G20 merchandise trade accelerated in Q2 2026. Measured in current US dollars, quarter-on-quarter import growth rose markedly to 6.7%, from the 5.2% growth recorded in the previous quarter, reflecting strong increases in a number of G20 economies. G20 merchandise exports growth remained broadly flat at 5.9%. Preliminary estimates also point to an acceleration in services trade, with exports rising by 3.4% and imports by 2.5%, as compared to 2.0% and 1.5% respectively in Q1 2026 (Figures 1 and 3).1
In North America, merchandise import growth for the United States increased to 7.8% in Q2 2026, up from 6.0% in the previous quarter, partly reflecting higher purchases of computers and computer accessories, while export growth slowed to 3.9%, despite higher energy prices boosting exports in crude and petroleum. By contrast, Canada’s exports surged by 13.5%, supported by energy products and motor vehicles, while import growth slowed. In Mexico, both exports and imports accelerated, with growth reaching 12.2%, and 7.7% respectively. In East Asia, China’s trade slowed markedly from the high growth for both exports and imports in Q1 2026 (13.4% and 16.9% respectively), but with Q2 2026 exports still growing by 4.7% and imports by 8.9%, both supported by mechanical and electrical products and high-technology goods. Japan’s trade also slowed, despite higher petroleum imports. By contrast, Korea’s imports surged by 11.6%, reflecting higher purchases of energy products and semiconductor equipment, while export growth continued to remain strong at 19.3%, supported by sales of semiconductors. In Europe, higher purchases of energy products boosted import growth to 4.2%, 4.2% and 4.1% in Germany, France and Italy, respectively, while exports grew by 2.1%, 1.8% and 1.8%. In the United Kingdom, higher trade in machinery and transport equipment and in fuels explained a rebound in exports to 6.6% and in imports to 5.7%. Merchandise trade also accelerated in India, where exports surged by 20.4%, with increases across the board, and imports rose by 8.7%, partly driven by purchases of petroleum and of electronic goods.
Strong international services trade growth was recorded in Q2 2026 in East Asia. Services trade accelerated markedly in China, with exports soaring by 16.6%, boosted by sales of transport, travel and ICT services. After growing by 3.3% in Q1 2026, China’s imports rose by 7.5% in Q2 2026, on higher spending for transport, insurance, and other business services. In Japan, exports grew by 7.8%, after negative growth in the previous quarter, supported by sales of intellectual property, ICT and other business services. Imports, however, fell by 2.0%, on lower spending on travel and insurance services. In Korea, import growth recovered to 3.9% in Q2 2026 from negative growth in Q1 2026, as higher transport payments more than offset lower travel expenditure. Export growth slowed but remained solid at 5.6%, reflecting higher transport and travel receipts. Services trade also accelerated in the United States, exports rose by 1.2% after 0.9% in Q1 2026, mainly supported by higher receipts from intellectual property and ICT. Imports grew by 1.5% in Q2 2026, driven by transport and insurance services, following no growth in the two previous quarters. No clear pattern was observed in the G20 European economies in Q2 2026. While exports accelerated in France, reflecting strong transport and travel receipts, they decelerated in Germany and Italy. In the same vein, services imports decreased in France while they increased in Germany and Italy, reflecting essentially higher transport and travel payments.
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 Asheville, N.C., United States: International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva delivered the following remarks at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting in Asheville, North Carolina:
“I would like to thank the Government of the United States for hosting this week’s G20 meeting, and Secretary Bessent and Chairman Warsh for their leadership in delivering a focused discussion on key global economic priorities.
During our discussions, there was a strong convergence of views around the importance of lifting potential growth everywhere. In a shock-prone and uncertain world, structural reforms and sound fiscal and monetary policies are essential to creating the foundation for stronger and better-balanced global growth. Beyond domestic responsibilities of policymakers, the G20 reminds us that international cooperation has a crucial role to play, especially in helping countries manage debt challenges, limit spillovers, and address global imbalances.
Global Economic Outlook
Since April, the global growth outlook for 2026 has firmed at around 3 percent. The global economy has absorbed the impact of the energy supply shock better than expected, through the use of oil and gas reserves, new sources of energy, and demand management measures. Surging AI investment—including in power projects to satisfy energy needs—is driving growth, in the US in particular, and in other economies integrated into the AI value chain, such as Korea.
But behind the averages there is significant divergence in economic fortunes and risks to the outlook remain high.
First, the energy shock is not over. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, strategic oil and gas reserves will need restocking, AI drives up energy demand, and in the northern hemisphere winter is coming.
Second, public debt—at almost 100 percent of GDP worldwide—now exceeds its post-World War II highs and is set to climb further. Looking back, the debt trajectory resembles a staircase: big vertical steps when shocks occur, little or no reduction afterward.
Third, the disinflation process has stalled in many countries. Mounting fiscal pressures are pushing core bond yields upward and the interplay between fiscal and monetary policy worries markets.
Last, but not least, the future impact of AI on productivity and financial stability is dogged by unknowns.
The policy priorities are clear. Central banks must focus on their price stability mandate. Fiscal authorities must hammer out credible medium-term consolidation plans. Structural policies should concentrate on cutting red tape and removing self-inflicted barriers to growth—because stronger potential growth would help address the fiscal problem, and addressing the fiscal problem would help lift growth prospects.
Debt Challenges in Developing Countries
The sovereign debt landscape for emerging and low-income countries has gradually improved in recent years, thanks to domestic policy efforts and international cooperation. But progress has been uneven, and persistent risks and uncertainty in the global economy, including spillovers from the significant increase in yields in advanced economies, call for policy discipline and underscore the importance of building buffers.
The increase in global interest rates is of particular concern. As key advanced economy yields rise to multi-year highs, they lift most of the world’s yield curves up with them. In some emerging markets this more than fully offsets hard-won spread compression.
High refinancing needs and rising debt-service costs are constraining many developing economies, in particular low‑income countries, limiting their capacity to finance critical spending on infrastructure, health, and education, which undermines growth and, in turn, debt sustainability.
These challenges are compounded by a sharp decline in net external financing, including cuts in official development assistance, and a marked reduction in new inflows from non‑Paris Club creditors.
Helping countries create fiscal space to support growth-enhancing spending is even more pressing in the current conjuncture.
Addressing these challenges requires a collective effort along three dimensions:

