‘Always on’ culture leads to increased risk of depression, anxiety and burnout
EU law to define minimum requirements for remote working
No repercussions for workers who exercise their ‘right to disconnect’

Parliament calls for an EU law that grants workers the right to digitally disconnect from work without facing negative repercussions.
In their legislative initiative that passed with 472 votes in favour, 126 against and 83 abstentions, MEPs call on the Commission to propose a law that enables those who work digitally to disconnect outside their working hours. It should also establish minimum requirements for remote working and clarify working conditions, hours and rest periods.
The increase in digital resources being used for work purposes has resulted in an ‘always on’ culture, which has a negative impact on the work-life balance of employees, MEPs say. Although working from home has been instrumental in helping safeguard employment and business during the COVID-19 crisis, the combination of long working hours and higher demands also leads to more cases of anxiety, depression, burnout and other mental and physical health issues.
MEPs consider the right to disconnect a fundamental right that allows workers to refrain from engaging in work-related tasks – such as phone calls, emails and other digital communication – outside working hours. This includes holidays and other forms of leave. Member states are encouraged to take all necessary measures to allow workers to exercise this right, including via collective agreements between social partners. They should ensure that workers will not be subjected to discrimination, criticism, dismissal, or other adverse actions by employers.
“We cannot abandon millions of European workers who are exhausted by the pressure to be always ‘on’ and overly long working hours. Now is the moment to stand by their side and give them what they deserve: the right to disconnect. This is vital for our mental and physical health. It is time to update worker’s rights so that they correspond to the new realities of the digital age”, rapporteur Alex Agius Saliba (S&D, MT) said after the vote.
Background
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, working from home has increased by almost 30%. This figure is expected to remain high or even increase. Research by Eurofound shows that people who work regularly from home are more than twice as likely to surpass the maximum of 48 working hours per week, compared to those working on their employer’s premises. Almost 30% of those working from home report working in their free time every day or several times a week, compared to less than 5% of office workers.
Contact:

Ingelise De Boer, Press Officer | ingelise.deboer@europarl.europa.eu  | empl-press@europarl.europa.eu

