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Financial stability: EU Commission adopts final one-year extension of the transitional regime for capital requirements for non-EU central counterparties (CCPs)

The European Commission has today extended – by one additional year –the current transitional regime regarding the capital requirements that EU banks and investment firms must maintain when exposed to non-EU central counterparties (‘CCPs’). This transitional regime will therefore continue to apply until 28 June 2022.
Mairead McGuinness, EU Commissioner responsible for financial services, financial stability and Capital Markets Union said, “Today’s decision gives us a bit more breathing space while we continue to work on equivalence decisions. It also gives EU banks and investment firms sufficient time to properly prepare for the possibility of higher capital charges. There will be no more extensions after today’s one.”
This is the last and final extension possible under the Capital Requirements Regulation (‘CRR’). Exposures to those non-EU CCPs which will not be recognised by ESMA by 28 June 2022 will no longer be eligible for lower capital requirements after that date. Stakeholders should start preparing for this possibility.
Background
CCPs operate between the counterparties of a derivatives contract. When a contract is centrally cleared, the CCP steps in and takes the place of the buyer to the seller, and the seller to the buyer. Following the financial crisis, their use was encouraged by the G20, as central clearing reduces risks in derivatives trading, notably the risk of contagion in case a counterparty defaults.
Under the CRR, EU CCPs and non-EU CCPs recognised by ESMA are considered to be ‘Qualifying CCPs’ (‘QCCPs’). EU banks and investment firms are subject to a significantly lower capital requirement for exposures to QCCPs compared to exposures to non-QCCPs.
At this time, a transitional regime under the CRR allows EU banks and investment firms to consider any non-EU CCP that has applied for recognition by ESMA as a QCCP during the recognition process. CCPs in Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey and the United States of America currently benefit from that transitional regime. Those CCPs have not been recognised by ESMA as the Commission has not adopted equivalence decisions for their home jurisdictions, or adopted such a decision only recently.
In the meantime, the Commission will continue its work on equivalence assessments. Nevertheless, the outcome of those assessments cannot be predicted and for various reasons there is no guarantee that the Commission will adopt equivalence decisions for all of these jurisdictions. An equivalence decision by the Commission is a prerequisite for ESMA to recognise a non-EU CCP. It is therefore possible that these non-EU CCPs, or some of them, will not be recognised by ESMA to provide clearing services in the EU.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Financial stability: EU Commission adopts final one-year extension of the transitional regime for capital requirements for non-EU central counterparties (CCPs) first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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IMF | Four Facts about Soaring Consumer Food Prices

Rising world food prices for producers are making headlines and causing concerns among the public. The most recent data show a moderation in consumer food price inflation globally, but as we explain below, that could change in the coming months. This would only add to the high prices that consumers in many countries already lived through last year.
If prices eventually rise again, there will likely be sizeable differences between countries. Due to various factors, it is probable that the effect would be felt most by consumers in emerging markets and developing economies still wrestling with the effects of the pandemic.

‘Emerging markets and low-income countries are more vulnerable to food price shocks.’

Fact #1: Food price inflation started increasing before the pandemic.
The increase in consumer food price inflation predates the pandemic. In the summer of 2018, China was hit by an outbreak of African swine fever, wiping out much of China’s hog herd, which represents more than 50 percent of the world’s hogs. This sent pork prices in China to an all-time high by mid-2019 creating a ripple effect on the prices of pork and other animal proteins in many regions around the world. This was compounded by the introduction of Chinese import tariffs on US pork and soybeans during the US-China trade dispute.
Fact #2: Early lockdown measures and supply chain disruptions induced a spike in consumer food prices.
At the start of the pandemic, food supply chain disruptions, a shift from food services (such as dining out) towards retail grocery, and consumer stockpiling (coupled with a sharp appreciation of the US dollar) pushed up consumer food price indices in many countries—with consumer food inflation peaking in April 2020—even though producer prices of primary commodities, including food and energy, were declining sharply as demand for primary food commodities was disrupted. By early summer 2020, however, various consumer food prices had moderated, pushing down consumer food inflation in many countries.