First, decisive action is needed in countries where debt is unsustainable, supported by further improvements in restructuring processes. Important progress has already been achieved, particularly under the G20 Common Framework. The G20 MOU template agreed this year is part of this effort. The Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable has also advanced its work, with the publication in April of an updated “Restructuring Playbook” and important clarifications to facilitate implementation of comparability of treatment and inter-creditor group coordination. These efforts should continue, including developing solutions for countries not eligible to the Common Framework. We will continue to remain strongly engaged, including through greater use of our “good offices” and work under the GSDR.
Second, accelerating the implementation of the IMF-World Bank Three-Pillar Approach to support countries with sustainable debt and pursuing strong growth-enhancing reforms is a key priority. Together with the World Bank, we have strengthened support for countries on reform implementation and domestic resource mobilization and continue to work on ways to encourage effective liability management operations, including to incentivize higher private sector inflows at lower cost. This has worked well in countries such as Ecuador or Pakistan. Securing strong support from other partners, including bilateral creditors, is essential. We count on the G20 to take leadership in this collective support to growth and investment.
Third, there is no substitute for sound economic fundamentals. Helping countries build resilience and prevent unsustainable debt build-up is critical, including through strengthening debt transparency, debt management capacity, and debtor–investor relations.

Global Imbalances
Our latest External Sector Report shows that excess global imbalances—those not explained by fundamentals—widened further in 2025, by 0.7% of GDP, the largest increase in the past decade. This widening was broad-based, with major contributions coming from the two largest economies.
Excess imbalances in major economies can signal uneven growth patterns and macro-financial vulnerabilities. They can result in cross-border spillovers, trade tensions, and economic fragmentation. And this is what we have seen: the widening of excess global imbalances in recent years has taken place against a backdrop of ongoing trade tensions and shifts in the configuration of trade relationships across countries.
The message from Fund research is clear: since macroeconomic factors are the main drivers of imbalances, sustained rebalancing requires policy action in both surplus and deficit countries. In surplus economies, market-oriented structural reforms can boost domestic consumption, promote investment, and lift growth prospects. In deficit economies, appropriate fiscal consolidation can increase savings and help rebuild fiscal buffers. Simultaneous—mutually reinforcing—policies across major economies would yield the best outcomes, including for growth.
At the IMF we recognize our responsibility to support members in addressing imbalances.