Compliments of the European Parliament.
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Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB and Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB | Frankfurt am Main, 21 January 2021 |
Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Executive Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis.
The start of vaccination campaigns across the euro area is an important milestone in the resolution of the ongoing health crisis. Nonetheless, the pandemic continues to pose serious risks to public health and to the euro area and global economies. The renewed surge in coronavirus (COVID-19) infections and the restrictive and prolonged containment measures imposed in many euro area countries are disrupting economic activity. Activity in the manufacturing sector continues to hold up well, but services sector activity is being severely curbed, albeit to a lesser degree than during the first wave of the pandemic in early 2020. Output is likely to have contracted in the fourth quarter of 2020 and the intensification of the pandemic poses some downside risks to the short-term economic outlook. Inflation remains very low in the context of weak demand and significant slack in labour and product markets. Overall, the incoming data confirm our previous baseline assessment of a pronounced near-term impact of the pandemic on the economy and a protracted weakness in inflation.
In this environment ample monetary stimulus remains essential to preserve favourable financing conditions over the pandemic period for all sectors of the economy. By helping to reduce uncertainty and bolster confidence, this will encourage consumer spending and business investment, underpinning economic activity and safeguarding medium-term price stability. Meanwhile, uncertainty remains high, including relating to the dynamics of the pandemic and the speed of vaccination campaigns. We will also continue to monitor developments in the exchange rate with regard to their possible implications for the medium-term inflation outlook. We continue to stand ready to adjust all of our instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation moves towards our aim in a sustained manner, in line with our commitment to symmetry.
Against this background, we decided to reconfirm our very accommodative monetary policy stance.
First, the Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We expect them to remain at their present or lower levels until we have seen the inflation outlook robustly converge to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2 per cent within our projection horizon, and such convergence has been consistently reflected in underlying inflation dynamics.
Second, we will continue our purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) with a total envelope of €1,850 billion. We will conduct net asset purchases under the PEPP until at least the end of March 2022 and, in any case, until the Governing Council judges that the coronavirus crisis phase is over.
The purchases under the PEPP will be conducted to preserve favourable financing conditions over the pandemic period. We will purchase flexibly according to market conditions and with a view to preventing a tightening of financing conditions that is inconsistent with countering the downward impact of the pandemic on the projected path of inflation. In addition, the flexibility of purchases over time, across asset classes and among jurisdictions will continue to support the smooth transmission of monetary policy. If favourable financing conditions can be maintained with asset purchase flows that do not exhaust the envelope over the net purchase horizon of the PEPP, the envelope need not be used in full. Equally, the envelope can be recalibrated if required to maintain favourable financing conditions to help counter the negative pandemic shock to the path of inflation.
We will continue to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the PEPP until at least the end of 2023. In any case, the future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance.
Third, net purchases under our asset purchase programme (APP) will continue at a monthly pace of €20 billion. We continue to expect monthly net asset purchases under the APP to run for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of our policy rates, and to end shortly before we start raising the key ECB interest rates.
We also intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.
Finally, we will continue to provide ample liquidity through our refinancing operations. In particular, our third series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) remains an attractive source of funding for banks, supporting bank lending to firms and households.
Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Following a sharp contraction in the first half of 2020, euro area real GDP rebounded strongly and rose by 12.4 per cent, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter, although remaining well below pre-pandemic levels. Incoming economic data, surveys and high-frequency indicators suggest that the resurgence of the pandemic and the associated intensification of containment measures have likely led to a decline in activity in the fourth quarter of 2020 and are also expected to weigh on activity in the first quarter of this year. In sum, this is broadly in line with the latest baseline of the December 2020 macroeconomic projections.
Economic developments continue to be uneven across sectors, with the services sector being more adversely affected by the new restrictions on social interaction and mobility than the industrial sector. Although fiscal policy measures are continuing to support households and firms, consumers remain cautious in the light of the pandemic and its impact on employment and earnings. Moreover, weaker corporate balance sheets and uncertainty about the economic outlook are still weighing on business investment.
