01 Apr
EACC

European Commission | Questions and Answers on the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve

What is the Commission proposing to change in the EU ETS Market Stability Reserve?

The Commission is proposing to stop the automatic invalidation of ETS allowances held in the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) above 400 million. Instead of being cancelled, these allowances will be retained in the reserve.
This strengthens the MSR’s role as a buffer, improving its ability to respond to future market developments, including situations of supply tightness or excessive price volatility, while preserving the system’s rules-based design.

Why is the Commission proposing updates to the Market Stability Reserve now?

The EU Emissions Trading System(EU ETS) is delivering: it is reducing emissions, cutting Europe’s dependence on imported fossil fuels and driving investment in clean, homegrown energy. At the same time, as recently highlighted by President von der Leyen at the March European Council, it needs to be modernised to remain effective, flexible and responsive to changing market conditions.
The proposed update to the MSR reflects this need. Stopping the invalidation of allowances will strengthen the system’s capacity to act as a buffer and ensure stability in the years ahead. The comprehensive review of the EU ETS, planned for July 2026, will contain that assessment and include any relevant adjustment to keep the MSR fit for purpose in the next decade.
This measure is part of a broader effort to keep the EU ETS fit for purpose, maintaining its core design while strengthening its ability to deliver decarbonisation, competitiveness and energy security.

How will this change affect carbon prices and the functioning of the EU carbon market?

The Commission does not speculate on carbon price developments or make projections on the price impacts of legislative proposals. The EU ETS remains a market-based system where prices are determined by supply and demand.
The proposed change does not have an immediate impact on the market balance. Under the proposal, allowances in the MSR would only be released into the market at times of market tightness or excessive price increases.
A comprehensive review of the EU ETS will follow in July 2026.

How will the proposal support Europe’s competitiveness while delivering on its climate targets?

Mainly thanks to the ETS, domestic emissions in the EU dropped by 39%, while the economy grew by 71% between 1990 and 2024. The proposal strengthens the EU ETS, so it continues to drive emissions reductions while providing the stability and predictability that industry needs to invest in the transition.
At the same time, strengthening the Market Stability Reserve improves the system’s ability to respond to market imbalances and reduces the risk of excessive price volatility. A more stable and predictable carbon market provides greater certainty for businesses planning long-term investments in clean technologies.
 
 
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31 Mar
EACC

OECD | Global Economic Outlook Remains Robust but has Weakened Amid Energy Shock and Geopolitical Risks

The resilience of the global economy is being tested by the evolving conflict in the Middle East, which has generated new inflationary pressures while creating significant uncertainty, according to the OECD’s latest Interim Economic Outlook.
Global growth was steady heading into 2026, supported by the strength of technology-related production, lower effective tariffs on US imports and the momentum carried over from 2025. The energy supply shock following the onset of the conflict in the Middle East is expected to significantly weigh on global growth while putting new upward pressure on inflation.
As a result of these developments, the Outlook projects global growth of 2.9% in 2026 and 3.0% in 2027. The evolution of the conflict in the Middle East is highly uncertain and poses considerable risks to these baseline projections. A more long-lasting disruption, with energy prices remaining elevated beyond mid-2026, would further reduce growth prospects.
GDP growth in the United States is projected at 2.0% in 2026, before moderating to 1.7% in 2027. In the euro area, growth is projected to be 0.8% in 2026 and 1.2% in 2027. China’s growth is projected to slow to 4.4% in 2026 and 4.3% in 2027.
Inflation pressures will persist for a longer period, with inflation now expected to be higher in 2026 than previously projected, reflecting the surge in global energy prices. Headline inflation in G20 countries is projected to be 4.0% in 2026, easing to 2.7% in 2027. Click here to see the projections

