What’s happening this week in economics? Deloitte’s team of economists examines news and trends from around the world.
What’s happening this week in economics? Deloitte’s team of economists examines news and trends from around the world.
The European Commission has sent a Statement of Objections to Meta, setting out its preliminary view that Meta breached EU antitrust rules by excluding third party Artificial Intelligence (‘AI’) assistants from accessing and interacting with users on WhatsApp. Meta’s conduct risks blocking competitors from entering or expanding in the rapidly growing market for AI assistants.
The Commission therefore intends to impose interim measures to prevent this policy change from causing serious and irreparable harm on the market, subject to Meta’s reply and rights of defence.
Meta’s flagship products are its social networks, such as Facebook and Instagram, and consumer communication applications, such as WhatsApp and Messenger. It also operates online advertising services and virtual and augmented reality products. Meta provides a general-purpose AI assistant, Meta AI.
On 15 October 2025, Meta announced an update of its WhatsApp Business Solution Terms, effectively banning third-party general-purpose AI assistants from the application. As a result, since 15 January 2026, the only AI assistant available on WhatsApp is Meta’s own tool, Meta AI, while competitors have been excluded.
The Commission has informed Meta that this policy change appears at first sight to be in breach of EU competition rules.
The Commission’s investigation
The Commission preliminarily concludes that:
Meta is likely to be dominant in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) market for consumer communication applications, notably through WhatsApp.
Meta is likely to be abusing this dominant position by refusing access to WhatsApp to other businesses, including third-party AI assistants. At this stage, the Commission considers that WhatsApp is an important entry point to enable general-purpose AI assistants reach consumers.
There is an urgent need for protective measures due to the risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition. Meta’s conduct risks raising barriers to entry and expansion, and irreparably marginalising smaller competitors on the market for general-purpose AI assistants.
The sending of a Statement of Objections on interim measures does not prejudge the outcome of the investigation. Meta now has the possibility to reply to the Commission’s concerns.
The Statement of Objections covers the EEA except for Italy, where the Italian Competition Authority imposed interim measures on Meta in December 2025.
Background
On 4 December 2025, the Commission opened formal proceedings in the context of this ongoing investigation.
Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement prohibit the abuse of a dominant position that may affect trade and prevent or restrict competition within the Single Market. The implementation of Article 102 TFEU is defined in Regulation 1/2003.
Pursuant to Article 8(1) Regulation 1/2003, interim measures may be imposed if, at first sight, there is an infringement of competition law rules, as well as an urgent need for protective measures due to the risk of serious and irreparable harm to competition.
A Statement of Objections is a formal step in the Commission’s investigations into the necessity of imposing interim measures. The Commission informs the parties concerned of its preliminary findings in writing. The parties can then examine the documents in the Commission’s investigation file, reply in writing and request an oral hearing to present their views on the case before representatives of the Commission and national competition authorities.
If the Commission concludes, after the parties have exercised their rights of defence, that the conditions for interim measures are met, it can adopt a decision imposing such measures. The adoption of an interim measures’ decision does not prejudge the final findings of the Commission on the substance of the case.
For more information
More information will be made available under the case number AT.41034 in the public case register on the Commission’s competition website.
Compliments of the European Commission
The post European Commission | Commission Notifies Meta of Possible Interim Measures to Reverse Exclusion of Third-Party AI Sssistants from WhatsApp first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the event “The digital euro in Cyprus”
Nicosia, 6 February 2026
It is a pleasure to be in Cyprus today.
I would like to thank Governor Patsalides and the organisers for inviting me.
Cyprus’s Presidency comes at a pivotal moment for Europe. In a global environment defined by rapid change, strategic uncertainty and geopolitical tensions, the Presidency’s priority, “Autonomy through security and competitiveness”, captures Europe’s ambition to strengthen its independence by building a strong, innovative and competitive economy.
This is not a call for protectionism. It is a call to invest in Europe’s collective capacity to innovate and to compete globally.
The ECB, along with the euro area national central banks, stands ready to play its part in turning the concept of autonomy through security and competitiveness into practical actions and solutions.
We will focus on an area that is intrinsically linked to our institutional mandate: issuing central bank money and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems.
There are two types of central bank money: retail money, which is used by people and businesses to purchase goods and services, and wholesale money, which is used by banks to settle claims between each other.
