EACC

Remarks by Chief Negotiator Barnier at the press conference on the Commission Recommendation to the European Council to endorse the agreement reached on the revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and revised Political Declaration

“Check against delivery”

Mesdames et Messieurs,
Aujourd’hui, nous avons trouvé un accord avec le gouvernement britannique sur le retrait ordonné du Royaume-Uni et le cadre de notre future relation.
C’est le résultat d’un travail intensif des deux équipes de négociateurs, l’équipe britannique et notre propre équipe, que je veux personnellement remercier pour leur ténacité et leur professionnalisme, mais aussi, du côté européen, d’un dialogue permanent avec les 27 Etats membres et le Parlement européen, avec qui nous avons réellement co-construit ce nouvel accord.
Cet accord est agréé au niveau des négociateurs. Avec le Président Juncker, qui a conclu ce matin avec le Premier ministre Johnson, nous le présenterons tout à l’heure au Conseil européen à 27. Je veux d’ailleurs remercier le Président Tusk pour sa confiance tout au long de ces trois années.
Ce texte, Mesdames et Messieurs, permet d’apporter de la sécurité juridique et de la certitude là où le Brexit crée de l’incertitude, en particulier et d’abord pour :
      Les citoyens européens au Royaume-Uni et les Britanniques dans un Etat membre de l’Union. Ils ont toujours été, et ils resteront, notre priorité, celle des Etats membres et du Parlement européen. L’incertitude pour ces citoyens a trop duré. Grâce à cet accord, leurs droits seront enfin garantis dans la durée.
      Les porteurs de projets financés par le budget de l’Union européenne, dans les 27 Etats membres et au Royaume-Uni puisque, grâce à cet accord, les engagements financiers déjà pris à 28 seront honorés à 28.
      Toutes les personnes et entreprises concernées par tous les autres sujets de la séparation, comme Euratom, la protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle existants, la protection des indications géographiques ou la protection des données personnelles.
      Cette proposition comprend aussi la période de transition, qui avait été demandée par le gouvernement britannique et qui durera jusqu’à la fin 2020 – 14 mois – et peut-être une ou deux années de plus en cas d’accord conjoint du Royaume-Uni et de l’Union européenne.
Ladies and gentlemen,
The UK government has wanted to open one point in the Withdrawal Agreement: the question of the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Throughout these negotiations, the EU and the UK were fully committed to protect peace and stability on the island of Ireland.
We had to reconcile two objectives:
First, include a legally operative solution in the Withdrawal Agreement that would:
      Avoid a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland;
      Preserve the all-island economy;
      Protect the integrity of the Single Market.
Secondly, a point extremely important to Prime Minister Johnson and the UK was that Northern Ireland remains in the UK’s customs territory.
Discussions over the past days have at times been difficult.
But we have delivered. Together.
The solution that we found rests on four main elements
1/ First, Northern Ireland will remain aligned to a limited set of EU rules, notably related to goods.
      This means that all applicable procedures on goods will take place at the points of entry into Northern Ireland and not across the island.
      For this purpose, UK authorities will be in charge of applying the Union’s Customs Code in Northern Ireland.
2/ Secondly, beyond applicable procedures, there is also the question of customs duties.
      Northern Ireland will remain in the UK’s customs territory. It will therefore benefit from the UK’s future trade policy.
      But Northern Ireland will also remain an entry point into our Single Market.
So what have we done to square this circle?