“The energy supply shock from the evolving conflict in the Middle East is testing the resilience of the global economy. We project global growth will remain robust, but it will be slower than the pre-conflict trajectory, with significantly higher inflation,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “Any policy measures adopted to cushion the impact of the energy price shock should be targeted towards those most in need, temporary, and ensure incentives to save energy are preserved. Increasing renewable energy generation and energy efficiency can enhance economic security while boosting resilience to future price shocks.”
The Outlook highlights a range of risks. The expected decline in future energy prices is based on assumptions that current disruptions to supply will ease over time, and be limited in 2027. Longer-lasting closure of oil and gas production facilities in the region or persistent disruptions to exports through the Strait of Hormuz would likely have more significant adverse consequences on energy prices, inflation expectations and future growth.
The Outlook points out that higher energy and fertiliser prices could spur increases in food prices, particularly affecting vulnerable households. Higher energy prices could also increase the cost for European countries carrying out necessary annual replenishing of natural gas stocks. Financial markets may experience additional volatility while rising long-term sovereign yields increase fiscal risks.
Given these challenges, the Outlook highlights key priorities for policymakers. Central banks should remain vigilant and ensure expectations are well-anchored. Stronger efforts are needed to safeguard the sustainability of public finances. Any measures to cushion the economic impact of the energy shock will need to be targeted, temporary and take into account limited fiscal space facing most governments. Lowering trade barriers would boost output and reduce inflationary risks. Over the medium term, improving energy efficiency and reducing dependency on fossil fuel imports can lower exposure to future supply shocks.
For the full report and more information, consult the Interim Economic Outlook online. Media queries should be directed to the OECD Media Office (+33 1 45 24 97 00).
Watch the live webcast of the press conference

Working with over 100 countries, the OECD is a global policy forum that promotes policies to preserve individual liberty and improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world.

 
 
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30 Mar
EACC & Member News

Ebury: Flight to safety accelerates as Iran war escalates

The prospect of a prolonged conflict of uncertain outcome sent stocks, bonds and almost all currencies except the dollar down. The sell off accelerated into the Friday close and continued in early Asian trading on Monday. Energy prices are spiking and dragging other commodities upward; these are the only major asset classes benefiting from the situation. Macroeconomic data around the world is starting to reflect the war’s consequences – higher inflation and lower growth.

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30 Mar
EACC

IMF | How the War in the Middle East is Affecting Energy, Trade, and Finance

Energy prices, supply chains, and financial markets are the main transmission channels, but the regional effects will vary significantly.
The world faces yet another shock. The war in the Middle East is upending lives and livelihoods in the region and beyond. It is also dimming the outlook for many economies that had only just shown signs of a sustained recovery from previous crises.
The shock is global, yet asymmetric. Energy importers are more exposed than exporters, poorer countries more than richer ones, and those with meager buffers more than those with ample reserves.
Beyond its painful human toll, the war has caused serious disruption to the economies of the most directly affected countries, including damage to their infrastructure and industries that could become long-lasting. Although these countries are resilient, their short-term growth prospects will be negatively affected.
Meanwhile, large energy importers in Asia and Europe are bearing the brunt of higher fuel and input costs: about 25 to 30 percent of global oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz, feeding demand not only in Asia but also in parts of Europe. Economies heavily dependent on oil imports in Africa and Asia are finding it increasingly hard to access the supplies they need, even at inflated prices.
Parts of the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America face the added strain of higher food and fertilizer prices and tighter financial conditions. Low-income countries are especially at risk of food insecurity; some may need more external support—even as such assistance has been declining.

Although the war could shape the global economy in different ways, all roads lead to higher prices and slower growth. A short conflict might send oil and gas prices soaring before markets adjust, while a long one could keep energy expensive and strain countries that rely on imports. Or the world may settle somewhere in between—tensions linger, energy stays costly, and inflation proves hard to tame—with ongoing uncertainty and geopolitical risk. Much depends on how long the conflict lasts, how far it spreads, and how much damage it inflicts on infrastructure and supply chains.
We are closely monitoring these developments and will provide a fuller assessment in our World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report, to be published on April 14, followed by our Fiscal Monitor on April 15.
Energy prices
Energy is the main transmission channel. The de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to regional infrastructure have produced the largest disruption to the global oil market in its history, according to the International Energy Agency. For fuel‑importing economies, the effect is that of a large, sudden tax on income.

