Today, the Council agreed its position on the proposal to simplify certain rules on data protection, privacy and cybersecurity, while maintaining strong levels of protection for personal data. The changes aim to make the EU’s digital rulebook clearer and easier to apply for businesses, public administrations and citizens, to support EU competitiveness
The proposal forms part of the so-called ‘Omnibus VII’ legislative package in the EU’s simplification agenda. The package includes measures to simplify the EU’s digital legislative framework and the implementation of harmonised rules on AI. For the latter AI-related part, the legislative act was adopted on 29 June 2026.

Simplifying and streamlining the EU’s digital rulebook will make it easier for businesses to operate across Europe, reducing administrative burdens while maintaining high standards for data privacy and citizens’ rights. The Irish presidency has worked to secure a timely agreement in Council so that these improvements can start delivering real benefits sooner. This is an important step in ensuring Europe remains an attractive place to invest, innovate and grow trusted digital businesses.
Helen McEntee, Minister for Foreign affairs and trade of Ireland

Under the Irish presidency, action is being taken under the Digital Omnibus to simplify rules on data protection, privacy and cybersecurity for businesses, public administrations and citizens, while maintaining established policy goals. These measures will reduce compliance costs and boost competitiveness and innovation. This is a key deliverable under the ‘One Europe One Market’ Roadmap and the Council is ready to engage in negotiations with the European Parliament as soon as it has established its position.
Thomas Byrne, Minister of State for European affairs and defence of Ireland

Main elements of the mandate
The proposal introduces amendments to the general data protection regulation (GDPR), modernises cookies rules laid down in the e-privacy directive, repeals provisions of the platform to business (P2B) regulation, consolidates single-market rules on data (the so-called ‘data acquis’), and introduces a mechanism for a single reporting point for cyber security and data incidents.
GDPR
Building upon the Commission proposal, the mandate includes a series of amendments to the GDPR, which seek to simplify and streamline provisions while maintaining appropriate protection for fundamental rights.
First, the Council mandate maintains the current definition of personal data and introduces a new provision on pseudonymisation and the identification of a natural person, with a view to helping companies comply with their GDPR obligations by clarifying rules in this area. Compliance rules are also being simplified in relation to unfounded or excessive requests and specific low risk circumstances in relation to information obligations.
The Council supports the introduction of a principle-based definition of ‘scientific research’, facilitating the consistent application of processing of personal data for this purpose and introducing targeted exemptions to certain obligations so that research organisations can operate in a simplified framework when it comes to data protection.
Furthermore, the Council mandate introduces safeguards to the newly proposed derogation allowing for the processing of sensitive data for the purpose of biometric verification and in the context of the development and operation of AI systems. Innovation and the development of AI are further supported with clarifications on the lawful ground for processing personal data and need to maintain appropriate safeguards.
The Council also backs the Commission proposal to extend the deadline for the notification of personal data breaches, as well as other measures to facilitate GDPR compliance and ensure greater consistency. Such measures include a single list at EU level of categories of processing likely to result in a high risk for individuals or the establishment of common templates for organisations to fulfil their regulatory obligations.
Data acquis and trade secrets
The mandate consolidates and streamlines rules on data altruism and data intermediation services. It presents benefits for public administrations holding public sector data, as well as for re-users, as they can streamline processes and reduce the administrative burden associated with interpreting and implementing diverse national laws.
The mandate introduces the possibility for public sector bodies to set out different conditions and charge higher fees for the re-use by very large enterprises and, in particular, undertakings designated as gatekeepers. It also answers to the urgent need to strengthen safeguards against the risk of trade secret leaks to third countries. The mandate specifically provides that trade secrets would have to be disclosed only once the data holder and the user have taken all necessary measures to preserve their confidentiality.
e-privacy directive and cookies
The Council mandate maintains the rules on cookies and other kinds of online tracking technologies under the e-privacy directive. This framework is updated with clearer and additional purposes where consent will not be required for the placing of cookies on a user device, thus reducing the number of cookie banners when navigating online. This would apply, for example, when necessary for the provision of a service, for the purpose of audience measurement or for ensuring the security of the user’s device.
The mandate also amends certain provisions related to the regulation on the protection of natural persons regarding the processing of personal data by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data (EUDPR) aligning them with the changes proposed under the GDPR.
Reporting cybersecurity and data incidents
The Council mandate replaces the proposed single-entry point at EU level by the establishment of a national entry point in each member state, supporting and facilitating the reporting of incidents and related events under different EU laws.
Furthermore, the Council mandate proposes the establishment of an incident reporting information point at EU level, as well as specific provisions towards a harmonised framework for incident notification and on cross-border incident notifications.
Next steps
Following today’s approval of the Council’s mandate, the Council presidency will start negotiations with the European Parliament once the latter adopts its own negotiating position with a view to a speedy agreement on the file.
Background
In October 2024, the European Council called on all EU institutions, member states and stakeholders, as a matter of priority, to take work forward, notably in response to the challenges identified in the reports by Enrico Letta (‘Much more than a market’) and Mario Draghi (‘The future of European competitiveness’).
Since February 2025, the Commission has put forward twelve ‘Omnibus’ packages aiming to simplify existing legislation, including a seventh Omnibus consisting of two proposals, one aiming to simplify the EU’s digital legislative framework and one aiming to simplify the implementation of harmonised rules on AI.
The ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap signed by the presidents of the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the Commission on 24 April 2026 in the margins of the informal leaders’ meeting in Nicosia includes the objective of concluding work on all simplification packages by the end of 2027.
With compliments of the Council of the EUThe post EU Council | Digital rulebook: Council agrees position to simplify data protection, privacy and cyber reporting rules first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

More than four-fifths (84%) of surveyed security and finance leaders expect cyber budgets to rise over the next twelve months—up from 78% last year—as nearly three-fifths (58%) cite AI in their top cyber budget priorities
Even as frontier AI models are rolled-out, less than two-fifths (39%) have a fully formalised and operational continuity plan that specifically addresses cyber risks
Half (50%) identify attacks targeting AI systems among the cyber threats they’re least prepared to address, yet just over one-fifth (22%) would authorise fully autonomous AI agents for cyber defence
Cyber resilience will require C-suite elevation: less than half (47%) strongly agree that cyber risk is a standing agenda item at the board level

