggregate decline in reserves will continue at the same pace as that observed for each bank business model group between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the fourth quarter of 2025.

As reserves decline, banks will increasingly rely on money markets and the Eurosystem refinancing operations to manage their reserve levels. Those banks that are closer to their preferred reserve levels or their internal regulatory targets will normally be the first to seek liquidity. We are analysing banks’ behaviour in money markets and central bank operations in order to learn how reserves are distributed through the market. We are also investigating how money market rates are evolving and how banks are adapting to the changes to the operational framework for implementing monetary policy announced in March 2024.
Liquidity is being redistributed smoothly
Commercial banks are actively lending and borrowing in money markets, which is redistributing their central bank reserves smoothly across banks and euro area countries. Currently this redistribution is working well – there are no signs of fragmentation. The repo market – the main money market to borrow and lend reserves – is dominated by banks with abundant reserves.[4] These are mainly dealer banks that intermediate liquidity. However, other banks are also becoming increasingly active in the repo market in order to manage their reserve levels (Chart 2). In fact, those closest to their preferred reserve levels borrow the most in the short-term repo market relative to their reserves.

Chart 2
Outstanding gross and net repo borrowing of banks

Sources: ECB (Securities Financing Transactions Data and the Eurosystem Bank Treasurer Survey) and ECB calculations.
Notes: The chart shows the average gross and net outstanding repo positions in 2025 by bank liquidity group. “Term repo” is defined as transactions by euro area banks against any collateral type with a maturity above one month. The bank liquidity groups are banks with reserves close to target (i.e. close to their preferred level); and banks with abundant reserves. For banks with abundant reserves we distinguish between those that are close to either their internal liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) or net stable funding ratio (NSFR) targets. Banks are considered to have optimised their LCR or NSFR if they are within 11 percentage points of their internal LCR target or 5.3 percentage points of their internal NSFR target. These ranges represent the 25th percentile of LCR standard deviations and the 50th percentile of NSFR standard deviations.

Banks are also active in term money markets – a market where they borrow and lend for longer than 30 calendar days. They use this market to manage their compliance with Basel III regulatory standards: the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Survey evidence indicates that banks set internal targets above the 100% regulatory minimum for these regulatory ratios and are keen to defend them. When facing liquidity shortfalls, term money markets are typically the first point of access. This market activity has further redistributed reserves across euro area banks and countries, but it has also pushed up premia on term liquidity, as banks close to their regulatory targets increasingly borrow in these markets to fine-tune these ratios. In turn, activity and interest rates in the term segment can act as an early indicator of changing system-wide liquidity needs and as a benchmark for how attractive Eurosystem standard refinancing operations are. Figure 1 illustrates these interactions.

Figure 1
Illustration of the interaction of reserves with regulatory ratios, markets and the central bank

Source: ECB.

Short-term interest rates are close to the deposit facility rate
Overall, short-term market interest rates remain near the ECB’s DFR (Chart 3a). The benchmark rate for unsecured bank borrowing is the euro short-term rate (€STR). Its spread versus the DFR has gradually narrowed. Likewise, secured money market (repo) rates have moved closer to the DFR as collateral has become more abundant and reserves have continued to decline.

Chart 3
Short-term interest rates steered by the deposit facility rate

a) Spread between short-term rates and the DFR

b) Spread between repo rates and the DFR by borrower type

Sources: ECB data (Money Market Statistical Reporting and the Securities Financing Transactions Data) and ECB calculations.
Notes: The left panel shows the spread between the €STR and the DFR as well as the spread between the repo rate and the DFR, 5-day moving average excluding month-ends, where the repo rate is the weighted-average repo rate for one-day trades collateralised by euro area government bonds or other EU bonds. The repo rate is trimmed at the 25th and 75th percentiles. The right panel shows the transaction volume-weighted average repo rate for: borrowing banks that are close to their preferred reserve level; borrowing banks that have abundant reserves (see Chart 1b); and borrowing by hedge funds. The latest observation is for 30 March 2026.

