The European Commission took two decisions finding non-compliance by Google with the Digital Markets Act (DMA) for self-preferencing its own services on Google Search, and for putting in place restrictions on businesses to direct consumers to alternative, often cheaper, purchase channels on Google Play (steering). In this regard, the Commission issued Google a fine of €460 million and a fine of €430 million respectively.  
Self-preferencing on Google Search
Under the DMA, gatekeepers must not treat their own services more favourably in ranking than third-party services. They have to apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions to such ranking.
The Commission found that Google gives preferential treatment to its own services, including shopping, hotels, transport and sports results, over those of third parties in Google Search, thereby breaching its obligations under the DMA.
Google displays its own services more prominently in search results, including at the top of the search results page or by using enhanced visuals and filters, while similar third-party services do not have the same prominence.
Google’s anti-steering
Under the DMA, app developers that distribute their apps via Google Play should be able to inform customers – free of charge – of alternative, often cheaper, offers, and to direct them to those offers to make purchases, for example on websites or alternative app stores.
The Commission found that Google failed to comply with that obligation.
In particular, Google prevents app developers from freely communicating and promoting offers and concluding contracts with users in distribution channels of their choice, including third-party app stores.
While Google can receive a fee for facilitating the initial acquisition of a new customer by an app developer via Google Play, the level of the steering-related fees charged by Google and the length of the charging period for these fees went beyond what is considered compliant with the DMA.
As part of today’s two decisions, the Commission has ordered Google to bring the non-compliance to an end.
In particular, Google must implement measures to:

Treat third-party services that feature on Google’s search results in a fair and non-discriminatory manner by reference to its own services, and
Allow app developers distributing their apps via Google Play Store, both technically and contractually, to freely communicate, promote offers and conclude contracts with users not only within but also outside the Google Play app store.

The Commission notes that, after a constructive dialogue, Google has proposed and started testing changes to how it presents its own services on Google Search for free services such as shopping, hotels and flights. The Commission will monitor the implementation of these solutions which constitute substantial progress towards compliance. The Commission also notes that Google has proposed and started testing changes to how it presents shopping ads and content related services, such as sports. The Commission is currently assessing these changes and will continue its dialogue with Google in light of today’s decision. The Commission also takes note of Google’s proposals on how it plans to apply the principles of the decision to AI Overviews and AI Mode, on which dialogue will continue in light of today’s decision.
The Commission also notes that Google has rolled out changes related to Google’s steering terms. These constitute good progress towards compliance and will also be assessed in light of the cease and desist order of today’s decision.
The fines imposed today on Google take into account the gravity and duration of the non-compliance.
Next steps
Google is required to comply with the Commission’s decisions within 60 days, otherwise it risks periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of its total worldwide turnover.
The Commission continues to engage with Google to ensure compliance with its decisions and the DMA more generally.
Background
Google was designated as a gatekeeper in September 2023 for its online search engine Google Search. On 25 March 2024, the Commission opened non-compliance investigations into Google’s measures to prevent self-preferencing and into its steering rules. On 19 March 2025, the Commission informed Google of its preliminary view that the company was in breach of the DMA.
Google exercised its rights of defence by examining in detail all the documents in the two Commission investigation files and comprehensively replying in writing to the Commission’s preliminary findings.
The two non-compliance decisions were adopted after a thorough investigation, including feedback from market participants, and extensive dialogue with Google.
When calculating the fines, the Commission has assessed the gravity, duration and recurrence of the breaches and concluded that the level of fines imposed are proportionate and appropriate.
Google may decide to appeal today’s decisions.
 
 
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The ECB Blog | Why have energy prices risen less during the Iran war than after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? This ECB Blog post compares the two episodes and explains the role of market buffers, demand and competition for LNG shipments.
The wars in Ukraine and Iran have both led to significant energy shocks and, as a result, rising energy prices. Yet the two shocks differ markedly in terms of both scale and market impact.[1] Most notably, although the disruptions to global oil and gas supplies have been considerably larger during the Iran conflict, the resulting price increases have so far been comparatively muted. To understand why, this post examines the dynamics of energy commodity markets.

The Iran war has disrupted oil supply more severely
Military strikes between the United States, Israel and Iran in late February 2026 led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. This interrupted the transit of around 20 million barrels per day (mb/d), equivalent to one-fifth of global oil supply. Although Saudi and Emirati pipeline networks have partially mitigated the disruption, the conflict has nevertheless resulted in an average supply loss of around 14 mb/d so far, representing 14% of global oil supply. By contrast, the war in Ukraine reduced oil supply by only around 1 mb/d, or 1% of global output, since most of Russia’s 10 mb/d of oil production continued to reach world markets despite the sanctions put in place (Chart 1, panel a).

Chart 1
Size of the energy shock and oil futures curve reaction

a) Size of the shock

b) Changes in oil futures prices and consensus forecasts at different horizons

(oil: mbd; gas: bcm/m)

(percent)