LONDON, 1 October 2026 — Organisations are doubling down on their cyber investment amid rapid advances in AI, with more than four-fifths (84%) of security and finance leaders expecting cyber budgets to increase—up from 78% last year—according to PwC’s 2027 Global Digital Trust Insights Survey, launched today.
The survey, which captured the views of almost 4,000 business and tech executives across 71 countries and territories, finds that as frontier AI models are rolled out, almost two-thirds (58%) of security leaders rank AI in their top cyber budget priorities for the year ahead.
This comes as less than two-fifths (39%) of security, risk and operations leaders have a fully formalised and integrated operational continuity plan that specifically addresses cyber risks altogether.
When asked specifically about the cyber threats organisations are least prepared to address, half (50%) of security leaders identify attacks targeting AI systems amongst their top threats—ahead of cloud-related threats (40%), third-party breaches (34%) and ransomware (33%).

“The ultimate goal of cybersecurity is not just to protect the business, but to give the business the confidence to move forward. As organisations race to capture the value of AI, cyber resilience needs to become a business capability, embedded in C-suite decision-making from the outset. The survey finds many organisations are still under-prepared for a rapidly evolving cyber landscape and organisations that get this right will be better positioned to innovate with confidence while continuing to operate through disruption.”
Avinash Rajeev,Global Cyber, Data & Tech Risk Leader, PwC US, said:

Cyber resilience will require C-suite elevation
Organisations should embed cyber-security in their C-suite decision-making if they are to bolster their cyber defences.
Even in the face of rising frontier AI vulnerabilities, companies have only implemented, on average, three out of seven key data-risk measures across their organisations. What’s more, only 5% of those surveyed have fully implemented every data risk measure surveyed—down from 7% last year.
While one-third (33%) of CEOs and security and risk leaders say their organisations have established dedicated AI roles, including a chief AI officer or AI board, less than half strongly agree that cyber risk is a standing agenda item at the board level (47%) or at executive leadership meetings (45%).
Unlocking AI’s defensive potential 
As cyber-attacks accelerate beyond human speed, AI is becoming an essential force multiplier for security teams. However, trust remains low—particularly around using autonomous AI agents.
This comes as compromise by autonomous botnets (53%), adversarial attacks (52%), and data poisoning (52%) rank among the top AI-enabled attacks that security and risk leaders say they are least prepared to address.
While security leaders rank threat detection and alerting (50%) and phishing detection and response (42%) among the top priority AI areas for cyber defence—roughly only one-fifth (22%) would authorise fully autonomous execution by AI agents for cyber defence.
Rapid advances in AI, however, are proving problematic. More than half (55%) rank reliability and maturity of AI technology among their top three barriers to increasing AI agent autonomy in security operations, while 46% cite accountability and explainability in AI decision-making.
Nearly half of CISOs (44%) identify workforce skills in AI oversight and governance as one of their top barriers to increasing AI agent autonomy.
Bolstering cyber resilience in the age of AI 
As organisations contend with a new frontier of cyber risks, they are taking action.
More than half (54%) of security and risk leaders are adopting multi-cloud or hybrid cloud strategies, while others are strengthening regional data and tech redundancy (47%) and localising infrastructure within specific jurisdictions (37%) to reduce concentration risk across their value chain.
As geopolitics shapes the cyber risk landscape, half (50%) are also making changes to vendor, third-party and supply chain risk management.
As cyber budgets take centre-stage, some companies are bringing in managed services to help—with artificial intelligence (53%) the leading focus area as organisations confront a shortage of specialist cyber and AI talent.
If organisations are to insulate their businesses against rapidly evolving AI and cyber threats, they must:

Strengthen cyber governance, accountability and risk decision-making;
Protect critical operations and build cyber resilience;
Secure data, AI and emerging technology;
Manage ecosystem, third-party and technology concentration risk;
Use trusted technology and data to create enterprise value;
Build the model to effectively leverage agents to defend against agent-enabled attacks.

“AI is changing both sides of the cyber equation. It is creating new risks and expanding the attack surface, but it can also transform how organisations defend themselves. The opportunity is to build the trust, governance and human oversight that allow organisations to use AI more confidently to secure the enterprise and create value.”
Avinash Rajeev,Global Cyber, Data & Tech Risk Leader, PwC US, concluded:

With compliments of PwC – premium member of the EACCNY

The post PwC: Executives Prepare for Rising Cybersecurity Budgets as AI Threats Grow first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Today, the Council agreed its position on the proposal to simplify certain rules on data protection, privacy and cybersecurity, while maintaining strong levels of protection for personal data. The changes aim to make the EU’s digital rulebook clearer and easier to apply for businesses, public administrations and citizens, to support EU competitiveness
The proposal forms part of the so-called ‘Omnibus VII’ legislative package in the EU’s simplification agenda. The package includes measures to simplify the EU’s digital legislative framework and the implementation of harmonised rules on AI. For the latter AI-related part, the legislative act was adopted on 29 June 2026.