Looking ahead, the roll-out of vaccines, which started in late December, allows for greater confidence in the resolution of the health crisis. However, it will take time until widespread immunity is achieved, and further adverse developments related to the pandemic cannot be ruled out. Over the medium term, the recovery of the euro area economy should be supported by favourable financing conditions, an expansionary fiscal stance and a recovery in demand as containment measures are lifted and uncertainty recedes.
Overall, the risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook remain tilted to the downside but less pronounced. The news about the prospects for the global economy, the agreement on future EU-UK relations and the start of vaccination campaigns is encouraging, but the ongoing pandemic and its implications for economic and financial conditions continue to be sources of downside risk.
Euro area annual inflation remained unchanged at -0.3 per cent in December. On the basis of current energy price dynamics, headline inflation is likely to increase in the coming months, also supported by the end of the temporary VAT reduction in Germany. However, underlying price pressures are expected to remain subdued owing to weak demand, notably in the tourism and travel-related sectors, as well as to low wage pressures and the appreciation of the euro exchange rate. Once the impact of the pandemic fades, a recovery in demand, supported by accommodative fiscal and monetary policies, will put upward pressure on inflation over the medium term. Survey-based measures and market-based indicators of longer-term inflation expectations remain at low levels, although market-based indicators of inflation expectations have increased slightly.
Turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rate of broad money (M3) increased to 11.0 per cent in November 2020, from 10.5 per cent in October, reflecting a continued increase in deposit holdings. Strong money growth continued to be supported by the ongoing asset purchases by the Eurosystem, which remain the largest source of money creation. In the context of a still heightened preference for liquidity in the money-holding sector and a low opportunity cost of holding the most liquid forms of money, the narrow monetary aggregate M1 has remained the main contributor to broad money growth.
Developments in loans to the private sector were characterised by moderate lending to non-financial corporations and resilient lending to households. The monthly lending flow to non-financial corporations remained very modest in November, continuing the pattern observed since the end of the summer. At the same time, the annual growth rate remained broadly unchanged, at 6.9 per cent, still reflecting the very strong increase in lending in the first half of the year. The annual growth rate of loans to households remained broadly stable at 3.1 per cent in November, amid a sizeable positive monthly flow.
The new bank lending survey for the fourth quarter of 2020 reports a tightening of credit standards on loans to firms. This tightening was mainly driven by heightened risk perceptions among banks, in a context of continued uncertainty about the economic recovery and concerns about borrower creditworthiness. Surveyed banks also reported a fall in loan demand from firms in the fourth quarter. The survey also indicated a further increase in net demand from households for loans for house purchase in the fourth quarter, even though credit standards continued to tighten.
Overall, our policy measures, together with the measures adopted by national governments and other European institutions, remain essential to support bank lending conditions and access to financing, in particular for those most affected by the pandemic.
To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed that an ample degree of monetary accommodation is necessary to support economic activity and the robust convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term.
Regarding fiscal policies, an ambitious and coordinated fiscal stance remains critical, in view of the sharp contraction in the euro area economy. To this end, continued support from national fiscal policies is warranted given weak demand from firms and households relating to the worsening of the pandemic and the intensification of containment measures. At the same time, fiscal measures taken in response to the pandemic emergency should, as much as possible, remain targeted and temporary in nature. The three safety nets endorsed by the European Council for workers, businesses and governments provide important funding support.
The Governing Council recognises the key role of the Next Generation EU package and stresses the importance of it becoming operational without delay. It calls on Member States to accelerate the ratification process, to finalise their recovery and resilience plans promptly and to deploy the funds for productive public spending, accompanied by productivity-enhancing structural policies. This would allow the Next Generation EU programme to contribute to a faster, stronger and more uniform recovery and would increase economic resilience and the growth potential of Member States’ economies, thereby supporting the effectiveness of monetary policy in the euro area. Such structural policies are particularly important in addressing long-standing structural and institutional weaknesses and in accelerating the green and digital transitions.
We are now ready to take your questions.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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Credit standards tightened for loans to enterprises and households
Firms’ demand for loans continued to decline, while demand for housing loans increased
Government guarantees on loans to firms supported bank lending conditions

