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IMF | How Europe Can Capture the AI Growth Dividend

By Florian Misch, Ben Park, Carlo Pizzinelli, and Galen Sher
Artificial intelligence could boost Europe’s productivity, but gains will hinge on efforts to deepen the single market and the calibration of regulation
Can artificial intelligence provide a much-needed boost to Europe’s economic productivity? Use of AI is spreading much faster than earlier technologies, such as the personal computer and the internet. And AI promises significant productivity jumps by automating many tasks and enhancing human capabilities.
However, achieving large gains will hinge on European countries’ commitment to growth-enhancing reforms and willingness to being flexible on regulation, to help the new technology to flourish. Absent reforms, our research shows that the medium-term gain in productivity from the AI alone would vary considerably across countries, and for Europe as a whole would be rather modest: about 1.1 percent cumulatively over five years. With pro-growth reforms, though, much bigger gains are possible over the longer run.

How AI helps productivity now
Three factors drive the economy-wide and one-off productivity effects of AI adoption:
• Exposure to AI of different sectors and occupations—the degree to which AI can automate or augment tasks;
• Companies’ incentives to adopt AI, particularly potential savings in labor costs;
• Average productivity gains across occupations. Contrary to past automation technologies, AI exposure is especially large in professional, managerial, or administrative work that is non-manual and often knowledge-based, like finance or software development.
European countries would benefit to different degrees. Higher-income countries typically gain more because they have more white-collar services, leaving them more exposed to AI. They also have higher wage levels which increase incentives to adopt labor-saving technologies. For example, Norway could gain as much as 5 percent in the most optimistic scenario.
Gains for lower-income economies will likely be more limited, which means that AI could temporarily widen productivity disparities within Europe. For instance, Romania could add just below 2 percent even in an optimistic scenario. Productivity gains could be larger in all countries if the cost of AI systems falls more quickly.

Strong upsides over longer term
The improving capabilities of AI models (as evidenced by various tests) suggest that gains could be much larger over a longer time horizon. AI could have more transformational effects by creating new industries and value chains. It could also boost productivity growth more permanently through accelerating research and development (referred to in literature as Invention in the method of inventing). For example, there is already evidence that AI accelerates and enhances pharmaceutical drug development.
Recent work estimates the long-run annual labor productivity growth impact when considering that AI is not only used to produce goods and services but also to create new commercial knowledge. In the United States, annual productivity growth could be boosted by 1 percent annually, while for Europe the gains could also be substantial but not as high. The analysis points to longer lasting effects which imply dramatically larger gains than the short-term effects we estimated. These predicted long-term benefits could even be conservative: When estimating the impact of technology, expectations are often too optimistic about the immediate effects and too pessimistic about lasting contributions (Amara’s Law).
How Europe should respond
To take full advantage of AI’s potential, Europe must focus on removing the barriers that limit diffusion of skills and technology and the growth of companies. The recent Regional Economic Outlook for Europe highlights several policy priorities.
Deepening the European Union single market will be critical to counter fragmentation along national borders. The goal must be to make it easier for innovative firms in the field of AI to access a broader, EU-wide customer base. This requires removing barriers to cross-border services, opening up protected sectors, and harmonizing standards – all of which can help reduce the cost of developing and adopting AI tools.
Funding the risky investments that underpin AI development (often based on intangible assets like software and intellectual property) requires stronger and more integrated financial markets. A well-functioning Capital Markets Union can increase the availability of venture capital by channeling more savings to early-stage, risky technological ventures in AI. Improving the recognition and valuation of intangibles assets such as intellectual property related to AI in financial statements and resolution regimes would also help mobilize private financing for innovation.
Flexible labor markets and portable social protection are vital to help workers transition toward sectors and firms that are expanding thanks to AI. For instance, simplifying degree recognition, enhancing housing affordability, and ensuring pension portability can facilitate movement to where opportunities from AI arise.
Creating a more efficient energy market is another key ingredient. Affordable and reliable electricity will support data centers that power AI systems. Securing competitive and low-carbon energy supplies through better market integration will support both AI infrastructure and Europe’s broader green transition.
Finally, regulation needs to remain flexible. While addressing important data protection, ethical, and safety concerns related to AI, regulation will need to be dynamically calibrated to navigate the trade-offs between addressing risks and enabling growth through AI adoption. Otherwise, even some of the moderate productivity dividends from AI adoption over the next few years could be lost.
Reaping the full potential of AI depends on policy choices that Europe makes today. Even moderate AI productivity gains in the coming years would be significant relative to Europe’s anemic economic growth prospects. Capturing larger, longer-term benefits—and keeping up with the United States—will hinge above all on Europe’s ability to move fast in building a more dynamic and integrated single market.
 
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ECB | Unlocking private investment and boosting productivity with EU programmes

By Alessandro De Sanctis, Roberto A. De Santis, Daniel Kapp and Francesca Vinci
To bridge Europe’s investment gap, we need both public and private funding. Well-designed EU investment programmes can act as a major catalyst for private capital. As this blog post shows, every euro invested by the EU is matched by private finance, thereby doubling its impact.

Europe is facing an unprecedented need for investment to support its green, digital and defence transitions. On current estimates, this will require additional spending of around €1,200 billion a year between 2025 and 2031. That is a significant increase from the €800 billion estimated just one year ago.[1]
To meet this challenge, public and private financing are both essential.[2] Even under optimistic assumptions, the combined national fiscal space available for additional government spending and the existing EU resources would still leave a substantial funding gap of over €100 billion a year. EU investment programmes can play a decisive role in bridging this gap. In this blog post, we look at how these programmes can help unlock private investment and boost productivity. Among other findings, we show that every euro invested by the EU is matched by private capital, more than doubling its impact.
The role of EU programmes
Amounting to just 1% of the total gross national income of all the Member States, the EU budget is modest compared with its national counterparts. Its effectiveness in supporting investment thus depends on its ability to harness additional resources. With this in mind, various budget instruments have been designed not only to finance public investment but also to mobilise private capital.
The European Structural and Investment (ESI) funds are central to these efforts. For over 25 years, they have served as the EU’s primary investment instrument. These funds help drive progress by supporting infrastructure, innovation and business development across the Union. ESI funds fulfil a dual purpose. First, they promote regional convergence by channelling more resources to less developed regions. Second, they enhance competitiveness by financing investments aligned with key policy priorities, such as fostering innovation, advancing digital technologies and accelerating the green transition.
Moreover, ESI funding is designed to leverage additional financial resources thanks to mandatory national co-financing. This ensures that EU investments are consistently complemented by domestic funds.[3]
“Crowding in” versus “crowding out”
When a government increases investment, the effects can ripple across the economy. Projects such as high-speed rail systems, digital networks and renewable energy grids can enhance productivity and stimulate additional private investment. This phenomenon of public investment attracting private activity is known as “crowding in”. However, large-scale public investment can also increase the demand for resources, potentially leading to higher prices and greater borrowing costs. This can discourage private sector initiative – a phenomenon referred to as “crowding out”.
The actual outcome ultimately depends on the economic setting and the quality of the public investment. Well-planned and carefully executed projects can yield lasting productivity gains that outweigh possible short-term pressures on demand. Conversely, poorly designed investment projects are more likely to raise the risk of crowding out, thus undermining the intended economic benefits.
Evidence from recent research
In a recent study, De Santis and Vinci (2025)[4] provide empirical evidence on the impact of ESI funds on private investment across EU regions between 2000 and 2021. Using advanced econometric methods, their research finds significant crowding-in effects. Over a two-year period, every euro of ESI funding generated €1.10 of private investment and €0.10 of business research and development (R&D) (see Chart 1). These findings underscore the effectiveness of ESI funds as a catalyst for private investment and innovation. European investment contributes significantly to long-term economic growth, while also advancing the EU’s green and digital transitions.