Sources: LSEG and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Panel a) compares energy market disruptions during the Ukraine war and the Iran war by showing the size of the realised shock (bars) and the volume of oil and gas at risk (diamonds). For oil, in the war in Ukraine, volume at risk refers to total Russian oil production in January 2022, while the realised shock corresponds to the peak decline in Russian oil supply observed in April 2022. For the Iran war, volume at risk refers to oil flows transiting through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025, while the realised supply shock accounts for mitigating factors, including the redirection of oil flows through Middle Eastern pipeline networks. For gas, volume at risk in the war in Ukraine refers to Russian pipeline exports to Europe in 2021, while the realised shock corresponds to the actual decline in Russian gas flows. For the Iran conflict, both the volume at risk and the realised gas shock refer to disruptions affecting Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) volumes transiting through the Strait of Hormuz. The dashed yellow area for the Iran war represents Europe’s exposure to Middle Eastern LNG disruptions.
Panel b): Bars show changes in futures prices across different maturities. For the Ukraine war, changes are measured from 24 February 2022 to the initial price peak on 8 March 2022; for the Iran war, they are measured from 27 February 2026 to the initial price peak on 31 March 2026. Diamonds show changes in consensus forecasts over the same periods (February to March 2022 and February to March 2026, respectively). For consensus data, forecast horizons correspond to the closest futures maturities (e.g. 1Q ahead to 3-month futures, 2Q to 6-month futures, 4Q to 12-month futures). Expected price reactions for the Iran war are based on historical elasticities from Caldara et al. (2019). The latest observations are for 8 March 2022 (Ukraine war) and 31 March 2026 (Iran war).

The scale of the disruption is unprecedented. However, the oil price response in 2026 has been surprisingly restrained. This may be the result of hopes that the supply shortage will be temporary. By historical standards, a disruption of this magnitude would typically push up oil prices by as much as 105% (Caldara et al. 2019).
And yet, by early June, oil prices stood at only around USD 94 per barrel, 29% above their pre-conflict level, after retreating from a peak increase of more than 50%. Similarly, prices rose by around 30% at their peak following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – a broadly similar response despite a far smaller supply shock. That increase was also short-lived, with prices stabilising at lower levels by August 2022.
Meanwhile, the oil futures market tells a similar story, with a smaller upward shift in the futures curve relative to the size of the shock during the Iran war. Another striking feature of this episode is that price increases have been concentrated in short-dated contracts. As a result, the curve moved into steeper backwardation: compared with 2022, near-term oil prices rose even more relative to longer-term prices in 2026 (Chart 1, panel b). This suggests that investors placed a higher value on immediate oil availability in 2026 than they did in 2022, pointing to elevated near-term upside risks to oil prices associated with the Iran war.
Oil markets were better prepared this time round
Alongside expectations of a swift resolution to the conflict, oil prices have also remained relatively contained thanks to a market that was better positioned to absorb supply disruptions than it was in 2022.

First, the oil market entered the conflict with an oil supply surplus of around 2.5 mb/d. Among other factors, this was underpinned by record US shale output and by China’s shift to electric vehicles.[2] This contrasts sharply with the conditions before the Ukraine war, when oil markets were already tight and the supply deficit stood at around 1 mb/d.
Second, inventories were significantly higher than in 2022. In addition to larger OECD stocks, China’s substantial stockpiling provided an extra buffer. Chinese inventories are estimated to have risen from 92 days of import cover in 2023 to around 115 days by early 2026. This helped to cushion the impact of supply losses.
Third, lower demand, particularly in Asia, helped contain price pressures in 2026. Key factors here were weaker Chinese petrochemical consumption and lower demand for jet fuel in the Middle East. In response to these developments, the International Energy Agency (IEA) revised its global oil demand forecast for the second quarter of 2026 down by 3 mb/d relative to its January outlook. It is currently projecting a year-on-year decline in demand of around 2%. This contraction is considerably larger than the one observed following the Ukraine war, when oil demand in the second quarter of 2022 was only 0.6 mb/d below the IEA’s pre-war forecast.[3]
Finally, policymakers have reacted more forcefully. The IEA’s coordinated strategic release of oil inventories of 400 million barrels far exceeded the 182 million barrels released in 2022.

Together, these factors help explain why a much larger supply shock has translated into a comparatively muted increase in oil prices.
Similar gas disruptions, smaller price increases
The contrast between the two crises can also be seen on the gas markets. While both conflicts resulted in supply losses amounting to around 9% of combined Asian and European gas demand, they differed in terms of the type of gas affected and the regions most directly exposed.
The war in Iran has disrupted the global LNG market. The Strait of Hormuz accounts for 20% of global LNG supply, equivalent to around 110 billion cubic metres (bcm) annually (Chart 1, panel a). By contrast, the war in Ukraine primarily affected pipeline gas, the impact of which was highly concentrated in Europe, with Russian exports to the region declining by 126 bcm in 2022.
However, as in the oil markets, the reaction of gas prices during the Iran war has been notably more muted than historical experience would suggest. By early June, Title Transfer Facility (TTF) natural gas prices, the most common European gas benchmark, had risen by 53% to €49 per megawatt-hour (MWh). Meanwhile, estimates based on historical data would suggest an increase of around 81%, broadly in line with the 79% price rise observed during the Ukraine war.
Given the similar size of the two supply shocks, this points to a more subdued market reaction in 2026. The two episodes also differ in terms of their underlying economic drivers. Adolfsen et al. (2026) suggest that the recent increase in TTF gas prices largely reflects precautionary demand shocks. In other words, price pressures increased owing to concerns over potential disruptions rather than actual supply losses, as Europe’s direct dependence on Middle Eastern LNG remains limited (Chart 2, panel a).
Conversely, during the 2022 energy crisis, while the initial increase in TTF gas prices reflected precautionary demand, it was subsequently amplified by physical supply disruptions, as declining Russian pipeline flows led to severe market tightness. The gas futures curve also indicated a more muted price reaction following the recent conflict. For instance, one and two-year futures rose by 12% and 2% during the Iran war, compared with 38% and 74% during the Ukraine conflict (Chart 2, panel b).

