Today, the European Commission adopted the 2025-2030 working plan for the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) and Energy Labelling Regulation.
The plan provides a list of products that should be prioritised to introduce ecodesign requirements and energy labelling over the next five years. This will foster sustainable, repairable, circular and energy efficient products across Europe,  in line with the Clean Industrial Deal and the Competitiveness Compass.
The priority products for ecodesign and energy labelling requirements are steel and aluminium, textiles (with a focus on apparel), furniture, tyres and mattresses. These were selected based on their potential to deliver on the circular economy.
Harmonised product sustainability requirements at EU level will reinforce the single market, prevent barriers to trade, improve the level playing field, reduce the administrative burden, and strengthen the global competitiveness of businesses offering sustainable products.
In addition, the Commission will introduce horizontal measures to requirements on repairability for products such as consumer electronics and small household appliances. This will include the introduction of a repairability score for products with the most potential, and requirements on recyclability of electrical and electronic equipment.
The selection of products included in the present working plan, is based on an inclusive process with stakeholders and reflects both the input from stakeholders and Member States. It is  based on a thorough technical analysis and criteria notably related to the EU’s climate, environment and energy efficiency objectives, as well as an extensive consultation process, including through the Ecodesign Forum.
Future ecodesign and energy labelling requirements for the selected products will cover two elements:

product performance, such as minimum durability, minimum energy and resource-efficiency, availability of spare parts or minimum recycled content;
and/or product information, including key product features such as the products’ carbon and environmental footprint. Product information will mainly be made available via the Digital Product Passport or, for products with energy labels, via the European Product Registry for Energy Labelling (EPREL).

When developing ecodesign requirements, the Commission will pay attention to the needs of SMEs, in particular micro-enterprises and small mid-cap enterprises, and will ensure that tailored support is available to them.
Next steps
Ecodesign and energy labelling requirements will be set via delegated acts on a product-by-product basis or for groups of similar products. This will be based on thorough preparatory studies and impact assessments. It will involve stakeholders and interested parties throughout the process, including in the recently established Ecodesign Forum.
Regarding some energy-related products, ongoing work under the Ecodesign Directive should continue, and relevant requirements will be adopted not later than 31 December 2026.
Background
The Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR) aims to improve the sustainability of products placed on the EU market by increasing their circularity, energy performance, recyclability and durability, while improving the Single Market and strengthening the competitiveness and resilience of the EU economy. Adopted in July 2024, it builds on the approach successfully pioneered under the EU’s current ecodesign and energy labelling frameworks.
Together with the Energy Labelling Framework Regulation (ELFR), the ESPR facilitates consumers’ choice in favour of more sustainable and energy efficient products.
Today’s working plan continues the work that started on 16 energy-related products (such as dishwashers, electric motors, electric vehicle chargers or displays) from the 2022-2024 ecodesign and energy labelling working plan.
 
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The European Union has paused its countermeasures on unjustified US trade tariffs to allow time and space for EU-US negotiations. 
The pause was first announced by EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week, and takes legal effect tomorrow.
The decision – which puts on hold for up to 90 days the EU’s planned countermeasures against US tariffs on EU steel and aluminium imports – was made in response to the US delaying by 90 days its so-called reciprocal tariffs.
In total, the suspended EU countermeasures cover €21 billion of US exports.
As part of the EU’s push to find a negotiated outcome with the US, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is today in Washington DC to hold meetings with his US counterparts in order to explore the ground for a negotiated solution.
As President von der Leyen made clear in her statement, the EU wants “to give negotiations a chance,” but should talks not prove satisfactory, the EU countermeasures will kick in.
In addition to these now-suspended countermeasures against US tariffs on steel and aluminium, preparatory work on further EU countermeasures continues.
The EU considers US tariffs unjustified and damaging, risking economic harm to both sides, as well as the global economy.
Next steps
The Commission has adopted two legal acts on 14 April which, respectively, impose and suspend its countermeasures:

The first act imposes the EU countermeasures.
The second act suspends all such measures until 14 July 2025.

Background
On 10 February 2025, the US announced that it would impose 25% tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium and derivative products. President von der Leyen immediately warned that such tariffs are “bad for business, worse for consumers” and would trigger a firm and proportionate European response. These US tariffs were imposed on 12 March.
The US tariffs of up to 25% apply on industrial-grade steel and aluminium, other steel and aluminium semifinished and finished products, and also their derivative commercial products (from machinery parts to knitting needles).
In response, the EU announced a swift and proportionate plan to impose countermeasures on US goods exports, while consistently stating its preference for finding a negotiated solution with the US.
On 9 April, EU Member States voted in favour of the European Commission’s proposal.
Later on 9 April, the US announced a 90-day pause on all universal tariffs impacting the EU, and the EU swiftly responded by announcing a pause on its intended countermeasures.
On 14 April, the Commission adopted two implementing acts – one that adopts the EU countermeasures, and another act that immediately suspends them.
Concretely, the first implementing act, which imposes the EU response:

Calibrates the 2018 measures reducing of the duty rate level to maximum 25% across the board and revising its scope (annex I).
Introduces the new package of countermeasures to respond to the expansion of the US tariffs to new products the increase of US tariffs on aluminium from 10 to 25% (annexes II-IV).