Chart 1
Impact of ESI funds on private investment and R&D

a) Private Investment

b) Business R&D

(estimated effect of €1 of ESI funds)

(estimated effect of €1 of ESI funds)

Source: De Santis, R.A. and Vinci, F. (2025), “Private investment, R&D and European Structural and Investment Funds: crowding-in or crowding-out?”, Working Paper Series, No 3098, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, August. Illustrations replicate the results presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Notes: The estimation entails a local projection, regressing the change in ESI funding on the change in private investment and business research and development (both scaled by regional gross value added (GVA), with an instrumental variable approach. The change in predicted ESI funding is employed as the instrument. This is constructed, for a given region, as the average ESI funds absorption rate in a given year in regions with similar characteristics but located in other countries, multiplied by the ESI funds allocation to the region at the beginning of the programming period. The specification controls for previous-year regional GVA growth, the one-year lag of the dependent variable, contemporaneous changes in government spending (normalised by previous-year real GDP) and changes in each country’s ten-year sovereign yield, as well as year and region fixed effects. The top and bottom 2% of observations are winsorised. The sample covers 24 EU Member States over the period 2000-21. Confidence intervals are reported at the 90% level.

ESI funds boost firms’ productivity
A small share of ESI funds is allocated directly to firms. This gives us a unique opportunity to assess their impact on firm-level outcomes and see how effective the EU programmes are in improving firm performance.
So just how effective are ESI funds in enhancing investment and productivity?
An ECB paper by De Sanctis, Kapp, Vinci and Wojciechowski (2025)[5] looks at these questions, focusing on firms’ performance during the 2014-2020 programming period for EU funding. Their research reveals that ESI-funded firms steadily increased their capital stock by 15%. In other words, they continued to invest in and expand their fixed assets year after year. These firms also experienced long-lasting gains in productivity, which rose by 3% over four years (Chart 2, panels a and b). Moreover, the study finds that financially constrained firms increased their debt and capital to a greater extent. These findings suggest that ESI funds do indeed play a pivotal role in facilitating access to finance (Chart 2, panels c and d).

Chart 2
Impact of receiving ESI funds on firms’ outcomes

a) Capital

b) Total factor productivity

(percentage)

(percentage)

c) Heterogeneity: impact on capital for financially constrained vs non-financially constrained firms

d) Heterogeneity: impact on leverage ratio for financially constrained vs non-financially constrained firms

(percentage)

(percentage)

Source: De Sanctis, A., Kapp, D., Vinci, F. and Wojciechowski, R. (2025), “Unlocking growth? EU investment programmes and firm performance “,Working Paper Series, No 3099, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, August.
Notes: The estimation uses a local projection difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the impact of receiving EU funding through the ESI funds on firms’ outcomes, specifically changes in capital and total factor productivity. The control group consists of firms who have not yet received funding, with time measured relative to the year of first funding within the 2014–20 programming period. A coefficient of 0.01 corresponds to a 1% growth effect. Confidence intervals are reported at the 99% level. The regression includes controls for the lagged values of total assets, sales growth, current ratio, capital-to-labour ratio, sales-to-assets ratio and firm age, as well as year, sector and region (NUTS 2) fixed effects. The variable “finc” indicates financial constraints: “finc = 1” denotes constrained firms and “finc = 0” unconstrained firms. The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of a firm’s debt to its total assets.

Policy takeaways
As we have seen, synergies between private investment and targeted public investment are critical to addressing Europe’s significant investment needs. ESI funds have proven to be an effective public investment tool, not only in driving infrastructure and regional development but also in enhancing firms’ investment capacity and productivity. Admittedly, there is still room for improvement, particularly in areas such as governance, the timely allocation of resources and the promotion of cross-border investment. And yet, the positive overall experience offers valuable lessons for future initiatives, and ESI funds can serve as an important benchmark when designing new programmes. As the EU prepares its 2028-34 budget, it is vital to prioritise investment programmes that crowd in private capital and boost productivity across Europe.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
Check out The ECB Blog and subscribe for future posts.
For topics relating to banking supervision, why not have a look at The Supervision Blog?

See Bouabdallah, O., Dorrucci, E., Nerlich, C., Nickel, C. and Vlad, A. (2025), Time to be strategic: how public money could power Europe’s green, digital and defence transitions, The ECB Blog, ECB, 25 July.
While private capital remains a cornerstone of investment, the additional burden on national and EU budgets has risen sharply to €510 billion a year. It now accounts for 43% of total investment needs, largely owing to a heavier dependence on public budgets for defence spending.
The EU also uses other instruments to finance investment and innovation, many of which are based, to some degree, on the ESI model. The Next Generation EU programme, launched in response to the pandemic crisis, scaled up EU support for investment. The InvestEU programme, which started operating in 2021, aims to reduce the risks of financing innovative or long-term projects through the European Investment Bank and other partners by leveraging EU budget guarantees. The Horizon Europe programme, in place since 2021, supports frontier research and innovation that is often too risky for private finance alone.
De Santis, R.A. and Vinci, F. (2025), “Private investment, R&D and European Structural and Investment Funds: crowding-in or crowding-out?”, Working Paper Series, No 3098, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, August.
De Sanctis, A., Kapp, D., Vinci, F. and Wojciechowski, R. (2025), “Unlocking growth? EU investment programmes and firm performance“, Working Paper Series, No 3099, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, August.