Chart 2
Gas price decomposition and gas futures curve reaction

a) Gas price decomposition

b) Changes in gas futures prices and consensus forecasts at different horizons

(percent)

(percent)

Sources: LSEG, Bloomberg, Gas Infrastructure Europe and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Panel a): The model is based on a weekly BVAR using the TTF gas price (1m future), inventories, NWE gas consumption, EU pipeline and LNG gas imports and the average of stock indices for gas price-sensitive sectors. The shocks are identified using sign and relative magnitude restrictions. The left panel covers the first months of the Ukraine war (February to August 2022), while the right panel covers the initial months of the Iran war (February to April 2026). The latest observations are for 28 August 2022 (left panel) and 10 April 2026 (right panel) (weekly data).
Panel b): Bars show changes in futures prices across different maturities. For the Ukraine war, changes are measured from 24 February 2022 to 31 August 2022; for the Iran war, they are measured from 27 February 2026 to the latest observation on 4 June 2026. Diamonds show changes in consensus forecasts over the same periods (February to August 2022 and February to May 2026, respectively). For consensus data, forecast horizons correspond to the closest futures maturities (e.g. 1Q ahead to 3-month futures, 2Q to 6-month futures, 4Q to 12-month futures). Expected price reactions for the Iran war are based on historical elasticities from Albrizio et al. (2023). The latest observations are for 31 August 2022 (Ukraine war) and 4 June 2026 (Iran war).

Weaker competition for LNG shipments contained gas prices
Several factors can help explain why gas prices have reacted more moderately in 2026 than during the Ukraine energy crisis.
First, the pre-shock conditions were favourable. In early 2026, TTF natural gas prices ranged between €28 and €40 per MWh. This reflected well-supplied markets following Europe’s diversification away from Russian gas and the expansion of LNG import capacity. By contrast, European gas markets were already under stress before Russia’s invasion in February 2022, with TTF natural gas prices standing between €80 and €90 per MWh and a heavy reliance on Russian pipeline gas. Meanwhile, storage levels were low and broadly comparable in both episodes (Chart 3, panel a).
Second, competition with Asia for LNG shipments was weaker in 2026. Although the type of disruption – LNG or pipeline – does not in itself determine the price response, market dynamics depend critically on the affected region’s ability to secure replacement supplies quickly. In both crises, the volumes previously supplied under long-term contracts had to be replaced through spot LNG purchases. In 2022, Europe bid aggressively for shipments while also contending with weak hydropower and nuclear generation. As a result, the spread between the Asian LNG benchmark (JKM) and the European gas benchmark (TTF) turned sharply negative. As gas became more expensive in Europe than in Asia, LNG shipments were diverted to Europe, where suppliers could get a better price (Chart 3, panel a).
By contrast, the JKM-TTF spread turned positive in March 2026, creating incentives to reroute LNG shipments to Asia. However, its much smaller magnitude points to less aggressive Asian buying than Europe’s in 2022, reflecting greater demand flexibility thanks to gas-to-coal substitution and China’s more diversified energy mix. As a result, Asian LNG demand has fallen much more sharply in 2026 than it did in 2022 (Chart 3, panel b).
Together, these factors have significantly reduced competition for LNG shipments and helped curb upward pressure on global gas prices, despite a disruption that has affected a substantial share of global LNG trade.

Chart 3
European and Asian gas market dynamics: 2022 vs 2026

a) Gas storage utilisation rate and gas spreads

b) Asian LNG imports

(left panel: percent of total capacity; right panel: USD per MMBtu)

(metric tonnes)

Sources: LSEG, Bloomberg, Gas Infrastructure Europe and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Panel a) shows the gas storage utilisation rates for 2022, 2025 and 2026, alongside the historical average and the range observed between 2011 and the latest observation. The latest observations are for 4 June 2026 (left panel) and 2 June 2026 (right panel).
Panel b) shows weekly LNG imports by Asian countries (China, India, Japan, South Korea and others) during the initial months of the Ukraine war (left panel, 24 February to the end of August 2022) and the Iran war (right panel, 27 February to the end of June 2026). “Average previous year” refers to the average level of LNG imports in the corresponding previous year (2021 and 2025, respectively). The latest observations are for 30 August 2022 (weekly data, left panel) and 26 June 2026 (weekly data, right panel).

Looking ahead
The comparison between the Iran and Ukraine wars highlights an important lesson: the size of an energy supply disruption alone does not determine the price response. Initial market conditions, inventories, demand flexibility and expectations can all be just as important.
Overall, expectations of a swift end to the conflict, stronger pre-crisis oil and gas market fundamentals and greater flexibility in Asian demand have so far helped contain the impact on energy prices. Nevertheless, conditions in the Strait of Hormuz—and, by extension, on global energy markets—remain highly volatile, particularly following the renewed surge in energy prices triggered by the resumption of strikes between the United States and Iran in July. A prolonged closure would gradually deplete the existing buffers and global inventories while forcing markets to abandon expectations of a rapid resolution, thus increasing the risk of renewed upward price pressures.
Conversely, a sustained reopening of the Strait could exert significant downward pressure on prices, particularly as oil and gas markets entered 2026 with expectations of sizeable supply surpluses. These expectations may have strengthened further, as the Iran conflict could encourage consumers to transition more rapidly towards alternative, more reliable energy sources, reducing their reliance on oil and gas.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
References
Adolfsen, J.F., Lappe, M.S., Manu, A.S., Rößler, D., Schupp, F. and Stalla-Bourdillon, A. (2026), “Gas market shocks: Tracing the effect on Euro Area inflation expectations”, Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 8, 103760.
Albrizio, S., Bluedorn, J., Koch, C., Pescatori, A. and Stuermer, M. (2023), “Sectoral shocks and the role of market integration: The case of natural gas”, in AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 113, pp. 43-46, American Economic Association, Nashville, May.
Burian, V. and Stalla-Bourdillon, A. (2026), “Non-linearities in oil prices: which conditions matter?”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB.
Caldara, D., Cavallo, M. and Iacoviello, M. (2019), “Oil price elasticities and oil price fluctuations”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 103, pp. 1-20.