Credit standards – i.e. banks’ internal guidelines or loan approval criteria – tightened across all loan categories, namely loans to enterprises, loans to households for house purchase and consumer credit and other lending to households in the fourth quarter of 2020, according to the January 2021 bank lending survey (BLS). The net percentage of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards for loans or credit lines to firms (net percentage of banks at 25%, see Chart 1) was somewhat higher than in the previous round. Credit standards for loans to households also tightened (a net percentage of 7% for loans to households for house purchase and 3% for consumer credit and other lending to households), but at a slower pace than in the previous quarters of 2020. Banks referred to the deterioration of the general economic outlook, increased credit risk of borrowers and a lower risk tolerance as relevant factors for the tightening of their credit standards for loans to firms and households. In the first quarter of 2021, banks expect credit standards to continue to tighten for loans to firms and households.
Banks’ overall terms and conditions – i.e. the actual terms and conditions agreed in loan contracts –tightened in the fourth quarter of 2020 for new loans to enterprises, with more stringent collateral requirements and wider loan margins, especially for riskier loans. For loans to households for house purchase, banks’ overall terms and conditions also tightened in the fourth quarter of 2020.
Firms’ demand for loans or drawing of credit lines declined further in net terms in the fourth quarter of 2020, with a larger percentage of banks indicating a decline than an increase in firms’ loan demand. Demand for inventories and working capital continued to contribute to an increase in demand, although its positive contribution was lower than in the first half of 2020. This might be explained by the precautionary liquidity buffers built up in previous quarters. Demand for loans for fixed investment declined for the fourth consecutive quarter (see Chart 2). Net demand for housing loans continued to increase in the fourth quarter of 2020, reflecting a catching-up in demand after the first lockdown period in the second quarter. For consumer credit and other lending to households a net percentage of banks reported a decline in demand, following a moderate increase in the previous quarter. Net demand for housing loans and consumer credit was supported by the low general level of interest rates, while lower consumer confidence continued to dampen demand. In the first quarter of 2021, banks expect net demand for loans to firms and for consumer credit to increase, while net demand for housing loans is expected to decline.
Euro area banks indicated that regulatory or supervisory action continued to strengthen banks’ capital position and had a strong easing impact on their funding conditions in 2020. Banks also reported that supervisory or regulatory action continued to have a net tightening impact on their credit standards across all loan categories.
Euro area banks reported that non-performing loans (NPLs) had a tightening impact on credit standards and on terms and conditions for loans to enterprises and consumer credit in the second half of 2020 (and a broadly neutral impact for housing loans). Risk perceptions and risk aversion were the main drivers of the tightening impact of NPL ratios.
Looking at a sectoral breakdown, respondent banks indicated a net tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises across all main sectors of economic activities in the second half of 2020. The net tightening was most pronounced for loans to firms in the commercial real estate and the wholesale and retail trade sectors.
Banks reported that coronavirus (COVID-19)-related government guarantees supported credit standards and helped keep terms and conditions for loans to firms more favourable in 2020. Banks also indicated a very strong net increase in demand for loans or credit lines with government guarantees in the first half of 2020, while the net increase in the second half was moderate, reflecting reduced liquidity needs.
The euro area bank lending survey, which is conducted four times a year, was developed by the Eurosystem in order to improve its understanding of banks’ lending behaviour in the euro area. The results reported in the January 2021 survey relate to changes observed in the fourth quarter of 2020 and expected changes in the first quarter of 2021, unless otherwise indicated. The January 2021 survey round was conducted between 4 and 29 December 2020. A total of 143 banks were surveyed in this round, with a response rate of 100%.
For media queries, please contact Silvia Margiocco tel.: +49 69 1344 6619.