 
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OECD updates Model Tax Convention to reflect rise of cross-border remote work and clarify taxation of natural resources

The OECD has released an update to the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, providing new and detailed guidance on short-term cross-border remote work and on the taxation of income from natural resource extraction. The update, approved by the OECD Council, aims to provide greater certainty for governments and businesses worldwide.
The 2025 Update to the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital clarifies when remote work across borders, such as from a home office, creates a taxable presence for business. This responds to the rise in such arrangements following the COVID-19 pandemic. The update also introduces a new alternative provision setting out how income from activities connected with the extraction of natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals should be taxed, a measure that is particularly relevant for developing and other resource-endowed economies. These changes aim to enhance tax certainty and support fair and efficient cross-border business taxation.
• Remote working: Clear guidance on how cross-border “home office” arrangements are treated under tax treaties, providing certainty for employers and employees.
• Natural resources: A new alternative tax treaty provision to ensure that income from activities connected with natural resources extraction is taxed where it occurs, reinforcing source-country rights and supporting resource-endowed developing economies.
• Other improvements: Additional refinements to enhance consistency in treaty interpretation and strengthen tax certainty.
“By clarifying the rules for remote work and reinforcing source taxation for extractive industries, this update helps countries and businesses navigate a rapidly evolving global landscape,” said OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann. “It also demonstrates the importance and continued relevance of multilateral co-operation in delivering practical solutions to modern tax challenges.”
Used by governments, tax authorities, businesses, and practitioners in both OECD and non-OECD Member countries, the OECD Model Tax Convention is a cornerstone of the international tax system, helping to reduce tax obstacles and promote cross-border trade and investment. These updates reflect the realities of a global economy where remote work and digital mobility are here to stay. They also underline the importance of multilateral co-operation in addressing shared challenges and ensuring that tax systems keep pace with economic change.
The updates published today will be reflected in revised condensed and full editions of the OECD Model Tax Convention to be released in 2026. A webinar presenting the 2025 Updates will be hosted by the OECD on 10 December featuring Manal Corwin, Director of the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, alongside OECD experts.
 
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European Commission | EU welcomes political agreement on the EU Talent Pool, making the EU more attractive to skilled talent from outside the EU

The European Commission welcomes the provisional political agreement reached today between the European Parliament and the Council on the EU Talent Pool. Once in place, the EU Talent Pool will be the first EU-wide platform to facilitate international recruitment of jobseekers residing outside the EU. This is a key step in making the EU more attractive to skilled talent from outside the EU, and hence more competitive globally.
As part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to migration set out in the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Talent Pool will offer opportunities for labour mobility and contribute to the EU’s competitiveness agenda  by helping Member States attract and retain global talent. Participation in the Talent Pool is voluntary for Member States.
This new platform will make it easier for employers across the EU to identify and recruit jobseekers from non-EU countries for occupations facing labour shortages within the EU. Jobseekers from third countries will be able to register their profiles on the platform and showcase their skills, qualifications, work experience and language knowledge. This will give EU employers access to a broader pool of talent. The job vacancies of EU employers from participating Member States will be available in the EU Talent Pool, allowing jobseekers to find jobs that match their skills.
The Talent Pool will also support the implementation of Talent Partnerships, a Commission initiative to match  the skills of workers from countries outside the EU with the labour market needs inside the EU, while engaging partner countries strategically on broader migration management cooperation including the prevention of illegal migration. Jobseekers who have developed their skills under a Talent Partnership will be able to flag them in their profiles on the EU Talent Pool platform.  In addition, the Talent Pool will also support the implementation of future European legal gateway offices, starting with the EU-India pilot, aimed to facilitated skilled labour mobility.
Next Steps
The regulation must now be formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. As soon as the regulation enters into force, the Commission will develop the platform, with the aim of making it operational as soon as possible.
Participating Member States will set up National Contact Points to support the implementation of the tool.
Background
The EU Talent Pool proposal was presented in 2023 as part of the Commission’s Skills and Talent Mobility package, delivering on President Ursula von der Leyen‘s commitment to make the EU more attractive to talent from outside the EU. It is also a deliverable of the Union of Skills and part of the comprehensive approach to migration under the Pact on Migration and Asylum.
 
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IMF | Policy Actions Can Reinforce Growth Progress in Many G20 Economies

By Nicolas Fernandez-Arias, Shushanik Hakobyan
Concerted action on economic reforms can help the G20 achieve the group’s collective growth ambitions, but the reforms with the biggest payoff vary across countries
Since the Group of Twenty’s foundational Pittsburgh conference in 2009, progress toward its goal of strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth has been modest.
While G20 economies have shown remarkable resilience in navigating multiple shocks, medium-term growth prospects have moderated to just 2.9 percent, the weakest since the global financial crisis. At the same time, disinflation remains incomplete for many, and public debt rose to a record 102 percent of GDP last year. Furthermore, excessive external imbalances are widening again.
Still, there are encouraging signs. Our latest annual report to the group—whose members account for about 85 percent of global economic output—points to some positive developments over the past year.
A survey of IMF country teams indicates that many G20 economies made progress toward stronger growth, including more than half of emerging market economies. Improvement has been substantial in some cases, such as Germany, where growth momentum was supported by reforms to fiscal rules.
Meanwhile, falling inflation and fiscal consolidation efforts are improving the sustainability of growth for most G20 advanced economies and half of the European Union.

But this is only part of the story. Progress over the past year has been somewhat muted along the final two dimensions:
• Balanced growth—without the buildup of internal or external imbalances, such as increasing reliance on one sector or on external demand—is proving elusive across the G20. Moderate deterioration was assessed in China and the United States because of widening excess current account balances.
• Inclusive growth—ensuring the economy benefits everyone—improved only slightly, particularly in G20 advanced economies and in the African Union, which joined the group in 2023.
With near-term uncertainty remaining high and an extensive list of headwinds, the outlook for securing strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth in the coming years is challenging. Against this backdrop, it’s more important than ever to reinforce momentum, even if it’s just tentative, across all dimensions of growth.
Smart fiscal policy is at the center of the challenge. Governments need to rebuild their fiscal buffers to contain rising debt, while meeting growing spending needs. Fundamental economic reforms are also needed to aid domestic rebalancing and foster stronger growth.
Of course, these structural reforms vary across countries. But to help guide prioritization and sequencing, IMF country teams have identified measures with the highest expected growth impact. Reforms to labor market institutions, in addition to improved fiscal policies and business regulations, consistently ranked highest across the G20 and in the European Union.

For African Union members, the largest potential gains lie in foundational governance improvements, as well as fiscal reforms.
The payoff from concerted action by G20 economies would be significant. Simulations suggest that implementing the identified highest-impact structural reforms, alongside recommended macroeconomic policies, could raise growth across the group by about 7 percentage points cumulatively over the next decade. This would benefit emerging market economies the most.
Moreover, debt burdens would decline by more than 8 percentage points of GDP within five years for countries with limited fiscal space, reflecting the combined impact of recommended fiscal adjustments and structural reforms.
And these concerted reform efforts would also support domestic rebalancing by helping narrow current account balances, with large improvements possible for both major surplus and deficit economies.
 