      UK authorities can apply UK tariffs on products coming from third countries, so long as those goods entering Northern Ireland are not at risk of entering our Single Market.
      However, for goods at risk of entering the Single Market, UK authorities will apply the EU’s tariffs.
3/ Third, this night and this morning still, we were working on the issue of VAT.
It is an important subject to avoid distortion of competition within the Single Market for goods.
On this point also, we have managed to achieve two objectives:
      Maintain the integrity of the Single Market
      But also satisfy the UK’s legitimate wishes.
4/ Finally, Prime Minister Johnson and the Taoiseach wanted to ensure long-term democratic support for the application by UK authorities of relevant Union rules in Northern Ireland.
      Four years after the entry into force of the Protocol, the elected representatives of Northern Ireland will be able to decide, by simple majority, whether to continue applying relevant Union rules in Northern Ireland or not.
This democratic support is a cornerstone of our newly agreed approach.
Why?
Because this newly agreed Protocol is no longer to be replaced by a subsequent agreement between the EU and the UK.  So it makes sense to ensure consent.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Obviously, when discussing Northern Ireland, we talk about the economy, about technical matters, about goods. But for me, since 3 years, what really matters are the people of Northern Ireland and Ireland.
What really matters is peace.
Mesdames et Messieurs,
Enfin, au-delà de cette séparation et de l’accord de retrait, nous avons trouvé un accord pour réviser la déclaration politique, qui devra être adoptée par le Conseil européen et qui sera le cadre pour rebâtir un partenariat ambitieux avec le Royaume-Uni, pays ami, pays partenaire et pays allié.
Sur ce point, le gouvernement de Boris Johnson a fait le choix clair d’un accord de libre-échange.
Toute référence à d’autres options, notamment l’option de créer entre nous un territoire douanier unique a donc été éliminée.
Ce qui ne change pas, en revanche, est notre proximité géographique et notre interdépendance avec l’économie du Royaume-Uni, et nous nous sommes mis d’accord pour avoir des garanties solides de level playing field afin de permettre un accord de libre-échange ambitieux sans tarifs ni quotas.
Sur ce point, je peux témoigner, pour en avoir souvent parlé avec eux, que les Etats membres, le Parlement européen et les entreprises du marché unique sont extrêmement attentifs à l’existence d’un socle commun sur les standards applicables à la fin de la transition, en matière de droits sociaux, de protection de l’environnement, d’aides d’Etat et les questions de fiscalité.
Au total, le niveau d’ambition de notre futur accord de libre-échange sera proportionnel au niveau et à la qualité des règles du jeu économique entre nous.
Mesdames et Messieurs,
Voilà l’accord que nous avons conclu au terme de ces journées intenses de négociation. Le texte juridique en est maintenant disponible.
Sur cette base, l’évaluation que nous présenterons tout à l’heure avec le Président Juncker au Conseil européen est que nous avons obtenu ensemble un résultat juste et raisonnable, qui correspond à nos principes.
Du côté européen, Il appartient maintenant au Conseil européen d’apprécier le contenu de cet accord. Et ensuite au Conseil de l’approuver, tout comme le Parlement européen, que je veux remercier pour sa confiance et qui aura le dernier mot.
Nous allons poursuivre ce processus dès aujourd’hui, dans le dialogue et le respect de nos institutions.
Nous avons aujourd’hui une base juste et raisonnable – fair and reasonable – pour un retrait ordonné du Royaume-Uni et surtout pour commencer – nous le souhaitons le plus tôt possible, dès le 1er novembre – à travailler à un nouveau partenariat avec le Royaume-Uni.
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