Digital payments are now the norm, and new technologies are disrupting financial services. While this brings exciting opportunities to boost growth, it also comes with challenges. We need to make sure central bank money remains fit for a digital world and thereby safeguard Europe’s monetary sovereignty in a digital world.
On the wholesale side, the lack of a widely available euro-denominated asset to settle transactions using distributed ledger technologies (DLT) creates a void that, if unaddressed, could be filled by non-European solutions. This would create new dependencies and push the euro into a secondary role in global digital finance.[1]
To address this, the Eurosystem has launched a strategy to settle transactions recorded on DLT in central bank money. This will provide a risk-free asset that supports the growth of an integrated and dynamic European digital finance ecosystem. Our strategy consists of two complementary initiatives: Pontes and Appia.[2] We are making swift progress here and aim to launch Pontes, our initial solution for cash settlement, during the third quarter of this year. Appia will develop a vision for Europe’s future digital finance ecosystem.[3]
Similarly, in the area of cross-border payments, the rapid growth of US dollar-denominated stablecoins risks displacing the role of euro commercial bank money. We are making rapid advances on this too, as we unlock faster, cheaper and more transparent cross‑border payments by interlinking Europe’s fast payment system with those of other countries.[4]
But there is one domain where Europe’s sovereignty is already under pressure: retail payments.
The role of cash – our sovereign means of payment – is declining as digitalisation accelerates. And almost two-thirds of card-based transactions in the euro area are carried out by non-European companies. In 13 euro area countries, including Cyprus, in‑store payments depend entirely on international card schemes.
This is the challenge I would like to focus on today as I make the most of having so many different stakeholders in one room, including Members of the European Parliament, national politicians, consumers, merchants and banks.
The ECB is committed to acting in line with its Treaty mandate in this area: to provide sovereign money to Europeans. However, the ECB cannot implement a solution without a robust legal framework to support it. This is why the ongoing work of European co-legislators is essential.
I will first explain why the digital euro is so important, particularly in the current context. I will then describe the many practical benefits it would bring to consumers, merchants and banks across the euro area. Finally, I will outline why we are optimistic that a public-private approach can help build a more resilient European payments system in the future.
The case for digital cash
Let me start with a simple observation: the way we pay has changed more in the past few years than in the previous 50.
Today, when we pay a bill, book a hotel or shop online, we rarely use cash.
For example, the ECB’s study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area shows that here in Cyprus, the share of e-commerce payments increased from around 1% in 2019 to roughly 26% in 2024 – a striking example of how quickly digital payments have become part of everyday life.[5]
Across the euro area, digital payments are increasingly the norm and cash can no longer be used to pay in all situations. Online shopping already accounts for more than one-third of retail transactions, yet cash cannot be used online.
This creates a structural gap in the monetary system: our economy is becoming increasingly digital, but central bank money remains confined to physical cash in retail transactions.
Make no mistake: we will continue to issue banknotes and we are working hard to ensure physical cash remains widely accepted and available.[6] In fact, we are preparing to produce and issue a third series of euro banknotes featuring a new design that Europeans can strongly relate to.
But the ECB must ensure that, in this digital age, public money satisfies the evolving needs of Europeans. Therefore, we are getting ready to complement physical cash with its digital equivalent: a digital euro.
This is not a side project – it forms part of the Eurosystem’s core tasks as defined in the Treaty: providing means of payment with legal tender status and issuing money as a public good.
By preparing for a digital euro, we are simply adapting to evolving technologies and preferences, and preserving Europeans’ freedom to pay with their money – the sovereign money issued by their central bank.
As a digital form of cash, the digital euro would ensure that central bank money remains available and usable in an increasingly digital economy, upholding its role as a trusted anchor of our monetary system.
Benefits for Europe’s autonomy
Given the current environment of growing geopolitical tensions, the digital euro is more than just a “nice to have”. As the use of cash declines, we increasingly rely on complex digital technologies that operate largely in the background.
As European citizens, we want to avoid a situation where Europe is overly dependent on payment systems that are not in our hands.
Payment systems have become part of Europe’s critical infrastructure, alongside energy, transport and telecommunications. The resilience and security of this infrastructure directly affects our economic stability and strategic autonomy. Imagine that digital payments weren’t possible, even just for a day. What effect would this have on society?
Cyprus, like the rest of Europe, is highly dependent on international providers across virtually all use cases, from e-commerce and person-to-person payments to in-store transactions.