The second act suspends all measures until 14 July 2025.
For more information
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 of 14 April 2025 on commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States of America and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/886
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/786 of 14 April 2025 suspending commercial rebalancing measures concerning certain products originating in the United States imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/778 and amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/2882
 
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NEW YORK—The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Center for Microeconomic Data today released the March 2025 Survey of Consumer Expectations, which shows that households’ inflation expectations increased at the short-term horizon, remained unchanged at the medium-term horizon, and ticked down at the longer-term horizon. Unemployment, job loss, and earnings growth expectations deteriorated. Household income growth expectations declined. Households were also more pessimistic about their year-ahead financial situations and credit access. Stock price expectations declined and reached the lowest level since June 2022.  
The main findings from the March 2025 Survey are:
Inflation

Median inflation expectations increased by 0.5 percentage point to 3.6% at the one-year-ahead horizon, were unchanged at 3.0% at the three-year-ahead horizon, and decreased by 0.1 percentage point to 2.9% at the five-year-ahead horizon. The survey’s measure of disagreement across respondents (the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles of inflation expectations) increased at the one- and three-year-ahead horizons and was unchanged at the five-year-ahead horizon.
Median inflation uncertainty—or the uncertainty expressed regarding future inflation outcomes—decreased at one- and five-year-ahead horizons and was unchanged at the three-year-ahead horizon.
Median home price growth expectations decreased by 0.3 percentage point to 3.0% in March. This series has been moving in a narrow range between 3.0% and 3.3% since August 2023.
Median year-ahead expected price growth increased by 0.1 percentage point for food to 5.2% (its highest level since May 2024), 0.7 percentage point for the cost of medical care to 7.9%, and 0.5 percentage point for rent to 7.2%. Median year-ahead price expectations fell by 0.5 percentage point for gas to 3.2% and 0.2 percentage point for the cost of college education to 6.7%.

Labor Market

Median one-year-ahead earnings growth expectations fell by 0.2 percentage point to 2.8% in March, equaling its 12-month trailing average. The series has been moving within a narrow range between 2.7% and 3.0% since January 2024.
Mean unemployment expectations—or the mean probability that the U.S. unemployment rate will be higher one year from now—jumped 4.6 percentage points to 44.0%, the highest reading since April 2020. The increase was broad-based across age, education, and income groups.
The mean perceived probability of losing one’s job in the next 12 months increased by 1.6 percentage points to 15.7%, the highest level since March 2024. The increase was largest for respondents with annual household incomes below $50,000. The mean probability of leaving one’s job voluntarily in the next 12 months increased by 0.4 percentage point to 18.0%, remaining far below the 12-month trailing average of 19.7%.
The mean perceived probability of finding a job if one’s current job was lost decreased by 0.1 percentage point to 51.1%.

Household Finance

The median expected growth in household income decreased by 0.3 percentage point to 2.8% in March, falling below its 12-month trailing average of 3.0%. The decline was most pronounced for respondents with at most a high school degree and for those with annual household incomes under $50,000.

Median household spending growth expectations declined by 0.1 percentage point to 4.9%.
Perceptions of credit access compared to a year ago showed a larger share of households reporting it is harder to get credit. Expectations for future credit availability also deteriorated, with a larger share of respondents expecting it will be harder to obtain credit in the year ahead.
The average perceived probability of missing a minimum debt payment over the next three months decreased by 1.0 percentage point to 13.6%, remaining slightly above the 12-month trailing average of 13.4%.
The median expectation regarding a year-ahead change in taxes at current income level decreased by 0.2 percentage point to 3.2%.
Median year-ahead expected growth in government debt decreased by 0.4 percentage point to 4.6%, the lowest reading of the series since its start in June 2013.
The mean perceived probability that the average interest rate on saving accounts will be higher in 12 months increased by 0.7 percentage point to 26.1%.
Perceptions about households’ current financial situations compared to a year ago deteriorated slightly, with a larger share of households reporting a worse financial situation compared to a year ago. Year-ahead expectations about households’ financial situations also deteriorated in March. The share of households expecting a worse financial situation in one year from now rose to 30.0%, the highest level since October 2023.
The mean perceived probability that U.S. stock prices will be higher 12 months from now dropped by 3.2 percentage points to 33.8%, the lowest level since June 2022.

About the Survey of Consumer Expectations (SCE)
The SCE contains information about how consumers expect overall inflation and prices for food, gas, housing, and education to behave. It also provides insight into Americans’ views about job prospects and earnings growth and their expectations about future spending and access to credit. The SCE also provides measures of uncertainty regarding consumers’ outlooks. Expectations are also available by age, geography, income, education, and numeracy.
The SCE is a nationally representative, internet-based survey of a rotating panel of approximately 1,300 household heads. Respondents participate in the panel for up to 12 months, with a roughly equal number rotating in and out of the panel each month. Unlike comparable surveys based on repeated cross-sections with a different set of respondents in each wave, this panel allows us to observe the changes in expectations and behavior of the same individuals over time. For further information on the SCE, please refer to an overview of the survey methodology here, the FAQs, the interactive chart guide, and the survey questionnaire.
The SCE release calendar has been updated for the remainder of 2025. Please see dates here.
 
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Firms reported declining interest rates on bank loans, while indicating a slight further tightening of other lending conditions.
The bank loan financing gap remained almost unchanged, with firms reporting a reduced need for such loans alongside a slight decrease in availability.
Firms’ one-year-ahead median inflation expectations decreased slightly to 2.9%, down from 3%, while median inflation expectations three and five years ahead remained unchanged at 3.0%.