Remarks by President Juncker at the joint press conference with Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

“Check against delivery”

Good to see you and good to see the Prime Minister, my friend Boris Johnson.
We have a deal. And this deal means that there is no need for any kind of prolongation.
This is a fair and balanced agreement. It is testament to our commitment to finding solutions.
It provides certainty where Brexit creates uncertainty. It protects the rights of our citizens and it protects peace and stability on the island of Ireland. There will be no border on the island of Ireland. And the Single Market will be protected.
This deal is not about us, the deal is about people and peace.
And I look forward to continue my conversations with Boris, because we will start the negotiations on the future relations immediately after the deal will have been approved.
We will start our debates on 1 November, without delay.
Tonight, together with Michel Barnier, I will explain the deal to the 27 Heads of State or Government.
And of course, it is for both our Parliaments to have the final say. It is not only Westminster having to approve the deal – the deal being in fact a Treaty – it is also up to the European Parliament to do the same.
So thank you, Boris for – I have to say – the excellent relations we had throughout the last weeks.
I have to say: I am happy about the deal, but I am sad about Brexit.
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

The EU is working together for the secure roll-out of 5G networks across the union, leading the way for a digital transformation of European societies. A new report provides insight into potential cybersecurity risks.

Today, Member States, with the support of the Commission and the European Agency for Cybersecurity published a report on the EU coordinated risk assessment on cybersecurity in Fifth Generation (5G) networks. This major step is part of the implementation of the European Commission Recommendation adopted in March 2019 to ensure a high level of cybersecurity of 5G networks across the EU.
5G networks is the future backbone of our increasingly digitised economies and societies. Billions of connected objects and systems are concerned, including in critical sectors such as energy, transport, banking, and health, as well as industrial control systems carrying sensitive information and supporting safety systems. Ensuring the security and resilience of 5G networks is therefore essential.
The report is based on the results of the national cybersecurity risk assessments by all EU Member States. It identifies the main threats and threats actors, the most sensitive assets, the main vulnerabilities (including technical ones and other types of vulnerabilities) and a number of strategic risks.
This assessment provides the basis to identify mitigation measures that can be applied at national and European level.
Main insights of the EU coordinated risk assessment
The report identifies a number of important security challenges, which are likely to appear or become more prominent in 5G networks, compared with the situation in existing networks:
These security challenges are mainly linked to:
key innovations in the 5G technology (which will also bring a number of specific security improvements), in particular the important part of software and the wide range of services and applications enabled by 5G;
the role of suppliers in building and operating 5G networks and the degree of dependency on individual suppliers.
Specifically, the roll-out of 5G networks is expected to have the following effects:
An increased exposure to attacks and more potential entry points for attackers: With 5G networks increasingly based on software, risks related to major security flaws, such as those deriving from poor software development processes within suppliers are gaining in importance. They could also make it easier for threat actors to maliciously insert backdoors into products and make them harder to detect.
Due to new characteristics of the 5G network architecture and new functionalities, certain pieces of network equipment or functions are becoming more sensitive, such as base stations or key technical management functions of the networks.
An increased exposure to risks related to the reliance of mobile network operators on suppliers. This will also lead to a higher number of attacks paths that might be exploited by threat actors and increase the potential severity of the impact of such attacks. Among the various potential actors, non-EU States or State-backed are considered as the most serious ones and the most likely to target 5G networks.
In this context of increased exposure to attacks facilitated by suppliers, the risk profile of individual suppliers will become particularly important, including the likelihood of the supplier being subject to interference from a non-EU country.
Increased risks from major dependencies on suppliers: a major dependency on a single supplier increases the exposure to a potential supply interruption, resulting for instance from a commercial failure, and its consequences. It also aggravates the potential impact of weaknesses or vulnerabilities, and of their possible exploitation by threat actors, in particular where the dependency concerns a supplier presenting a high degree of risk.
Threats to availability and integrity of networks will become major security concerns: in addition to confidentiality and privacy threats, with 5G networks expected to become the backbone of many critical IT applications, the integrity and availability of those networks will become major national security concerns and a major security challenge from an EU perspective.
Together, these challenges create a new security paradigm, making it necessary to reassess the current policy and security framework applicable to the sector and its ecosystem and essential for Member states to take the necessary mitigating measures.
European Agency for Cybersecurity threat landscape: To complement the Member States’ report, the European Agency for Cybersecurity is finalising a specific threat landscape mapping related to 5G networks, which considers in more detail certain technical aspects covered in the report.
Next Steps
By 31 December 2019, the Cooperation Group should agree on a toolbox of mitigating measures to address the identified cybersecurity risks at national and Union level.
By 1 October 2020, Member States – in cooperation with the Commission – should assess the effects of the Recommendation in order to determine whether there is a need for further action. This assessment should take into account the outcome of the coordinated European risk assessment and of the effectiveness of the measures.  
Background
On 26 March 2019, after receiving the support from the European Council, the Commission adopted a Recommendation on Cybersecurity of 5G networks calling on Member States to complete national risk assessments and review national measures and to work together at EU level on a coordinated risk assessment and a common toolbox of mitigating measures.
At national level, each Member State has completed a national risk assessment of 5G network infrastructures and transmitted the results to the Commission and ENISA, the EU Agency for cybersecurity. The national risk assessments reviewed in particular main threats and threat actors affecting 5G networks, sensitive 5G assets as well as relevant vulnerabilities, including both technical ones and other types of vulnerabilities, such as those potentially arising from the 5G supply chain, in line with the EC Recommendation.
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

How can we mobilize private finance for climate-friendly investments?