The multi-regional impact is apparent. Energy‑importing economies in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America are feeling the strain from higher import bills on top of already limited fiscal space and external buffers.
In Asia’s large manufacturing economies, higher fuel and power bills are raising production costs and squeezing people’s purchasing power; in some, balance‑of‑payments pressures are already weighing on currencies. In Europe, the shock is reviving the specter of the 2021–22 gas crisis, with countries such as Italy and the United Kingdom especially exposed by their reliance on gas‑fired power, while France and Spain are relatively protected by their greater nuclear and renewables capacity.
By contrast, oil‑exporting countries in the Middle East, parts of Africa, and Latin America that can still get their barrels to market have a prospect of stronger fiscal and external positions from higher prices. Producers whose exports are constrained or curtailed—including several Gulf Cooperation Council members—can expect much less upside. Even after transit resumes, higher risk premia and uncertainty may curb investment and growth.
Supply chains
The war is also reshaping supply chains for non-energy and critical inputs. Rerouting tankers and container ships raises freight and insurance costs and lengthens delivery times. Air‑traffic disruptions around key Gulf hubs impact global tourism while adding another layer of complexity to trade.
In addition to higher commodity prices, countries, companies, and consumers already face the effects of these supply‑chain complications. With shipments of fertilizer—of which about one-third passes through the Strait of Hormuz—disrupted, concerns about food prices are mounting. The interruption of crop-nutrient supplies from the Gulf comes just as planting season begins in the Northern Hemisphere, threatening yields and harvests through the year and pushing food prices higher.
The most vulnerable will bear the heaviest burden. People in low‑income countries are most at risk when prices rise because food accounts for about 36 percent of consumption on average, compared with 20 percent in emerging market economies and 9 percent in advanced economies. That makes any spike in fertilizer and food prices not just an economic problem but a socio-political one, especially where fiscal resources to cushion the blow are limited.
There could also be shortages or price surges of other materials used in manufacturing. The Gulf supplies a large share of the world’s helium, used in a vast array of products from semiconductors to medical imaging devices. Indonesia, which provides roughly half of global nickel—a key component in electric‑vehicle batteries—could face a shortage of sulfur needed to process the metal. Eastern African economies that depend on trade links with and remittances from Gulf countries face weaker demand for their services exports, logistical bottlenecks and reduced remittances.
Inflation and inflation expectations
If elevated energy and food prices persist, they will fuel inflation worldwide. Historically, sustained oil‑price spikes have tended to push inflation higher and growth lower. Over time, higher transport and input costs work their way into the prices of manufactured goods and services. For many countries that had only just brought inflation closer to target, and even more so those with stickier inflation, this risks a renewed period of uncomfortable price pressures.
Here, too, the pattern is uneven. In much of Asia and parts of Latin America, where inflation had been relatively low, higher energy and food costs will test the resilience of expectations, particularly in economies with weaker currencies and large energy imports. In Europe, another energy‑driven spike in prices would come on top of existing cost‑of‑living strains, raising the risk of more persistent wage demands. In low‑income countries where people spend a large share of their income on food, especially in Africa and parts of the Middle East, and Central America higher food prices carry acute social and economic costs.
If people and businesses in any of these regions believe inflation will remain higher for longer, they may build this into wages and prices, making it harder to contain the shock without a sharper slowdown. The war thus raises not only current inflation but also a risk of expectations becoming less firmly anchored.
Financial conditions
Finally, the war has unsettled financial markets. Global stock prices have declined, bond yields have risen across major advanced economies and many emerging markets, and volatility has increased. The market sell-off has so far been contained compared with past global shocks. Nonetheless, these moves have tightened financial conditions worldwide.
Again, effects vary. In Europe and many emerging markets, higher yields and wider credit spreads raise debt‑service burdens and complicate refinancing for governments and firms alike. In sub‑Saharan Africa and some low‑income economies in the Middle East and South Asia, already meager reserves and limited market access make external shocks to financing conditions more dangerous—especially as higher import bills for fuel, fertilizer, and food widen trade deficits and put pressure on currencies. In the Middle East and elsewhere, high levels of debt and tighter financial conditions may further raise debt financing costs.
By contrast, advanced economies with deep domestic capital markets and some commodity exporters with ample buffers—such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, or Latin American commodity producers like Brazil and Ecuador—can better absorb market stress, even if they are not immune to higher risk premia.
The IMF’s role
These channels show why the war’s economic impact is both global and highly uneven. They help explain why the same shock can look like a terms‑of‑trade windfall for some countries, a balance‑of‑payments strain for others, and a renewed cost‑of‑living squeeze across many economies.
Such complex spillovers confront us at a time when many economies have limited room to absorb shocks. Many countries were already facing record-high debt levels, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability.
To manage the shock and maintain resilience, it is therefore more important than ever that countries adopt appropriate policies. Measures need to be carefully calibrated to country-specific needs. Countries with limited reserves and little fiscal room to maneuver should be especially cautious.
At this pivotal moment, the IMF is stepping up as well. We are supporting our members—especially the most vulnerable—with policy advice, capacity development and, where needed and in coordination with the international community, financial assistance. As Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva has said: “In an uncertain world, more countries are needing more of our support. We are there for them.”
 