The share of overnight repo trades above the DFR has increased to 40%, but this does not reflect funding pressures for banks. In fact, banks – including those with less abundant reserves – are still borrowing at rates just below the DFR on average (Chart 3b). Instead, repo rates above the DFR mainly reflect cash demand from hedge funds which are willing to pay the spread to fund their investment strategies in other market segments.
Lessons learned from other jurisdictions, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom, underscore two points. First, money market rates can also be driven by other factors, such as higher collateral supply or higher non-bank demand for cash. And, second, it is not only banks’ reserve needs which can substantially influence money market rates.[5] So rising rates do not necessarily signal increasing scarcity of reserves, but may instead reflect shifts in market structure or funding conditions. In such cases, movements in certain segments of the money markets need to be interpreted with caution, as they may not provide a reliable signal about the overall liquidity environment.
Declining reserves to eventually lift take-up in ECB operations
The demand for Eurosystem SROs remains low so far, because conditions in money markets continue to be favourable. On average, money market rates are largely below the rate on the main refinancing operation (MRO), currently 2.15%, which is 15 basis points above the DFR, now at 2.0% (Chart 4a). Banks can borrow at lower rates in markets than they would have to pay to borrow from the central bank against a broad set of collateral. As a result, the take-up in the ECB’s SROs has remained limited, averaging around €20 billion last year (Chart 4b). In contrast, longer-term market funding (for instance, with tenors of 12 months) is seeing rates above the MRO rate. This reflects its regulatory value, especially for the NSFR, as SRO funding does not count towards this ratio. However, while overall SRO take-up is low, more banks are participating with test bids or for covering temporary liquidity needs. Simply put, there is little urgency to borrow from the ECB as of now, but banks have to ensure operational readiness.
Our survey results show that banks’ incentive to use Eurosystem operations is likely to increase as reserves become scarcer and SROs become more attractive relative to market funding. This means that moving to lower levels of reserves may, all other things being equal, be accompanied by a rise in money market rates.
In the ECB’s operational framework, the SROs are designed to serve as the marginal tool for meeting banks’ liquidity needs. As reserves become less abundant and more banks will approach their preferred levels of reserves, SROs – provided at fixed rates with full allotment – offer a key source of reserves. Also, when money market rates are moving higher, borrowing through SROs and lending into the money market becomes more attractive. In turn, more take-up in SROs will inject reserves into the system, keeping money market rates in check.

Chart 4
Favourable funding conditions in money markets explain low take-up in Eurosystem operations

a) Relative market pricing of borrowing in money markets versus the expected deposit facility rate

b) Use of Eurosystem SROs

Sources: ECB (Money Market Statistical Reporting, Securities Financing Transactions Data, Short-Term European Paper statistics, Survey of Monetary Analysts) and ECB calculations.
Notes: The left panel shows the average difference between each money market rate and the expected DFR implied by the overnight interest swap (OIS) rate with a matching maturity, as an average from July 2025 until 30 March 2026. Repo against high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) collateral – such as euro area government bonds (EGB) – tends not to provide any LCR or NSFR regulatory value irrespective of the trade maturity. The right panel shows the outstanding amount in SROs and the median consensus from the March 2026 Survey of Monetary Analysts. LTRO stands for 3-months longer-term refinancing operation, MRO for main refinancing operation.

Conclusion
More banks are now operating closer to their preferred reserve levels and the euro area financial system has so far adjusted well to declining reserves. Banks are borrowing and lending in the markets effectively, which is helping redistribute reserves smoothly across banks and countries. There are no signs of fragmentation. Short-term interest rates, both secured and unsecured, remain close to the ECB’s DFR. Until now, money market funding conditions have been favourable compared with the terms for borrowing through the SROs. Therefore, banks have met almost all their liquidity needs through the money markets. However, as reserves continue to decline it will be important for banks to be ready to use Eurosystem operations as routine tools to manage their liquidity and to support market-making.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.