In the most recent round of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), covering the first quarter of 2025, euro area firms reported a net decrease in interest rates on bank loans (a net ‑12%, compared with a net ‑4% in the previous quarter), suggesting that monetary policy easing is being transmitted to firms. At the same time, a net 24% (a net 22% in the previous quarter) observed increases in other financing costs (i.e. charges, fees and commissions) (Chart 1).
In this survey round, firms indicated a reduction in the need for bank loans (net ‑4%, unchanged from the fourth quarter of 2024, Chart 2). At the same time, firms reported broadly stable availability of bank loans (a net ‑1%, down from a net 2% in the previous quarter). This left the bank loan financing gap – an index capturing the difference between the need for and the availability of bank loans – broadly unchanged (a net ‑1%, after a net 1% in the previous survey round). The current composite financing gap indicator – which includes bank loans, credit lines and trade credit as well as debt securities and equity – is reaching levels historically associated with periods of monetary policy easing. Looking ahead, firms expect a modest improvement in the availability of external financing over the next three months.
Firms continued to perceive the general economic outlook to be the main factor hampering the availability of external financing, as in the previous survey round (a net ‑21%, compared with a net ‑22%). A net 7% of firms indicated an improvement in banks’ willingness to lend (down from a net 8% in the previous survey round).
A net 6% of firms reported an increase in turnover over the last three months, unchanged from the previous survey round, with a significantly higher percentage of firms becoming optimistic about developments in the next quarter (a net 30%, up from a net 11%). More firms saw a deterioration in their profits compared with the previous survey round (a net ‑16%, down from ‑14% in the previous survey round). The survey indicates that the net percentage of firms reporting rising cost pressures had also increased over the past three months.
Firms’ expectations of selling prices over the next 12 months were unchanged, while expectations for wage costs slightly decreased, driven by lower expected pressures in the services sector (Chart 3). On average, firms’ selling price expectations remained unchanged at 2.9%, while the corresponding figure for wages was 3.0% (down from 3.3% in the previous round). At the same time, firms signalled a slight increase in other production costs (4%, up from 3.8% in the previous round).
Firms’ inflation expectations for the short term slightly decreased, while remaining unchanged at longer horizons (Chart 4). Median expectations for annual inflation one year ahead declined by 0.1 percentage point to 2.9%, while those for three and five years ahead saw no changes, standing at 3.0%. For inflation five years ahead, fewer firms reported balanced risks (30%, down from 33% in the previous round). A higher percentage of firms is seeing risks to the five-year-ahead inflation as being tilted to the upside (55%, up from 51% in the previous round), which was mirrored by a decline in the proportion of those perceiving risks to the downside (14%, down from 16%).
The report published today presents the main results of the 34thround of the SAFE survey for the euro area. The survey was conducted between 10 February and 21 March 2025. In this survey round, firms were asked about economic and financing developments over two different reference periods. Around half of firms were asked about changes in the period between October 2024 and March 2025. The remainder, all from the 12 largest euro area countries, were asked about changes in the period between January and March 2025. Additionally, firms also reported their expectations for euro area inflation, selling prices, and other costs. Altogether, the sample comprised 11,022 firms in the euro area, of which 10,167 (92%) had fewer than 250 employees.
For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg tel.: +49 172 1683704.
Notes

The report on this SAFE survey round, together with the questionnaire and methodological information, is available on the ECB’s website.
Detailed data series for the individual euro area countries and aggregate euro area results are available on the ECB Data Portal.

Chart 1
Changes in the terms and conditions of bank financing for euro area firms

(net percentages of respondents)

Base: Firms that had applied for bank loans (including subsidised bank loans), credit lines, or bank or credit card overdrafts. The figures refer to rounds 27 to 34 of the survey (April-September 2022 to October 2024-March 2025).
Notes: Net percentages are the difference between the percentage of firms reporting an increase for a given factor and the percentage reporting a decrease. The data included in the chart refer to Question 10 of the survey. The grey panels represent responses for three-monthly reference periods, whereas the white panels relate to replies for six-monthly reference periods.

Chart 2
Changes in euro area firms’ financing needs and the availability of bank loans

(net percentages of respondents)

Base: Firms for which the instrument in question is relevant (i.e. they have used it or considered using it). Respondents replying “not applicable” or “don’t know” are excluded. The figures refer to rounds 27 to 34 of the survey (April-September 2022 to October 2024-March 2025).
Notes: The financing gap indicator combines both financing needs and the availability of bank loans at firm level. The indicator of the perceived change in the financing gap takes a value of 1 (-1) if the need increases (decreases) and availability decreases (increases). If firms perceive only a one-sided increase (decrease) in the financing gap, the variable is assigned a value of 0.5 (-0.5). A positive value for the indicator points to a widening of the financing gap. Values are multiplied by 100 to obtain weighted net balances in percentages. The data included in the chart refer to Questions 5 and Questions 9 of the survey. The grey panels represent responses for three-monthly reference periods, whereas the white panels relate to six-monthly reference periods.

Chart 3
Expectations for selling prices, wages, input costs and employees one year ahead, by size class

(percentage changes over the next 12 months)

Base: All firms. The figures refer to rounds 29 to 34 (September 2023 to March 2025) of the survey, with firms’ replies collected in the last month of the respective survey waves.
Notes: Average euro area firms’ expectations of changes in selling prices, wages of current employees, non-labour input costs and number of employees for the next 12 months using survey weights. The statistics are computed after trimming the data at the country-specific 1st and 99th percentiles. The data included in the chart refer to Question 34 of the survey.

Chart 4
Firms’ median expectations for euro area inflation by size class

(annual percentages)

Base: All firms. The figures refer to pilot 2 and rounds 30 to 34 (December 2023 to March 2025) of the survey, with firms’ replies collected in the last month of the respective survey waves.
Notes: Median firms’ expectations for euro area inflation in one year, three years and five years, calculated using survey weights. The statistics are computed after trimming the data at the country-specific 1st and 99th percentiles. The data included in the chart refer to Question 31 of the survey.

 
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Blog post by: Salih Fendoglu, Mahvash S. Qureshi, Felix Suntheim | Heightened tensions can hurt stock markets, raise government borrowing costs, and pose risks to financial stability
Global geopolitical risks remain elevated, raising concerns about their potential impact on economic and financial stability.
Shocks such as wars, diplomatic tensions, or terrorism can disrupt cross-border trade and investment. This can hurt asset prices, affect financial institutions, and curtail lending to the private sector, weighing on economic activity and posing a threat to financial stability.
Such risks are challenging for investors to price due to their unique nature, rare occurrence, and uncertain duration and scope. This can lead to sharp market reactions when geopolitical shocks materialize.
As we show in a chapter of the latest Global Financial Stability Report, stock prices tend to decline significantly during major geopolitical risk events, as measured by more frequent news stories mentioning adverse geopolitical developments and associated risks. The average monthly drop is about 1 percentage point across countries, though it’s a much larger 2.5 percentage points in emerging market economies.