 
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30 Mar
EACC

ECB | Where do the Costs of Higher US Tariffs Fall?

Understanding the impact of tariffs on inflation is a complex task as it involves analysing responses along the pricing chain, including those by foreign exporters, distributors, producers and retailers. At different stages of this pricing chain, domestic firms could respond to tariff announcements by building up inventories before tariffs are implemented, shifting the sourcing of their imports from countries facing higher tariffs to countries facing lower tariffs (trade diversion) and adjusting the pricing of their products to accommodate the impact of tariffs. This analysis is made all the more intricate by exchange rate developments and exemptions for goods in transit at the time of tariff implementation. In this box, we estimate the impact of recently imposed US tariffs on the prices exporters are charging for products delivered to the United States and explore differences in the pricing behaviour of exporters across countries and sectors observed to date. We show that the costs of tariffs are falling mostly on US firms and consumers and only 5% of costs are borne by foreign firms.
Following a series of tariff increases imposed by the United States, both the prices (net of tariffs) and the volumes of goods it imports have been declining. From January to November 2025, the announced statutory effective tariff rate increased significantly from 3% to over 18%.[1] The annual change in the prices of goods imported into the United States, measured as unit values and reported net of tariffs, has been slightly negative since April. Volumes of imported goods have declined sharply. However, the magnitude of the adjustments in prices and quantities varies across major trading partners, such as China, Canada, Mexico and the EU, which were targeted by higher tariffs. These differences could reflect variations in tariff rates and scope, shifts in the composition of imports and country-specific dynamics.
Exporters to the United States are absorbing only a small fraction of higher tariff-related costs. In aggregate, unit values of imported goods reported net of tariffs show an average pass-through coefficient of 0.95 (Chart A, panel a).[2] This means that a 10% increase in tariffs implies only a 9.5% increase in prices. Therefore, only a small fraction of the increased tariffs is being absorbed by exporters.[3] The pass-through coefficient is significantly lower when looking at specific sectors.[4] However, no significant differences are evident in the estimated tariff pass-through by major trading partners.

Chart A
Impact of tariffs on unit values and volumes of imported goods

a) Unit values of imported goods
(elasticity; complete pass-through = 1)

b) Volumes of imported goods
(elasticity)

Source: ECB staff calculations.
Notes: The reported estimates are based on a panel regression analysis of six-digit product categories of the harmonised system (HS6) import unit values, following the methodology of Amiti et al. (2019). Estimated on a sample from January 2024 to October 2025. The upper part of panel b) reports estimates of the aggregate elasticity (extensive and intensive margin) obtained from a regression where product categories, including those subject to higher tariffs, are no longer imported into the United States. The lower part of panel b) reports estimates obtained from a regression on those product categories which are still traded under tariffs.

The estimated impact of tariffs on import volumes is large. The estimated aggregate elasticity of imports for all product categories stands at -3.7. This means that a 10% increase in tariffs would result in a 37% decline in import volumes. If, by contrast, we focus on only those product categories which are still traded under tariffs, the estimated coefficient declines markedly, albeit remaining economically relevant at ‑0.43. This means that a 10% increase in tariffs would result in a 4.3% decline in import volumes. This difference in estimated elasticity for import volumes suggests that the observed decline is largely associated with products which, in response to tariffs, are no longer traded – meaning they undergo an adjustment through the extensive margin (Chart A, panel b, upper graph). However, volumes also decline markedly for products which are still being traded under tariffs (trade adjustment through the intensive margin; Chart A, panel b, lower graph).
Zooming in on the automotive sector highlights how tariffs triggered significant changes in trade structures, particularly within regional supply chains. In the automotive sector, the results point to a clear decoupling of the United States from China and the EU in favour of Canada and Mexico (Chart B). The surge in car imports from Canada and Mexico reflects a strengthening of existing trade relationships.[5] This stands in sharp contrast to the results reported for the EU and Japan, which saw both a contraction in the unit value of exported cars and a strong decline in the volume of products subject to tariffs and still exported to the United States.[6]

Chart B
Impact of tariffs on unit values and volumes of cars imported to the United States

a) Unit values of imported cars

b) Volumes of imported cars

(elasticity; complete pass-through = 1)

(aggregate elasticity)

Source: ECB staff calculations.
Notes: The reported estimates are based on a panel regression analysis of six-digit product categories of the harmonised system (HS6) import unit values, following the methodology of Amiti et al. (2019). Estimated on a sample from January 2024 to October 2025.