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World Bank | Commodity Prices to Hit Six-Year Low in 2026 as Oil Glut Expands

Inflationary Pressures Ease, But Geopolitical Tensions Cloud Outlook
WASHINGTON, October 29, 2025—Global commodity prices are projected to fall to their lowest level in six years in 2026, marking the fourth consecutive year of decline, according to the World Bank Group’s latest Commodity Markets Outlook. Prices are forecast to drop by 7% in both 2025 and 2026, driven by weak global economic growth, a growing oil surplus, and persistent policy uncertainty.
Falling energy prices are helping to ease global inflation, while lower rice and wheat prices have helped make food more affordable in some developing countries. Despite the recent declines, however, commodity prices remain above pre-pandemic levels, with prices in 2025 and 2026 projected to be 23% and 14% higher, respectively, than in 2019.
“Commodity markets are helping to stabilize the global economy,” said Indermit Gill, the World Bank Group’s Chief Economist and Senior Vice President for Development Economics. “Falling energy prices have contributed to the decline in global consumer-price inflation. But this respite will not last. Governments should use it to get their fiscal house in order, make economies business-ready, and accelerate trade and investment.”
The global oil glut has expanded significantly in 2025 and is expected to rise next year to 65% above the most recent high, in 2020. Oil demand is growing more slowly as demand for electric and hybrid vehicles grows and oil consumption stagnates in China. Brent crude oil prices are forecast to fall from an average of $68 in 2025 to $60 in 2026—a five-year low. Overall, energy prices are forecast to fall by 12% in 2025 and a further 10% in 2026.
Food prices are also easing, with declines of 6.1% projected in 2025 and 0.3% in 2026. Soybean prices are falling in 2025 because of record production and trade tensions but are expected to stabilize over the next two years. Meanwhile, coffee and cocoa prices are forecast to fall in 2026 as supply conditions improve. However, fertilizer prices are projected to surge 21% in 2025, reflecting higher input costs and trade restrictions, before easing 5% in 2026. These increases are likely to further erode farmers’ profit margins and raise concerns about future crop yields.
Precious metals have reached record highs in 2025, fueled by demand for safe-haven assets and continued central bank purchases. The price of gold—widely viewed as a safe haven during times of economic uncertainty—is expected to increase by 42% in 2025. It is projected to increase by a further 5% next year, leaving gold prices at nearly double their 2015-2019 average. Silver prices are also expected to hit a record annual average in 2025, rising by 34% and further 8% in 2026.
Commodity prices could fall more than expected during the forecast horizon if global growth remains sluggish amid prolonged trade tensions and policy uncertainty. Greater-than-expected oil output from OPEC+ could deepen the oil glut and exert additional downward pressure on energy prices. Electric-vehicle sales, which are expected to increase sharply by 2030, could further depress oil demand.
Conversely, geopolitical tensions and conflicts could push oil prices higher and boost demand for safe-haven commodities such as gold and silver. In the case of oil, the market impact of additional sanctions could also lift prices above the baseline forecast. Extreme weather from a stronger-than-expected La Niña cycle could disrupt agricultural output and increase electricity demand for heating and cooling, adding further pressure to food and energy prices. Meanwhile, the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence (AI) and growing electricity demand to power data centers could raise prices for energy and for base metals like aluminum and copper, which are essential for AI infrastructure.
“Lower oil prices provide a timely opportunity for developing economies to advance fiscal reforms that promote growth and job creation,” said Ayhan Kose, the World Bank’s Deputy Chief Economist and Director of the Prospects Group. “Phasing out costly fuel subsidies can free up resources for infrastructure and human capital—areas that create jobs and strengthen long-term productivity. Such reforms would help shift spending from consumption to investment, rebuilding fiscal space while supporting more durable job creation.”
The report’s special focus section examines the history of international commodity agreements in the context of today’s volatile commodity markets. It finds that while many past efforts—such as inventory controls, production quotas, and trade restrictions—helped stabilize prices for some commodities in the short term, few achieved lasting results. The most enduring international commodity agreement, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has struggled to sustain market power especially when prices are high—because higher prices tend to draw new competitors into the market. Instead of using price-control schemes, the report recommends that countries foster more diverse and efficient production, invest in technology and innovation, improve data transparency, and promote market-based pricing to build long-term resilience to price volatility.
 
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Council of the EU | EU budget for 2026: Council and Parliament reach agreement

The Council and the European Parliament have agreed on the EU’s annual budget for 2026. Next year’s budget will focus on delivering Union priorities and dealing with ongoing challenges. It will boost competitiveness, strengthen Europe’s defence readiness and preparedness, provide support for humanitarian assistance and address migratory pressures.
At the same time, the budget safeguards the flexibility to react swiftly and effectively to unforeseen needs and crises.
The 2026 budget amounts to €192.8 billion in total commitments and €190.1 billion in total payments. €715.7 million has been kept available this year under the expenditure ceilings of the current multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027, allowing the EU to react to unforeseeable needs.

“Today’s agreement shows that Europe can deliver, even in challenging times. The 2026 EU budget will allow us to deliver on our common priorities – security, competitiveness and border control – all while ensuring that the EU can react swiftly and effectively to unforeseen needs and crises.”
– Nicolai Wammen, Minister for Finance of Denmark and chief Council negotiator for the 2026 EU budget

 
2026 EU budget (in € million)

Headings
Commitments
Payments

1. Single market, innovation and digital
22,163.0
23,336.6

2. Cohesion, resilience and values
71,649.8
73,166.7

3. Natural resources and environment
56,529.4
52,577.3

4. Migration and border management
5,018.9
3,887.9

5. Security and defence
2,813.5
2,253.3

6. Neighbourhood and the world
15,600.0
16,569.7

7. European public administration
13,277.5
13,277.5

Special instruments
5,715.9
5,022.5

Total
192,768.1
190,091.6

Appropriations as % of GNI (gross national income)
1,00%
0,99%

Commitments are legal promises to spend money on activities whose implementation extends over several financial years. Payments cover expenditure arising from commitments made for the EU budget during current and preceding financial years.
This is the sixth annual budget under the EU’s long-term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. The 2026 budget is complemented by actions to support the COVID-19 recovery under NextGenerationEU, the EU’s plan to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Next steps
The European Parliament and the Council now have 14 days to formally approve the agreement reached. The Council is expected to endorse it on 24 November. Adoption of the budget requires a qualified majority within the Council.
 