Watch this Friday’s launch of the International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) with European Commission Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis and IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva to find out. The International Platform on Sustainable Finance: A Global Approach for Financing the Green TransitionFriday, October 18, 2019 2:00 PM EDT / 06:00 PM GMT

 
Click HERE at the time of the event to view the webcast
 

SPEAKERS:
Introductory remarks by Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission
Keynote remarks by Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
Key statements by the IPSF members, Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors
Compliments of the European External Action Service and the IMF

EACC

Its Official: European American Chamber of Commerce Expands Network to The Netherlands

New York/Amsterdam — The newest chapter of the European American Chamber of Commerce (EACC) was formally opened with an inaugural board meeting on June 21st in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  “This is an important milestone for our trading and investment relationships with the United States,” said newly nominated Board President Myrthe Görtzen a Partner at the Dutch law firm AKD.  “Every additional EACC network partner on either side of the Atlantic will strengthen our ability to build new and mutually beneficial business relationships.”
James Rosener the President of EACC New York commented: Ever since Henry Hudson sailed across the Atlantic to discover New Amsterdam economic relations between the Netherlands and the United States have been strong and growing.  It is only natural that the first chapter in Europe outside of France is in the Netherlands.  For our members in New York and elsewhere in the United States our growing network will help to continue to reinforce the position of the European American Chamber of Commerce as the premier business organization supporting companies doing business on both sides of the Atlantic
“I am delighted to learn about the opening of the Netherlands EACC chapter. The EACC is a valuable platform for transatlantic business relations, creating solid networking and business development opportunities, whilst also providing insightful events with a focus on European-American economic trends and foreign policy. An actual presence in the Netherlands will further strengthen transatlantic ties and enhance business opportunities. The economic relations between our countries go back 400 years and are in full swing, the Netherlands being the 5th largest investor in the USA and the most important gateway to the European market for American products and services” according to Dolph Hogewoning, Consul General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in New York.
Founding Members of the European American Chamber of Commerce Netherlands (EACC NL) include: Lucas Bols, Deloitte, AKD, Gateway Business Support, Loyens & Loeff and NIPA Capital; General Members so far include: Houthoff and Stibbe. They are part of the larger EACC network which represents over 750 member companies on both sides of the Atlantic. More information about EACC NL can be found at www.eaccnl.eu.
The EACC started in Paris, France and the New York chapter was established in 2008 as the second EACC chapter in the United States, the first US chapter is based in Cincinnati. The network also includes representations in Princeton, NJ, the Carolinas, Lyon (France), Brussels (Belgium), and now The Netherlands.  New chapters are under development in Florida and Washington DC, with other chapters being explored in Milan (Italy), Spain, Germany and Portugal.
# # #
 About the European American Chamber of Commerce in New York
The EACCNY has created a dynamic ecosystem to help its members succeed in their transatlantic business activities. Its trusted and engaged business network assists European companies as they launch and grow their U.S. operations, while also supporting companies from the Tri-state area and beyond as they export and/or establish operations in Europe.
The European American Chamber of Commerce® provides its members with access to transatlantic business opportunities as well as timely and relevant information, resources and support on matters affecting business activities between Europe and the U.S.
The goal of the EACC’s New York Chapter is to stimulate business development, and to facilitate networking and relationships between European and American businesses & professional organizations.
The EACC is a not-for-profit, non-governmental, non-political business association that is 100 percent member funded. The EACC New York is part of a growing network of chapters in the U.S. and Europe: Cincinnati, New Jersey, Carolinas, Paris, Lyon, Brussels and Amsterdam. For more information, visit eaccny.com or follow us on twitter @eaccny

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EACC

Widening Gaps: Regional Inequality within Advanced Economies

Differences in economic performance between regions within countries can be large and sometimes even larger than between countries.
For example, average real GDP per person in the United States is about 90 percent higher than in Slovakia. At the same time, within the United States, per capita GDP in the state of New York is 100 percent higher than in Mississippi.

Many are concerned that these large and persistent gaps signal that regions and people are being left behind, undermining inclusive growth. Poor regional performance can fuel discontent and erode social trust and cohesion.
Chapter 2 of the latest World Economic Outlook looks at the gaps between the better and worse performing regions in advanced economies and finds that these gaps have widened in many cases. We also look at how regional labor markets respond to trade and technology shocks, captured by increases in import competition in external markets and declines in machinery and equipment costs for regions that are more vulnerable to automation. The findings indicate that only technology shocks have lasting effects, especially for worse performing regions.

Differences in economic performance between regions within countries can be large.