Simplifying and streamlining the EU’s digital rulebook will make it easier for businesses to operate across Europe, reducing administrative burdens while maintaining high standards for data privacy and citizens’ rights. The Irish presidency has worked to secure a timely agreement in Council so that these improvements can start delivering real benefits sooner. This is an important step in ensuring Europe remains an attractive place to invest, innovate and grow trusted digital businesses.
Helen McEntee, Minister for Foreign affairs and trade of Ireland

Under the Irish presidency, action is being taken under the Digital Omnibus to simplify rules on data protection, privacy and cybersecurity for businesses, public administrations and citizens, while maintaining established policy goals. These measures will reduce compliance costs and boost competitiveness and innovation. This is a key deliverable under the ‘One Europe One Market’ Roadmap and the Council is ready to engage in negotiations with the European Parliament as soon as it has established its position.
Thomas Byrne, Minister of State for European affairs and defence of Ireland

Main elements of the mandate
The proposal introduces amendments to the general data protection regulation (GDPR), modernises cookies rules laid down in the e-privacy directive, repeals provisions of the platform to business (P2B) regulation, consolidates single-market rules on data (the so-called ‘data acquis’), and introduces a mechanism for a single reporting point for cyber security and data incidents.
GDPR
Building upon the Commission proposal, the mandate includes a series of amendments to the GDPR, which seek to simplify and streamline provisions while maintaining appropriate protection for fundamental rights.
First, the Council mandate maintains the current definition of personal data and introduces a new provision on pseudonymisation and the identification of a natural person, with a view to helping companies comply with their GDPR obligations by clarifying rules in this area. Compliance rules are also being simplified in relation to unfounded or excessive requests and specific low risk circumstances in relation to information obligations.
The Council supports the introduction of a principle-based definition of ‘scientific research’, facilitating the consistent application of processing of personal data for this purpose and introducing targeted exemptions to certain obligations so that research organisations can operate in a simplified framework when it comes to data protection.
Furthermore, the Council mandate introduces safeguards to the newly proposed derogation allowing for the processing of sensitive data for the purpose of biometric verification and in the context of the development and operation of AI systems. Innovation and the development of AI are further supported with clarifications on the lawful ground for processing personal data and need to maintain appropriate safeguards.
The Council also backs the Commission proposal to extend the deadline for the notification of personal data breaches, as well as other measures to facilitate GDPR compliance and ensure greater consistency. Such measures include a single list at EU level of categories of processing likely to result in a high risk for individuals or the establishment of common templates for organisations to fulfil their regulatory obligations.
Data acquis and trade secrets
The mandate consolidates and streamlines rules on data altruism and data intermediation services. It presents benefits for public administrations holding public sector data, as well as for re-users, as they can streamline processes and reduce the administrative burden associated with interpreting and implementing diverse national laws.
The mandate introduces the possibility for public sector bodies to set out different conditions and charge higher fees for the re-use by very large enterprises and, in particular, undertakings designated as gatekeepers. It also answers to the urgent need to strengthen safeguards against the risk of trade secret leaks to third countries. The mandate specifically provides that trade secrets would have to be disclosed only once the data holder and the user have taken all necessary measures to preserve their confidentiality.
e-privacy directive and cookies
The Council mandate maintains the rules on cookies and other kinds of online tracking technologies under the e-privacy directive. This framework is updated with clearer and additional purposes where consent will not be required for the placing of cookies on a user device, thus reducing the number of cookie banners when navigating online. This would apply, for example, when necessary for the provision of a service, for the purpose of audience measurement or for ensuring the security of the user’s device.
The mandate also amends certain provisions related to the regulation on the protection of natural persons regarding the processing of personal data by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data (EUDPR) aligning them with the changes proposed under the GDPR.
Reporting cybersecurity and data incidents
The Council mandate replaces the proposed single-entry point at EU level by the establishment of a national entry point in each member state, supporting and facilitating the reporting of incidents and related events under different EU laws.
Furthermore, the Council mandate proposes the establishment of an incident reporting information point at EU level, as well as specific provisions towards a harmonised framework for incident notification and on cross-border incident notifications.
Next steps
Following today’s approval of the Council’s mandate, the Council presidency will start negotiations with the European Parliament once the latter adopts its own negotiating position with a view to a speedy agreement on the file.
Background
In October 2024, the European Council called on all EU institutions, member states and stakeholders, as a matter of priority, to take work forward, notably in response to the challenges identified in the reports by Enrico Letta (‘Much more than a market’) and Mario Draghi (‘The future of European competitiveness’).
Since February 2025, the Commission has put forward twelve ‘Omnibus’ packages aiming to simplify existing legislation, including a seventh Omnibus consisting of two proposals, one aiming to simplify the EU’s digital legislative framework and one aiming to simplify the implementation of harmonised rules on AI.
The ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap signed by the presidents of the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the Commission on 24 April 2026 in the margins of the informal leaders’ meeting in Nicosia includes the objective of concluding work on all simplification packages by the end of 2027.
With compliments of the Council of the EUThe post Digital rulebook: Council agrees position to simplify data protection, privacy and cyber reporting rules first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