Card payments are a case in point. During the first half of 2025 card payments accounted for 74.5% of all cashless transactions in Cyprus – the second highest in the euro area.[7] But there are no European solutions available for card payments in Cyprus.
This level of dependence means that critical parts of Europe’s payment infrastructure are owned and operated outside the euro area. At a time when resilience and strategic autonomy matter more than ever, this creates vulnerabilities that we cannot afford to ignore.
A digital euro, built on European infrastructure, would allow Europe to regain ownership of the rails on which its payment system runs and thereby strengthen our autonomy.
Benefits for consumers
Our motivation is clear, but what concrete benefits would the digital euro bring for consumers?
The digital euro would bring the simplicity and the convenience of being able to pay with a single solution – for example your smart phone. It would also ensure that we always have the freedom to choose to pay with a public means of payment – not only in physical form, but also digitally.
In fact, in a Eurosystem survey, 66% of Europeans said they would be interested in trying a digital euro after the concept was explained to them.[8]
The digital euro would be a payment solution for every occasion. It could be used anytime and anywhere in the euro area – just like cash, but in digital form. It would be universally accepted and free of charge for basic use.
It would work both online and offline. Offline functionality is particularly important, as it ensures resilience in situations where connectivity is limited and allows people to pay digitally with a level of privacy comparable to cash. For offline digital euro transactions, personal transaction details would be known only to the payer and the payee. And for online payments, the ECB and the national central banks would not be able to identify the payer or the payee: we would only see encrypted codes and the transaction amount. The link between these codes and the identities of the payer and the payee would only be known to their banks.[9]
To fulfil its goal of serving as a digital complement to cash, the digital euro would be accessible to everyone, including people who are financially and digitally vulnerable and people with disabilities. We have just signed a collaboration agreement with the ONCE Foundation for Cooperation and Social Inclusion of People with Disabilities[10] to promote and ensure universal access to the digital euro.
In short, the digital euro would combine the convenience of digital payments with the trust, safety and privacy that people associate with cash.
Benefits for merchants
The digital euro would also bring tangible benefits for merchants.
Today, many European merchants depend heavily on international card schemes, which often come with high and non-transparent fees. This is particularly the case for merchants in Cyprus, where it is compulsory for retailers to accept card payments.[11]
The digital euro would offer a European alternative that is accepted across the euro area, thereby putting merchants in a stronger position to negotiate fees.
Today small merchants – including in Cyprus, where very small businesses are a central part of the economy – pay up to four times more for card payments than larger merchants.[12] With the digital euro, these small merchants can expect to pay approximately half of what they are paying today for digital payments. And this would also give them more power to negotiate lower fees than what they pay today.
Larger merchants would need to negotiate a lower charge individually. Given that the digital euro does not charge scheme fees a balanced allocation of these cost savings is important to ensure all stakeholders in the digital euro ecosystem benefit.
From the outset, the ECB has worked closely with merchants and their representatives. This engagement includes high-level meetings with President Christine Lagarde as well as technical workshops at staff level. The design of the digital euro reflects what merchants consider essential: seamless integration with existing checkout systems, ease of use, reliability and resilience.[13]
The digital euro would allow merchants to receive payments instantly. And thanks to its offline functionality, payments could still be accepted even when internet connectivity is temporarily unavailable.
Benefits for payment service providers
Let me now turn to the payment service providers, in particular banks, which play a central role in the digital euro project.
We have designed the digital euro in a way that ensures banks will not be disintermediated.
Right from the start, we envisaged that the digital euro would be distributed through banks and other supervised intermediaries. Just as they are for cash, banks will remain the primary interface for users.
Also, digital euro holdings will not be remunerated and will be subject to holding limits to avoid the risk of excessive deposit outflows, especially in times of stress. Our recent technical assessments confirm that using the digital euro for day-to-day payments would not undermine financial stability.[14] And because it will be possible to link the digital euro wallet to a commercial bank account, people will be able to pay and be paid seamlessly in digital euro, even for larger amounts.
While preserving financial stability, the digital euro would also make it more advantageous for banks to offer payment solutions to their clients. Today, with international card schemes, banks lose fees. With big tech mobile payment solutions, they lose both fees and data. And in the future, with stablecoins – which do not have holding limits – they would lose fees, data and stable retail deposits.
But the compensation model envisaged for the digital euro ensures that banks will benefit when payments move from these solutions to the digital euro. As I already mentioned, this is because the Eurosystem will not charge scheme or settlement fees, creating savings that can be distributed among banks and merchants.