Measuring regional differences
One way to measure regional inequality is to calculate the 90/10 ratio—divide real GDP per capita in the top 10 percent regions (or 90th percentile) by the bottom 10 percent within a country. In the case of Italy, the 90/10 ratio is about 2, meaning that GDP per capita of the well-off province of Trento is about twice as large as Sicily’s. In contrast, the 90/10 ratio for Japan is small, at 1.35.
Regional disparities within advanced countries have gradually been creeping upwards since the late 1980s, undoing some of the marked decline of the previous three decades. The 90/10 ratio within advanced economies, including the United States, is now at about 1.7, indicating that the 90th percentile region is, on average, 70 percent richer than the 10th percentile region. That said, incomes tend to vary much more within regions than between them.
Rising disparities also means that poorer regions in advanced economies are no longer catching up to the rich as fast as they used to.

Big differences
The WEO chapter classifies a region as lagging if two conditions are met: the region’s initial real GDP per capita in 2000 is below the country’s median region, and the region’s average growth over the period 2000–16 is below the country’s average growth over the same period.
But there are more differences than just output. On average, people in lagging regions are worse off when it comes to health, with higher infant mortality and lower life expectancy. They also have smaller shares of college-educated workers and people in their prime, considered to be 25 to 54 years old, higher unemployment rates, and a smaller share of people participating in the labor force.
Consistent with these unfavorable demographics, lagging regions tend to have lower labor productivity—output per worker—across sectors. This ranges from about 5 percent less in public services to around 15 percent less in manufacturing industries and finance and professional services.
In addition, poorer regions tend to specialize in agriculture and manufacturing industries rather than high productivity service sectors such as information technology and communications and finance. Climate change may exacerbate disparities as rising temperatures lower labor productivity in agriculture and heat-exposed industries, often affecting lagging regions more.

Responses to shocks
To get a better sense of regional differences, our study analyzes the effects of trade and technology shocks on regional unemployment and migration.
We find that trade shocks—increases in import competition in external markets—do not have significant effects on regional unemployment on average, both overall and for lagging regions specifically. While these shocks tend to reduce labor force participation after one year, this effect quickly fades. These findings may come as a surprise to those who view international trade as particularly disruptive to regional growth.
Technology, however, is a different story. We find that a negative technology shock—proxied by a decline in the cost of machinery and equipment—raises unemployment in all regions that are more vulnerable to automation, but lagging regions are particularly hurt.

Our research also shows that automation-prone lagging regions see a statistically significant drop in people leaving after the shock. This suggests that workers from these regions find it harder to move out in search of better employment than those from other regions. Labor’s adjustment to technology shocks in lagging regions is hampered.
Focus on people and places
Policies that reduce distortions and encourage more open and flexible markets can help regions minimize increases in unemployment to shocks and improve the reallocation of workers and capital. Labor policies to retrain the displaced and speed re-employment can also help, particularly in lagging regions. Product markets that are more open—through lower barriers to entry and greater trade openness—can facilitate the movement of capital to regions and firms where their returns are higher.
In addition, boosting educational and training quality to adapt to the changing world of work—a key recommendation from the literature—would disproportionately benefit lagging regions where unemployment is higher.
Finally, fiscal policies that aim to narrow the gaps across regions—such as targeting fiscal support to lagging regions and programs to ease worker relocation—and to provide buffers against regional shocks may also play a role. But these place-based policies have to be carefully designed to help rather than hinder adjustment.
Compliments of the IMF

EACC

Commission launches new edition of the Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor 2019

Today, the European Commission released the second edition of its Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor, a tool designed to benchmark and boost the creative and cultural potential of European cities, which is vital to driving economic growth and social cohesion. After the success of the first edition in 2017, the 2019 release presents an updated portrait of Europe’s cultural and creative richness in an extended sample of 190 cities in 30 countries, including Norway and Switzerland. The Monitor was created by the Joint Research Centre, the Commission’s science and knowledge service, and is accompanied by a revamped online tool which enables cities to add their own data for more in-depth coverage and benchmarking. 