So while food prices at your grocery store (i.e., consumer food prices) may have increased, it is an exaggeration to say that they are currently rising at their fastest pace in years. They are also not currently contributing to headline inflation, though they may do so later this year and in 2022 (see the outlook below). Producer prices, on the other hand, have recently soared (see fact #4). But it takes at least 6-12 months before consumer prices reflect changes in producer prices. Also, on average, the pass-through from producer to consumer prices is only about 20 percent. This is because consumer food prices include the shipping costs of primary food commodities, the processing, marketing and packaging of food, and final distribution costs such as transport costs.
The last two facts will help us understand what to expect for consumer food prices.
Fact #3: Soaring shipping and transport costs.
Ocean freight rates as measured by the Baltic Dry Index (a measure of shipping costs) have increased around 2-3 times in the last 12 months while higher gasoline prices and truck driver shortages in some regions are pushing up the cost of road transport services. Higher transport costs will eventually increase consumer food inflation.
Fact #4: Global food producer prices have rallied reaching multi-year highs.
From their trough in April 2020, international food (producer) prices have increased by 47.2 percent attaining their highest (real) levels on May 2021 since 2014 (highest level ever in current dollar terms).  Between May 2020 and May 2021, soybean and corn prices increased by more than 86 and 111 percent, respectively.
There are three main factors behind the recent rally in producer prices: (1) Demand for staples for both human consumption and animal feed has remained high, especially from China, as countries have stockpiled food reserves due to pandemic-related worries about food security. (2) The recent 2020-2021 La Niña episode—a global weather event occurring every few years—has led to dry weather in key food exporting countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. This has caused, in some cases, harvests and harvest outlooks to fall short of expectations. As demand has outpaced supply, US and world stocks-to-use ratios—a measure of market tightness—reached multi-year lows for some staples. (3) Strong demand for biofuels increased speculative demand by non-commercial traders, and export restrictions are additional factors supporting world producer prices.
Outlook
Based on the four facts presented, it is plausible that consumer food price inflation will pick up again in the remainder of 2021 and 2022. Indeed, the recent sharp increase in international food prices has already slowly started to feed into domestic consumer prices in some regions as retailers, unable to absorb the rising costs, are passing on the increases to consumers. More is likely to come, however, since international food prices are expected to increase by about 25 percent in 2021 from 2020, stabilizing in 2021. A pass-through of 20 percent (13 percent in the first year and 7 percent in the second) would, thus, imply an increase in consumer food price inflation of about 3.2 percentage points and 1.75 percentage points on average in 2021 and 2022, respectively. An additional 1 percentage point to the 2021 global consumer food inflation could be added by the higher freight rates.
The impact, however, will vary by country. Consumers in emerging markets could experience even higher increases due to the higher dependency on food imports (e.g. countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa). The pass-through from producer prices to consumer prices also tends to be larger for emerging markets. For low-income countries struggling from the pandemic, the effects of further food inflation could be dire and risk a backslide in efforts to eliminate hunger.
Emerging markets and low-income countries are also more vulnerable to food price shocks because consumers in these countries typically spend a relatively large proportion of their income on food. Finally, for emerging markets and developing economies an additional risk factor is the currency depreciation against the US dollar—possibly due to falling export and tourism revenues and net capital outflows. Since most food commodities are traded in US dollars, countries with weaker currencies have seen their food import bill increase.
Compliments of the IMF.
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EU Cybersecurity: EU Commission proposes a Joint Cyber Unit to step up response to large-scale security incidents

The Commission is today laying out a vision to build a new Joint Cyber Unit to tackle the rising number of serious cyber incidents impacting public services, as well as the life of businesses and citizens across the European Union. Advanced and coordinated responses in the field of cybersecurity have become increasingly necessary, as cyberattacks grow in number, scale and consequences, impacting heavily our security. All relevant actors in the EU need to be prepared to respond collectively and exchange relevant information on a ‘need to share’, rather than only ‘need to know’, basis.
First announced by President Ursula von der Leyen in her political guidelines, the Joint Cyber Unit proposed today aims at bringing together resources and expertise available to the EU and its Member States to effectively prevent, deter and respond to mass cyber incidents and crises. Cybersecurity communities, including civilian, law enforcement, diplomatic and cyber defence communities, as well as private sector partners, too often operate separately. With the Joint Cyber Unit, they will have a virtual and physical platform of cooperation: relevant EU institutions, bodies and agencies together with the Member States will build progressively a European platform for solidarity and assistance to counter large-scale cyberattacks.