While tariffs are reshaping the geography of trade relations with the United States, their costs are falling mostly on domestic importers and consumers. We find that costs associated with higher tariffs are passed down the pricing chain, with consumers currently bearing around a third of the tariff burden (Chart C). And if the higher tariffs are expected to stay in place for a longer period, the available survey evidence from US firms suggests that they will pass a larger share of tariff-related costs on to consumers. Over the longer term, this share could rise to over half as US firms exhaust their ability to absorb costs. Additionally, if the extent to which exporters absorb tariffs remains limited in scope, as reported above, this implies that US firms would absorb around 40% of higher tariff costs in the longer term.

Chart C
Distribution of tariff-implied costs along the pricing chain

(coefficient estimates)

Source: ECB staff calculations.
Notes: The chart shows how tariff costs are distributed across the pricing chain, based on empirical analyses using data available up to August 2025 (dark blue). The grey bars represent residual attributions, with hashed sections indicating survey results from Andrade et al. (2025), which suggest that the tariff pass-through to consumers increases to 0.55 when in place over longer time horizons. The figure for consumers is derived from a panel regression of tariffs on personal consumption expenditures PCE components, while the figure for exporters is based on a panel regression analysis of six-digit product categories of the harmonised system (HS6) import unit values, following the methodology of Amiti et al. (2019). “Firms” refers to distributors, producers and retailers.

References
Amiti, M., Redding, S.J. and Weinstein, D.E. (2019), “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 33, No 4, pp. 187-210.
Amiti, M., Flanagan, C., Heise, S. and Weinstein, D.E. (2026), “Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs?”, Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 12 February.
Andrade, P., Dietrich, A.M., Leer, J., Lin, X., Schoenle, R.S., Tang, J. and Zakrajšek, E. (2025), “Who Will Pay for Tariffs? Businesses’ Expectations about Costs and Prices”, Current Policy Perspectives, No 25-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 29 September.
Hinz, J., Lohmann, A., Mahlkow, H. and Vorwig, A. (2026), “America’s Own Goal: Who Pays the Tariffs?”, Kiel Policy Brief, No 201, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Le Roux, J. and Spital, T. (2026), “Global trade redirection: tracking the role of trade diversion from US tariffs in Chinese export developments”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 1, ECB.

There is a difference between statutory and actual effective tariff rates. The statutory effective tariff rate is calculated based on tariff announcements and a usually fixed trade structure, whereas the actual tariff rate is derived from customs data and is typically lower. The World Trade Organization reports in its tariff tracker that the statutory effective tariff rate on goods for the United States was 18.2% in November 2025, whereas the actual effective tariff rate on goods for the same month was 9.8%. For economic analysis, the statutory effective tariff rate is typically used as the explanatory variable as the implementation date is judged to be more relevant compared with customs reports data, which often suffer from reporting lags and endogeneity bias caused by changing trade volumes triggered by tariffs.

Aggregate effects are captured through time fixed effects, while product-level characteristics are controlled for by including item fixed effects following Amiti et al. (2019). The tariff effect is identified by the common movement of the dependent price variable in response to tariff changes within all items across time.

This finding is broadly consistent with the evidence from the 2018-19 period as documented in Amiti et al. (2019). It is also in line with the available estimates for the current tariffs (Hinz et al., 2026), suggesting that the United States possesses limited terms-of-trade leverage over its global suppliers in the short term. While Amiti et al. (2026) report a similar tariff pass-through (elasticity) of 0.94 for the period from January to August 2025, they find it declined to 0.86 in November.

Steel and aluminium, cars and car parts were targeted early on by the US Administration and faced significant tariffs ranging from 25% to 50%, with few exemptions.

Rerouting of Chinese car exports via these countries may have contributed to these developments, although recent analyses suggest that Chinese exports may have been rerouted through countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. For further details, see Le Roux and Spital (2026).

The estimated elasticity on the trade volume at the intensive margin is 0.84 for Canada and Mexico and ‑1.26 for the EU.