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European Commission | Autumn 2025 Economic Forecast shows continued growth despite challenging environment

The European Commission’s Autumn 2025 Economic Forecast shows that growth in the first three quarters of 2025 outperformed expectations. While the strong performance was initially driven by a surge in exports in anticipation of tariff increases, the EU economy continued to grow in the third quarter. Looking ahead, economic activity is expected to continue expanding at a moderate pace over the forecast horizon, despite a challenging external environment.
This year’s Autumn Forecast projects real GDP to grow by 1.4% in the EU in 2025 and 2026, edging up to 1.5% in 2027. The euro area is expected to mirror this trend, with real GDP projected to grow by 1.3% in 2025, 1.2% in 2026, and 1.4% in 2027. Inflation in the euro area is forecast to continue its decline, falling to 2.1% in 2025, and to hover around 2% over the forecast horizon. In the EU, inflation is set to remain marginally higher, falling to 2.2% in 2027. 
Private consumption and investment drive growth
Latest business indicators and survey data point to sustained positive momentum in the coming quarters. Looking further ahead, the global environment remains challenging, but a resilient labour market, improving purchasing power and favourable financing conditions are set to support moderate economic growth.
In addition, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU funds are cushioning the effect of fiscal consolidation in several Member States. This support underpins domestic demand, which is set to be the main driver of growth over the forecast horizon. Private consumption is expected to grow steadily, supported by the above factors, but also by a gradual decline in the saving rate. Investment is set to regain momentum, mainly driven by non-residential construction and capital spending on equipment.
The EU’s highly open economy remains susceptible to ongoing trade restrictions, but the trade deals reached between the US and its trading partners, including the EU, have alleviated some of the uncertainties that overshadowed the Spring Forecast.
The forecast assumes that all country- and sector-specific tariffs implemented by the US administration at the cut-off date of 31 October will be in place throughout the forecast horizon. Globally, trade barriers have reached historic highs, and the EU now faces higher average tariffs on exports to the US than assumed in the Spring 2025 Forecast. Nevertheless, tariffs on EU exports remain lower than those applied to several other major global players. This represents a modest relative advantage for the EU economy, albeit in a context of weak global goods trade and a strong euro tempering foreign demand.
Inflation projected to stabilise
Inflation in the euro area has been revised slightly up from the Spring Forecast. It is now expected to come down from 2.4% in 2024 to reach the ECB’s target of 2% in 2027. Trends vary across components, with decreases in services and food inflation counterbalanced by rising energy inflation. Intensifying competitive pressures from imports and the appreciation of the euro should restrain inflation in non-energy goods. Headline inflation in the EU is projected to be marginally higher than the euro area, gradually declining from 2.6% in 2024 to 2.2% in 2027. This forecast assumes that the new EU Emissions Trading System (ETS2) will enter into force in 2027, as has been legislated.
Unemployment rates decline further
The gradual slowdown of employment growth that started in 2022 continued in the first half of 2025. Still, the EU economy generated 380,000 jobs during that period. Employment is set to continue expanding moderately—by 0.5% in 2025 and 2026—before decelerating to 0.4% in 2027. The unemployment rate is anticipated to edge down further from 5.9% in 2025 and 2026 to 5.8% in 2027. Wage growth in the EU is set to slow but remain above inflation, modestly improving household purchasing power.
Government deficits to edge up 
The EU general government deficit is expected to increase from 3.1% of GDP in 2024 to 3.4% by 2027, partly due to the increase in defence spending from 1.5% of GDP in 2024 to 2% in 2027, measured according to the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG).
The EU debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise from 84.5% in 2024 to 85% in 2027, with the euro area ratio set to rise from around 88% to 90.4%. This reflects ongoing primary deficits and the fact that the average cost of public debt is higher than nominal GDP growth. By 2027, four Member States are expected to have debt ratios above 100% of GDP.
Challenging global environment continues to weigh on the outlook
Looking forward, risks to the growth outlook are tilted downwards.
Persistent trade policy uncertainty continues to weigh on economic activity, with tariffs and non-tariff restrictions potentially constraining EU growth more than expected.
Any further escalation of geopolitical tensions could intensify supply shocks. At the same time, repricing of risks in equity markets, especially in the US technology sector, could impact investor confidence and financing conditions. Domestic political uncertainty might also weigh on confidence. Finally, the increasing frequency of climate-related disasters could undermine growth.
On the upside, resolute progress on reforms and the competitiveness agenda, higher defence spending focused on EU production, and new trade agreements could bolster economic activity more than projected. 
Background
This forecast is based on a set of technical assumptions concerning exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices, with a cut-off date of 27 October. For all other incoming data, including assumptions about government policies, this forecast takes into consideration information up until, and including, 31 October. Unless new policies are announced and specified in adequate detail, the projections assume no policy changes.
The European Commission publishes two comprehensive forecasts (spring and autumn) each year, covering a broad range of economic indicators for all EU Member States, candidate countries, EFTA countries and other major advanced and emerging market economies.
The European Commission’s Spring 2026 Economic Forecast will update the projections in this publication and is expected to be presented in May 2026. 
 
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Council of the EU | Council adopts new EU law to speed-up handling of cross-border data protection complaints

Today the Council adopted new rules to improve cooperation between national data protection bodies when they enforce the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in order to speed up the process of handling cross-border data protection complaints.
The measures adopted will streamline administrative procedures relating to, for instance, the rights of complainants or the admissibility of cases, and thus make enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases more efficient.
Main elements of the new EU regulations
• Admissibility: The requirements for the admissibility of cross-border action – the decision if a complaint meets the conditions for being investigated – will be harmonised. Regardless of where in the EU a complaint is filed, admissibility will be judged on the basis of the same information.
• Rights of complainants and parties under investigation: Common rules will apply for the involvement of the complainant in the procedure, the right to be heard for the company or organisation that is being investigated as well as the right to receive the preliminary findings in order to express their views on it.
• Simple cooperation procedure: For straightforward cases data protection authorities can decide, in order to avoid administrative burden, to settle actions without resorting to the full set of cooperation rules.
• Deadlines: In the future an investigation should not take more than 15 months. For the most complex cases this deadline can be extended by 12 months. In the case of a simple cooperation procedure between national data protection bodies, the investigation should be wrapped up within 12 months.
Next steps
Today’s adoption by the Council is the final legislative step. The regulation will enter into force 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the EU. It will become applicable 15 months after its entry into force.
Background
The GDPR has put in place a system of cooperation between national data protection bodies. Those authorities, which are responsible for enforcing the GDPR, are obliged to cooperate when a data protection case concerns cross-border processing. This is the case, for instance, when the complainant resides in a member state other than that of the company under investigation.
In such cross-border cases, a single national authority will take on the role of lead authority in the investigation, but is required to cooperate with its counterparts in other member states.
 