The Recommendation on the creation of the Joint Cyber Unit is an important step towards completing the European cybersecurity crisis management framework. It is a concrete deliverable of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy and the EU Security Union Strategy, contributing to a safe digital economy and society.
As part of this package, the Commission is reporting today on progress made under the Security Union Strategy over the past months. Furthermore, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have presented the first implementation report under the Cybersecurity Strategy, as requested by the European Council, while at the same time they have published the Fifth Progress Report on the implementation of the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the 2018 Joint Communication on increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats. Finally, the Commission has issued the decision on establishing the office of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in Brussels, in accordance with the Cybersecurity Act.
A new Joint Cyber Unit to prevent and respond to large-scale cyber incidents
The Joint Cyber Unit will act as a platform to ensure an EU coordinated response to large-scale cyber incidents and crises, as well as to offer assistance in recovering from these attacks. Today, the EU and its Member States have many entities involved in different fields and sectors. While the sectors may be specific, the threats are often common – hence, the need for coordination, sharing of knowledge and even advance warning.
The participants will be asked to provide operational resources for mutual assistance within the Joint Cyber Unit (see proposed participants here). The Joint Cyber Unit will allow them to share best practice, as well as information in real time on threats that could emerge in their respective areas. It will also work at an operational and at a technical level to deliver the EU Cybersecurity Incident and Crisis Response Plan, based on national plans; establish and mobilise EU Cybersecurity Rapid Reaction Teams; facilitate the adoption of protocols for mutual assistance among participants; establish national and cross-border monitoring and detection capabilities, including Security Operation Centres (SOCs); and more.
The EU cybersecurity ecosystem is wide and varied and through the Joint Cyber Unit, there will be a common space to work together across different communities and fields, which will enable the existing networks to tap their full potential. It builds on the work started in 2017, with the Recommendation on a coordinated response to incidents and crises – the so-called Blueprint.
The Commission is proposing to build the Joint Cyber Unit through a gradual and transparent process in four steps, in co-ownership with the Member States and the different entities active in the field. The aim is to ensure that the Joint Cyber Unit will move to the operational phase by 30 June 2022 and that it will be fully established one year later, by 30 June 2023. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, will serve as secretariat for the preparatory phase and the Unit will operate close to their Brussels offices and the office of CERT-EU, the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies.
The investments necessary for setting up the Joint Cyber Unit, will be provided by the Commission, primarily through the Digital Europe Programme. Funds will serve to build the physical and virtual platform, establish and maintain secure communication channels, as well as improve detection capabilities. Additional contributions, especially to develop Member States’ cyber-defence capabilities, may come from the European Defence Fund.
Keeping Europeans safe, online and offline
The Commission is reporting today on the progress made under the EU Security Union Strategy, towards keeping Europeans safe. Together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, it is also presenting the first implementation report under the new EU Cybersecurity Strategy.
The Commission and the High Representative presented the EU Cybersecurity strategy in December 2020.  Today’s report is taking stock of the progress made under each of the 26 initiatives set out in this strategy and refers to the recent approval by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union of the regulation setting up the Cybersecurity Competence Centre and Network. Good progress has been made to strengthen the legal framework for ensuring resilience of essential services, through the proposed Directive on measures for high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (revised NIS Directive or ‘NIS 2′). Regarding the security of 5G communication networks, most Member States are advancing in the implementation of the EU 5G Toolbox, having already in place, or close to readiness, frameworks for imposing appropriate restrictions on 5G suppliers. Requirements on mobile network operators are being reinforced through the transposition of the European Electronic Communications Code, while the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is preparing a candidate EU cybersecurity certification scheme for 5G networks.
The report also highlights the progress made by the High Representative on the promotion of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, notably by advancing on the establishment of a Programme of Action at United Nations level. In addition, the High Representative has started the review process of the Cyber Defence Policy Framework to improve cyber defence cooperation, and is conducting a ‘lessons learned exercise’ with Member States to improve the EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox and identify opportunities for further strengthening EU and international cooperation to this end. Moreover, the report on the progress made in countering hybrid threats, that the Commission and the High Representative have also published today, highlights that since the 2016 Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response was established, EU actions have supported increased situational awareness, resilience in critical sectors, adequate response and recovery from the ever increasing hybrid threats, including disinformation and cyberattacks, since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic.