European rails for digital payments
In sum, the digital euro will deliver tangible benefits to European citizens, merchants and payment service providers alike – it is a win-win for Europe.
We strongly believe in public-private partnership when it comes to enhancing the resilience of our payment systems and strengthening our autonomy. And both sides of this partnership are moving forward.
On the public side, the digital euro project is advancing well, both technically and legislatively.
On the technical front, we are continuing the preparations and building the necessary technical capacity ahead of a possible decision to issue. As part of this work, we will shortly publish a call for interest inviting payment service providers to take part in our pilot exercise.[15]
On the legislative front, we welcome the Council of the European Union’s agreement on its negotiating position on the proposed digital euro Regulation.[16] This agreement by Member States, including Cyprus, is a decisive step towards a digital euro.
The Council’s position preserves the key pillars of the European Commission’s proposal, including legal tender status, mandatory distribution and acceptance as well as online and offline functionalities. It also introduces targeted adjustments that address some of the concerns raised by European banks.[17]
In parallel, the European Parliament is actively discussing the proposal and is expected to reach its position in May.
On the private sector side, we welcome the recent announcement on the collaboration between regional and domestic schemes to facilitate cross-border payments and the intention to move towards greater European market integration. This shows that European actors are stepping up.
At the same time, most European payment solutions today have a small footprint in physical shops. Their coverage in online shopping is also limited. Therefore, building a common acceptance network will take time and money, also because most industry standards are currently in the hands of foreign companies. It is therefore unclear whether these solutions, on their own, can scale up enough to address Europe’s payment challenges in the long run.
That is why we have always been committed to working with the private sector – to ensure that it can make the best use of the opportunities created by the digital euro.
The digital euro, thanks to its legal tender status, would create a European standard – a common set of rails on which private payment solutions can operate and innovate.[18]
I often compare this to a public rail network. The infrastructure is public, but private companies can use these tracks to reach any destination in Europe and compete on services, quality and innovation.
Thanks to this shared infrastructure, private European payment initiatives would be able to achieve pan-European reach more easily and scale up faster.
Private providers would also be able to integrate the digital euro seamlessly into their existing payment solutions, for example in digital wallets or by co-badging it on physical cards.[19]
At the same time, we aim to minimise additional investment costs for payment service providers by reusing existing infrastructures as much as possible.
Adopting the digital euro Regulation has become increasingly urgent if we are to make use of the synergies between public and private solutions and reduce our dependence on foreign companies.
Importantly, some of the benefits of the digital euro will start to materialise even before its launch. Once the legislation is adopted, the digital euro standards can be finalised and made available to the market. As merchants renew their payment terminals, they can ensure that the new devices are “digital euro-ready”. This will, in turn, allow European payment service providers to begin expanding their reach and the range of use cases they can support.
Delays in the legislative process would risk breaking the momentum of these twin public and private efforts. They would further entrench our dependence on international card schemes and increase our exposure to non-European big tech payment solutions and stablecoins.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
In October last year European leaders stressed the importance of “swiftly completing legislative work and accelerating other preparatory steps” for the digital euro.[20] Their message was clear: the time to act is now.
In this fast-changing world, let’s show Europeans that we respond to challenges head-on – by protecting our currency and guaranteeing people’s freedom to pay as they choose.
Consumers, merchants and payment service providers all stand to benefit.
Compliments of the European Central Bank The post ECB | The Digital Euro: Strengthening Europe’s Payments Ecosystem first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
The coalition parties that will form the next Dutch government published the coalition agreement, including their strategic priorities, on 30 January 2026. Notably, the ACM will be granted new merger‑control enforcement tools and the so-called new competition tool, FDI screening will be tightened, and additional instruments will be granted to temporarily halt mergers in the healthcare sector.
Submarine data cables, carrying 99% of intercontinental internet traffic, are essential for modern life and the European economy. As the EU faces increasing risks to this critical infrastructure, the European Commission is intensifying efforts to enhance its security and resilience. Today, it introduced a new Cable Security Toolbox of risk mitigating measures and a list of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs). It also amended the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) – Digital Work Programme to allocate €347 million to strategic submarine cable projects, including a €20 million call to enhance Europe’s repair capacities, which opens today.
Today’s announcements are part of the EU Action Plan on Cable Security, aimed at increasing the security and resilience of Europe’s submarine cables, including countering the rise of intentional damage and sabotage.