For an analysis of the differences in the macroeconomic conditions prevailing at the time of the two shocks, including labour market and fiscal conditions, see Arce et al. (2026), ‘’A tale of two energy crises – initial conditions matter’’, The ECB Blog, 3 June.
Recent evidence suggests that oil supply shocks have a more muted impact on prices when market balances are in surplus, see Burian, V. and Stalla-Bourdillon, A. (2026), “Non-linearities in oil prices: which conditions matter?”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2.
See the IEA Oil Market Report, January 2022, January 2023, January 2026 and May 2026.

 
 
 
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Corporate income tax (CIT) revenues remained at historically high levels in 2023, while corporate tax rates have broadly stablised, according to the 2026 edition of OECD Corporate Tax Statistics released today.
Across 135 jurisdictions for which data is available, CIT revenues accounted for 17.3% of total tax revenues and 3.5% of GDP on average. While slightly lower than in 2022, these levels remain above pre-pandemic levels and earlier historical peaks. Corporate tax revenues continue to represent an important source of public finances, particularly in developing economies.
Over the longer term, corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP have converged across income groups. In low-income jurisdictions, CIT revenues increased from 0.8% of GDP in 2000 to 3.1% in 2023, approaching the average level in high-income jurisdictions of 3.6%.
Large mulinational enterprises (MNEs) are a key source of corporate tax revenue, contributing an average of 44.5% of total corporate tax revenues in 2023, up from 42.8% in 2017 across the 60 jurisdictions providing Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) data.
The data also show continued stabilisation of statutory corporate income tax rates. The average statutory CIT rate across Inclusive Framework jurisdictions has remained broadly unchanged at around 21.2% between 2020 and 2026, following a prolonged decline from significantly higher levels in the early 2000s.
The publication includes an expanded set of anonymised and aggregated CbCR statistics, covering the activities of nearly 9 400 MNE groups headquartered in more than 60 jurisdictions. The enhanced dataset provides new insights into how revenues, profits and taxes are distributed across jurisdictions and among different categories of MNEs.
Indicators derived from the CbCR data continue to point to strong growth in global MNE profits and tax revenues. At the same time, some evidence points to ongoing mismatches between the location of profits and observed markers of MNE activity (tangible assets, number of employees). While some high-level indicators of mismatches show a slight increase in recent years, they remain below earlier peaks and continue to be substantially higher in investment hubs than in other jurisdictions.
The 2026 edition of Corporate Tax Statistics provides internationally comparable information on corporate tax systems in more than 170 countries and jurisdictions, including corporate tax revenues, statutory and effective tax rates, R&D tax incentives, withholding taxes, tax treaties and the implementation of BEPS measures.
To access the OECD Corporate Tax Statistics data, visit: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/corporate-income-tax-rates-database.html.
For further information, please contact the Communications Office in the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration.

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Today, the European Commission published guidelines to assist providers and deployers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in meeting the AI Act’s transparency obligations, which start to apply on 2 August 2026.
Transparency obligations will help people recognise when they are interacting with AI or when content has been generated or altered by AI, reducing the risk of deception and manipulation. The guidelines published today clarify which providers and deployers must comply with the transparency obligations for interactive AI systems and the marking and labelling of AI-generated content.
AI Act transparency obligations
Under the AI Act, AI providers will have to design AI systems to inform users when they are directly interacting with an AI and they will have to add machine-readable marks to enable the detection of AI-generated or manipulated content.
Deployers will also have to inform users when they are exposed to deep fakes, to AI-generated content on matters of public interest without human review or editorial control, and to emotion recognition or biometric categorisation systems.
The guidelines explain certain concepts, give exemptions and examples. These include what constitutes directly interactive AI systems, such as chatbots, synthetic content, including partially or fully AI-generated text, deepfakes, and AI-generated text on matters of public interest, as well as examples for relevant exceptions such as standard editing, e.g. spelling and grammar correction.
Finally, the guidelines explain how compliance with the transparency obligations of the AI Act may be demonstrated, including through adherence to a code of practice, which provides legal certainty and a simple and practical way to demonstrate compliance with the AI Act.
Background
The Commission’s Guidelines on the AI Act’s transparency guidelines complement the Code of Practice on Transparency of AI-generated content.   The Code of Practice was drafted by independent experts with input from hundreds of stakeholders. The Commission and the AI Board confirmed that the Code is an adequate, voluntary means which the providers and deployers of AI can rely on to demonstrate compliance with the AI Act.
To help organisations better understand their AI Act obligations, the Commission is putting in place a range of tools, including guidelines, the Code of Practice, and also the AI Act Service Desk, an accessible, up-to-date information hub offering clear guidance on the AI Act.
Next steps
On 2 August 2026, the majority of rules laid down in the AI Act start to apply, including the enforcement powers of the Commission and of national market surveillance authorities.
AI systems placed on the market before August will have to comply with the marking and detecting obligations from 2 December 2026.
 