Important steps were also taken over the last 6 months under the EU Security Union Strategy to ensure security in our physical and digital environment. Landmark EU rules are now in place that will oblige online platforms to remove terrorist content referred by Member States’ authorities within one hour. The Commission also proposed the Digital Services Act, which puts forward harmonised rules for the removal of illegal goods, services or content online, as well as a new oversight structure for very large online platforms. The proposal also addresses platforms’ vulnerabilities to amplifying harmful content or the spread of disinformation. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union agreed on temporary legislation on the voluntary detection of child sexual abuse online by communications services. Work is also ongoing to better protect public spaces. This includes supporting Member States in managing the threat represented by drones and enhancing the protection of places of worship and large sports venues against terrorist threats, with a €20 million support programme underway. To better support Member States in countering serious crime and terrorism, the Commission also proposed in December 2020 to upgrade the mandate of Europol, the EU Agency for law enforcement cooperation.
Members of the College said:
Margrethe Vestager, Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age, said: “Cybersecurity is a cornerstone of a digital and connected Europe. And in today’s society, responding to threats in a coordinated manner is paramount. The Joint Cyber Unit will contribute to that goal. Together we can really make a difference.”
Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said: “The Joint Cyber Unit is a very important step for Europe to protect its governments, citizens and businesses from global cyber threats. When it comes to cyberattacks, we are all vulnerable and that is why cooperation at all levels is crucial. There is no big or small. We need to defend ourselves but we also need to serve as a beacon for others in promoting a global, open, stable and secure cyberspace.”
Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life, said: “The recent ransomware attacks should serve as a warning that we must protect ourselves against threats that could undermine our security and our European Way of Life. Today, we can no longer distinguish between online and offline threats. We need to pool all our resources to defeat cyber risks and enhance our operational capacity. Building a trusted and secure digital world, based on our values, requires commitment from all, including law enforcement.”
Thierry Breton, Commissioner for the Internal Market, said: “The Joint Cyber Unit is a building block to protect ourselves from growing and increasingly complex cyber threats. We have set clear milestones and timelines that will allow us – together with Member states- to concretely improve crisis management cooperation in the EU, detect threats and react faster. It is the operational arm of the European Cyber Shield.”
Ylva Johansson, Commissioner for Home Affairs, said: “Countering cyberattacks is a growing challenge. The Law Enforcement community across the EU can best face this new threat by coordinating together. The Joint Cyber Unit will help police officers in Member States to share expertise. It will help build law enforcement capacity to counter these attacks.”
Background
Cybersecurity is a top priority of the Commission and a cornerstone of the digital and connected Europe. The increase of cyberattacks during the coronavirus crisis has shown how important it is to protect health and care systems, research centres and other critical infrastructure. Strong action in the area is needed to future-proof the EU’s economy and society.
The EU is committed to delivering on the EU Cybersecurity Strategy with an unprecedented level of investment in Europe’s green and digital transition, through the long-term EU budget 2021-2027, notably through the Digital Europe Programme and Horizon Europe, as well as the Recovery Plan for Europe.
Moreover, when it comes to cybersecurity, we are as protected as our weakest link. Cyberattacks do not stop at the physical borders. Enhancing cooperation, including cross-border cooperation, in the cybersecurity field is therefore also an EU priority: in recent years, the Commission has been leading and facilitating several initiatives to improve collective preparedness, as EU joint structures have already supported Member States, both at technical and at operational level. Today’s recommendation on building a Joint Cyber Unit is another step towards greater cooperation and coordinated response to cyber threats.
At the same time, the Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities, known as the cyber diplomacy toolbox, encourages cooperation and promotes responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, allowing the EU and its Member States to use all Common Foreign and Security Policy measures, including, restrictive measures, to prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious cyber activities.