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ECB | Resilient banks through effective supervision: a pillar of Europe’s competitiveness

Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the ECB Forum on Banking Supervision 2025
It is a pleasure to deliver the last keynote speech of this year’s banking supervision forum. Over the past two days, we have discussed what resilience means in times of challenge, complexity and disruption – and why resilience should be broad based.[1] As the Chair mentioned yesterday morning, broad-based resilience is about strong financials, but equally about operational resilience, sound governance and good risk management.
During this period of profound change, a debate on European competitiveness has emerged with full force. Many are asking what the key impediments and main enablers might be for a more competitive European economy. How can we tackle the former and improve the latter? And what role does the banking sector play in shaping the competitiveness of the real economy?
The good news is that over the past decade, much has already been achieved to make banks more resilient, and this resilience remains the indispensable foundation to support the real economy throughout the economic cycle. I will therefore start by illustrating this very welcome healthy state of the banks under our supervision.
At the same time, discussions about the complexities that are having an impact on European banks’ competitiveness have gained prominence. Today I would like to highlight how we are tackling undue complexities in the regulatory and supervisory framework in order to help banks operate efficiently within a predictable, proportionate and risk-based framework.
I will then illustrate how banks’ competitiveness crucially hinges on structural and macroeconomic factors that will require a concerted effort from a wide range of stakeholders. In this way, Europe’s banking system can be both innovative and strong, competitive and resilient. So, let me first start by looking at the resilience I mentioned at the start.
Bank resilience is crucial to withstand shocks and support the economy at all times
Resilient banks are a vital precondition for a thriving real economy. Why is this so?
Well-capitalised and resilient banks are better placed to channel funds from savers to borrowers to enable businesses to innovate, households to buy homes and governments to finance public goods. Banks must therefore be well regulated and supervised.[2]
European banking supervision was established in 2014 in response to the global financial crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Now, almost to the day 11 years later, banks under our supervision are significantly stronger. Thanks to regulatory guardrails, rigorous supervision and continued improvements in banks’ risk management, the banking sector is now in a much better position to fulfil its essential function of supporting the economy at all times.
Today’s euro area banks have solid capitalisation levels, with a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of 16% compared with 12.7% a decade ago.[3]

Chart 1
Capital adequacy

Source: ECB supervisory banking statistics.

Banks have robust liquidity positions well above regulatory requirements[4] and the asset quality problems that plagued many significant banks across Europe a decade ago have been successfully tackled. In fact today the non-performing loans ratio stands at 1.9%, less than a third of the level observed ten years ago.[5]

Chart 2
Asset quality

Source: ECB supervisory banking statistics.

Moreover, euro area banks’ profitability has improved, with their return on equity now standing at 10.1%.

Chart 3
Euro area banks’ return on equity

Source: ECB supervisory banking statistics.

Encouragingly, stronger profitability is increasingly reflected in the higher valuations investors attribute to euro area banks, as shown by a price-to-book value of over 1.

Chart 4
Euro area median price-to-book ratio for publicly listed significant institutions (daily data)

Source: ECB calculations based on Bloomberg data

In addition to financial resilience, euro area banks have also improved their risk management and governance[6], and boosted their operational resilience[7].
Thanks to broad-based resilience banks have been an anchor of stability in undeniably challenging times.
In the past five years alone, we have dealt with the worst pandemic since the 1920s, the most devastating war on European soil since the 1940s, and the biggest energy shock and rise in inflation since the 1970s. Moreover, we are now seeing tariff levels and “beggar-thy-neighbour” trade policies reminiscent of the 1930s and a resurgence of great power rivalry similar to the Cold War of the 1950s, all while the climate and nature crises are getting worse.
Against this backdrop of change and complexity, the euro area banking system has fared well. Banks remained resilient and did not propagate shocks.. And this is no coincidence: well-capitalised and resilient banks do not excessively retreat in downturns, propagating adverse dynamics; instead, they continue to support the economy.[8] Think about what happened during the pandemic: banks continued to supply credit to struggling businesses and households, even in the direst of circumstances. Better capitalisation therefore makes the banking sector more resilient and better able to fund the real economy in good as well as bad times.[9] Fiscal and monetary support to households and firms clearly helped to shield the banks from higher credit losses.
So resilient banks yield a double dividend: not only are they safer and hence better able to withstand shocks, but they are also better able to continue playing their vital role of supporting the economy at all times. In that sense, resilient banks play an important role in contributing to competitiveness, especially in a bank-based economy like Europe.
Resilience must not, however, lead to complacency in an environment that continues to be complex and, in certain aspects, is becoming increasingly challenging. Geopolitical tensions are not expected to subside, ever more frequent and severe cyberattacks are here to stay, and the substantial growth of non-bank financial institutions, including their interconnectedness with the banking sector, demand our continued vigilance.[10]
Reducing undue complexities, overlaps and costs that may hinder competitiveness
At the same time we hear voices loud and clear about undue complexities in the regulatory and supervisory framework that may negatively impact banks’ competitiveness.
Looking at how the regulatory and supervisory framework evolved since the start of the banking union there is undoubtedly an increase in size but also complexity which is shaped by several factors.
A root cause of this complexity lies in the persistent fragmentation of rules at national level. Many facets of the current prudential framework, for example, do not actually consist of a single European regulation but of a patchwork of nationally transposed directives that create complexity. In addition, foundational elements of the prudential framework, such as accounting standards, securities and insolvency laws, continue to differ across Member States, which also adds unnecessary complexity.
Another root cause of this increasing complexity is that regulation and supervision have developed in lockstep with the complexity of the external environment in which the banks under our supervision operate. For example, the framework has evolved to make sure banks are operationally resilient, for instance, to ever more frequent and severe cyberattacks and operational failures.[11]And while this was very much warranted in light of a more complex external risk landscape, it has also led to regulation growing in size.
At the same time there is also a need to identify areas of unwarranted complexity, overlaps and unnecessarily prescriptive elements that may have built up over the past decade and which can and must be simplified.
Against this backdrop, we welcome the debate on simplification. The ECB’s Governing Council has created a High-Level Task Force on Simplification to develop proposals to simplify the European prudential regulatory, supervisory and reporting framework, while still maintaining resilience. The Task Force plans to deliver its proposals for simplification to the Governing Council by the end of the year, after which they will be presented to the European Commission.
As far as European banking supervision is concerned, we have been taking action for quite a few years now. Let me outline some of the initiatives that are already in full swing to make supervision more efficient, more transparent and more risk-based, without sacrificing resilience. This makes sure that we keep bank resilient in an efficient and effective manner and thereby reducing cost factors that may hamper competitiveness. We are proving that simplification and resilience are not opposing forces – they can go very well hand in hand.
The comprehensive reform of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) that we embarked upon in 2022 is at the heart of our simplification initiatives. We have embraced risk-based supervision through initiatives like the risk tolerance framework and a multi-year approach, which allow our supervisory teams to focus more effectively on the underlying risks that matter the most. Practically speaking, this means that we are not looking every year at every risk in every bank.
The SREP reform is already delivering results: SREP decisions have become shorter and more focused, with SREP measures decreasing from 700 in 2021 to below 400 in 2025, with a stronger emphasis on addressing severe findings.[12] Moreover, issuing decisions by the end of October rather than the end of December means that key findings can be communicated more promptly. We are also enhancing our supervisory planning by improving the alignment of different supervisory activities, which helps banks to avoid duplicating their efforts.
In addition, we are reducing undue complexities and prescriptiveness by streamlining our supervisory processes through our “next-level supervision” project, which covers areas such as decision-making processes, internal models, stress testing, capital-related decisions, reporting and on-site inspections.[13] One concrete example is fit and proper assessments, where, thanks to the help of machine learning and technology, we have reduced processing times so that banks receive faster responses.[14]
Another example is a new fast-track process for simple securitisations, which was tested in the first half of 2025. This new process will cut approval times from three months to just ten working days.
An additional concrete simplification initiative is our drive to reduce reporting costs by establishing an integrated reporting framework that is accessible to statistical, prudential and resolution authorities.
We are also further embracing proportionality, which, although already embedded in the European regulatory and supervisory system, can be expanded further. Currently, small and non-complex institutions (SNCIs), which are banks that meet clear criteria for size, simplicity and limited trading activity, already benefit from lighter reporting templates and simplified liquidity and market risk standards, as well as streamlined recovery and resolution planning.[15] In practice, this means they are only required to report up to 30% of the data that large banks must report. They also benefit from less frequent on-site inspections. Therefore the SNCI regime seems the natural starting point to further enhance proportionality. For instance, one could consider a more systematic application of this regime, as well as an increased scope. These steps could be taken while maintaining the Single Rulebook, which ensures the risk-based nature of the prudential framework is retained for all banks. This is important, because proportionality should not be mistaken for simply reducing prudential standards for all smaller banks, irrespective of the risks this would generate. Instead, we should focus our attention on initiatives that reduce undue complexity, prescriptiveness and cost factors, without making banks less safe or causing them to lose track of the underlying risks.
In addition, while maintaining the current level of financial resilience among supervised banks, there is room to increase the predictability of how our supervisory assessments feed through to banks’ capital requirements. This enhanced predictability would help banks’ capital planning. Moreover, the risk-based capital stack in the EU is admittedly complex. With up to nine different layers of requirements and buffers, each serving a specific purpose that needs to be met with going and gone-concern funding instruments, the system can be difficult to navigate and, at times, create unintended interactions.[16] Thus there seems to be room to make the framework simpler and more transparent while maintaining resilience.
Banking sector competitiveness is shaped by multiple factors
Reducing undue complexities in regulation, supervision and reporting that may hamper banks’ competitiveness is essential. However the ability of euro area banks to compete with other actors – especially their international peers – is primarily shaped by a broad range of other factors, many of which are structural as well as macroeconomic in nature.
This becomes particularly clear when looking more closely at the profitability gap between euro area and US banks.[17] European banks, for instance, have a smaller home market and lower IT investments. US banks are more concentrated, with the largest ones operating across the entire country, which allows them to exert more pricing power and reap the benefits of economies of scale. European banks, on the other hand, do not have access to the same benefits because the Single Market is still fragmented.
Moreover, business volumes and profitability crucially depend on a dynamic real economy. As the Draghi report[18] convincingly shows, real GDP growth in the EU has been subdued in comparison with US growth over the last decade. And the robust economic growth in the United States, partly fuelled by its more advanced capital markets, has provided substantial benefits to banks. Thus, improvements in European banks’ competitiveness crucially hinge on revitalising growth in the European economy.[19]
Another factor shaping banks’ competitiveness is operating efficiency. Although euro area banks’ cost/income ratio has improved from 66% to 54% between 2020 and 2025, since 2021 this has been entirely driven by increasing revenues most notably net interest income, showing that there is still room for improvement when it comes to banks’ cost base.