IMF Annual Meetings, 17 October 2026
Lagarde described the euro-area economy as resilient but exposed to energy-driven downside risks, expects inflation to stay above target into the first half of 2027, and called for adoption of the digital euro regulation by the end of 2026.
Introduction
The global economy has proven surprisingly resilient in the face of high uncertainty. The conflict in the Middle East continues to expose energy markets to sharp swings. Trade tensions and protectionist measures are weighing on confidence and contributing to a reconfiguration of trade flows. The global economy has held up thanks in part to the rise of artificial intelligence, with investment in technology supporting activity and trade, particularly in economies integrated into technology value chains. Risks nonetheless remain tilted to the downside for growth and to the upside for inflation. A return to an international economic order grounded in openness, predictability and the rule of law would help trade and investment flourish.
Economic activity
Despite global headwinds and the ongoing energy shock, the euro area economy has so far proved resilient. Growth was broad-based across most euro area countries and sectors in the first half of 2026. The September ECB staff projections foresee growth of 0.9% in 2026, 1.4% in 2027 and 1.5% in 2028.
As the energy shock fades over the medium term, the projections see domestic demand benefitting from a recovery in real income over the medium term, driven by lower energy inflation and a resilient labour market. Rising government spending on infrastructure and defence, complemented by investment in AI and digital technologies, should also support growth. Export growth should pick up on the back of strengthening foreign demand, also driven by AI.
The medium-term outlook is surrounded by uncertainty over how intense and long-lasting the Middle East conflict will be, and how the resulting shocks might propagate through the economy. Risks to growth are assessed to be on the downside.
Fiscal sustainability remains a crucial anchor for broader economic stability. It is important to maintain sound fiscal policies, including by adhering to fiscal rules, and, where debt is high, to consolidate, re-prioritise spending and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public finances to rebuild buffers. Governments should strive to ensure that any fiscal response to the energy shock is temporary, targeted and tailored.
In addition, policies that strengthen resilience to climate change can improve the economy’s ability to absorb climate-related shocks. These efforts should be complemented by structural policies that promote labour market participation, equip the workforce with the skills needed in an AI-driven economy and facilitate the diffusion of new technologies. Priorities include advancing the savings and investments union, improving access to risk capital and creating better conditions for innovative firms to scale up across the Single Market.
Inflation
Headline inflation increased to 3.8% in September, mostly reflecting a surge in energy inflation, and, to a lesser extent, an increase in food and services inflation. Core inflation increased slightly to 2.5%. The range of underlying inflation measures remained broadly stable in September and wages have so far shown no material response to the energy shock.
Looking ahead, higher energy prices are expected to keep headline inflation well above target into the first half of 2027 and to gradually feed through to core and food inflation. Headline inflation is expected to decline after the first quarter as energy inflation falls, returning to around target towards the end of 2027. The risks to the inflation outlook are to the upside due, in particular, to the Middle East conflict and Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine. A more intense or persistent energy shock could strengthen indirect and second-round effects, resulting in higher and more persistent inflation. Extreme weather could push up food prices. By contrast, a sustainable resolution of geopolitical conflicts, weaker energy pass-through or more risk-averse financial markets could lower inflation.
Monetary policy
The Governing Council decided to raise the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points in September, following an increase of the same size in June.
Our interest rate decisions are based on our reaction function, which comprises three criteria: our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation; and the strength of monetary policy transmission.
The inflation outlook points to higher inflation ahead, especially in the short term, given the latest developments in energy markets. However, we see no evidence at this stage of significant pass-through of energy prices to other prices and wages, beyond what we have already included in our projections. And while growth has been resilient, financing conditions have tightened, with long-term interest rates rising notably since our last meeting. This will slow growth and reduce pass-through by more than projected in our September exercise.
Taking these three criteria together, the energy shock is too large to “look through” but a measured response remains appropriate to keep inflation in check.
In setting future policy, we will make a comprehensive assessment of the incoming data based on our reaction function. In July, the Governing Council decided on the operational features and the onboarding process for the enhanced EUREP, the Eurosystem repo facility for central banks that was announced earlier this year. The new facility supports the smooth transmission of monetary policy and reinforces the international role of the euro. More than 30 central banks have expressed interest in EUREP in the past six months.
Financial stability
Sources of risk and vulnerabilities for euro area financial stability remain high. Continued geopolitical tensions, fiscal challenges and uncertainties around accelerated AI adoption continue to be causes for concern. The widespread concentration of critical third-party service providers introduces single points of failure for both financial and non-financial institutions. New frontier AI models have increased cyber risks and operational vulnerabilities.
Euro area banks maintain strong capital and liquidity buffers and robust profitability, together with healthy and stable asset quality. These solid fundamentals should help navigate ongoing geopolitical uncertainties and effectively support lending to the economy. Strengthened prudential regulation and supervision since the global financial crisis has helped leave euro area banks in a strong position to withstand the unfolding economic challenges.
Shocks could expose vulnerabilities among non-bank financial intermediaries, notably from concentrated AI-related exposures, amplifying market stress and creating spillovers across financial sectors. Banks’ exposures to non-banks and vulnerable firms could expose funding and credit vulnerabilities.
Stress in private credit markets has continued, with private credit funds reporting outflows and reactivating redemption gates. Private market “semi-liquid funds” that allow for redemptions are becoming more prevalent, which could lead to greater liquidity mismatches in the future, but euro area financial institutions have limited direct exposure to private credit. This means, for now, that private credit in isolation is unlikely to be a source of financial instability in the euro area.
Payment systems
Central bank money must evolve to fulfil the needs of an increasingly digital economy. The Eurosystem is at the forefront of this evolution, bringing the stability and trust of central bank money to digital retail payments and tokenised finance in Europe. In the retail space we are preparing to complement cash with its digital equivalent – the digital euro – for day-to-day payments. The digital euro will further stimulate innovation and competition in retail payments, ensuring that the continued co-existence of public and private solutions underpins Europe’s strategic autonomy in payments. To lay the groundwork for a seamless and secure launch, we will run a 12-month internal pilot in the second half of 2027. Adopting the Regulation on the establishment of the digital euro by the end of 2026 is key to making this possible.
In the wholesale space, the Eurosystem is developing new capabilities to ensure that central bank money can settle transactions in the growing market of tokenised assets. Pontes – the Eurosystem’s distributed ledger technology (DLT) solution that went live on 21 September – marks the first step in implementing our strategy to enable the development of a European tokenised ecosystem. This vision will be advanced under the Appia initiative, which aims to deliver a blueprint for this ecosystem based on common standards, shared network infrastructure and European governance.
International cooperation
We value the work of our global institutions and fora, particularly those that promote global macroeconomic and financial stability. We welcome the recent completion of the three major IMF reviews (Comprehensive Surveillance Review, Financial Sector Assessment Program Review and Review of Program Design and Conditionality), which strengthen the role of the IMF at the centre of the global financial safety net. Climate-related work should remain fully anchored in IMF operations, particularly surveillance. Multilateral efforts to help tackle global imbalances support coordination of domestic action that is required to minimise the risks from disorderly adjustment. The IMF’s analytical work on global imbalances and its improvements to the methodology for assessing external balances provide a strong basis for these efforts.
 