We are working with member countries and other international organizations to improve cross-country data and external sector statistics.
We are continuing to refine our EBA methodology that underlines our assessment of excess imbalances. We have extended our analytical framework to better understand the linkages between trade and industrial policies and current account imbalances. We are advancing complementary work on capital flow and stock imbalances.
Our Comprehensive Surveillance Review aims to deliver a more comprehensive and forward-looking assessment of external sector issues at the country level, as well as cross-country spillovers. The goal is to move from diagnosis to action.

The Fund is strongly committed to engaging with our members to address global imbalances. The G20 offers a unique platform to advance this dialogue, and we will continue to support our membership going forward.”
 
 
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Blog | In a world of frequent shocks, central bank communications should anchor expectations by explaining how policy responds to changing conditions, rather than committing to a fixed path.
In a world of frequent and faster-moving shocks, where uncertainty is high and markets react instantly, central banks face a fundamental communications challenge: how to help the public understand monetary policy objectives while explaining how policy may evolve as economic conditions change. In this regard, explaining the policy framework, the reaction function of the central bank, and the way in which economic uncertainty and risks play into alternative scenarios have become the foundation of the central banker’s communications playbook.
As central banks adapt their policy frameworks and tools to a more uncertain and shock-prone world, it is only natural that they are also reassessing how best to communicate policy frameworks and talk about the conjuncture. A new IMF note explores these questions and sets out principles for effective monetary policy communication.
Perils of commitment
During the low-inflation era that followed the global financial crisis, communication was dominated by forward guidance, centered on precommitting to a likely future path of the policy rates. Such an approach can be effective when policy is stuck at the lower bound and inflation expectations are drifting down. But commitments may become costly when circumstances change. Supply shocks, inflation surprises, or abrupt shifts in the balance of risks may require policymakers to adjust course.
As a result, central bank communication has shifted toward explaining how policy will respond as economic conditions evolve and new data become available.
Understanding reaction functions
A central task has therefore been communicating the reaction function: how policymakers interpret incoming data, weigh risks, and navigate tradeoffs between key central bank objectives. The strength of underlying inflation, the evolution of inflation expectations, and the nature of monetary policy transmission are the key inputs to the reaction function. “Data dependence” has featured prominently: central banks emphasize what data matter, how data shape decisions, and what future contingencies may mean. The goal is to help the public understand the logic that guides a central bank’s decision-making.
Explaining Risks and Uncertainty
Central banks convey their views on the economic outlook through forecasts and scenarios. This is crucial because policy decisions are based on where the macroeconomy is expected to go.
But forecasts are not promises. In a shock-prone world, they are subject to tremendous uncertainty. If forecasts are communicated too precisely, or policy-rate projections are interpreted as commitments, revisions can be misinterpreted as policy reversals. In this context, scenarios can help illustrate how policy might respond under different economic outcomes, while reinforcing that future decisions will depend on incoming data and evolving conditions.
Communication for a shock-prone world
Forecasts should be accompanied by a clear explanation of risks. Effectively communicating the reaction function can help the public better understand how policy may respond under alternative economic outcomes. By contrast, rate-path commitments should be exceptional and conditional, with clear escape clauses so that any conditional promise is clearly subordinate to the price-stability mandate.
More isn’t always better
Clear communication can anchor expectations and support accountability. But more communication is not always better. Social media, automated news analysis, and artificial intelligence mean that central bank communications are parsed in real time. Too much detail can lead markets to focus excessively on decoding the central bank rather than assessing fundamentals. Hence conditionality relative to the evolving outlook is foundational.
Volatility’s value
The goal of central bank communication is not to eliminate volatility. Rather, it is to reduce uncertainty about how the central bank will respond, limiting surprises around policy decisions.
Volatility is not, in and of itself, undesirable. When asset prices move in response to new information about incoming macroeconomic data that shape the inflation and growth outlook, markets are performing their essential price-discovery function. Such volatility is fostering the information content of expectations and can in turn provide information to policymakers.
Speaking with humility
Successful communication therefore depends on fostering a better understanding of the policy framework. That means being clear about central bank objectives, the reaction function, and forecasts. Given the high degree of uncertainty globally, central banks need to be explicit about risks, with the goal of reflecting the degree of underlying macroeconomic uncertainty accurately.
 