Chart 1
Changes in credit standards for loans or credit lines to enterprises and contributing factors(net percentages of banks reporting a tightening of credit standards and contributing factors)

Source: ECB (BLS).Notes: Net percentages are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”.

Chart 2
Changes in demand for loans or credit lines to enterprises and contributing factors(net percentages of banks reporting an increase in demand and contributing factors)

Source: ECB (BLS).Notes: Net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”.
Compliments of the ECB.

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The conclusion of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement on 24 December 2020 means that the very successful mandate of the Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom (UKTF) will come to an end. The UKTF will cease to exist on 1 March 2021.
To support the efficient and rigorous implementation and monitoring of the Agreements with the UK, the European Commission has decided to establish a new Service for the EU-UK Agreements (UKS). The UKS will be part of the presidential services’ Secretariat-General and will be operational as of 1 March 2021. The mandate and duration of the newly created service will be reviewed on a continuous basis. The UKS will closely cooperate with the HRVP.
Michel Barnier will become Special Adviser to President von der Leyen as of 1 February 2021. He will advise the President on the implementation of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement and provide expertise in view of the finalisation of the EU’s ratification process of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, the Vice-President in charge of interinstitutional relations and foresight, has been appointed as the Member of the Commission to co-chair and represent the European Union in the Partnership Council, established by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Over 8,000 responses received in online survey
Privacy, security and pan-European reach ranked highest in European citizens’ preferences
Detailed analysis to be published in spring, ahead of decision on project launch

The European Central Bank (ECB) concluded its public consultation on the digital euro yesterday and will now analyse in detail the large number of responses. 8,221 citizens, firms and industry associations submitted responses to an online questionnaire, a record for ECB public consultations.
The public consultation was launched on 12 October 2020, following the publication of the Eurosystem report on a digital euro. The ECB will publish a comprehensive analysis of the public consultation in the spring, which will serve as an important input for the ECB’s Governing Council when deciding whether to launch a digital euro project.
An initial analysis of raw data shows that privacy of payments ranked highest among the requested features of a potential digital euro (41% of replies), followed by security (17%) and pan-European reach (10%).
“The high number of responses to our survey shows the great interest of Europe’s citizens and firms in shaping the vision of a digital euro,” said Fabio Panetta, Member of the ECB’s Executive Board and Chair of the task force on a digital euro. “The opinions of citizens, businesses and all stakeholders are of utmost importance for us as we assess which use cases a digital euro might best serve.”
The Eurosystem task force, bringing together experts from the ECB and 19 national central banks of the euro area, identified possible scenarios that would require the issuance of a digital euro. These scenarios include an increased demand for electronic payments in the euro area that would require a European risk-free digital means of payment, a significant decline in the use of cash as a means of payment in the euro area, the launch of global private means of payment that might raise regulatory concerns and pose risks for financial stability and consumer protection, and a broad take-up of central bank digital currencies issued by other central banks.
A digital euro would be an electronic form of central bank money accessible to all citizens and firms – like banknotes, but in a digital form – to make their daily payments in a fast, easy and secure way. It would complement cash, not replace it. The Eurosystem will continue to issue cash in any case.
A digital euro would combine the efficiency of a digital payment instrument with the safety of central bank money. The protection of privacy would be a key priority, so that the digital euro can help maintain trust in payments in the digital age.
For media queries, please contact Alexandrine Bouilhet, e: Alexandrine.Bouilhet[at]ecb.europa.eu | tel.: +49 172 174 93 66.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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Members on the Foreign Affairs and International Trade Committees will debate the new EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement on Thursday at 10.00 CET.