Tibor Navracsics, Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth, Sport, and responsible for the Joint Research Centre said: “The first edition of the Cultural and Creative City Monitor proved to be a success, enabling cities across Europe to boost development by better harnessing their cultural assets. I am confident that the second, expanded edition will be equally useful for city authorities, the cultural and creative sectors, and citizens themselves. The Monitor is an excellent example of how the Joint Research Centre can empower policy-makers and help improve citizens’ quality of life through concrete, evidence-based tools.” 
Key findings of the second edition include:
·         Paris (France), Copenhagen (Denmark), Florence (Italy) and Lund (Sweden) rank top in their respective population groups, with Lund being a ‘new entry’ among the top cities compared to the 2017 edition.
·         Jobs in the cultural and creative sectors have been growing particularly in cities in the North and East of Europe, with an average yearly increase of around 12% in Budapest (Hungary), Tallinn (Estonia), Vilnius (Lithuania), Krakow and Wroclaw (Poland) and Tartu (Estonia).
·         Macro-regional performance shows that Northern Europe does best. Western Europe leads on ‘Cultural Vibrancy’, very closely followed by both Northern and Southern Europe. Western Europe is also the top performer on ‘Creative Economy’, with northern Europe coming close behind. The best job creation dynamics are found, on average, in Northern and Eastern European cities.
·         In the analysed city-sample, cultural venues are generally a 30-minute walk away (or just 5 minutes by bicycle) from where European citizens live and are highly accessible by public transportation.
·         Future EU Cohesion Policy funds could further support socio-economic convergence and territorial cohesion by focusing on creative jobs and innovation, transport connections and governance – the areas where the biggest gaps remain.
·         Leading cultural and creative cities are more prosperous: there is a positive and significant association between the Cultural and Creative Cities Index scores and the cities’ income levels.
The first edition of the Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor has inspired local governments across Europe. For instance, Madrid (Spain) used evidence included in the Monitor to understand which cultural and creative assets, such as monuments, museums, cinemas, theatres and art galleries, the Spanish capital should focus its branding strategy on to improve its international ranking. As a result, Madrid published a new leaflet “Madrid – Facts and Figures 2018” promoting the city’s rich cultural venues. The Monitor also helped Győr (Hungary) analyse future investment needs and provided evidence to support the city’s decision to adopt a 2019-2028 cultural and creative economy strategy which identifies key measures to be implemented such as the creation of creative spaces for artists and a design incubation centre. Umeå (Sweden) used the tool to raise awareness among local stakeholders of the role cultural investments have to play in fostering sustainable growth. 
Background
Launched in July 2017, the Cultural and Creative Cities Monitor uses quantitative and qualitative information to measure cities’ cultural and creative potential. The Monitor’s quantitative information is captured in 29 individual indicators relevant to nine policy dimensions, which reflect three major facets of a city’s cultural and socio-economic vitality:
·         “Cultural Vibrancy” measures a city’s cultural ‘pulse’ in terms of cultural infrastructure and participation in culture.
·         “Creative Economy” captures the extent to which the cultural and creative sectors contribute to a city’s economy in terms of employment and innovation.
·         “Enabling Environment” identifies the tangible and intangible assets that help cities attract creative talent and stimulate cultural engagement.
New features of the 2019 edition include:
·         22 European cities from 14 Member States have been added, taking the total to 190;
·         New sources of web data (OpenStreetMap) have been used to better grasp Europe’s cultural vibrancy in a more dynamic way;
·         Novel findings from the spatial analysis of cultural venues help to put the social inclusion perspective at the core of the research alongside economic wealth;
The Monitor supports EU policy on culture: it was a basis for the economic impact assessment underpinning the 2018 ‘New European Agenda for Culture’, and is one of the actions included in the ‘European Framework for Action on Cultural Heritage’ to help ensure that the European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018 has a lasting impact.
The Monitor is expected to be updated every two years. 
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