 
 
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27 Mar
EACC

European Council | EU customs: Council and Parliament Agree on Landmark Reform

The Council and the Parliament today agreed to overhaul the EU customs framework, giving the Union a more modern toolbox to deal with trends such as huge increases in trade volumes, especially in e-commerce, a fast-growing number of EU standards that must be checked at the border and challenging geopolitical realities.
The reform establishes innovative new instruments to facilitate global trade, collect customs duties more efficiently and to tighten controls on non-compliant, dangerous or unsafe goods. Overall, the new system will allow for more robust controls without excessive burden for authorities and traders.

“Today’s agreement marks the greatest reform since the creation of the Customs Union in 1968. The new Union customs code will allow us to deal with the multiple challenges prompted by the new geopolitical realities, while ensuring economic security. Once adopted, this modern toolbox will facilitate trade and ensure the proper collection of duties, in a simplified manner, and with the required legal certainty.” – Makis Keravnos, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus

The co-legislators have agreed on legislation to:

create a single, state-of-the-art EU customs data hub: one central platform for importers and exporters to interact with customs in the EU, strengthening data integrity, traceability and customs controls
introduce enhanced customs simplifications for the most trusted traders, saving them time and money
implement a new EU-wide handling fee for items contained in small parcels entering the EU
establish a new decentralised agency for customs – the EU customs authority – which will oversee the EU customs data hub while supporting the risk management work of national customs authorities.

The EU customs authority
The new decentralised EU agency for customs will coordinate governance of the EU customs union in certain areas.
To support the work of national offices, the EU customs authority will analyse the constantly updated import and export data contained in the new EU customs data hub, helping to identify the riskiest cargo entering the EU which should be prioritised for inspection.
The authority will also help establish priority control areas and risk criteria. Finally, it will coordinate EU-level crisis management in the area of customs.
The customs authority will be located in Lille, France. It will be established on the day that the overarching regulation enters into force.
The EU customs data hub
The EU customs data hub will be the single online environment designed to collect and analyse customs data to ensure the smooth flow of goods in and out of the EU. It will also support the EU-wide risk management carried out by the EU customs authority.
To fulfil their customs obligations, businesses importing to and exporting from the EU will only need to submit customs information once to this single portal, rather than to up to 27 individual customs authorities. They can enter the same information to cover multiple consignments, saving time and money.
National customs authorities will gain a full overview of trade flows and supply chains. With the support of the EU customs authority, member states will have access to the same real-time data and will be able to pool information to respond to risks more quickly, consistently and effectively.
Under the terms of the agreement, the data hub will become operational for e-commerce goods on 1 July 2028. A phased rollout will bring all movements of goods into its scope by 1 March 2034.
Trust and check traders
The updated legislation creates a new category of the most transparent businesses – trust and check traders.
Under this scheme, companies providing comprehensive information on the movement and compliance of goods, along with other stringent criteria, will enjoy more streamlined customs obligations, such as simplified procedures for temporary storage and transit.
The most reliable companies will be able to release their goods into circulation in the EU without any active customs intervention at all.
Other companies will still be able to enjoy the already existing simplifications available to trusted traders under the current authorised economic operator scheme.
Managing the influx of small parcels
To help cover rising costs from monitoring the growing number of small parcels entering the EU via e-commerce, the agreed text introduces a new handling fee to be collected by customs authorities on small consignments sold through distance selling.
The level of the fee will be decided by Commission delegated act before it starts being applied by EU member states no later than 1 November 2026.
The new rules also clarify that platforms and those selling into the EU by distance sale, e.g. via e-commerce, are considered the goods’ importer and responsible for ensuring that all customs formalities and payments are taken care of, rather than the final EU consumer.
Finally, the legislation will include a new system of financial penalties for e-commerce operators that systematically fail to comply with their customs obligations.
Next steps
The Council and the European Parliament will continue work to finalise the technical elements of the package before final adoption by the co-legislators. The new customs legislation will come into full application 12 months following publication in the EU’s official journal.
Background
For over 50 years, the EU customs union has been operating efficiently across national borders, managed by national customs offices working together. As one of the world’s largest trading blocs, the EU customs union manages trade worth over €4.3 trillion, accounting for around 14% of global trade.
In 2024, 2,140 customs offices, working 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, collected almost €27 billion as customs duties and handled the import, export and transit of more than 1,370 million items. In the same year, EU customs authorities detected 64,000 cases of goods presenting a risk for consumers in terms of health and detained 112 million counterfeit items.
 