To ensure security both in our physical and digital environments, the Commission presented in July 2020 the EU Security Union Strategy for the period 2020 to 2025. It focuses on priority areas where the EU can bring value to support Member States in fostering security for all those living in Europe: combatting terrorism and organised crime; preventing and detecting hybrid threats and increasing the resilience of our critical infrastructure; and promoting cybersecurity and fostering research and innovation.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post EU Cybersecurity: EU Commission proposes a Joint Cyber Unit to step up response to large-scale security incidents first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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FSB | Global Transition Roadmap for LIBOR

Transition away from LIBOR requires significant commitment and sustained effort from both financial and non-financial institutions across many LIBOR and non-LIBOR jurisdictions.
The Financial Stability Board has identified that continued reliance of global financial markets on LIBOR poses clear risks to global financial stability. On 5 March 2021, ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) and the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) formally confirmed the dates that panel bank submissions for all LIBOR settings will cease, after which representative LIBOR rates will no longer be available. The majority of LIBOR panels will cease at the end of this year, with a number of key US dollar (USD) settings continuing until end-June 2023, to support rundown of legacy contracts only.
This updated Global Transition Roadmap (GTR) is intended to inform those with exposure to LIBOR benchmarks of some of the steps they should be taking now and over the remaining period to LIBOR cessation dates to successfully mitigate these risks. These are considered prudent steps to take to ensure an orderly transition by end-2021 and are intended to supplement existing timelines/milestones from industry working groups and regulators.
This does not constitute regulatory advice or affect any transition expectations set by individual regulators, which may require firms to move faster in some instances. It is important that all regulated financial institutions have an open and constructive LIBOR transition dialogue with their regulators, both home state and host state, throughout the transition period. As benchmark transitions vary across currency regions and legislation and other actions to promote transition are taking different paths in different jurisdictions, financial institutions, non-financial firms and others with exposure to LIBOR benchmarks should also monitor developments with regard to other IBORs relevant to their business.
Compliments of the Financial Stability Board.
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ECB Interview | A powerful push for digitalisation

Interview with Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, conducted by Martin Arnold on 14 June 2021 |

You are getting close now to a decision on whether to pursue further work on the digital euro. You recently completed your public consultation on this, in which the biggest concerns were about privacy. So how do you address people’s concerns about privacy and still do all the necessary checks to make sure that it’s not abused for money laundering, tax evasion, and all of those things?
If the central bank gets involved in digital payments, privacy is going to be better protected. Why? Because we’re not like private companies. We have no commercial interest in storing, managing or monetising the data of users of a digital means of payment. We’re not a profit-maximising institution, we work in the interest of citizens. So we’re a different animal than private service providers. This also emerged from the public consultation. People feel safer if their information is in the hands of the central bank – a public institution – than if it is in the hands of private companies. Second, there are many ways in which we can protect confidential data while allowing the checks foreseen by law to avoid illicit transactions, such as those linked to money laundering, the financing of terrorism or tax evasion.
How would that work?
First of all, we could segregate the data. Suppose that I have to give you money. I’m the payer and you’re the payee. I would go to my bank, which would know that I’m making a payment and would transmit a code to the payment operator. The payment operator would transfer the payment between one code and another code. It would not know the identity of the payer behind the one code and the payee behind the other. So the payment will go through, but nobody in the payment chain would have access to all the information. But this is only one example. We could use cryptographic codes. It could be possible, for example, to make offline payments for small amounts, in which no data are recorded outside the wallets of the payer and payee. One could imagine that for payments of small amounts – €70 or €100 – you could have offline payments without a connection.
But don’t you need to link back to the identity if you’re going to restrict people to a certain amount? 
For these amounts, one can also imagine that you don’t do that. Why do we want to have all payments traceable? Because there are issues in terms of money laundering, the financing of terrorism and tax evasion. This risk is much lower for small transactions, as long as they are not used to split a larger payment into many smaller ones. We addressed this in past experimentation by introducing “anonymity vouchers”, making it possible to anonymously transfer a limited amount of digital euro over a defined period of time. So the concept is that controls should be cost-effective. For very small amounts, we could permit truly anonymous payments, but in general, confidentiality and privacy are different from anonymity. Full anonymity must be considered very carefully, because there is a trade-off between guaranteeing full anonymity and guaranteeing compliance with fundamental regulations in areas such as anti-money laundering, combating the financing of terrorism and tax evasion. And let’s not forget that citizens will still be able to use cash, which guarantees anonymity. There are many things we can do, with the help of technology, so people feel safe about how their data are used, and at the same time, so a payment can be reconstructed ex post if the police want to assess whether there’s been any illicit activity, any crime going on. But that would not be in line with the incentives of private intermediaries, which are interested in the commercial value of transaction data. We’ve done some preliminary experimentation on how to safeguard confidentiality with national central banks, which will be published. So we’re discussing possible ways to guarantee privacy. Why are we doing this? For obvious reasons and because the message that emerged from the consultation, as you said before, is very clear. Privacy is a top priority for users.