Mediterranean and Black Seas: Commission proposes fishing opportunities for 2020

Today, the Commission has adopted its first ever proposal on fishing opportunities covering both the Mediterranean and the Black Seas.
With this proposal, the Commission is delivering on the political commitments made in the MedFish4Ever and Sofia Declarations to promote sustainable management of fish stocks in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. It reflects the Commission’s efforts and ambition to ensure social and economic viability for the fishermen operating in the region by restoring and maintaining stocks at sustainable levels.
“Throughout my term in office, I have been working to reverse the alarming situation for most fish stocks in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as part of the EU’s wider commitment to sustainable fisheries. It is a long process but today’s proposal is another important step in the right direction”, said Karmenu Vella, Commissioner for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.
In the Mediterranean Sea, the proposal implements the multiannual management plan for demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean, adopted in June this year. To that end, a reduction of fishing effort is necessary in 2020 for red mullet, hake, deep-water rose shrimp, Norway lobster, blue and red shrimp and giant red shrimp.
The proposal also includes additional measures, in line with the decisions of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). In particular, it introduces a 3 months closure period for eel, catch and fishing effort limits for small pelagics in the Adriatic and a fishing effort limit for demersals in the Adriatic.
In the Black Sea, the Commission proposes catch limits and quota for turbot and sprat. For turbot, the proposal will transpose the EU quota to be decided in the context of the revision of the GFCM turbot multiannual management plan. For sprat, the Commission proposes to maintain the same catch limit as in 2019, namely 11,475 tonnes.
The Commission proposal will be updated after the GFCM annual session (4-8 November 2019) with the figures of those stocks subject to negotiations within that organisation.
At the December Agriculture and Fisheries Council (16-17 December), Member States will set the fishing opportunities for 2020 on the basis of the Commission proposal.
Background
In 2016, 78% of assessed fish stocksin the Mediterranean and Black Seas were exploited outside biological sustainable limits. (FAO, 2018)
To tackle this grave situation, the Commission is promoting multilateral cooperation on fisheries management in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. Enhanced governance has been established following the adoption of the Malta “MedFish4ever” and Sofia Declarations.
The multiannual management plan for demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean adopted in June 2019, introduced a fishing effort regime for trawlers intended to achieve an overall reduction of up to 40% in five years. For the first year of implementation, the plan foresees a reduction of 10% from the baseline established in accordance with the provisions of the plan.
The General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) is a regional fisheries management organisation competent for the conservation and management of fish stocks in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In recent years, the GFCM has adopted an impressive number of conservation, management and control measures at the proposal of the European Union. In 2018, the GFCM adopted a management plan for eel in the Mediterranean Sea and emergency measures for 2019-2021 for small pelagic stocks in the Adriatic Sea. The GFCM is expected to adopt measures regarding demersal stocks in the Adriatic Sea at its annual session in November this year.
In 2017, the GFCM adopted a multiannual management plan for turbot, introducing management and control measures to be implemented for the first time at regional level. The multiannual plan will be reviewed at the GFCM 2019 annual session, where a new quota allocation is expected to be agreed upon by contracting parties.
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