Cable Security Toolbox and projects of European interest
The toolbox outlines six strategic and four technical and support measures to improve the security of submarine cable infrastructure. It builds on the October 2025 risk assessment, which identified risk scenarios, threats, vulnerabilities and dependencies.
The list of 13 CPEI areas for public funding specifies three five-year stages, up to 2040, to fund projects aimed at strengthening the resilience of submarine cables. CPEI areas will be prioritised in upcoming CEF Digital calls for proposals and will inform planning for possible funding under the next Multi-annual Financial Framework.
These resources—risk assessment, toolbox and CPEIs—were developed by the Commission and Member State representatives within a dedicated Cables Expert Group.
Funding opportunities under Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital
The Commission amended the CEF Digital Work Programme, allocating €347 million to fund strategic submarine cable projects. These calls will support the CPEIs, enhance the EU’s cable repair capacity and equip submarine cables with smart capabilities.
In 2026, two funding calls worth €60 million will support cable repair modules, alongside a separate €20 million call for SMART cable system equipment. These are sensors and monitoring components integrated into submarine telecommunications infrastructure to gather real-time ocean and seismic data. Additionally, there will be two calls for CPEI funding in 2026 and 2027, totalling €267 million.
Supporting submarine cable repairs
Opening today is a €20 million call under CEF Digital to finance adaptable modules for submarine cable repairs. These modules will be stationed at ports or shipyards to swiftly restore submarine cable services.
This marks the first phase of a broader initiative planned for all major sea basins of the European Union, including the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. This pilot will focus on the Baltic Sea due to the rise in submarine cable disruptions in recent years, suggesting these critical infrastructures might be subject to hostile acts.
Calls for proposals will be open only to public entities with an ‘emergency response’ mandate, such as those active in civil protection, national emergency response agencies, coastguards and military navies.
Background
In February 2024, the Commission adopted a Recommendation (EU) 2024/779 on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures. It established the Submarine Cable Infrastructure Expert Group, involving Member State authorities and the European Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA).
A year later, Joint Communication on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security outlined measures to protect submarine cables at all stages of resilience. By October 2025, the Cable Expert Group published the EU risk assessment on submarine cable infrastructures, informing today’s EU Cable Security Toolbox of mitigating measures and the CPEIs list.
Under the current CEF Digital multiannual Work Programme (2024-2027), a total €533 million is allocated for submarine cable projects, with €186 million already awarded to 25 projects. From 2021 to 2024, it provided €420 million to 51 backbone cable connectivity projects.
Compliments of the European Commission The post European Commission | Commission Increases Submarine Cable Security with €347 Million Investment and New Toolbox first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
Frankfurt am Main, 5 February 2026
Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference.
We would like to begin by congratulating Bulgaria on joining the euro area on 1 January 2026. We also warmly welcome Dimitar Radev, the Governor of Българска народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank), to the Governing Council. Membership of the euro area has almost doubled since 1999 and is testimony to the attractiveness of the single currency and the enduring benefits of European integration.
We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting.
The Governing Council today decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. Our updated assessment reconfirms that inflation should stabilise at our two per cent target in the medium term. The economy remains resilient in a challenging global environment. Low unemployment, solid private sector balance sheets, the gradual rollout of public spending on defence and infrastructure and the supportive effects of our past interest rate cuts are underpinning growth. At the same time, the outlook is still uncertain, owing particularly to ongoing global trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical tensions.
We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at our two per cent target in the medium term. We will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website.
I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions.
Economic activity
The economy grew by 0.3 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2025, according to Eurostat’s preliminary flash estimate. Growth has mainly been driven by services, notably in the information and communication sector. Manufacturing has been resilient despite the headwinds from global trade and geopolitical uncertainty. Momentum in construction is picking up, also supported by public investment.
The labour market continues to support incomes, even though demand for labour has cooled further. Unemployment stood at 6.2 per cent in December, after 6.3 per cent in November. Growing labour incomes together with a lower household saving rate should bolster private consumption. Government spending on defence and infrastructure should also contribute to domestic demand. Business investment should strengthen further, and surveys indicate that firms are increasingly investing in new digital technologies. At the same time, the external environment remains challenging, owing to higher tariffs and a stronger euro over the past year.