Of the different types of major geopolitical risk events, international military conflicts hit emerging market stocks the hardest, likely because of more severe economic disruptions compared with other events. In these cases, the average monthly drop in stock returns is a significant 5 percentage points, twice as much as for all other types of events.
Heightened geopolitical risks may also affect the public sector as economic growth slows and governments spend more. Consequently, sovereign risk premiums—measured by prices for credit derivatives that protect against default—often increase after geopolitical events by, on average, about 30 basis points for advanced economies and 45 basis points for emerging market economies. Such financial strains are especially significant in emerging market economies, where premiums increase up to four times as much.
Cross-border spillovers
Geopolitical risk events can also spill over to other economies through trade and financial linkages, increasing the risk of contagion. Stock valuations decline by an average of about 2.5 percent following the involvement of a main trading partner country in an international military conflict. Likewise, sovereign risk premiums rise when trading partners are involved in geopolitical risk events, and the effect is at least twice as large for emerging market economies with high public debt relative to economic output, low international reserves adequacy, and weak institutions, as the chapter shows.

Heightened uncertainty is a key channel for asset price reactions. Geopolitical shocks tend to raise macroeconomic uncertainty for several months. Investors, however, recognize these risks and demand compensation for holding stocks that may perform worse when hit by a shock.
Eventually, a sudden drop in asset prices may weigh on bank and non-bank financial institutions with potential spillovers to the broader financial system and the real economy. For example, banks tend to curb lending, and investment funds face lower returns and elevated redemption risk when exposed to geopolitical risk events.
Mitigating risks
While it may seem like the global economy and financial markets are regularly upended by unpredictable and even unprecedented events, there is still much that the financial sector and those charged with safeguarding it can do to protect financial stability.
Financial institutions and their regulators should allocate adequate resources to identify, quantify, and manage geopolitical risks. For example, through stress tests and other analyses that incorporate how such risks are likely to interact with financial markets.
In addition, financial institutions should hold enough capital and liquidity to help them endure potential losses from geopolitical risks. Emerging market and developing economies should further develop and deepen financial markets to help investors manage risks. Finally, since countries with weaker buffers are particularly vulnerable to geopolitical shocks, sufficient fiscal policy space and adequate international reserves could help them better defend against such disruptions.
—This blog is based on Chapter 2 of the April 2025 Global Financial Stability Report, “Geopolitical Risks: Implications for Asset Prices and Financial Stability.”
 
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The Cybersecurity Act strengthens the EU Agency for cybersecurity (ENISA) and establishes a cybersecurity certification framework for products and services.

A new mandate for ENISA
ENISA, the EU Agency for cybersecurity, is now stronger. The EU Cybersecurity Act grants a permanent mandate to the agency, and gives it more resources and new tasks.
ENISA will have a key role in setting up and maintaining the European cybersecurity certification framework by preparing the technical ground for specific certification schemes. It will be in charge of informing the public on the certification schemes and the issued certificates through a dedicated website.
ENISA is mandated to increase operational cooperation at EU level, helping EU Member States who wish to request it to handle their cybersecurity incidents, and supporting the coordination of the EU in case of large-scale cross-border cyberattacks and crises.
This task builds on ENISA’s role as secretariat of the national Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRTs) Network, established by the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive).
A European cybersecurity certification framework
The EU Cybersecurity Act introduces an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for ICT products, services and processes. Companies doing business in the EU will benefit from having to certify their ICT products, processes and services only once and see their certificates recognised across the European Union.
More on the certification framework
Targeted amendment
On 18 April 2023, the Commission proposed a targeted amendment to the EU Cybersecurity Act. This targeted amendment was adopted on 15 January 2025 and aims to enable the future adoption of European certification schemes for ‘managed security services’ covering areas such as incident response, penetration testing, security audits and consultancy. Certification is key to ensure high level of quality and reliability of these highly critical and sensitive cybersecurity services which assist companies and organisations to prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents.
On 11 April 2025, the Commission launched a public consultation for input to evaluate and revise the Cybersecurity Act.

 
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Today, EU Member States have voted in favour of the European Commission’s proposal to introduce trade countermeasures against the United States.
The Commission’s proposal was made in response to the March decision by the US to impose tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from the EU.
The EU considers US tariffs unjustified and damaging, causing economic harm to both sides, as well as the global economy. The EU has stated its clear preference to find negotiated outcomes with the US, which would be balanced and mutually beneficial.
Today’s vote of approval by Member States means that – once the Commission’s internal procedures are concluded, and the implementing act published – countermeasures will enter into force. Duties will start being collected as of 15 April.
These countermeasures can be suspended at any time, should the US agree to a fair and balanced negotiated outcome.
For more information, please contact:

Olof Gill, Spokesperson, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Saul Louis Goulding, Press Officer, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Marta Perez-Cejuela Romero, Press Officer, EUROPEAN COMMISSION

 
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To become a global leader in artificial intelligence (AI) is the objective of the AI Continent Action Plan launched today. As set out by President von der Leyen at the AI Action Summit in February 2025 in Paris, this ambitious initiative is set to transform Europe’s strong traditional industries and its exceptional talent pool into powerful engines of AI innovation and acceleration.
The race for leadership in AI is far from over. From cutting-edge foundation models to specialised AI applications, the AI landscape in the EU is dynamic. It is driven by research, emerging technologies and a thriving ecosystem of startups and scaleups. The AI Continent Action Plan will boost the European Union’s AI innovation capabilities through actions and policies around five key pillars:

Building a large-scale AI data and computing infrastructure  

The Commission will strengthen Europe’s AI and supercomputing infrastructure with a network of AI Factories. 13 of these factories are already being deployed around Europe’s world-leading supercomputers. They will support EU AI startups, industry and researchers in developing AI models and applications.
As announced in the Competitiveness Compass, the EU will also help set up AI Gigafactories. These will be large-scale facilities equipped with approximately 100,000 state-of-the-art AI chips, four times more than current AI factories. They will integrate massive computing power and data centres to train and develop complex AI models at unprecedented scale. The AI Gigafactories will lead the next wave of frontier AI models and maintain the EU’s strategic autonomy in critical industrial sectors and science, requiring public and private investments. A call for expression of interest for interested consortia is published today.
Private investment in Gigafactories will be further stimulated through the InvestAI, which will mobilise €20 billion investment for up to five AI Gigafactories across the Union.
To stimulate private sector investment in cloud capacity and data centres, the Commission will also propose a Cloud and AI Development Act. The goal is to at least triple the EU’s data centre capacity in the next five to seven years, prioritising highly sustainable data centres.

Increasing access to large and high-quality data

Bolstering AI innovation also requires access to large volumes of high-quality data. An important element of the Action Plan is the creation of Data Labs, bringing together and curating large, high-quality data volumes from different sources in AI Factories. A comprehensive Data Union Strategy will be launched in 2025 to create a true internal market for data that can scale up AI solutions.

Developing algorithms and fostering AI adoption in strategic EU sectors

Despite the potential of AI, only 13.5% of companies in the EU have adopted AI. To develop tailored AI solutions, boost their industrial use and full adoption in EU strategic public and private sectors, the Commission will launch the Apply AI Strategy in the coming months. European AI innovation infrastructure, including notably the AI Factories and the European Digital Innovation Hubs (EDIHs), will play an important role in this Strategy.

Strengthening AI skills and talents

To meet rising demand for AI talent, the Commission will facilitate international recruitment of highly skilled AI experts and researchers through initiatives such as the Talent Pool, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Action ‘MSCA Choose Europe’ and AI fellowships schemes offered by the upcoming AI Skills Academy. These actions will contribute to legal migration pathways for highly skilled non-EU workers in the AI sector and attract the best European AI researchers and experts back to Europe. It will also develop educational and training programmes on AI and Generative AI in key sectors, preparing the next generation of AI specialists and supporting the upskilling and reskilling of workers.

Regulatory simplification

The AI Act raises citizens’ trust in technology and provides investors and entrepreneurs with the legal certainty they need to scale up and deploy AI throughout Europe. The Commission will also launch the AI Act Service Desk, to help businesses comply with the AI Act. It will serve as the central point of contact and hub for information and guidance on the AI Act.
Next Steps
With this Action Plan the Commission opens today two public consultations, running until 4 June 2025, to further shape these AI Continent Action Plan initiatives.

A public consultation inviting all interested parties to share their views on the Cloud and AI Development Act
A public consultation on Apply AI to identify stakeholder priorities, challenges to the uptake of AI, and the relevance of proposed solutions and policy approaches—including additional measures to ensure the smooth and simple application of the AI Act.

A third public consultation on Data Union Strategy will be launched in May.
In parallel, the Commission will organise dialogues with industry representatives and the public sector to help shape the Apply AI Strategy. These dialogues, together with the public consultations, will identify relevant examples of untapped potential in adopting AI technologies in specific sectors, their current integration in business and production processes, and opportunities for scaling up within these sectors and the wider economy.
Background
On 1 August 2024 the AI Act entered into force and guidelines on prohibited AI practices were published on 4 February 2025. On 24 January 2024, the Commission launched a package of measures to support European startups and SMEs in the development of trustworthy AI. On 9 July 2024 the amended EuroHPC JU Regulation entered into force, allowing the set-up of AI Factories. On 10 December 2024, seven consortia were selected to establish AI Factories, followed by six additional consortia on 12 March 2025. At the AI Action Summit in Paris on 11 February 2025, President von der Leyen announced InvestAI, an initiative to mobilise a €200 billion investment in AI across Europe.
 
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Governments should renew their efforts to better design, deliver, and review regulation and regulatory processes, according to a new OECD report. 
The Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 – the OECD’s flagship publication on drafting laws and regulations, their implementation and review – highlights the efforts governments are making to advance policy objectives while adapting to rapid technological change and evolving policy environments. It identifies opportunities to reduce unnecessary regulations, while ensuring regulatory frameworks are focused on better outcomes for people, and contribute to a policy environment that supports innovation and strong and sustainable growth.
Regulations are often seen as burdensome for citizens and businesses, while their weak enforcement can raise concerns about government effectiveness in protecting people and the environment. Governments must renew efforts to design and review rules and build trust, the report said.
“To navigate today’s complex policy environment, with fast technological changes and growing demands for efficiency and effectiveness, governments need to ensure that regulatory frameworks are adaptive, efficient and proportionate to underlying policy objectives,” OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann said. “By tackling unnecessary regulations, and ensuring regulatory frameworks are focused on better outcomes, governments can contribute to a supportive policy environment for stronger and more sustainable growth. This fourth edition of the Regulatory Policy Outlook provides evidence-based recommendations for developing best practice regulatory frameworks to achieve these objectives.”
New analysis shows that OECD Members have made good progress toward improving stakeholder engagement, particularly by using digital platforms, extending consultation periods, and enabling the public to provide evidence on both the anticipated and actual impacts of regulations. However, there is room for improvement. Only 33% of OECD countries provide direct feedback to stakeholder engagement, missing the chance to make interaction more meaningful and encourage future participation. Broader consultations are also needed to ensure inclusivity and reduce concerns around undue influence.
Regulations are more likely to be effective when based on sound evidence. Governments have improved evidence-based decision making, requiring an examination of more social and environmental considerations alongside economic ones when using tools such as regulatory impact assessment. These efforts should continue and be followed by effective implementation of regulations, the report said.
Current regulatory frameworks often lag behind technological progress, and struggle with overlapping jurisdictions, legal fragmentation, and outdated rules. To better support innovation while managing risks, governments must embrace adapt and learn from experience to improve anticipatory governance, while also strengthening co-operation and co-ordination across authorities. The use of strategic intelligence tools like horizon scanning and strategic foresight can also help anticipate and mitigate risks, ensuring rules stay relevant and effective even as circumstances change.
Most OECD countries have scope to further support compliance and desired outcomes by adopting risk-based analysis. This would allow enforcement resources to be focused on where non-compliance would have the greatest impact, saving both businesses and government time and resources, while maintaining positive outcomes. However, less than 50% of OECD countries currently allow regulators to base enforcement work on risk criteria.
Significant challenges remain in implementing governments’ commitments to environmental protection while preserving economic growth. Only 21% of OECD Members review rules with a “green lens” of environmental sustainability across sectors and the wider economy. Deepening such reviews to consider the local and broader impact of pollution, carbon emissions and biodiversity is critical to ensure that regulations actively support the green transition.
To achieve meaningful environmental outcomes, governments should streamline the complex patchwork of rules with environmental objectives, viewing them as a system, reducing unnecessary regulatory burdens including across borders, prioritising risk-based regulation and focusing enforcement efforts on areas where the greatest risks to the environment exist.
To access the report, data, and summary, visit: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2025_56b60e39-en.html.
For further information on OECD work on regulatory policy, visit: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/regulatory-reform.html.
Media enquiries should be directed to Lawrence Speer in the OECD Media Office (+33 1 45 24 97 00).
 