The Difficulties with the New UK Backstop Proposals

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
There is, at last, some movement in the Brexit negotiation.
On the UK side, Boris Johnson previously insisted on the Irish backstop being scrapped. Now he is making proposals (unacceptable so far to the EU) to rewrite it.
On the EU side, there is a movement too.
 The present Agreement contains a backstop to cover the whole UK. Now the EU is apparently willing to contemplate a backstop confined to Northern Ireland (NI) alone. This is a step backward for Ireland.  An “NI only” backstop would not protect Irish trade with Britain which is more valuable than trade across the border with NI.
Why are the new UK proposals for an NI only backstop unacceptable so far to the EU?
It is hard to give a complete answer to this question because the UK has insisted that its legal text for the new backstop remain confidential. This is a pity because any such text could benefit from constructive criticism from outside the narrow confines of the UK negotiation team and the Article 50 Task Force.
The only thing we have to go on is an Explanatory note published by the UK Government.
The note says the UK Government wants to uphold the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This Agreement was made in good faith by the then Irish government, on the basis of joint Irish and British membership of the EU Single Market, which had come into force only five years earlier in 1993, and had removed trade barriers between the two parts of Ireland.
 If there was at that time any possibility of the UK ever withdrawing from the Single Market, it would have been for the UK side to have brought that up in the negotiations. Neither the then UK government, nor the Tory Opposition, did so.
  If they had, there would probably have been no Belfast Agreement.
This is because the Belfast Agreement is all about convergence between North and South, as well as convergence between Ireland and Britain.  In contrast, Brexit inevitably is about divergence between North and South, AND divergence between Britain and Ireland. At a fundamental level they are incompatible. 
While everybody may now be acting in full good faith, there is also the issue for the EU of the structural reliability of the UK as a negotiating partner. 
 A Conservative government, with a parliamentary majority, signed a joint paper with the EU, committing it to protect the Belfast Agreement and to avoid border controls.  Now another Conservative government, in the same Parliament but now without a majority, wants to renege on that. 
UK public opinion sees no problem with this, but it is difficult for the EU. The EU would be setting a precedent for future negotiations, with the UK and with others. 
The latest UK proposals would align the regulatory standards for goods in NI, with EU standards. This is a welcome move, but it would mean new controls, between NI and Britain, to check compliance with EU standards. On the other hand it would remove the need for controls, for this particular purpose, at the land border in Ireland.
 But the proposals completely ignore tariffs there will be between the EU and UK. Once the transition period is over, imports from the UK will have to pay EU tariffs, which are quite high for some products, particularly agricultural ones. 
These tariffs will have to be collected at or near the land border in Ireland. The proposal to align NI and EU regulatory standards for goods does not solve that problem of tariffs on those same goods. 
The collection of these tariffs at or near the border will be highly contentious, although it will be absolutely necessary if Ireland is to remain in the EU. 
 If , in future, the UK  makes a trade agreements with a third country (say the US), and has to make concessions on either tariffs or goods standards to get these agreements, there would  then have to be additional or wider controls. These wider controls would be the land border for tariffs, and between NI and UK for standards.
 This problem would get steadily worse as time goes on. Boris Johnson has said that the UK will deliberately diverge from EU labour, environmental and product standards and will be making many concessions in his trade deals, so the scope and scale of the controls will become greater all the time.
 These will be either on the land border, or on the Irish Sea. Both go against the convergence goals of the Belfast Agreement. 
The new UK proposals envisage a system of notifications to prevent prohibited products entering the EU and for the collection of VAT. It remains to be seen if these can be rendered compatible with the EU Customs code, which envisages the tariff, tax, and quality status of goods being checked at the same place, at a customs post on the border.
 I expect the Article 50 Task force are now subjecting these UK proposals to forensic examination. They will ensure that Ireland’s status as a fully compliant part of the EU Single Market is not put in doubt and that the VAT is collected.  
The entire UK package would create dangerous new opportunities for smuggling, and smuggling is often used to finance political terrorism and mafia practices. 
The UK proposals are conditional on “Consent” in Northern Ireland to adherence to EU goods and food standards and to the Single Electricity Market.
 They would not to come into effect, without the consent of the NI Executive and Assembly. This consent would have to be renewed every four years. 
 The NI Assembly nowadays seems incapable of meeting, let alone of making decisions, so I do not think the EU being happy to delegate the future of any hard won compromise it makes with the UK to it. It would be giving a regional body, in a non EU state, a power to obviate an Agreement into which the EU would have entered in good faith every four years. We must not forget that the NI Assembly operates on the basis of a “petition of concern” whereby, a minority ( 30 out of 90)  of members in the Assembly, could block consent to deal . 
This  NI “consent” provision is to be inserted into the heart of what one hopes will to be a balanced, and hard fought, overall deal between the UK and the EU. I cannot see the EU agreeing to  all this being subject to the ongoing vagaries of NI politics. 
Compliments of John Bruton

EACC

Statement on the publication of WTO’s award in the Airbus dispute

Following the publication today of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) award regarding the amount of U.S. countermeasures in the WTO Airbus dispute, Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström made the following statement:
“The European Union takes note of the decision of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) arbitration panel in the Airbus case, and the level of possible countermeasures.
We remain of the view that even if the United States obtains authorisation from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, opting for applying countermeasures now would be short-sighted and counterproductive.
Both the EU and the U.S. have been found at fault by the WTO dispute settlement system for continuing to provide certain unlawful subsidies to their aircraft manufacturers.
In the parallel Boeing case, the EU will in some months equally be granted rights to impose countermeasures against the U.S. as a result of its continued failure to comply with WTO rules. A preliminary list of U.S. products to be considered for countermeasures was published last April.
The mutual imposition of countermeasures, however, would only inflict damage on businesses and citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, and harm global trade and the broader aviation industry at a sensitive time.
The European Commission has consistently communicated to the United States that the European Union is ready to work with them on a fair and balanced solution for our respective aircraft industries.
The aircraft sector is amongst the most complex industries in the world, from the development, production and financing point of view. The specificity of the sector calls for comprehensive subsidy disciplines so that all players compete on an equal footing.
The EU has, as recently as this July, shared concrete proposals with the U.S. for a new regime on aircraft subsidies, and a way forward on existing compliance obligations on both sides. So far the U.S. has not reacted.
Our readiness to find a fair settlement remains unchanged. But if the U.S. decides to impose WTO authorised countermeasures, it will be pushing the EU into a situation where we will have no other option than do the same.”
For More InformationWTO decision authorising countermeasuresHistory of the disputeParallel WTO dispute on Boeing and potential EU countermeasures