Standard refinancing operations consist of the main refinancing operations (MROs), with a duration of one week, and also the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs), which have a duration of three months. Both operations provide liquidity upon demand against broad collateral, at the MRO rate and the average MRO rate respectively.

The Eurosystem Bank Treasurer Survey was conducted between 14 and 29 October 2025 with two main objectives: to determine the preferred minimum level of reserves banks aim to maintain under the current economic and financial conditions and to assess the demand for Eurosystem refinancing operations. The survey also investigates what drives demand for central bank reserves and how regulatory requirements interact with that demand.

The path of reserves is calculated based on a projection of the other balance sheet items of the Eurosystem. Banknote growth and non-monetary policy holdings are the main contributors to the uncertainty around the central projection.

Repo refers to repurchase transactions, a type of short-term loan where one party sells a financial asset with a simultaneous commitment to repurchase that asset at a future date. The repo market is therefore also called the secured money market, as borrowing of liquidity (reserves) is secured by collateral (typically government bonds) which the cash lender keeps as insurance should the borrower not repay the loan. Before the global financial crisis, reserves were mainly redistributed via unsecured borrowing and bank lending.

For example, in the United States the Federal Reserve announced the launch of Reserve Management Purchases to stabilise the level of reserves, while in the United Kingdom banks are increasingly borrowing from the Bank of England’s operations, even though reserves remain above the preferred minimum range of reserves. In these jurisdictions, repo rates have experienced upward pressure and mild volatility, which is partly related to demand from non-banks, including hedge funds, and partly to bond supply.

 
 
Compliments of the European Central Bank The post ECB |How Banks Are Adjusting to Declining Reserves first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

European Commission | Questions and Answers on the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve

What is the Commission proposing to change in the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve?

The Commission is proposing to stop the automatic invalidation of ETS allowances held in the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) above 400 million. Instead of being cancelled, these allowances will be retained in the reserve.
This strengthens the MSR’s role as a buffer, improving its ability to respond to future market developments, including situations of supply tightness or excessive price volatility, while preserving the system’s rules-based design.

Why is the Commission proposing updates to the Market Stability Reserve now?

The EU Emissions Trading System(EU ETS) is delivering: it is reducing emissions, cutting Europe’s dependence on imported fossil fuels and driving investment in clean, homegrown energy. At the same time, as recently highlighted by President von der Leyen at the March European Council, it needs to be modernised to remain effective, flexible and responsive to changing market conditions.
The proposed update to the MSR reflects this need. Stopping the invalidation of allowances will strengthen the system’s capacity to act as a buffer and ensure stability in the years ahead. The comprehensive review of the EU ETS, planned for July 2026, will contain that assessment and include any relevant adjustment to keep the MSR fit for purpose in the next decade.
This measure is part of a broader effort to keep the EU ETS fit for purpose, maintaining its core design while strengthening its ability to deliver decarbonisation, competitiveness and energy security.

How will this change affect carbon prices and the functioning of the EU carbon market?

The Commission does not speculate on carbon price developments or make projections on the price impacts of legislative proposals. The EU ETS remains a market-based system where prices are determined by supply and demand.
The proposed change does not have an immediate impact on the market balance. Under the proposal, allowances in the MSR would only be released into the market at times of market tightness or excessive price increases.
A comprehensive review of the EU ETS will follow in July 2026.

How will the proposal support Europe’s competitiveness while delivering on its climate targets?

Mainly thanks to the ETS, domestic emissions in the EU dropped by 39%, while the economy grew by 71% between 1990 and 2024. The proposal strengthens the EU ETS, so it continues to drive emissions reductions while providing the stability and predictability that industry needs to invest in the transition.
At the same time, strengthening the Market Stability Reserve improves the system’s ability to respond to market imbalances and reduces the risk of excessive price volatility. A more stable and predictable carbon market provides greater certainty for businesses planning long-term investments in clean technologies.
 
 
Compliments of the European Commission The post European Commission | Questions and Answers on the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.