 
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26 Mar
EACC & Member News

Rödl: Iran war as a stress test for B2B pricing models: When “currently valid list prices” are no longer sufficient

Unternehmen mit energie‑, rohstoff- oder logistikintensiven Geschäftsmodellen stehen erneut stark unter Druck: Der Iran‑Konflikt hat die Straße von Hormus als Engpass des Welthandels in den Fokus gerückt. Über diese Meerenge läuft rund ein Fünftel des weltweiten Rohölverbrauchs und etwa 20 Prozent des LNG‑Handels; Blockaden und Angriffe führen zu massiven Preissprüngen bei Öl und Gas, aber auch bei Düngemitteln, chemischen Vorprodukten und Frachtraten.

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26 Mar
EACC

European Parliament | EU US Trade Deal: MEPs Set Conditions for Lowering Tariffs on US Products

Suspension clause in case the US introduces new tariffs
Sunrise clause: tariff preferences only effective if the US respects its commitments
Sunset clause: tariff preferences set to expire by 31 March 2028, unless renewed

On Thursday, MEPs adopted their position on two proposals implementing the tariff aspects of the EU-US Turnberry trade deal.

The texts, if agreed with EU member states, will eliminate most tariffs on US industrial goods and provide preferential market access for a wide range of US seafood and agricultural goods, in line with the commitments made in summer 2025 between the EU and the US.
Suspension clause
MEPs strengthened the proposed suspension clause, which would allow the tariff preferences with the US to be suspended under a number of conditions. For instance, the Commission would be able to propose suspending all or some trade preferences if the US were to impose additional tariffs exceeding the agreed 15% ceiling, or any new duties on EU goods. The suspension clause could also be activated if the US, for example, undermined the objectives of the deal, discriminated against EU economic operators, threatened member states’ territorial integrity, foreign and defence policies, or engaged in economic coercion.
Sunrise clause
MEPs have introduced a “sunrise clause” that would mean that the new tariffs would only become effective if the US respects its commitments. These conditions include the US lowering its tariffs on EU products with a steel and aluminium content below 50%, to a tariff of maximum 15%.
Furthermore, for EU products with a steel and aluminium content of above 50%, unless the US reduces its tariffs to a maximum of 15%, EU tariff preferences for US exports of steel, aluminium and their derivative products would cease to apply six months after the entry into application of the regulation.
Sunset clause
Members also agreed on an expiry date for the main regulation on 31 March 2028. This could only be extended via a new legislative proposal, to be submitted following a thorough impact assessment of the effects of the regulation.
Safeguard mechanism
The Commission would be tasked with monitoring the impact of the new rules and would be able to suspend the new tariffs temporarily, should US imports reach a level that could cause serious harm to EU industry, for instance in the event of a 10% increase in imports of a particular group of products.
Quote
Rapporteur Bernd Lange (S&D, DE) said: “With today’s vote, we have a strong mandate for negotiations with the Council and we intend to make the most of it. MEPs will only be able to sign up to the trade terms of the deal if the regulation contains very strong and clear safeguards, and only after the US has fully respected the terms of the deal. I intend to defend this mandate firmly in the negotiations.
The conditions are clearly defined in Parliament’s position. They include a sunrise clause requiring full US compliance before the regulation can take effect, and a sunset clause ensuring full parliamentary oversight of any extension of the concessions, all the while remaining WTO-compliant. Any further tariff threat, or the failure of the deal to deliver for EU producers and consumers, will lead to the expiry of the legislation.”
Next steps
The two legislative acts were adopted by 417 votes in favour and 154 against, with 71 abstentions (adjustment of customs duties and opening of tariff quotas for the import of certain goods originating in the US); and 437 votes in favour and 144 against, with 60 abstentions (non-application of customs duties on imports of certain goods). MEPs are now ready to start negotiations with EU governments on the final shape of the legislation.
Background
On 27 July 2025, in Turnberry, Scotland, US President Donald Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reached a deal on tariff and trade issues, outlined in a joint statement published on 25 August. On 28 August, the Commission published two legislative proposals aimed at implementing the tariff aspects of the statement. The first provides preferential access for US goods to the EU; the second extends the existing zero-tariff regime on imports of certain types of lobster.

 
 
Compliments of the European ParliamentThe post European Parliament | EU US Trade Deal: MEPs Set Conditions for Lowering Tariffs on US Products first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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