Chart 5
Drivers of the change in euro area banks’ cost/income ratio

Source: ECB supervisory reporting.
Notes: The data show the year-on-year changes in the cost/income ratio (operating expenses as a share of net total operating income), along with the individual contributions of the numerator (“cost effect”) and denominator (“revenue effect”) to these changes. Lower values indicate an improvement in cost efficiency.

Boosting bank competitiveness by deepening integration and revitalising growth
Considering the myriad factors shaping European banks’ competitiveness and the fact that many of these factors have structural and macroeconomic root causes, real progress requires a concerted effort by a wide range of stakeholders. Let me outline some of the potential avenues that can sustainably move the dial when it comes to banks’ competitiveness.
One promising path for euro area banks to improve their operating efficiency is to enable them to reap the benefits of economies of scale by consolidating the highly fragmented sector. Larger, pan-European banks would also be better equipped to diversify risks, invest in digital transformation and compete in higher-margin, fee-based business areas. Such developments would not only strengthen banks’ competitiveness but also enable them to operate more effectively in the most profitable segments of the financial market, improve their profitability and optimise their liquidity management at the group level. From a supervisory perspective, we have repeatedly stressed that we see the benefits of cross-border mergers and have been crystal clear that we will not obstruct consolidation efforts, provided that the limitative set of regulatory criteria are met. These criteria essentially ensure that a merger results in the formation of a safe and sound bank.
At the same time, the ability of euro area banks to build pan-European business models and scale up their activity is additionally constrained by the fact that the banking union is incomplete. Completing it, including by establishing a European deposit insurance scheme, would help eliminate barriers that still hinder market integration and ensure that euro area banks can scale up and diversify geographically more easily.
Some financial instruments can also play a meaningful role in transferring risks away from credit institutions so that they are better positioned to meet additional lending demands from the real economy, while creating opportunities for financial market investors. As noted in the recently published ECB opinion on the securitisation package, the proposed regulations are a step in the right direction to make further progress at EU level to achieve economies of scale in the development of securitisation products, facilitate the expansion of the market, and support the integration of EU markets, all of which would broadly support the savings and investments union.
However, further integrating banking markets alone is no silver bullet for the competitiveness challenge banks are facing.
Looking at the real economy, the Draghi report shows that the widening GDP gap between the EU and the United States is primarily driven by weaker productivity growth in Europe. And when it comes to productivity, economists largely agree that one key reason for the gap is that Europe is adopting digital technologies more slowly and is unable to fully capture the efficiency gains of the digital transformation. Many firms remain behind the technological frontier.[20] In order to catch up, these firms need access to risk capital and to investors with networks and experience – which is why finalising the savings and investments union is vitally important for more efficient and more integrated capital markets.
Beyond capital market integration, the broader lack of a true Single Market further amplifies Europe’s competitiveness challenge. As I mentioned in a speech earlier this year[21],internal barriers to the Single Market are, on average, equivalent to a tariff of 44% on goods and a staggering 110% on services. And soberingly, 60% of barriers to trade in services are still the same as they were 20 years ago. So in order to boost productivity, unlock competitiveness and promote simplification, a time-limited roadmap to complete the Single Market is more important than ever. In areas where full harmonisation is currently politically or technically unfeasible, alternative approaches, such as introducing a “28th regime”, could provide a practical and effective interim step.
Conclusion
Let me conclude.
Europe stands at an important crossroads: to become a bulwark against external threats, ensure our strategic autonomy, and remain masters of our own destiny with good living standards for all Europeans, our economic prosperity is more important than ever.
And to safeguard our prosperity, we must bolster our competitiveness to ensure Europe is a place where innovators, creators and doers seek opportunity in the world’s second largest market. And if we are to succeed, a concerted effort from a wide range of stakeholders is essential.
Resilient banks have an important role to play. Banks that are innovative, strong and at the service of firms and citizens at all times, are an essential pillar of a competitive real economy.
And as supervisors, our single most important contribution is to make sure that banks continue to fulfil this role. Our job description is clear: maintain the public good that is financial stability. Because history has taught us – often in the hardest way during crises – that without financial stability, growth falters, progress fades, potential flounders, investment stalls, innovation slows and confidence slips away. But with the solid bedrock of financial stability, there is no ceiling to the innovation, progress and prosperity we can unleash.
Thank you for your attention.