 
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Once I was elected President of the European Council, I decided to visit each member state every year, to meet bilaterally with each European leader. These exchanges are first and foremost an opportunity to listen: to remain closely attuned to the concerns, priorities and expectations of the members of the European Council, and of the citizens they represent. They also allow me to share my perspective on the challenges and opportunities ahead for our union. These visits take place at the beginning of the political season, provide a unique 360-degree view of the state of our union and help to ensure that the work of the European Council remains firmly anchored in the realities, priorities and aspirations across Europe. 
One of the defining features of European integration is that its most tangible benefits often go unnoticed precisely because they have become part of our everyday lives. We cross borders with ease. We share a single currency from Lisbon to Helsinki and from Dublin to Athens. We benefit from common standards that protect our environment, our health and our quality of life. We support one another in responding to natural disasters – as we have done during this summer’s devastating forest fires –, public health emergencies and other common challenges. And when we travel across Europe, we stay connected with family and friends without giving a second thought to mobile roaming charges. What has become ordinary in our daily lives is, in fact, the result of decades of a shared European endeavour.
This provides a strong foundation on which to continue to build Europe. In today’s geopolitical reality, a stronger, more resilient and more autonomous Europe is more important than ever.
That is why we are building the Europe of defence: to strengthen our ability to deter threats, protect our citizens and, ultimately, restore peace on our continent. A peace that has been shattered by Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The EU has set itself the objective of decisively ramping up Europe’s defence readiness by 2030 by strengthening the European defence industry, reducing strategic dependencies and jointly developing priority military capabilities. What is crucial is that Europe’s necessary rearmament is pursued collaboratively, avoiding duplication and waste and, above all, ensuring that this historic effort strengthens the collective security and defence of Europe as a whole.
Building Europe’s strategic autonomy also requires a more competitive economy. That is why the European Union is making it easier to do business by cutting red tape, mobilising private investment to help businesses scale up and innovate, completing the single market, strengthening supply chains and diversifying trade relations, while ensuring access to critical raw materials and to affordable, clean and home-grown energy sources. In all these areas, the ‘One Europe, One Market’ agenda agreed by the European Council sets out concrete objectives to be delivered from now until the end of 2027. Beyond the geopolitical imperative, this is ultimately about making life more affordable for citizens, creating the conditions for more high-quality jobs and improving the resilience of Europe’s social market economy.
Defence and competitiveness, together with EU enlargement and our ongoing support for Ukraine, will be high on the agenda as I meet the European leaders during this year’s tour of capitals.
But among the key decisions before us this year, one stands above all others: reaching, by the end of the year, an agreement on the EU’s next multiannual financial framework – our long-term budget for 2028-2034.
Why must that agreement be reached before the end of 2026? Because we will then need about a year to put in place the necessary legislative and administrative framework – in Brussels and in the member states – to ensure the uninterrupted implementation of the next EU budget. This is simply sound planning. Otherwise, we risk disrupting funding for farmers, businesses, students, researchers and innovators.
For decades, the EU budget has supported sustainable and inclusive growth across our continent through investments in agriculture, our regions, research, and the green and digital transitions. It will continue to do so. At the same time, the budget must also reflect Europe’s evolving priorities, including defence, security and competitiveness.
Like national budgets, the EU budget must deliver on its priorities within the limits of finite resources. Most of it is financed through member states’ national contributions. We need to keep those contributions within reasonable limits. That is why a balanced and ambitious package of new common resources will be an essential part of an overall agreement.
I have been encouraged by the constructive spirit of discussions among leaders on the multiannual budget so far. I am confident that, in the end, we will find the right balance for our union, our citizens and our future. Because it is our shared responsibility to do so.
 