 
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Enforcement Milestone Marks Strategic Pivot from Administrative Fines to Criminal and Civil Accountability Across the Global Supply Chain

The Department of Justice announced today that the Trade Fraud Task Force (TFTF), launched in August 2025, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has surpassed $1 billion in civil and criminal recoveries, penalties, forfeitures, and publicly charged losses in less than one year This milestone reflects a fundamental shift in the federal government’s approach to customs and trade enforcement, emphasizing rigorous criminal prosecution and civil enforcement under the False Claims Act (FCA).
“For too long, fraud actors have viewed customs violations as a mere surcharge or cost of doing business,” said Assistant Attorney General Colin McDonald of the Justice Department’s National Fraud Enforcement Division. “By utilizing the Department’s full weight, we are making it clear that trade fraud is a serious economic crime. This billion-dollar milestone demonstrates that the United States and the National Fraud Enforcement Division will no longer allow the integrity of our country’s borders and markets to be compromised for illicit profit. This message should be heard loud and clear by all supply-chain actors.”
The TFTF was established by DOJ and DHS to investigate and prosecute those who defraud the government through material misrepresentations to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), including transshipment, mislabeling, and false declaration. Its mandate covers the entire supply chain, including importers, customs brokers, downstream distributors, industrial and commercial end-users, and other supply-chain actors who knowingly profit from merchandise imported contrary to law. Although the TFTF maintains broad enforcement authority,  the task force focuses on key revenue and enforcement priorities, including the evasion of Section 301 tariffs, antidumping duties (AD), and countervailing duties (CVD), the eradication of forced labor from global supply chains that seek to exploit U.S. markets, and the prosecution of criminal violations concerning imported goods that threaten public health and safety. By prioritizing clear, high-impact enforcement actions within established legal frameworks, the TFTF ensures swift accountability and a level playing field for law-abiding American businesses.
“Ensuring that the global supply chain remains a level playing field for law-abiding American businesses is a critical component of CBP’s mission,” said U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Rodney S. Scott. “By pairing CBP’s operational reach with DOJ’s prosecutorial authority, we are dismantling the networks that seek to bypass our laws and undermine our economic security. Every day, CBP confronts criminal networks that exploit our supply chains, endanger American families with unsafe goods, threaten the integrity of our consumer and industrial markets, and undermine confidence in international commerce. Our message is clear: those who seek to exploit America’s trade system will be identified, investigated, and brought to justice.”
“Through the Trade Fraud Task Force, Homeland Security Investigations is actively protecting American families and businesses from the dangers and consequences of illegal trade practices,” said Homeland Security Investigations Acting Executive Associate Director John A. Condon. “HSI combines investigative expertise and global partnerships to confront criminal networks that threaten fair trade and the security of our nation’s economic interests. By holding offenders accountable, we build trust in the products people rely on every day and support a fair marketplace for honest businesses.”
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ANNOUNCES CHARGES IN TWO SIGNIFICANT CHICAGO TRADE FRAUD CASES
The United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL) today announced charges against multiple defendants in significant customs duty evasion schemes involving the false declaration of countries of origin for gold jewelry. The Trade Fraud Task Force (TFTF) has selected NDIL as its lead prosecutorial partner. These Chicago cases contributed to the TFTF surpassing the $1 billion milestone in enforced trade fraud matters.
Raj Kohli and Veena Kohli, who operate Surya International, Inc., a gold jewelry importer and wholesaler in South San Francisco, California, were charged in U.S. District Court in Chicago with falsely declaring that the gold jewelry they imported into the United States had originated in Singapore and not its true country of origin—India and United Arab Emirates. The charges allege that from approximately August 2020 through May 2024, the company, together with foreign manufacturers and other United States entities, imported and brought into the United States approximately 563 separate entries of gold jewelry that were falsely declared as having been manufactured in Singapore and in doing so avoided paying customs duties of between 5.5% and 5.8% of the declared value of the imported gold jewelry. The gold jewelry had an estimated total value of more than approximately $693 million, thus causing the avoidance of more than approximately $38 million in United States customs duties.
Separately, Narain Gulabani who owned and operated Barkha Wholesale, Inc., a gold jewelry importer and wholesaler in Naperville, Illinois, was charged in U.S. District Court in Chicago with falsely declaring the country of origin for imported gold jewelry. The charges allege that, from approximately May 2016 and October 2021, Gulabani, together with foreign manufacturers and other United States entities, imported or caused to be imported into the United States approximately 242 separate entries of gold jewelry that were falsely declared as having been manufactured in Oman or Singapore and in doing so avoided paying customs duties of between 5.5% and 5.8% of the declared value of the imported gold jewelry. The gold jewelry had an estimated total value of more than approximately $240 million, thus causing the avoidance of more than approximately $13.6 million in United States customs duties.
These charges are part of a broader federal effort to combat trade fraud schemes that undermine fair competition, harm domestic industries, deprive the United States of substantial revenue, and ultimately hurt the American taxpayer.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
The TFTF has a nationwide mandate to investigate and prosecute trade fraud and related cases, from coast-to-coast. Any offense involving the importation of an object may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which the imported object moves. Moreover, federal law criminalizes down-chain activities involving merchandise entered contrary to law when done with knowledge of the illegal entry. As a result, the port of entry is only the starting point for these actions, which may also be prosecuted in the district that feels the impact of the trade fraud.
The TFTF has secured major victories across a diverse range of industries. Recent high-impact matters include:

Perfectus Aluminum (May 12, 2026) (CDCA): S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)-led criminal investigation resulted in the collection of $549.5 million through a FCA settlement concerning massive scheme to evade antidumping and countervailing duties on aluminum extrusions.
Boise Cascade (April 27, 2026) (SDFL): HSI-led criminal investigation resulted in a $6.3 million fine and guilty plea for Lacey Act violations where the company demonstrated willful blindness toward illegally imported birch plywood.
Ceratizit USA (December 18, 2025) (EDMI): $54 million FCA settlement to resolve allegations of knowingly failing to pay duties on tungsten carbide products imported from China.
Royal Sovereign (April 28, 2026) (DNJ): $8 million criminal fine and restitution ordered after failure to report to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission dangerously defective imported air conditioners allegedly linked to more than 40 fires and one death.
MGI International (December 12, 2025) (DNH): HSI-led criminal investigation leading to resolutions against a global plastic resin distributor and its former executive concerning misrepresentations of the goods’ country of origin to avoid paying Section 301 duties.