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Introductory statement by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament
It is a privilege to be here today to continue our discussion on the digital euro.
There are many compelling arguments in favour of introducing a digital euro, and in my view they all converge on one fundamental principle: strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy.
Today I would like to discuss what strategic autonomy in day-to-day payments means in practice, looking at both the key role of cash and the benefits of a digital euro.
Faced with a less predictable international environment, it is now time to take concrete action.
Retail payments are becoming increasingly digital.[1] Consumers are increasingly choosing to use digital means of payment in shops, and they are also making ever more purchases online. Yet, a significant share of these transactions depend on non-European providers. Today, people in 13 euro area countries rely solely on international card schemes or mobile solutions for in-shop payments.[2] And even where national card schemes exist, they rely on co-badging with international card schemes to enable cross-border payments within the euro area. In the not so distant future, this could evolve into dependence on other private means of payment, for instance foreign stablecoins.
Excessively relying on foreign providers undermines our resilience and compromises our monetary sovereignty.[3] It also underscores the urgent need for a digital euro. Failing to act would not only expose us to significant risks, but also deprive us of a great opportunity.
The vital role of cash in ensuring financial inclusion and resilience
Despite the rapid digitalisation of retail payments, cash remains a cornerstone of the European financial system and is currently our only sovereign means of payment.
The continued strong demand for cash[4] highlights the importance of ensuring that it remains a convenient, secure and universally accepted means of payment and store of value.
Cash ensures financial inclusion, but it also plays a crucial role in maintaining the resilience of our payment systems and economies. In times of crisis, for example during cyberattacks or power failures, cash provides a reliable fall-back option. We have also seen this during the natural disasters that have affected parts of the euro area over the past year.
Against this background, the Eurosystem is fully committed to ensuring that cash remains a widely available and accepted means of payment for everyone in Europe. We have implemented a comprehensive cash strategy[5], and we are redesigning euro banknotes to make them fit for the future.
Moreover, the ECB strongly welcomes the proposed regulation governing the legal tender status of euro banknotes and coins. As we explained in our opinion, the regulation should clearly prohibit ex ante unilateral exclusions of cash by retailers or service providers. It should also ensure that Member States will hold the banking sector responsible for providing essential cash services to both private and corporate customers, ensuring good access to facilities for withdrawing and depositing euro cash across the euro area.[6]
The need to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy in digital payments in a changing geopolitical environment
However, we must also ensure that Europeans have a secure and reliable digital means of payment that complements cash and extends its key benefits to the digital sphere. The growing preference for digital payments means that the acceptance and the availability of cash are no longer sufficient to cover a growing share of use cases. For example, online shopping accounts for more than one-third of our retail transactions, but cash cannot be used online and it is often not possible to pay using a European payment service[7], meaning we need to rely on non-European payment systems. This is a structural weakness that we need to address.
Europe cannot afford to rely excessively on foreign payment solutions. Doing so makes us dependent on the kindness of strangers in a context of heightened geopolitical tensions. The urgency of preserving our autonomy in defence and energy is already extremely clear. But ensuring autonomy for essential services like daily payments is just as urgent. Without it, we are vulnerable to geopolitical threats and risk losing our monetary sovereignty. Recent international developments underscore these risks.
Meanwhile, our reliance on foreign payment providers weakens our economic potential and our ability to compete. Owing to the fragmented payments market, European payment service providers often lack the scale to offer their services across the EU. This plays into the hands of non-European providers that can offer their services at the European level, and even internationally.
Our fragmented market structure also comes with a large price tag. But it does not have to be this way – we have the power to decide how unified our payments market should be.
Data show that domestic card schemes are losing market share across Europe[8], while international schemes charge high fees to European banks and merchants.[9]
And the growing popularity of digital wallets like PayPal or Apple Pay is exposing European banks to further outflows of fees and data.
Most recently, the measures taken by the new US Administration to promote crypto-assets and US dollar-backed stablecoins raise concerns for Europe’s financial stability and strategic autonomy. They could potentially result not just in further losses of fees and data, but also in euro deposits being moved to the United States and in a further strengthening of the role of the dollar in cross-border payments. At the same time, private businesses are increasingly open to accepting stablecoins for customer payments, which could have far-reaching implications for monetary sovereignty.[10]
Faced with these challenges, we need a public-private partnership to retain our sovereignty. The digital euro – as a sovereign European means of payment based on EU legislation – would be the cornerstone of this partnership.
It would ensure that the euro area retains control over its financial future. By offering a secure and universally accepted digital payment option which would be suitable for all use cases – and, crucially, under European governance – it would reduce our dependence on foreign providers. And it would limit the potential for foreign currency stablecoins to become a common medium of exchange within the euro area.[11]