What about people who say that, while the ECB may not have commercial interests, you are a public sector body? So the idea of the government spying on people by looking at what they’re doing with their money, isn’t that also a concern for people?
I start from the assumption that people should be able to rely on a public institution, and we’ll make sure to set up governance structures to avoid any possible abuse of data. We’ll act within the scope of European legislation, which is the most advanced worldwide in protecting data, with an independent data protection supervisor that we will be interacting with.
Can you tell me a bit more about the experimentation? What does that entail? 
The experimentation we’ve done so far is to get a preliminary sense of the pros and cons of different technologies and the limits of, for example, handling payments while safeguarding confidentiality. In this preliminary phase, we’ve organised four work streams in which we’ve tested the possibility of running a digital euro with a centralised system, a decentralised one, a mixture of the two and with offline payments. If the Governing Council gives us the green light in July, we’ll start a formal investigation phase focusing on the design of a digital euro. After two years, we’ll get back to the Governing Council, and in the meantime we’ll interact with other European authorities and institutions – the Parliament, the Commission, the Council, the Eurogroup – all those who are involved, because the digital euro will require legislative changes. So at the end of these two years, ideally, we would have more clarity on the steps which would be necessary to issue a digital euro, if the decision were taken to launch it. Then we expect to have, by and large, three years to be able to implement what we have decided on, by working together with the technology providers and banks on the end user features of a digital euro so it could be integrated into the services that they’re already offering to their customers.
Why do you need legislation?
Because, for now, a digital euro is not explicitly foreseen in the European legislation. There are different ways in which you could define the legal basis for a digital euro, depending on its characteristics. Existing legislation may also need to be adjusted to cater for a digital euro. For example, to allow the anti-money laundering authorities to have powers to verify, ex post, not only transactions through bank accounts, but also through the digital euro.
Let’s take a slight step back. There are still some people who are scratching their heads and saying, what is the problem that you’re trying to solve with this project? What is the point of the digital euro?
First of all, for many centuries, from ancient Greece to the Roman Empire and Charlemagne, the sovereign has always offered money to citizens – sovereign money, which is the ultimate reserve of value for citizens. We’re doing the same. We intend to continue to do so. So why do we need a digital euro for this? There are two reasons. First, people are paying more and more digitally, and less and less with our current means of payment – cash. And second, people are buying more and more online, and with e-commerce it is relatively difficult to pay with cash. So people are using the means of payment backed by the central bank less and less. We’re moving into a digital era, so by introducing a digital euro we would be changing how people can access our balance sheet and use our means of payment.
So it is the decline of cash that you are responding to? But you can pay digitally with electronic money, you don’t need a digital euro to do so. I can already buy pretty much anything I like sitting here with my mobile phone. 
First of all, there is no digital means of payment that you can use everywhere in the euro area, from Finland to Cyprus.
What about a Visa card?
You can’t use it everywhere. As you know, even here in Frankfurt you can’t use Visa or American Express in every shop. And it can be expensive to use them. Second, I think that this is not just about preserving the role of the instrument of the central bank. There are many other reasons. First, we would offer a means of payment that is risk-free. I think that people do have the right to access the balance sheet of the central bank, which is the only risk-free institution, even less risky than the sovereign. One could imagine that, in most cases, liabilities of commercial banks are pretty similar to the liability of the central bank. But there are situations when differences do matter. You remember in the financial crisis when banks stopped trusting each other. So in that situation, the liability of a commercial bank was not perceived by citizens or by banks themselves as riskless. So you must have a riskless means of payment, a riskless financial instrument in the economy. And this is the liability of the central bank.
Are you also worried about the threat from cryptocurrencies and other central bank currencies? 