CBP ENFORCEMENT
In addition to the civil and criminal enforcement efforts that led to this historic milestone, CBP continues to exercise its enforcement authorities to address trade violations. So far this Fiscal Year, CBP has assessed more than $2.1 billion in commercial trade penalties and debarred 35 parties from doing business with the federal government. These actions complement DOJ’s enforcement mechanisms and strengthen CBP’s mission to protect our national and economic security by preventing fraud, waste, and abuse.
THE TRADE FRAUD RESOURCE GUIDE
The DOJ and the DHS today released A Resource Guide to Trade Fraud Enforcement (the Guide). As the first joint comprehensive framework of its kind, the Guide is a historic and seminal roadmap for cross-border compliance and enforcement priorities. The Guide provides critical information to enterprises of all sizes and addresses a wide variety of topics, including who and what is covered by customs regulations and anti-trade fraud laws and the different types of civil and criminal resolutions available in trade fraud enforcement. On these and other topics, the Guide takes a multi-faceted approach toward setting forth the statutory and regulatory requirements and providing insights into the enforcement practices of the DOJ and DHS.
Since January 2025, the Department has brought trade fraud enforcement actions all over the country as shown in the map below:

“When companies commit trade fraud, the prosperity and safety of American workers, families, and communities are put at risk,” said the DHS Assistant Secretary for Trade and Economic Security, Aris Kourkoumelis. “To level the playing field and protect the American people, DOJ and DHS have forged the Trade Fraud Task Force and have produced this Resource Guide which provides the private sector with a transparent, comprehensive manual on trade fraud enforcement.”
GLOBAL TRADE & COMMERCE ENFORCEMENT SECTION
The Department is announcing the creation of the Global Trade & Commerce Enforcement Section (GTCES) within the National Fraud Enforcement Division. The GTCES’s mission is to investigate and prosecute criminal import, trade, and other fraud offenses that undermine American industries, evade external revenue collection, threaten consumers’ health and safety, finance foreign adversaries, promote forced labor through illegal trade practices, and violate United States laws and regulations governing domestic and foreign commerce.
A FOUNDATION OF PARTNERSHIP
The success of the GTCES and TFTF is built upon unprecedented cooperation between Main Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, and law enforcement partners.
“It has been a tremendous honor to work closely with the Department and its leadership to envision what the Trade Fraud Task Force could be, and then to convert concept into reality,” said U.S. Attorney Andrew S. Boutros of the Northern District of Illinois. “Helping stand up the Task Force from the ground up has been a vision of mine for nearly 20 years, dating back to when I was a federal prosecutor in Chicago bringing what has still stood as the largest criminal trade fraud cases of their kind and doing so against a stacked deck. It is deeply satisfying to know that we were decades ahead of our time and that our strategy from years ago has now been adopted at the highest levels of the Department and is being implemented across the whole of government. It is a great privilege and responsibility for the Northern District of Illinois to be selected as lead prosecutorial partner for the Trade Fraud Task Force. With our expansive venue and my decades of experience in this space, the Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office intends to be the tip of the spear when it comes to robust and vigorous enforcement of our nation’s trade, forced labor, and other related laws. There should be no doubt, the key roads for trade fraud enforcement lead from, to, and through Chicago past, present, and future.”
The Department extends its gratitude to the 35 TFTF masthead U.S. Attorneys’ Offices: District of Arizona, Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern District of California, Central District of California, Eastern District of California, Southern District of California, District of Colorado, District of Columbia, Southern District of Florida, Northern District of Georgia, Central District of Illinois, Northern District of Illinois, Southern District of Illinois, Northern District of Indiana, Southern District of Indiana, District of Maryland, District of Massachusetts, Eastern District of Michigan, Western District of Missouri, District of Nebraska, District of New Jersey, District of New Mexico, Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York, Middle District of North Carolina, District of Oregon, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, District of Puerto Rico, Middle District of Tennessee, Western District of Tennessee, Northern District of Texas, Southern District of Texas, Eastern District of Virigina, Eastern District of Wisconsin, and Western District of Wisconsin.
The Task Force also acknowledges the indispensable contributions of its law enforcement and agency partners, including CBP, HSI, IRS Criminal Investigation, the Environmental Protection Agency’s Criminal Investigation Division, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration.
The Department-wide Corporate Enforcement Policy provides concrete benefits to incentivize companies to voluntarily disclose discovered misconduct, cooperate with our investigations, and timely and appropriately remediate the wrongdoing.
The Justice Department encourages whistleblowers to alert the government to credible allegations of fraud, including utilizing the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act or through the Department’s Corporate Whistleblower Program at CorporateWhistleblower@usdoj.gov using the form available here.