The Governing Council stresses the urgent need to strengthen the euro area and its economy in the present geopolitical context. Governments should prioritise sustainable public finances, strategic investment and growth-enhancing structural reforms. Unlocking the full potential of the Single Market remains crucial. It is also vital to foster greater capital market integration by completing the savings and investments union and the banking union to an ambitious timetable, and to rapidly adopt the Regulation on the establishment of the digital euro.
Inflation
Inflation declined to 1.7 per cent in January, from 2.0 per cent in December and 2.1 per cent in November. Energy inflation dropped to -4.1 per cent, after -1.9 per cent in December and -0.5 per cent in November, while food price inflation increased to 2.7 per cent, from 2.5 per cent in December and 2.4 per cent in November. Inflation excluding energy and food eased to 2.2 per cent, after 2.3 per cent in December and 2.4 per cent in November. Goods inflation edged up to 0.4 per cent, whereas services inflation declined to 3.2 per cent, from 3.4 per cent in December and 3.5 per cent in November.
Indicators of underlying inflation have changed little over recent months and remain consistent with our two per cent medium-term target. Negotiated wage growth and forward-looking indicators, such as the ECB’s wage tracker and surveys on wage expectations, point to a continued moderation in labour costs. However, the contribution to overall wage growth from payments over and above the negotiated wage component remains uncertain.
Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around 2 per cent, supporting the stabilisation of inflation around our target.
Risk assessment
The euro area continues to face a volatile global policy environment. A renewed increase in uncertainty could weigh on demand. A deterioration in global financial market sentiment could also dampen demand. Further frictions in international trade could disrupt supply chains, reduce exports and weaken consumption and investment. Geopolitical tensions, in particular Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine, remain a major source of uncertainty. By contrast, planned defence and infrastructure spending, together with the adoption of productivity-enhancing reforms and the adoption of new technologies by euro area firms, may drive up growth by more than expected, including through positive effects on business and consumer confidence. New trade agreements and a deeper integration of our European Single Market could also boost growth beyond current expectations.
The outlook for inflation continues to be more uncertain than usual on account of the volatile global policy environment. Inflation could turn out to be lower if tariffs reduce demand for euro area exports by more than expected and if countries with overcapacity increase further their exports to the euro area. Moreover, a stronger euro could bring inflation down beyond current expectations. More volatile and risk-averse financial markets could weigh on demand and thereby also lower inflation. By contrast, inflation could turn out to be higher if there were a persistent upward shift in energy prices, or if more fragmented global supply chains pushed up import prices, curtailed the supply of critical raw materials and added to capacity constraints in the euro area economy. If wage growth moderated more slowly, services inflation might come down later than expected. The planned boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also cause inflation to pick up over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate and nature crises more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.
Financial and monetary conditions
Market rates have come down since our last meeting, while global trade and geopolitical tensions temporarily increased financial market volatility. Bank lending rates for firms ticked up to 3.6 per cent in December, from 3.5 per cent in November, as did the cost of issuing market-based debt. The average interest rate on new mortgages again held steady, at 3.3 per cent in December.
Bank lending to firms grew by 3.0 per cent on a yearly basis in December, after 3.1 per cent in November and 2.9 per cent in October. The issuance of corporate bonds rose by 3.4 per cent in December. According to our latest bank lending survey for the euro area, firms’ demand for credit was up slightly in the fourth quarter, especially to finance inventories and working capital. At the same time, credit standards for business loans tightened again.
Mortgage lending grew by 3.0 per cent, after 2.9 per cent in November and 2.8 per cent in October, in response to still rising demand for loans and an easing of credit standards.
Conclusion
The Governing Council today decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at our two per cent target in the medium term. We will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. Our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
In any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.
We are now ready to take your questions.
Compliments of the European Central Bank The post ECB | Monetary Policy Statement- Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB Press Conference first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
Today, the European Union, the United States and Japan met during the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting held in Washington, DC in which several EU member states also took part.
The European Union, the United States and Japan are now taking significant steps towards increasing their economic security and national security by jointly enhancing resilience in critical minerals supply chains. They have announced their intention to expedite cooperative efforts for a mutually beneficial Partnership, with two components.
This includes a commitment within the next 30 days to conclude a Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and the United States aimed at boosting critical minerals supply chain security. The forthcoming Memorandum of Understanding will identify areas of cooperation to stimulate demand and diversify supply for both participants by identifying and supporting projects in mining, refining, processing, and recycling. It will also include discussion of measures to prevent supply chain disruptions, promote research and innovation efforts, and facilitate the exchange of information on stockpiling. In addition, on 27 October 2025, the leaders of the United States and Japan signed a Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing, covering the abovementioned areas.