This is not why we started this analysis and will possibly start a project, but of course there is the potential threat that could come from others issuing a digital means of payment. This could be a so-called global stablecoin or another sovereign providing a digital means of payment. And if people do want to pay digitally and we don’t offer them a digital means of payment, somebody else would do that. So I can give you many, many reasons. And by the way, it’s not just about payments. This, I think, is a historical change that will not only change the way the financial system works. This will change the attitude of citizens towards digital instruments. I think this is a fundamental change to how payments will function in the future, both for the financial system and for society at large. And it is generating huge interest.
Do you think the end consumer is going to notice a big difference? Because legally they will have a claim directly on the central bank. But for all intents and purposes, it’s just going to be numbers on a screen, the same way that their digital deposits are shown on a banking app. 
Most of the time I would agree with you, but not always. The great financial crisis was a very big wakeup call. It’s not true that people don’t differentiate. Most of the time, they don’t need to differentiate between different means of payment, among liabilities of different issuers of different means of payment. But there are situations in which people do understand very well. They optimise. They don’t care about whether they have bank deposits or cash, unless the bank deposit becomes risky. In that case, they seem to understand the difference very well and they seem to differentiate very carefully.
Some people imagine that the central bank is going to be operating these digital euro accounts directly. But is that really how it’s going to work? You’re more likely to outsource the management and the operation of this to the commercial banks and some fintechs, right?
It’s theoretically possible that the central bank would handle the accounts of individual citizens. But it’s extremely unlikely that this would be the choice we would make. Why? First of all, there are currently, I believe, around two million or more bank employees in Europe, dealing with 400 million customers. There’s no way that the limited number of employees at the central bank could do this. So even if we were crazy enough to embark on such a project, we could not do it. We’re very productive, but not that presumptuous. Second, we don’t want to use the digital euro to change the structure of the financial system or to destabilise the functioning of the financial sector. Banks already provide citizens with a large number of services, and in the future they would add access to the digital euro as one additional service to build a business model with the “digital euro inside”. Banks are also much better than central banks at onboarding, and at know-your-customer and anti-money laundering checks. We could not do it. So even if it is theoretically possible, it’s very unlikely. What we want is for the digital euro to be a sort of raw material that we would hand over to banks to provide the services they are providing now, plus access to the digital euro, in the same way they’re already providing access to cash.
Only banks?
Well it would be intermediaries that are involved in the provision of payment services. They would need to be regulated and supervised intermediaries. So not only banks.
Is there a danger of crowding out innovation by the private sector? 
We’re a very peculiar supplier of services, because in general, private service providers want to take market share from competitors. We’re not that type of provider. What we want to do is negate the risk that the digital euro would crowd out banks and innovation in payments. So we’ll take care of that. I think the digital euro would be a source of innovation, not the opposite. And we’ll not crowd out banks, because this will be a public good provided by the central bank to foster innovation, progress and efficiency in the financial system.
That must be one of your primary concerns: to avoid destabilising the banking system in any way or facilitating runs on banks in crisis times? 
Absolutely. We’re reflecting on how to avoid that. What we want to offer is a means of payment, not a form of investment. To avoid crowding out banks, we are discussing possible alternatives. One possibility is to put a cap on the amount of digital euro that individual users could hold. So you can hold a maximum of, say, €3,000, but not more. Any money in excess of that would have to be transferred into a bank account. Another possibility is that you can hold as much as you want, but beyond a certain threshold, you would face a financial disincentive. Up to €3,000 euro, amounts held in digital euro would never be treated less favourably than cash, they would never be remunerated at interest rates below zero. But if for some reason you wanted to hold more than that, then you would face a financial disincentive that would discourage you from doing so. Why would we do that? Because if people could hold an unlimited amount of digital euro, they could shift all their deposits from bank accounts into digital euro, especially in the run-up to a crisis, potentially precipitating a banking crisis. Which would destabilise the financial system. By the way, these proposals which originate from the ECB are now being discussed quite widely around the globe.
Are you leaning towards one or the other of those?