Buch, C. (2025), “Global banking, global risks: how banks and supervisors can navigate a complex environment’’, keynote speech at the ECB Forum on Banking Supervision, Frankfurt, 13 November.
The traditional microprudential regulation of banks operates on a well-established logic. Banks finance themselves with high leverage, partly through insured deposits, which play a crucial role in preventing destabilising bank runs (see Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of political economy, 91(3), 401-419)). However, high leverage and deposit insurance also creates moral hazard: it incentivises bank managers to take on excessive risks, knowing that potential losses would be absorbed by creditors and taxpayers rather than the bank itself. The primary objective of capital regulation is to counteract this moral hazard by compelling banks to internalise potential losses. Another convincing explanation of the rationale of prudential supervision was outlined in the seminal book by Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (1994), The Prudential Regulation of Banks, which states that supervisors’ task is to monitor banks to ensure they are safe and sound on behalf of depositors, as the latter are too small, dispersed and have neither the time nor the expertise required to understand the risks a bank is taking. That’s why supervisory authorities are assigned the task of ensuring financial stability. Moreover, after the great financial crisis, a credible and effective resolution framework to resolve failing banks in an orderly manner has been a key innovation to increase trust, protect taxpayers’ money and preserve financial stability.
Data on European banks refer to significant institutions under the direct supervision of the ECB. Please see the latest list of supervised entities as well as the latest available supervisory data that refer to the second quarter of 2025.
As of the second quarter of 2025, the liquidity coverage ratio stood at 157.8% and the net stable funding ratio at 126.7%.
In the second quarter of 2015, the comparable number was 7.5%. These ratios include cash balances at central banks and other demand deposits. The NPL ratio excluding cash balances at central banks and other demand deposits stood at 2.2% as of the second quarter of 2025.
Elderson, F. (2024), “The first decade of European supervision: taking stock and looking ahead”, keynote speech at the “10 Years of SSM – Looking back and looking forward” conference organised by the European Banking Institute and the Hessisches Ministerium für Wissenschaft und Kunst, Frankfurt am Main, 4 November; Elderson, F. (2024), “The art of bending without breaking – banking on operational resilience”, speech at the joint European Banking Authority and European Central Bank international conference on “Addressing supervisory challenges through enhanced collaboration”, Frankfurt am Main, 4 September; and Tuominen, A. (2025), “Operational resilience in the digital age”, The Supervision Blog, ECB, 17 January.
For why a broader view on resilience, including governance and risk culture, operational resilience and structural risk drivers are not peripheral issues but are at the core of prudential supervision, see Elderson, F. (2025), “What good supervision looks like”, keynote speech at the 24th Annual International Conference on Policy Challenges for the Financial Sector, Washington DC, 12 June; and Elderson, F. (2025), “Resilience offers a competitive advantage, especially in uncertain times”, keynote speech at the Morgan Stanley European Financials Conference, London, 19 March.
Boissey, F. et al. (2019), “Impact of financial regulations: insights from an online repository of studies”, BIS Quarterly Review, 5 March; Budnik, K., Dimitrov, I., Gross, J., Lampe, M. and Volk, M. (2021), “Macroeconomic impact of Basel III finalisation on the euro area”, Macroprudential Bulletin, No 14, ECB, July. See also Siciliani, P., Eccles, P., Netto, F., Vitello, E., Sivanathan, V. and van Hasselt, I. (2023), Paper 2: The links between prudential regulation, competitiveness and growth, Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority, 11 September. On the usability of buffers for bank lending, see Couaillier, C. et al. (2021), “Bank capital buffers and lending in the euro area during the pandemic”, Financial Stability Review, November; and Couaillier, C. et al. (2022), “Caution: do not cross! Capital buffers and lending in Covid-19 times”, Working Paper Series, No 2644, ECB, February.
See Berg, J., Boivin, N. and Geeroms, H. (2025), “The quickly fading memory of why and when bank capital is important”, Working Papers, Issue 4, Bruegel; and Behn, M. and Reghezza, A. (2025), “Capital requirements: a pillar or a burden for bank competitiveness?”, Occasional Paper Series, No 376, ECB.
In relation to the significant growth of non-bank financial institutions that now accounts for over half of financial sector assets in the euro area, see Buch, C. (2025): “Hidden leverage and blind spots: addressing banks’ exposures to private market funds”, The Supervision Blog, ECB, 3 June; and Montagner, P. (2025), “Non-bank financial institutions: understanding transmission channels and regulatory challenges”, contribution for Eurofi Magazine, 17 September.
For example, the number of significant cyber incidents reported to the ECB more than doubled between 2022 and 2024.
Banks will be informed of their SREP outcome, key concerns and requirements/recommendations in a concise letter, with the main text expected to be around ten pages on average.
Buch, C. (2025), “Simplification without deregulation: European supervision, regulation and reporting in a changing environment”, speech at the Goldman Sachs European Financials Conference 2025, Berlin, 11 June; ECB, “Making European supervision more efficient, effective and risk-focused”; Donnery, S. (2025), “As simple as possible, but not simpler”, The Supervision Blog, ECB, 8 September.
For example, we reduced the average processing time from 109 days in 2023 to 97 days in 2024, and to as little as 61 days for non-complex cases, meaning that we can dedicate more time and resources to complex cases in line with our risk-based approach. For certain appointments, such as renewals of mandates, we will streamline the assessment process further.
Today, around 1,400 banks, or more than 70% of less significant institutions, are also SNCIs.
Buch, C. (2025), “Simplification without deregulation: European supervision, regulation and reporting in a changing environment”, speech at the Goldman Sachs European Financials Conference 2025, Berlin, 11 June.
Di Vito, L., Martín Fuentes, N. and Matos Leite, J. (2023), “Understanding the profitability gap between euro area and US global systemically important banks”, Occasional Paper Series, No 327, ECB, August.
Draghi, M. (2024), The future of European competitiveness, European Commission, September.
Donnery, S. (2025), “Less regulation, more growth? It’s not that simple”, speech at the SSM Senior Forum organised by A&O Shearman, Königstein im Taunus, 25 June.
Schnabel, I. (2024), “From laggard to leader? Closing the euro area’s technology gap”, inaugural lecture of the EMU Lab at the European University Institute, Florence, 16 February.
Elderson, F. (2025), “Europe at a crossroads: it is high time to complete the Single Market” , keynote speech at the SRB Legal Conference 2025, Brussels, 18 June.

 
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