Building upon existing international cooperation and initiatives, the European Union, the United States and Japan intend to develop Action Plans and explore a plurilateral trade initiative with like-minded partners on trade in critical minerals. Such a plurilateral trade initiative could include exploring the development of coordinated trade policies and mechanisms, such as border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, price gap subsidies, or offtake-agreements.
The Department of State will lead US engagement on the Memorandum of Understanding. The Office of the US Trade Representative will lead US engagement on the Action Plan.
The European Union, the United States and Japan intend to further engage on these aspects, as well as explore additional possibilities for critical minerals resilience and other measures, in relevant international fora, including the G7, and the Minerals Security Partnership or any successor forum.
Compliments of the European Commission The post European Commission | Joint Press Statement Among the European Commission, the United States Government, and the Japanese Government Following February 4 Critical Minerals Ministerial Meeting first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
Good morning to all.
Thank you, dear Ursula, for this special treat: to join your amazing team for a little while.
I’m here to talk about re-energizing Europe, why it matters, and how it can be done.
I loved being part of the Commission, and I love coming back home. Europe is a wonderful place—affluent, creative, fair. Home to the ancient cities of Athens and Rome but also to the makers of cutting-edge microchip machines and one in every two airliners worldwide.
Above all, it is home to the best invention of the 20th century: the EU’s convergence engine, lifting communities, countries, and living standards all across the membership.
But Europe’s convergence engine is stalling. It is held back by an incomplete single market and complacency about what it takes to compete in today’s and tomorrow’s world.
And this is happening while Europe faces huge external threats:
To the East, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine casts a dark shadow over Europe’s most precious achievement—peace for its people.
And to the West, the transatlantic alliance is dented, with potentially high costs. We estimate that just a trade breakdown, if it were to happen, could cost the EU some 0.3 percent of GDP this year and next, on top of half a percentage point already lost.
You have a hugely important job: to lead Europe to overcome the barriers that hold it back.
Here are the hard facts:
Fact one: Europe’s economy is shrinking in relative terms, and size matters. When I was called to Brussels in 2010, EU GDP was the same as the US’s and a lot bigger than China’s. But now—what the heck?—look at how this has changed: here we see GDP and, here, we see GDP per capita (Slide 1). Europe is still rich, but its relative wealth is eroding, and it’s going to become harder and harder to sustain its cherished social model.
Fact two: Europe used to lead in productivity, but now it trails behind, and productivity matters—indeed it is the core underlying challenge. On the left, productivity of the US and EU tech sectors; on the right, the same for non-tech (Slide 2). The gap keeps growing.
Fact three: Europe’s firms used to dominate, but now they are less competitive and less able to grow, and corporate scale matters. Here is market capitalization for firms born in the last 50 years—look at how the US dwarfs the EU, especially in high-tech (Slide 3).
Europe has plenty of startups, but they struggle to grow—and this drives many European innovators to foreign shores.
For its people and its standing in the world, Europe needs to grow more. And to do that, dynamically and durably, it needs to set itself one core objective: much faster productivity growth.
OK—but how?
By pursuing with higher determination two major efforts:
One, structural reforms at the national level, focused on increasing flexibility in local product and labor markets; and
Two, completion of the single market, focused on the EU’s four freedoms—the freedom of movement of goods, of services, of labor, of capital.
You and your teams have been pushing on both fronts—please push even harder.
We know over-regulation and clumsy regulation impose large costs on Europe:
In intra-EU cross-border trade, regulatory barriers are two-to-three times higher than for interstate trade in the US.
For cross-border labor movement, regulatory barriers and other factors make moving about eight times more costly than between the 50 US states.
In energy, limited grid linkages and resource endowments coupled with geopolitical factors leave Europe with an average energy price double that in the US, with high volatility and variation.
In finance, a banking system split into 27 national pieces, paired with small and fragmented capital markets, leaves Europe’s 60‑trillion‑euro financial system handling what I call “lazy money”—too afraid to prudently take sufficient risks to support growth.
You can drive solutions to these challenges.
Working with member states, you should lead a deep “regulatory housecleaning” to sweep away the legacy rules that do more harm than good—harm that includes disproportionately burdening small firms, as we can see here (Slide 4).