The digital euro would provide European consumers with a simple and safe digital payment option, free for basic use, that covers all their payment needs everywhere in the euro area while ensuring their privacy.[12] It would also protect European merchants from excessive charges imposed by international card schemes and put them in a stronger position to negotiate fees with these schemes.[13]
In addition, the digital euro could be used offline, making our daily payments more resilient as both consumers and merchants would still be able to use the digital euro without a network connection.
And, importantly, the digital euro would enable European payment service providers to operate autonomously once more.[14] The digital euro would not compete with private initiatives. Instead, it would exploit synergies and enable private initiatives to scale up more easily across the EU. This would help overcome the hurdles that have led to the current fragmentation.
One example of these synergies is offering an integrated solution that enables private initiatives to provide services across the euro area and effectively cover all use cases thanks to the common digital euro standards.
This would mean that people would not have to look for alternative foreign payment solutions. European banks would be able to retain their customers and be adequately compensated for their services.
The world of payments is changing fast, which is why it is crucial to move forwards with the digital euro legislation now.
The consequences of inaction are becoming increasingly apparent. Inaction could lead to a loss of control over our financial infrastructure, increased reliance on foreign systems and potential disruptions to our banking and credit systems. Delaying the digital euro would slow down our collective public-private response to these risks. European citizens are relying on us to secure Europe’s chance to drive change rather than watch from the sidelines.
Digital euro project on track
Let me now focus on the technical progress of our project.
The legal framework is crucial in shaping how the digital euro operates, including its status as legal tender and how privacy is protected. In parallel, the digital euro project is progressing according to schedule and we are nearing the end of the preparation phase.[15]
Together with market participants we are working on the digital euro rulebook – a single set of rules, standards and procedures for digital euro payments.[16] You have previously asked about the benefits a digital euro would have for the private sector. This rulebook will enable European payment providers to expand their services across the euro area by capitalising on the open standards and legal tender status of the digital euro. As soon as the legislation is adopted by the co-legislators, these standards can be finalised and market participants can use them, even before the potential issuance of a digital euro.[17] This would frontload the benefits for both merchants and consumers. Later this week we will publish an update on the progress we have made on developing the rulebook.
It is vital that the digital euro ensures the stability of the financial system – we have heard your concerns on this topic, and it is one of our key priorities. As I mentioned the last time we met, we are currently developing the methodology that builds a solid analytical base to determine the digital euro holding limit.[18] This methodology is based on the three pillars indicated in the draft legislation – usability, monetary policy and financial stability. We are building on the feedback we have received from all market stakeholders, and we aim to publish the results in the summer. Preliminary findings already indicate that using the digital euro for daily payments will not harm financial stability, banking supervision or monetary policy.
This public-private effort to regain our autonomy in the retail payment space will be more likely to succeed if it also fosters innovation, as some of you have mentioned previously. Therefore, last October we issued a call for expressions of interest in innovation partnerships for the digital euro.[19] The primary goal is to experiment with conditional payments and other innovative use cases. For example, we are exploring the possibility of allowing people to pay only if a given service is provided, thereby avoiding lengthy and uncertain reimbursement procedures.
We have seen a lot of interest from various market sectors, with around 100 applicants wanting to experiment further with new use cases and technological solutions.[20] These innovation partnerships will ultimately benefit all digital euro providers and users. Providers will be able to expand their customer and revenue bases, while users will benefit from innovative payment options.
In addition, technical work on privacy, offline functionality and operational resilience is progressing well. We are also in the middle of the procurement process to establish framework agreements with possible future providers of digital euro services.[21]
Finally, we are conducting comprehensive user research to gather actionable insights into user preferences and ensure that the digital euro offers people clear benefits.[22] This is something you also raised in the European Parliament’s recent resolution on the ECB’s Annual Report.[23]
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
The time to act is now. Making progress on both the digital euro regulation and the regulation on the legal tender status of cash has become urgent if we are to increase our resilience to possible disruptions and reverse our ever-increasing dependence on foreign companies.
We have been highlighting the importance of Europe’s strategic autonomy since the very beginning of the digital euro project.[24] The good news is that both the co-legislators and the ECB have been working hard on this issue in recent years.
This is a public-private common European project, and as co-legislators you are central to making it happen. Now is the moment to make Europe’s strategic autonomy in the critical area of payments a reality.
For the digital euro to be successful, we need robust and forward-looking legislation. The ECB stands ready to support you with technical input as your deliberations progress, and we will of course continue to update you on the progress we are making.
In a fast-changing world, let’s show all Europeans that we respond to challenges head-on, protect our currency and guarantee people’s freedom to pay as they choose.
Thank you for your attention.