 
 
 
Compliments from the ECBThe post ECB | Statement by Christine Lagarde at the 54th Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

IMF Blog post | Realizing tokenized markets’ potential depends on legal and regulatory clarity, greater interoperability, appropriate settlement assets, and financial stability safeguards to contain risks.
The promise of tokenization is enticing: faster transactions, lower costs, broader access, and seamlessly operating markets. The reality, at least for now, is more complicated. Although growing rapidly, tokenized markets remain very small and fragmented. Yet investors are already showing interest in some of their key features, such as round-the-clock trading and fractional ownership of equities, as we show in an analytical chapter of the latest Global Financial Stability Report.
What sets tokenization apart from previous financial innovations is its potential to reorganize markets. By representing assets directly on distributed programmable ledgers, tokenization can bring together functions that are traditionally performed by separate institutions and infrastructures, from issuance and trading to settlement and servicing. It can also compress processes that now happen in sequence. If widely adopted, it could reshape how financial markets operate. But much of this potential remains unrealized.
Fast growth from a small base
The bulk of tokenized activity takes place in the market for so-called repurchase agreements (or “repos,” short-term loans backed by government bonds, in which the parties agree to reverse the transaction at a later date). These average around $300 billion to $350 billion in daily transaction volume, reflecting tokenization’s appeal for collateral management.

Tokenized assets (credit, money market funds, and equities, among others) add another $65 billion. While these assets have been growing rapidly, they are still tiny compared with their “traditional” versions—the volume of the US repo market is about $13 trillion daily, while global capital markets represent $300 trillion in assets.
Issuance of tokenized assets is concentrated in a few markets, such as the US and a few major offshore jurisdictions, while trading is highly fragmented across platforms, networks, and settlement arrangements.

What prevents tokenization from growing faster? Our work points to four mutually reinforcing constraints: legal certainty, regulatory clarity, interoperability, and the availability of settlement assets.

Investors require legal certainty that tokenized assets represent enforceable rights.
Regulators ought to clarify how existing rules apply to new ledgers and market functions.
Platforms will have to become interoperable rather than isolated liquidity pools.
Settlement needs to rely on safe, widely accepted forms of money.

Useful features, thin liquidity
Early evidence suggests that investors value some of the features that tokenization enables. More than half of trading occurs outside traditional market hours, indicating demand for continuous around-the-clock access. Fractional ownership is widely used, allowing retail investors to, for example, buy less than one share of a company and participate with lower entry costs. In fact, around 80 percent of the tokenized equity trades we analyzed were executed in sizes smaller than one share.
Additionally, overnight tokenized-equity returns are reflected in traditional equity prices shortly after the market opens, suggesting that tokenized and traditional markets respond to similar information and that overnight signals from tokenized markets are relevant in “traditional” trading.

However, while tokenization offers the prospect of more efficient financial markets over time, tokenized markets today remain relatively illiquid and exhibit higher volatility than their traditional counterparts. Liquidity is further weakened by fragmentation across multiple networks and venues, preventing efficient price formation and contributing to price deviations.
Fragmentation across various platforms, and the lack of both interoperability and common settlement assets, undermine the network effect that could help tokenized markets grow faster. The value of a tokenized ecosystem depends on how many assets, investors, and settlement instruments are connected to it. As these networks grow and consolidate, benefits such as liquidity, efficiency, and composability (the ability of smart contracts to interact and combine with each other) can increase substantially.
How to grow safely
Greater scale, however, could also amplify risks. While technological and infrastructure risks may dominate in the early stages of market development, some tokenization features can create new channels for transmitting and amplifying traditional financial risks, such as fire sales, liquidity runs, and contagion through greater interconnectedness and leverage. Today’s sequential processes of messaging, trading, delayed settlement and reconciliation add frictions and costs, but also provide buffers, safety and liquidity management that would mostly disappear in a hypothetical fully tokenized environment.
As greater scale in tokenized markets can increase both benefits and risks, the challenge for policymakers is to create the conditions for safe and efficient development of tokenization.
A technology-neutral approach is essential. Countries should clarify the legal rights linked to tokenized assets, ensure that similar activities are regulated consistently regardless of technology, and support interoperability between tokenized platforms and traditional financial systems. They also need to continue monitoring emerging vulnerabilities, including those arising from growing interconnectedness, leverage, and liquidity risks, and ensure that safeguards keep pace as markets scale.
Tokenization may yet transform finance, but its future will be determined less by technological possibilities than by policies that ensure market depth, trust, and sound safeguards.
—This blog is based on Chapter 3 of the October 2026 Global Financial Stability Report: “Scaling Tokenization: New Efficiencies, New Vulnerabilities.”
 
 
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What is a strategic project?

Strategic projects are projects that make a significant contribution to the EU’s security of supply of strategic raw materials by helping diversify sourcing away from dominant suppliers, often China.
They can cover different stages of the raw materials value chain, including extraction, processing, and recycling. To qualify, projects must meet the criteria set out in the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), including requirements related to their contribution to security of supply, technical feasibility, sustainability, and cross-border benefits.
Strategic project status gives projects access to a number of benefits, including streamlined permitting, support in accessing financing, and assistance in connecting suppliers and buyers.

Why does the EU need strategic projects?

Strategic raw materials are inputs in products and technologies that are important for Europe’s economy and security, such as batteries, renewable energy technologies, digital technologies, defence equipment, and aerospace.
Today, the EU depends heavily on third countries for many of these materials, principally China, a dependence which has already been used against the EU by limiting their supplies on the market and thus EU companies’ ability to source these inputs. The strategic projects strengthen Europe’s own capacity and thus make supply chains more resilient to disruptions. The projects therefore contribute to the competitiveness of European industry and to the EU’s green, digital, and defence objectives.

What are the EU’s targets for strategic raw materials?

The Critical Raw Materials Act has a target that by 2030, the EU has sufficient capacity to extract at least 10%, process at least 40%, and recycle at least 25% of its annual consumption of strategic raw materials. The Act also aims to ensure that no more than 65% of the EU’s annual consumption of any strategic raw material at a relevant stage of processing comes from a single third country. The Strategic Projects selected by the Commission will contribute to achieving these objectives.

How many strategic projects have been selected?

Following the second call for projects, the Commission has selected 46 strategic projects in the EU from 16 Member States. Together with the 47 strategic projects selected in March 2025, there are now 93 strategic projects in the EU.
In addition, 13 strategic projects in third countries and Overseas Countries and Territories were selected in June 2025. The Commission will announce Strategic Projects in third countries and Overseas Countries and Territories later this year.

Which raw materials and industries will benefit?