Updated July 14, 2026

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The European Central Bank (ECB) has selected 36 payment service providers (PSP) from across the euro area to participate in the digital euro pilot. The pilot exercise is crucial for testing the digital euro’s technical functionality and operational processes, as well as for refining user experience. The pilot aims to support the ongoing preparatory work for the potential issuance of a digital euro, and is due to start during the second half of 2027 for a period of 12 months.
Following a call for expression of interest in March 2026, the Eurosystem received more than 50 applications from PSPs, reflecting strong interest and engagement from the market. Applicants were evaluated based on a set of pre-defined eligibility criteria. The selected participants, including banks and non-bank service providers, span a broad range of business models and sizes and offer broad geographical coverage, ensuring a diverse and representative testing and learning environment for the digital euro.
“The strong market interest in the pilot shows the private sector’s readiness to engage actively and quickly advance with the digital euro project to strengthen the European payments landscape,” said ECB Executive Board member Piero Cipollone, who chairs the High-Level Task Force on a digital euro. “We look forward to deeper engagement as we work with and learn alongside European payment service providers in developing a secure, efficient and inclusive digital euro.”
The pilot will use a beta version of the digital euro. It will be functionally and technically close to the digital euro as foreseen in the draft legislation but will not have legal tender status.
Some of the selected providers – known as distributing PSPs – will give Eurosystem staff access to beta digital euro services, such as setting up their beta digital euro account and paying, and others – known as acquiring PSPs – will serve selected merchants and enable them to receive beta digital euro payments. Some providers will play a dual acquiring and distributing role.
The pilot will take place at the ECB and 19 national central banks across the euro area, namely in Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. The pilot takes into account that selected PSPs may provide pilot services in countries other than the one in which they are established.
The pilot will involve staff from the ECB and participating national central banks, as well as e-commerce merchants, and merchants offering everyday services on their premises (e.g. cafeterias and restaurants). Staff at participating central banks will have the opportunity to make beta digital euro payments from person to person (both online and offline) and from person to business (both at the physical point of sale, including Software Point of Sale, and via e-commerce, including mobile payments).
The pilot will also help refine the digital euro design and user experience. Updates on progress will be regularly published on the ECB’s dedicated digital euro pilot webpage. As next steps, the selected payment service providers will work closely with their respective national central banks and the ECB to make the necessary preparations for the pilot exercise.
 
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As a result of the historic deal related to U.S. and Taiwan Trade and Investment announced in January 2026, TSMC has just announced an incremental $100 billion investment for a total of $265 billion in the U.S. This investment will result in four additional advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities, bringing the total to 12 leading-edge semiconductor and packaging facilities.
Today, the White House and the Department of Commerce announced an incremental $100 billion investment by TSMC for advanced semiconductor manufacturing and packaging facilities in Arizona. With the additional facilities, TSMC’s $265 billion investment will provide a total of 12 facilities in the United States.
This follows the March 2025 announcement with President Trump and Secretary Lutnick, in which TSMC agreed to expand its original $65 billion investment commitment by an additional $100 billion. The total planned investment in the United States is now a record $265 billion.
The announcement comes just months after the signing of the historic deal on trade and investment between the U.S. and Taiwan, under the auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and highlights the Trump Administration’s commitment to strengthening domestic manufacturing and U.S. technological leadership through strategic partnerships and investment.
This additional $100 billion investment marks a significant expansion of TSMC’s commitment to build multiple fabrication plants and advanced packaging facilities in the United States. TSMC’s investments in the United States are expected to create significant construction and high-tech jobs while driving billions of indirect economic output as TSMC executes its investment plan.
“President Trump’s leadership is driving companies to invest in American manufacturing. TSMC’s announcement of an additional $100 billion investment following our historic deal on trade and investment with Taiwan will create tens of thousands of American jobs and bring advanced semiconductor manufacturing back to America,” said Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick.
“We appreciate the strong collaboration and support of the Trump Administration, Secretary Lutnick and our leading U.S. customers, and have announced an additional $100 billion investment in the U.S., bringing the total planned investment to $265 billion and adding to the largest foreign direct investment in U.S. history,” said Dr. C.C. Wei, TSMC Chairman and CEO. “This is to support the strong multi-year demand from our leading U.S. customers, and we believe this investment will further foster the development of the U.S. semiconductor ecosystem, strengthen the supply chain, and support significant job creation in the United States. We are very excited about the tremendous opportunities that lie ahead of us.”
Additionally, the trade and investment deal is expected to catalyze incremental Taiwanese investment in the United States. The deal provides $250 billion in direct investments by Taiwanese semiconductor and other enterprises and $250 billion of additional Taiwan investment to bring other critical elements of the semiconductor supply chain to the U.S.
 
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The European Commission today adopted a Communication on the competitiveness of the EU banking sector, setting out measures to strengthen the Single Market for banking. 

President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said: “Getting capital flowing is how we will get Europe growing. Our Savings and Investments Union needs a strong, competitive banking sector at its heart. And today’s Communication takes a clear step in this direction, recalibrating our approach to risk, and enabling growth and innovation while maintaining financial stability.” 

The objective is to build a more integrated, efficient, and competitive banking sector that can strengthen Europe’s economy by financing growth, innovation, and strategic priorities, underpinned by a better-balanced regulatory framework, creating the conditions for banks to take prudent risks while safeguarding the sector’s resilience, delivering better services to households and businesses, all while preserving financial stability and fostering sustainable growth. 

This Communication is a key pillar of the Commission’s Savings and Investments Union (SIU) strategy: having a banking sector with the strength and scale to finance growth and strategic priorities, such as innovation, the clean transition, and defence, while delivering high-quality financial services to households and businesses. 

Following a public consultation and exchanges with Member States, stakeholders, and supervisory authorities, the Commission has identified three main challenges that limit the banking sector’s ability to support the EU economy effectively. 