And as you do this, you must push back hard against uneven enforcement and “gold plating” as member states add requirements going far beyond the minimum mandated by EU Directives.
With the single market running on 27 national legal regimes for firms, we at the IMF strongly support your determination to bring to life a 28th regime—to allow firms to opt into a single, pan-EU legal framework covering company law and insolvency, broadening over time.
We urge swift action, and we urge it be done by EU Regulation, not Directive—Europe does not need a 28th regime with 27 versions!
For labor market mobility, in turn, many steps are needed. Key among them: mutual recognition of qualifications, social security portability, and flexible housing markets. Europe cannot thrive without a mobile workforce.
Moving to energy, we see a strategic vulnerability that touches every factory, data center, and household across the EU—a vulnerability that cuts directly to competitiveness and resilience. Integration requires eliminating national subsidies, building interconnectors, aligning grid access and tariffs, and fast-tracking permitting for renewables and storage.
All of this needs to be integrated into one European blueprint for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution.
Meeting Europe’s strategic needs—from energy security to defense—requires joint action. And that action, in our view, should be supported by joint funding. We at the IMF see a case for more EU debt issuance in key areas, to efficiently drive forward European public goods delivery.
Despite high public debt ratios in several member states—where we urge fiscal consolidation—the EU’s aggregate public debt load remains below that of China and the US (Slide 5). So there is some room; use it wisely, strategically. But use it.
At the same time, Europe must drive forward its savings and investment union to channel risk capital—not just from Europe’s vast pool of savings but from global markets—to its most innovative firms, delivering cross-border private risk sharing, higher returns, and faster growth.
I ask you, please look at the number of exchanges, trading platforms, and clearinghouses in the EU relative to the US (Slide 6). Ridiculous! We urge that the political emphasis shift from national to European financial markets.
We know that pan-European finance is tied up in a knot of national redlines. Countries fear imported financial and fiscal risks, defend local banking cooperatives, protect their positions in investment fund registration, and so much more.
But Europe needs one unified financial system, not 27 silos. Your recent package for the savings and investment union sets the right direction of travel. Yet getting to the destination will require much more ambition, collectively, and a will to confront vested interests and inertia.
And, speaking as a former Vice President for the EU Budget, let me add that performance-based budgeting under the Multiannual Financial Framework can play a strongly supportive role in helping align national and shared European interests.
Finally, keep trading, keep being a voice for rules-based trade! I salute your efforts to put Europe’s negotiating power to good use crafting trade deals with key partners. I celebrate your recent deals with Mercosur and India. More please!
And should anyone doubt the benefits of the common trade policy, one more animation. Here we see countries’ market size and openness. Note the US and China both sit in the bottom-right corner (Slide 7).
Now please watch carefully. See how 27 EU member states—the little blue dots—move down and to the right to merge as one large, powerful dot: this is the EU, sitting with the other “big boys.” In this simple graphic we can see how the EU’s common trade policy delivers strength.
The case for joint action—urgent, determined action—is unambiguous.
A good moment for a spot of happy news: IMF research shows that, if national and single-market reforms were to reduce intra-EU frictions to levels comparable with those in the US, EU productivity could rise by 20 percent, materially narrowing the gap to the US.
And looking beyond the models, we see ample real-world evidence that reforms pay off: Just look at Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Let me end with three practical suggestions:
First, make the single market your single-minded obsession. Appoint a single market “czar” with full authority and political credibility to drive forward implementation in both the European Council and the Commission. You all have separate areas of duty, yet they all need to come together to form a united whole. The EU’s unified approach to Brexit shows it can be done.
Second, set a hard deadline and plan backward from it with discipline and resolve. Whether it is January 2028 or some other feasible but demanding date, Europe needs a deadline that signals this single-minded focus on the single market and ironclad will to get the job done.
Third, transform Europe’s image as a “regulatory superpower” that suffocates business into one that adapts swiftly to a rapidly changing world and sweeps away obsolete rules and red tape. Use AI to help you with your regulatory deep-cleaning—why not? Transform the EU into a new global leader in streamlining and modernization.
To close, I want to leave you with a question, rhetorical yet serious: what will Europe’s next global success on the scale of Airbus be? A cutting-edge venture in AI perhaps? In defense? In energy? Unleash the single market and I am confident we will get our answer! Thank you!
Compliments of the International Monetary Fund The post IMF | Re-energizing Europe Speech by Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director At the European Commission first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.
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