The new projects cover 15 of the 17 strategic raw materials under the Critical Raw Materials Act.
They include projects covering lithium, nickel, cobalt, manganese and graphite, which will contribute to diversifying supplies in the EU battery value chain.
Projects covering magnesium and tungsten will support defence and aerospace value chains, while projects covering rare earth elements will contribute to the permanent magnet value chain. The new list also includes projects covering titanium and silicon metal.

What other measures does the Commission take to support the industry and enhance supply security?

Following up on our commitment in the ResourceEU Action Plan, and given the urgency, we have established an operational nucleus within the Commission, overlooking the portfolio of Strategic Projects and laying down the preparatory work for the EU CRM Centre. The Commission will engage with the co-legislators to best define the necessary legal mandate for the functions that the Centre will fulfill, including its role in supporting strategic projects, stockpiling, financing, and supply chain analysis.
As announced by President von der Leyen during SOTEU, the European Corporation for Critical Raw Materials will bring public and private investments together, contributing to the operational capacity that the Centre needs to achieve the EU’s objectives of supply security, diversification and support to critical industries.

How will the new strategic projects strengthen the EU’s raw materials supply?

The 46 projects cover different parts of the raw materials value chain:

8 extraction projects;
11 processing projects;
19 recycling projects; and
8 integrated projects; three that combine extraction and processing, and five that combine processing and recycling, supporting the EU’s integrated value chain approach.

By developing capacity across these different stages, the projects will help strengthen European value chains and reduce vulnerabilities linked to excessive reliance on external suppliers.
The projects are expected to require approximately €21.1 billion in capital investment to become operational.

Does this mean that the EU will become self-sufficient in raw materials?

No. The EU cannot and does not aim to produce all the raw materials it needs domestically.
Imports will continue to be an important part of Europe’s supply. The objective is instead to increase European capacity, diversify sources of supply, and reduce excessive dependence on individual suppliers.
Strategic projects therefore complement efforts to diversify international supply chains and develop partnerships with reliable suppliers outside the EU.

Will these projects receive EU funding?

Strategic project status does not automatically mean that a project receives EU funding.
However, the Commission facilitates access to relevant EU funding instruments and supports interaction between project promoters and financial institutions. They are also often seen as more attractive by investors, thanks to the assessment of sustainability and technical feasibility, faster permitting, and overall funding facilitation.
For the strategic projects selected in 2025, more than €2 billion in financial support has already been mobilised through the Innovation Fund, State aid, and the European Investment Bank.
The 46 new projects are expected to require around €21.1 billion in capital investment, mobilised from a combination of public and private sources.

Will strategic projects benefit from faster permitting?

Yes. Strategic Projects benefit from a streamlined and predictable permitting framework under the Critical Raw Materials Act.
Thanks to the Act, Member States have established Single Points of Contact, who guide project promoters through the permitting process.
Per the Critical Raw Materials Act, the permit-granting process should not exceed 27 months for extraction projects and 15 months for other projects, subject to the conditions set out in EU and national legislation.

Can we have faster permitting without lowering environmental standards?

Yes. Strategic projects must comply with applicable EU and national environmental legislation. Faster permitting is intended to make procedures more efficient and predictable, not to lower environmental, social or governance standards.
Environmental, social, and governance considerations are also part of the criteria used to assess projects for strategic project status.

Are the projects already being built?

Being named as a strategic project does not guarantee that a project will become operational.
Project promoters still need to secure financing, complete the necessary permitting procedures, and comply with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements.
However, the first group of strategic projects is progressing. Of the projects selected in 2025, 25 have completed their environmental impact assessment and 17 have obtained a construction permit. In addition, 22 projects have made significant progress towards securing offtake agreements.

What happens next?

The Commission and Member States will continue to support the implementation of the strategic projects.
The Commission will facilitate access to financing and support connections between suppliers and potential buyers through the Raw Materials Mechanism, which has already generated more than 30 matches covering 10 raw materials.
Member States will continue to support projects through their Single Points of Contact and streamlined and predictable permitting.
The Commission also plans to launch a new call for strategic project applications towards the end of 2026.
 
 
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The European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group launched today the European Institutional Investors Pact (EIIP) at the TechEU Equity Summit.
The Pact is a new voluntary framework designed to channel more long-term institutional capital into Europe’s technology and scale-up ecosystem. Thirteen institutional investors have already expressed their intention to channel investments into Europe’s innovation and scale-up ecosystem, including through the €15 billion European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) 2.0 and the €5 billion Scaleup Europe Fund.
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said: “Talent, ideas and ambition – Europe has all of these. Now we are making sure our innovative companies can grow, scale and lead on the global stage – from Europe. By bringing together public and private partners, the goal is to unlock long-term capital for our technology. This is about turning European innovation into European industrial and economic strength.”
The EIIP has been developed jointly by the European Commission and the EIB Group under the EU Startup and Scaleup Strategy.
To support investors, the Pact includes two complementary elements:

A Policy Dialogue Forum: led by the Commission, this forum will enable exchanges with institutional investors on regulatory policy developments, as well as EU investment policies.
An Investment Platform: led by the EIB Group, this platform will help investors access to investment opportunities across Europe’s venture capital and growth equity ecosystem, through sharing of investment pipelines, market intelligence, peer exchange and ecosystem insights helping investors identify opportunities. It will be developed in close cooperation with Member States and aligned with relevant national initiatives, aiming at facilitating engagement and providing pathways linked to exit.