ECB (2024), Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE), December.
ECB (2025), Report on card schemes and processors, February. In addition, only a limited number of European countries offer a domestic payment option for online shopping.
According to the most recent ECB payment statistics, in the first half of 2024 international card schemes accounted for 66% of all electronically initiated transactions conducted using cards issued in the euro area (up from 61% in 2022).
The total value of euro banknotes in circulation is currently just below €1.6 trillion. And banknotes circulate rapidly: in 2024 the value of banknotes supplied by banks to their customers was at a similar level, just above €1.6 trillion.
The Eurosystem cash strategy aims to ensure that cash remains widely available and accepted as both a means of payment and a store of value. See also ECB (2025), “ECB selects motifs for future euro banknotes”, press release, 31 January.
This approachensures legal certainty for in-person payments and is aligned with the provisions laid down in the digital euro draft regulation. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, European Commission, COM(2023) 364 final, 28 June 2023 and Opinion of the European Central Bank of 13 October 2023 on a proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins (CON/2023/31).
ECB (2024), op. cit.
ECB (2025), Report on card schemes and processors, February.
EuroCommerce (2024), “EU businesses’ competitiveness impacted by current cards payments landscape – a call for urgent action”, position paper, 8 July.
For example, PayPal has announced plans to offer its own stablecoin – PayPal USD (PYUSD) – as a payment option to more than 20 million small and medium-sized merchants by the end of 2025. This will allow merchants to easily pay their vendors in stablecoins through a new PYUSD-powered feature for paying bills. Instead of wiring payments through traditional banking networks, businesses will be able to send PYUSD instantly, with no intermediaries involved. PYUSD can be used anywhere PayPal is accepted, including millions of merchants worldwide. PYUSD can therefore already be used as a payment option on e-commerce platforms and at point-of-sale terminals, enabling merchants to accept payments from customers.
See also Lane, P.R. (2025), “The digital euro: maintaining the autonomy of the monetary system”, speech at the University College Cork Economics Society Conference 2025, Cork, 20 March.
An offline functionality would allow people to use digital euro even when they have poor or no network reception. Before making a payment, the user would need to prefund their offline digital euro payment account and the funds would be stored locally on their device. The payment would take place without any third-party involvement. For more information on privacy, see Daman, M.G.A. (2024), “Making the digital euro truly private”, The ECB Blog, ECB, 13 June.
As is currently the case for other payment systems, payment service providers distributing the digital euro would be able to charge merchants for these services. Price-setting for merchants and payment service providers would be subject to a cap, as proposed by the European Commission in its digital euro legislative proposal. As with the production and issuance of banknotes, the Eurosystem would bear the costs of establishing the digital euro scheme and infrastructure.
There are several examples of market initiatives that aim to provide pan-European solutions. For example, 14 banks from France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are seeking to position a new brand, Wero, as part of the European Payments Initiative (EPI). Wero currently offers payment solutions for person-to-person and online (where accepted) use cases. While this is a positive development, Wero still has a limited scope in the EU and does not intend to expand into point-of-sale payments with a contactless (NFC) solution. In parallel, EuroPA, the European Payments Alliance, has been created, under which Bancomat, Bizum and MB WAY have started rolling out their service to enable users in Italy, Portugal, Spain and Andorra to send and receive money instantly via mobile phone number. While interoperability among domestic schemes has the potential to connect separate payment systems, achieving a truly seamless and integrated payment experience requires significant technical, regulatory and user experience challenges to be overcome, particularly when considering various use cases like point-of-sale and e-commerce. These European private initiatives could capitalise on the open standards and legal tender status of the digital euro, thereby expanding into new countries and addressing new use cases more cost-effectively.
ECB (2024), Progress on the preparation phase of a digital euro – Second Progress Report, 2 December.
The Eurosystem established a Rulebook Development Group for the digital euro scheme to obtain input from the financial industry, consumers and merchants. The Group consists of 22 public and private sector experts with experience in finance and payments. See ECB (2023), “Members of the Rulebook Development Group”, 15 February. For more information, see the letter from Piero Cipollone to Aurore Lalucq, Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, on the “Update on work of digital euro Rulebook Development Group”, 5 September 2024.
The digital euro rulebook would mandate common standards across the euro area. The digital euro acceptance standards would be made available for free for reuse by private parties, who will be able to develop their services on that basis. This will help private providers achieve a pan-European acceptance on a technical level, leading to cost efficiencies and a more integrated European payment market. The expansion of both their geographical reach and their portfolio of products will, in turn, make it easier for them to compete internationally. While technical acceptance would be guaranteed, commercial agreements would still be needed.
The ECB has been working with experts from national central banks and national competent authorities to develop a comprehensive methodology for calibrating the digital euro holding limit. At the technical session on a digital euro held on 16 July 2024, Euro Retail Payments Board member associations shared their views on the factors influencing this calibration, which were incorporated into the development process. See ECB (2024), “Preliminary methodology for calibrating holding limits”, 10 December.
ECB (2024), “Call for expressions of interest in innovation partnerships for the digital euro”, MIP News, 31 October.
The applicants included 25 start-ups, 18 IT companies, ten other payment service providers, nine universities and five banks. Examples of new use cases include i) suburban transportation using a smartphone as the check-in/out device and allowing for conditional reimbursement if a service is delayed; ii) implementing consumer rights to withdraw from subscriptions, a process that is currently not always transparent.
In 2024 we launched the process to select potential providers. We issued calls for applications to establish framework agreements for five digital euro components expected to be operated by providers outside the Eurosystem: (i) the alias lookup component; (ii) the secure exchange of payment information component; (iii) the fraud and risk management component; (iv) the offline component; and (v) a digital euro app and related software development kit. Other components, such as payment settlement, would be sourced from within the Eurosystem. For more information, see the letter from Piero Cipollone to Irene Tinagli, Chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, on “Update on work of digital euro Rulebook Development Group and start of selection procedure for potential digital euro providers”, 3 January 2024.
The ECB has engaged a specialised provider to conduct comprehensive user research, which began in September 2024. The aim of this research is to gather actionable insights into user preferences to enhance the digital euro’s value proposition. Key focus areas include: (i) a general segmentation analysis of the broader population to identify who would use a digital euro and what they would need; (ii) user preferences for holding limits that will inform the technical work on the methodology for calibrating the holding limit; and (iii) in-depth studies carried out with vulnerable groups and small merchants. The methodologies employed include surveys, focus groups, peer interviews and an online community for rapid consultation with users. The research findings are expected to be published in mid-2025.
European Parliament (2025), REPORT on European Central Bank – annual report 2024, 22 January.
ECB (2020), Report on a digital euro, October.

 
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