First, the sector remains too fragmented along national lines. This prevents EU banks from scaling up and competing globally in key market segments and finding efficiencies across borders. Second, the way international banking standards, known as Basel III standards, are transposed into the EU framework does not always reflect the specific features of the EU banking landscape. The framework needs to work better for both large and small banks. Third, some parts of the EU regulatory framework, including the interaction between microprudential, macroprudential and resolution rules, as well as reporting requirements, are too complex and burdensome and should be simplified. Addressing these three challenges is essential to building a banking sector that is not only resilient and competitive, but also able to support the EU economy. 

Boosting competitiveness calls for a cultural shift in banking towards responsible, measured risk-taking. Simplifying the regulatory framework, integrating the Single Market and completing the Banking Union would help EU citizens and businesses access better products and services at more competitive prices.  

Key measures 

The Communication identifies key measures that are built around three objectives. 

First: removing barriers to cross-border banking activity and fostering market integration. Today’s Communication sets out the path towards reducing prudential and non-prudential barriers to cross-border activity so that EU banks can reach the scale required to compete globally. This would include the following measures: 

Allowing cross-border banking groups to use capital and liquidity more efficiently across the EU: this would allow groups to redirect excess funds to where they can be more productive without hampering their capacity to finance local economies, and without prejudice to financial stability across the Single Market and in each Member State. 

Strengthening common safeguards: the Commission will seek to increase trust in the financial system and among supervisors by proposing a simpler and more effective common deposit protection mechanism in the Banking Union. This would replace the 2015 European Deposit Insurance Scheme proposal and build on existing central and national safety nets, which are now fully funded.  

Closer monitoring of EU anti-money laundering and consumer protection frameworks and their national implementation: this would make it easier for banks to offer services across borders.

Second: implementing international standards while taking into account EU specificities and proportionality. The EU remains committed to applying international standards while better reflecting the specificities of the EU banking sector. To preserve the international level playing field and support EU banks to compete globally, the measures set out in the Communication include: 

Re-assessing how the EU implements certain international standards, which may be in some cases limiting the lending capacity of EU banks.

Possible revisions of certain prudential and corporate governance rules to better reflect EU banks’ specificities in relation to banks’ size, business models, and activities.

Finally: the regulatory framework for banks should be simplified as part of the Commission’s wider objective of reducing administrative burden. Trust in the banking system depends on strong safeguards, but unnecessary complexity should be reduced and requirements made more predictable and transparent for banks and authorities alike. In particular, the Communication highlights:

Simplifying the capital stack and further harmonising banks’ macroprudential buffers.

Standardising and streamlining resolution capital requirements and processes.

Adjusting the criteria and thresholds for “small and non-complex institutions” and adapting their requirements.

Next steps

The Commission has sought stakeholder feedback, and respondents are welcome to submit views or comments in the months to come. The Commission will propose in the first quarter of 2027 a package of measures to amend the banking regulatory framework and deliver on this Communication, in line with the objectives of the One Europe, One Market roadmap. In parallel, the Communication calls on Member States, supervisory authorities, and the banking industry to continue their own efforts to improve bank competitiveness.

Background

The SIU strategy aims to improve how the EU financial system channels savings into productive investment. It envisages an efficient and integrated banking sector based on a single rulebook and a completed Banking Union. The strategy is aligned with the EU’s Competitiveness Compass, developed in response to the recommendations of the Letta and Draghi reports; the Single Market Strategy; and the One Europe, One Market roadmap. 

 
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The European Commission officially launched the EU-Ukraine Drone Alliance during the third EU-Ukraine Defense Industry Forum in Kyiv. The Alliance will help the EU and Ukraine work more closely on developing and using drones and systems to stop hostile drones. It is part of wider EU efforts to strengthen Europe’s defense in this fast-changing area.
The Alliance brings together companies, start-ups, researchers, armed forces and other users from EU countries and Ukraine. Its main goal is to help improve the security of both the EU and Ukraine by supporting a strong drone industry, encouraging the development of new drone and counter-drone technologies, and helping build Europe’s overall capacity in this area.
The Alliance begins to implement the Drone Deal, announced by President Ursula von der Leyen in Kyiv on Wednesday 15 July. Its objective is to build joint ventures between Ukrainian and European companies, and to accelerate the development and production of next-generation drones and counter-drone systems. By doing so, it will help ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities it needs today, while strengthening Europe’s defense readiness for the future.
The Commission is now preparing the first meeting of the 18 founding members scheduled to take place in Brussels in September.
These founding members, selected following an open call for expression of interest, include ORQA d.o.o., Indra Group, Fincantieri, WB Electronics/WB Group, Destinus, Delair, RSI Europe, TERMA A/S, Quantum Systems from EU Member States.
Selected Ukrainian members are LLC Skyfall Industries, LLC, Greentech Harvest, LLC, Tencore, LLC, Deviro, LLC, Vyriy Industry, Scientific production Company ‘ATHLON AVIA’ LLC, TEHAVTOFART PIVDEN” (TAF Industries), UFORCE and F-Drones.
Background
The EU-Ukraine Drone Alliance was first announced by President von der Leyen in her State of the European Union speech in 2025 to foster an innovative defence drone-industrial ecosystem. It is a key deliverable of the Joint Communication Preserving Peace – Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, published in October 2025, and of the Communication on the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security of February 2026.
The announcement follows the selection of the 18 founding members, including both EU and Ukrainian companies, based on a call for expressions of interest. The application deadline was 25 May 2026.
 
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