It aims to make it easier for institutional investors to invest in European venture capital and growth equity funds, helping high-growth European companies access the capital they need to scale up and compete globally while remaining rooted in Europe.
It forms part of the broader EU effort to unlock more institutional capital, from investors such as banks, pension funds and insurance companies, for European technology and innovation, addressing one of the key funding challenges identified in Europe’s competitiveness agenda.
Nadia Calviño, President of the EIB Group said: “Our goal is clear: to provide Europe’s institutional investors with a single, credible entry point into innovation financing. In today’s world, this partnership between EU institutions and the private sector sends a powerful message of European unity, ambition and determination.”
The 13 institutional investors ready to join the EIIP have expressed their intent in investing in large EU-based funds focused on later-stage and growth equity financing for European technology companies. These include the European Tech Champions Initiative 2.0, the Scaleup Europe Fund, the European Investment Fund-backed funds supported under InvestEU, and other investment strategies targeting the scale-up phase of venture and growth capital.
Ekaterina Zaharieva, Commissioner for Startups, Research and Innovation said ” Europe has the talent, the research base and the entrepreneurial ambition to lead in strategic technologies. What many companies still lack is access to sufficient late-stage capital. With the European Institutional Investors Pact, we are helping connect Europe’s deep pools of long-term capital with its most promising innovators so they can scale up and stay in Europe.”
Karl Nehammer, Vice-President of the EIB said “Leading investors recognise both the need and the opportunity to strengthen Europe’s innovation financing ecosystem and support companies as they grow. Through the EIIP, investors, the European Commission, the EIB Group and Member States can work together within a common framework to help develop deeper venture and growth capital markets across Europe.”
Marjut Falkstedt, Chief Executive of the EIF said “This first milestone demonstrates growing momentum among institutional investors and reflects the strong complementarity between the EIB Group and the European Commission in mobilising capital for Europe’s future tech champions. Our priority is now to connect investors with credible pathways into Europe’s innovation economy. The Investment Platform will help translate that interest into long-term investment activity.”
 
 
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Thank you, Graeme, and thank you SWIFT for the kind invitation.
The theme of this year’s conference is digital finance for AI-driven economies.  This is an important topic for the IMF because an efficient and secure payments system is critical to economic growth and stability.
Clearly, as the theme suggests, the financial system, and payments in particular, will need to evolve. If AI is used as widely as proponents expect, a great deal of economic activity will be undertaken by AI agents rather than by people. The current payments system was not built for autonomous agents operating continuously and at scale.
At the same time, AI has extraordinary potential to transform the payments system we already have, even before we get to the more difficult questions about how the financial system itself may need to evolve.
Today, I want to explore three points: first, how AI can improve the payments system; second, whether and how the financial system needs to be reengineered to support an AI-intensive world; and third, how policymakers should respond to certain risks that are unique to AI.
I. What AI can do for payments
Let me start with how AI can improve the payments landscape.
One way is by reducing information frictions and switching costs.  AI agents can assess fees, services, exchange rates and execution quality continuously, routing each transaction to the most efficient provider. That lowers barriers to entry, increases competition and puts pressure on incumbents to improve their prices and services.  This applies not just to financial services, but to all forms of commerce.  One might even wonder whether a sustained reduction in information frictions and switching costs could have macroeconomically significant consequences for inflation.
Second, agents can automate complex transactions that today require extensive human involvement.  They can manage the mechanics of paying, coordinating machine-to-machine payments and optimizing the timing based on liquidity, costs, and contractual obligations. Some of this is possible today through programmability. But programmability only takes you so far. It requires explicit instructions for each task and operates within predefined parameters. By contrast, agentic systems can interpret context and operate without requiring a new set of instructions for each transaction. That would open up more commerce to automation, increasing the volume and speed of transactions.
Third, agentic AI could substantially lower the costs of regulatory reporting and compliance by automating the collection, reconciliation and reporting of data across institutions and jurisdictions. Agents could continuously monitor transactions and positions against regulatory requirements, identify gaps in real time, and produce compliance documentation.
The benefits of AI become even more powerful in the context of cross-border payments, which bridge different legal systems, currencies and regulatory requirements.  Agents could automate activities such as customer due diligence and sanctions screening, improving the speed and consistency of compliance. And the benefits from agent-enabled price comparison are likely to be even larger than in the domestic context, given the incremental frictions faced by retail consumers making cross-border payments.
I would not underestimate the scale of the benefits of applying AI to the existing payments architecture. Payments are about much more than just the public infrastructure that supports them.  A full payments product requires regulatory compliance, dispute resolution, and customer support.  Those functions are needed regardless of whether payments run on blockchain rails or other infrastructures.
Many of the benefits promised by a reimagined financial system can instead be delivered by upgrading the core payment systems that we already have. That is where AI can help.  In the short run, this is where we are likely to see more tangible benefits.
The scale alone makes the case for investment. IMF staff estimate that cross-border payments move nearly $1 quadrillion a year. At that scale, even improvements measured in basis points can translate into very large gains.
II. How the financial system might evolve
As AI agents become a significant part of economic activity, the financial system will need to evolve alongside them. It must become more digital, more interoperable and more programmable.
A range of payment technologies could supply the infrastructure needed for autonomous agents to transact across financial networks. Tokenization may be especially promising, since tokenized assets are natively programmable and can settle almost instantly, at any hour.
We are already seeing progress.  CHIPS, for example, is leading a multi‑bank initiative to create a shared tokenized deposit settlement platform.
The challenge for policymakers is to support innovation without compromising stability.  That begins with legal and regulatory frameworks that permit different payment technologies to compete on their merits.
The law needs to clearly establish the legal nature of tokens, including the rights and claims of purported owners and parties with varying degrees of contractual privity.  It must also define the relationship between tokenized assets and their real-world equivalents.  Authorities should avoid erecting unnecessary obstacles to interoperability across networks.  And liquidity frameworks will need to keep pace because while atomic settlement removes counterparty risk, it also raises intraday liquidity needs by requiring prefunding.
If banks continue to embrace tokenization, it naturally raises the question of how central banks should respond, as the existing bank-based payments architecture rests on a foundation of central bank money that is not currently tokenized.
Stablecoins, too, raise questions of the form of liabilities issued by the government.  To maintain a stable value and function as a payment instrument, they need to be backed by safe and liquid assets like short-term government obligations, central bank deposits, or insured commercial bank deposits that are ultimately supported by central bank money.
At the Fed’s Jackson Hole conference this year, we had very interesting discussions about whether central banks should offer new forms of central bank money, such as tokenized reserves, and whether they should extend access to central bank money to new parties.  Finance ministries, too, might consider whether they should issue government obligations in tokenized form.
We are seeing a wave of experimentation across these domains.  For example, the ECB’s recently launched Project Pontes is designed to enable wholesale transactions on distributed ledger platforms to settle in central bank money.  The Bank of England is requiring certain issuers of stablecoins to hold central bank deposits.
The diversity of these approaches reflects varying country circumstances and underscores why policymakers should keep their options open, observe how developments unfold, and consider tailored solutions as the market matures. This is an area where the IMF supports central banks in evaluating alternative pathways through technical assistance.
It is certainly appropriate for central banks to provide new public infrastructure that supports competition, such as tokenized reserves.  But these services should be constructed in a way that does not lock out new technologies and business models that might emerge from market-based competition. The objective should be to create an enabling environment, while ensuring the integrity and stability of the payment system.
Preserving space for competition is not just about increasing efficiency and innovation.  It is also a financial stability issue.  Policymakers that encourage overly narrow solutions often discourage heterogeneity in business models that can be a source of resilience.  When the inevitable shock comes, similar institutions tend to fail in the same way, creating systemic risk.
III. Approaching AI risk
The development and diffusion of AI technologies may pose broader risks that need to be considered. Cyber risks are of course at the top of the list.  AI is reshaping cyber risk by accelerating the speed, frequency, and breadth of vulnerability discovery and potential exploitation. Tokenized markets depend heavily on shared, complex infrastructure and a small number of third-party providers. That means a cyber incident can propagate widely enough to become systemic.
Fortunately, we have not yet seen a macro-critical cyber event. Private risk management and the existing supervisory architecture have contained risks. That approach still applies: strong governance, technical controls that limit the blast radius of a breach, and robust incident response and recovery. We need more coordination among standard setters and supervisory networks, and between governments and industry.
As frontier AI tools are deployed by cyber actors, defenders will need those same tools to respond.  And that gets to a broader debate about whether increasingly powerful AI systems could pose such severe risks to society as a whole that new regulation is needed to slow the pace of development.
These concerns deserve to be taken seriously. The IMF contributes to this vital debate by bringing a macro-financial lens to questions of regulation and risk. We focus on where market failures may arise; where risks can become systemic or macro-critical; and where private incentives may diverge from the public interest.
In AI, that may include major externalities from defective products, information gaps between developers, users, and regulators, or operational dependencies on a small number of providers. It could also include the loss of competitiveness and concentration of market power that may result from the imposition of a poorly designed regulatory framework that creates barriers to entry.
The starting point should be to identify demonstrable market failures and evaluate whether existing regulatory frameworks are sufficient to address them.  To the extent that new interventions are needed, they should be proportionate, targeted, and internationally coordinated, while taking great care not to discourage competition and innovation.
AI could be transformative for the payments system. Handled well, AI can help build a payments system that is more efficient, more competitive, and better suited to the economy of the future.
For policymakers, the challenge is to enable this transformation, while safeguarding against risks. The IMF supports our membership by helping them assess spillovers and vulnerabilities from this transformation.
More broadly, the Fund also facilitates the international dialogue needed for the payments system to remain open and stable—consistent with our 80-year mandate to ensure the stability of the international monetary and financial system.
Thank you very much.
 