The joint meeting of the lead committees will intensify the democratic parliamentary scrutiny process for the new EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement reached by EU and British negotiators on 24 December.
The two committees will in due course vote on the consent proposal prepared by the two standing rapporteurs Christophe Hansen (EPP, Luxembourg) and Kati Piri (S&D, The Netherlands), to allow for a plenary vote before the end of the provisional application of the agreement.
In addition to the plenary vote, Parliament will also vote on an accompanying resolution prepared by the political groups in the UK Coordination Group and the Conference of Presidents.
The meeting
When: Thursday, 14 January, at 10.00 CET.Where: Room 6Q2 in Parliament’s Antall building in Brussels and remote participation.
You can follow it live here. (10.00-12.00 CET).
Here is the agenda.
Background
The new Trade and Cooperation agreement has been provisionally applied since 1 January 2021. For it to enter into force permanently, it requires the consent of the Parliament.
MEPs on the International Trade Committee held a first meeting on the new EU-UK deal on Monday 11 January, during which they promised thorough scrutiny of the agreement. Read more here.
Compliments of the European Parliament. 

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By John Bruton, former Prime Minister of Ireland (Taoiseach) & former EU Ambassador to the US |
UK gained a little extra sovereignty of the island of Britain, by giving up some UK sovereignty in Northern Ireland
The EU/UK trade deal maintains Ireland’s agricultural export market in Britain. A “No Deal” would have destroyed it. The imposition of tariffs would have imposed huge costsm on consumers and disruption to business.
That said, the fact that the Agreement had to be rushed through at the last minute left little time for debate which side lost the least in the negotiation.  For it is in the nature of a divorce, like Brexit, that both sides actually lose.
First let us look at the British side.
For them, the goal was “sovereignty”. In sum, Boris Johnson gained more UK sovereignty over the island of Britain, but did so by sacrificing a considerable measure of UK sovereignty over Northern Ireland.
Traditionally sovereignty in Britain was seen as the unfettered power of the British Parliament to legislate.  Brexiteers have interpreted it as taking back control into the hands of British Ministers, rather than into the hands of Parliament as such.
On the other hand, EU rules, in which neither the UK, nor the people of Northern Ireland, will have  a direct say, will continue to be made for, and apply in, Northern Ireland. This creates a democracy deficit, even if the subject matter will be highly technical.
After much effort and controversy, the UK has won the right to diverge from EU rules for the island of Britain. To show that the effort was worthwhile, it will be tempted to adopt different rules on trade and regulatory matters just for the sake of it.
The more Britain diverges from the EU, the more will it diverge from Northern Ireland
But the more British rules diverge from EU rules, the more will Northern Ireland diverge from the rest of the United Kingdom.
This creates a political mine field and a strategic dilemma.
The implications for NI unionists could be quite destabilising. A sense of losing control over their future, and of not being represented when decisions are being made, could encourage irrational politics. This will require serious reflection in Brussels, London and especially Dublin before there is any new divergence between the UK and the EU.
The Joint EU/UK Committee, already set up under the Withdrawal Agreement, will need to monitor the political and security consequences. Title X of the Agreement requires advance notice, and consultations, on any changes in regulations as between the UK and the EU. It will be important for peace and security of these islands  that these consultations include representatives of all major interests in Northern Ireland.
The gains for the UK side, at a price
On the other hand, the Agreement contains significant gains for the UK side from a “sovereignty” perspective, at least as far as the island of Britain is concerned.
Firstly, there will be no direct application of decisions of the European Court of Justice on the island of Britain.
Secondly, while the UK has accepted that it will not regress from present high social and environmental standards, it will be free to set for itself the detail of those standards. These may be different from those in the EU and thus in Northern Ireland.  This right to diverge is what UK Brexiteers saw as an expression of UK’s sovereignty. There will be strong temptations to use this power if only to show that Brexit was worth the effort.
But the UK also accepts that divergence will not come for free.
It has had to accept that services exports from the UK have lost automatic access to the EU market, a large and incalculable sacrifice. It has also lost the European Arrest Warrant and access to eU data bases.
As one advocate of Brexit, Dr Liam Fox MP, put it in Westminster last week
“If we want to access the Single Market, there has to be a price to be paid.  If we want to diverge from the rules of the Single Market, there has to a price to be paid”
The Agreement establishes detailed mechanisms to settle what ”price” will  have to be paid for any new  divergence .
Already, the UK is contemplating allowing genetically edited crops. If these are not permitted in the EU, there could be trade frictions and competitive losses for EU farmers.
How will disputes be settled?
These new mechanisms , a Partnership Council, Joint Committees, and Arbitration Tribunals, are completely untested at this stage.
A great deal will depend on how much use the UK will make of its new freedoms. The more EU and British policies diverge, the greater will be the strain on the Agreement.
In the last 5 years of debate about Brexit, UK politicians have actually advanced very few ideas of how they might use the new freedom conferred by Brexit.
So it is impossible to assess, at this stage, whether or not they might do things that would push the EU to seek redress through the mechanisms of the Agreement, or contribute to instability in Northern Ireland.
If problems arise and these cannot be settled in the committee system, there is an agreed provision for arbitration. Three person Arbitration Tribunals which will operate on strict time limits. If the Arbitrators find that either the EU or the UK has breached the agreed principles, the other party will be allowed to impose tariffs or prohibitions, to compensate for losses it has suffered.
Better than no deal
This Dispute settlement aspect of the Agreement is valuable from an EU point of view.
Without it, any disputes would have had to be referred to the WTO.  The WTO system is both cumbersome and narrow. Parties can stall, adopt delaying tactics, or  ignore WTO rulings.
Disputes in the WTO can drag on for years, as we have seen with the US/EU dispute about subsidies to Boeing and Airbus.
That said, we will now  be replacing a single set of rules, interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), with individual Arbitration Tribunals, operating under tight deadlines.
This could lead to inconsistent decisions in different areas of trade. If a Tribunal interprets EU law differently to the interpretation later made by the ECJ, there could be real difficulties. Some of the problems that have arisen in EU relations with Switzerland could be replicated in EU relations with the UK, but with added complications in respect of Northern Ireland.
The UK will also be free to negotiate trade agreements of its own with non EU countries. These negotiations may create additional pressure for even more divergence between UK and EU standards, than the UK authorities themselves might have chosen.
It may come under pressure to allow the imports to the UK that would not meet EU standards, for example chlorinated chicken, hormone treated beef, or genetically modified food . If these products are then incorporated into exports to the EU, the EU will have to ban them.
UK or EU policy decisions could also skew the level playing field on which EU and British producers must compete.
In Title XI of Part One, and in Part Six of the Agreement, there are provisions for resolving disputes .
If the dispute is about unfair subsidies, firms can go directly to the courts, citing the text of Title XI.
If the dispute is about something else, the remedy  will be under Part Six  and  will be indirect, requiring either the EU or UK side to take the matter up in one of the many Committees set up under the Agreement. There could eventually be recourse to an Arbitration Tribunal.
In global terms, the continent of Europe as a whole has been weakened by Brexit. The day to day effect remains to be seen.
Compliments of John Bruton.
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