 
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GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth in the OECD area increased slightly to 0.5% in Q2 2026, up from 0.4% in the previous quarter, according to provisional estimates (Figure 1). This reflected a mixed picture across the 30 OECD countries for which data were available. In Q2 2026, 27 countries recorded growth, but at varying rates, while 3 saw no change in GDP.
GDP growth in the G7 slowed to 0.3% in Q2 2026, down from 0.4% in Q1, reflecting slower growth in five G7 countries: Germany, from 0.4% to 0.2%; Italy, from 0.3% to 0.2%; Japan, from 0.5% to 0.3%; the United Kingdom, from 0.6% to 0.4%; and the United States, from 0.5% to 0.4%. In Japan, the slowdown mainly reflected stagnant private consumption, destocking and a decline in investment. In the United Kingdom, weaker private consumption and a decline in government consumption weighed on economic activity. In the United States, slower growth mainly reflected weaker export growth, destocking and a decrease in government consumption. By contrast, growth in Canada accelerated from zero in Q1 to 0.8% in Q2. In France, GDP returned to growth (0.2%) in Q2, following a contraction of 0.1% in Q1.
Among other OECD countries for which data were available, Ireland recorded the highest quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in Q2, at 3.9%, followed by Israel, at 3.6%. At the other end of the spectrum, GDP was unchanged in Austria, Belgium and Chile.
Year-on-year GDP growth in the OECD area increased to 2.3% in Q2 2026, up from 1.7% in Q1 (Table 2). Among G7 economies, the United States recorded the highest annual GDP growth, at 2.1%, while Japan recorded the lowest, at 0.5%.
Click here to access the interactive chart.
 
 
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€3.9 bn surplus for EU

Euro area
The first estimates of euro area balance showed a €8.6 bn surplus in trade in goods with the rest of the world in June 2026, compared with + €4.8 bn in June 2025.
The euro area exports of goods to the rest of the world in June 2026 were €272.5 billion, an increase of 14.4% compared with June 2025 (€238.2 bn).
Imports from the rest of the world stood at €264.0 bn, a rise of 13.1% compared with June 2025 (€233.4 bn).

In June 2026, the euro area balance registered a surplus of €8.6 bn, following a deficit of €9.0 bn in May 2026. Compared with June 2025, when the balance stood at a surplus of €4.8 bn, the latest figure represented an improvement of €3.8 bn. In the presence of a larger energy deficit, this increase was primarily driven by a higher surplus in chemicals and related products, and by surpluses in other manufactured goods as well as in food and drink. The surplus of machinery and vehicles also slightly improved.

€3.9 bn surplus for EU

In January to June 2026, the euro area recorded a surplus of €9.8 bn, compared with €82.2 bn in January-June 2025.
The euro area exports of goods to the rest of the world fell to €1 487.2 bn (a decrease of 0.2% compared with January-June 2025), and imports rose to €1 477.4 bn (an increase of 4.9% compared with January-June 2025).
Intra-euro area trade rose to €1 408.2 bn in January-June 2026, up by 4.7% compared with January-June 2025.
European Union
The EU balance showed a €3.9 bn surplus in trade in goods with the rest of the world in June 2026, compared with +€5.2 bn in June 2025.
The extra-EU exports of goods in June 2026 were €241.5 billion, up by 12.5% compared with June 2025 (€214.7 bn).
Imports from the rest of the world stood at €237.7 bn, up by 13.5% compared with June 2025 (€209.5 bn).

In June 2026, the EU balance registered a surplus of €3.9 bn, following a deficit of €13.9 bn in May 2026. Compared with June 2025, when the balance stood at a surplus of €5.2 bn, the latest figure represented a deterioration of €1.3 bn. This deterioration was primarily driven by a larger energy deficit, partly offset by a wider surplus in chemicals and related products.

In January to June 2026, the EU recorded a deficit of €14.9 bn, compared with €74.1 bn in January-June 2025.
The extra-EU exports of goods fell to €1 317.0 bn (a decrease of 2.1% compared with January-June 2025), and imports rose to €1 331.9 bn (an increase of 4.7% compared with January-June 2025).
Intra-EU trade rose to €2 200.6 bn in January-June 2026, +5.7% compared with January-June 2025.
Annex – Seasonally adjusted data
In June 2026 compared with May 2026, euro area seasonally adjusted exports increased by 0.9%, while imports decreased by 2.1%. The seasonally adjusted balance was €1.8 bn, an increase compared with May (€-6.1 bn).
In June 2026 compared with May 2026, EU seasonally adjusted exports increased by 0.4%, while imports decreased by 2.1%. The seasonally adjusted balance was €-4.9 bn, a narrowing compared with May (€-10.8 bn).
In April-June 2026, euro area exports rose by 5.6%, while imports rose by 8.6%. Intra-EA trade rose by 3.9%.During the same period, EU exports increased by 5.4%, while imports rose by 9.9%. Intra-EU trade increased by 4.0%
Click here to access the interactive charts and tables.

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