 
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The EU’s growing network of trade agreements helps European businesses to access new export markets and creates a more predictable trade and investment environment, according to a report published today. The sixth Annual Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of EU Trade and Economic Security Policy, covering the year 2025, concludes that EU trade agreements play a crucial role in increasing the resilience and competitiveness of EU operators.
Preferential trade works

At the end of 2025, the EU had in place 44 preferential trade agreements with 76 countries, representing 46.3% of the EU’s external trade. Trade in goods with these partner countries grew faster than the EU’s total trade with other third countries: 3.1% growth compared to 1,4%. In 2025, EU agri-food exports to countries with a trade agreement increased by 4.6%, while those to non-preferential partners fell by 3.6%.
The EU-Chile Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) illustrates the immediate and positive impact that a new trade agreement can have. Total bilateral trade amounted to €20.8 billion in the first 11 months since its entry into force on 1 February 2025, 3% higher year-on-year. EU exports of machinery and appliances grew by 9%, chemical products by 8%, and optical and photographic instruments by 17%.
Through a continued focus on the successful implementation of EU trade agreements, the Commission, in close cooperation with Member States and businesses, was able to get 20 barriers to trade fully or partially removed in 14 partner countries. This helps to improve market access for EU operators.

Strengthening the EU’s geopolitical presence
EU trade agreements continue to strengthen the EU’s geopolitical presence in a challenging international environment. Over the reporting period, EU goods exports to FTA partners increased by €250 billion, helping to compensate for reduced exports of goods to Russia, which fell by €54.5 billion during that time.
In 2025, EU trade agreements again played a significant role in providing stable import sources of raw materials and energy products of strategic importance to the EU economy:

Preferential partners supply a quarter of the EU’s critical raw materials imports. For example, between 2024 and 2025, EU critical raw materials imports from Canada increased by 62% in value terms to reach €3.3 billion.
The EU’s trade agreements with resource-rich partners such as Canada and Chile have facilitated imports of mineral products. Between 2024 and 2025, imports of mineral products from Canada increased by 14% (in value terms) to reach €6.1 billion: continuing a trend observed since 2022. Over a quarter of the EU’s mineral product imports now come from Canada. Since the entry into force of the EU-Chile ITA in February 2025, EU imports of mineral products have grown by 33%.

The EU currently has 45 trade agreements in place, covering 81 preferential trade partners.
Moreover, the EU continues to expand its network of trade agreements:

2025 and the first half of 2026 saw the EU conclude trade agreements with Mercosur (provisionally in force since 1 May 2026), Mexico, Indonesia, India, Australia, and the four Eastern and Southern African countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles). Together, they will increase the EU’s share of preferential trade to 53.3%.
The EU is currently negotiating trade agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, as well as seeking to widen its network of trade agreements in recent years the EU has pursued other forms of engagement with partner countries, notably digital trade agreements with Singapore and Korea, a Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement with Angola, and a Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa.

 
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