No, we will take that decision after consulting with stakeholders, citizens, merchants and banks, and there are implications and pros and cons in either method. For example, the cap may be more powerful. You cannot hold more than €3,000 full stop. Right. But then we would have to deal with a number of complications. Suppose that you have €2,800 in your digital euro account and I owe you €500. If I make a payment to you, what happens to the €300 that exceeds the threshold, the cap of €3,000? Either the payment cannot go through, which would be disastrous as it would create uncertainty about the completion of a payment, or a waterfall mechanism would have to be set up to transfer the rest to a bank account. But that would mean obliging you to have a bank account, which is at odds with the concept of financial inclusion, which is one of our objectives. Access would need to be provided to basic bank accounts that are free of charge. Tiered remuneration is of course more market friendly. But is it powerful enough? In a crisis, it could be very difficult to have a financial disincentive that is large enough to cause you not to seek security if you fear that your bank could go under and that you could be bailed in. So you would need to bring down the remuneration of digital euro in excess of a threshold when there are concerns about a financial crisis. But then that would be a signal that would need to be managed. So, you see that there are solutions, but each of them – cap or tiered remuneration – has advantages and disadvantages.
Is a digital euro going to use blockchain, or distributed ledger technology?
In our tests, we have experimented with two systems. One is a centralised system known as TIPS. We have used this to analyse the functioning of a theoretical digital euro. How many transactions can be done per second using that infrastructure? And how much time does it take to complete each transaction? We had excellent results with TIPS, suggesting we could handle hundreds of millions of transactions per day, and the completion time for payments was negligible. Then we have also looked at distributed ledger technology (DLT). While there are types of DLT which are used by commercial banks for financial transactions, there’s no experience of DLT that could serve the needs of 400 million customers. And we’ve also experimented with a combination of the two, because there’s no reason why one should exclude the other. We could have a centralised system with different nodes, and then these different nodes would interact with the centralised base enabling you to multiply the power of the system. But this is a question for the IT experts.
Regulation of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins, how do you see that? Do you think that stablecoins need to be more tightly regulated? 
We still have unstable coins. To become stablecoins, a necessary although not sufficient condition is that they need to be regulated and supervised. And obviously, the coins have a number of risks for individual consumers and for the financial system at large. So what is the mechanism behind the so-called stable or unstable coins? The stablecoin issuer sells the coin to you, then uses the proceeds from the sale to invest in reserve assets. But those reserve assets do not have the certainty or stability of their value. They may be low-risk assets, but they are not risk-free assets. It is also uncertain whether the issuer holds an adequate amount of such assets to back the value of coins in circulation. Then there is the possibility of the value of the asset changing and the value of the coin changing. In periods of financial tension, there could be an expectation that the value of the coin would change significantly because of the value of the asset, and then there could be a risk of people going to the issuer and withdrawing their money. That is the mechanism that leads to a run. But unlike in the case of banks, there is currently no supervision. There is no deposit guarantee scheme and there is no emergency liquidity provision by the central bank, because the central bank cannot commit public money to save entities that are not subject to adequate prudential requirements, meaning that there is an inherent instability in the function of these coins – and for this reason they are still unstable coins. Once we have regulation and oversight, it is possible they might become more deserving of the name “stablecoins”. But only the money issued by the central bank is truly stable. Europe is at the forefront of regulation in this field. The European Commission’s legislative proposal for a regulation on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) sets out a number of mechanisms to reduce the risks to consumers and to financial stability. And the message sent is that until the regulation is in place, the presumption would be that no stablecoin should start operating in the euro area. At the same time, we are looking to adopt our oversight framework. We are currently discussing our new Eurosystem oversight framework for payment instruments – the PISA framework – and it will be adopted to include oversight of stablecoins. Once this is done, then we will discuss the possible introduction of such coins.
What about cryptocurrencies – bitcoin and the like? How are you managing them at the moment? Because the regulation framework isn’t in place yet. 
There is no formal mechanism that we can use to prevent any investor in the euro area from buying crypto-assets. They are not currencies; they are not money. The risks they bear are very high. I think there should be careful regulation. MiCA introduces regulation for crypto-assets. Our PISA framework will also give us the possibility to conduct oversight of crypto-assets.
What does this mean, oversight of crypto-assets? 
It’s very difficult to regulate them, to oversee them, because there is no responsible legal entity. They are decentralised. They could be in China. They could be in Switzerland or in South America. They could be anywhere. But to the extent that intermediaries are involved in the supply of those crypto-assets, then we would have regulation and oversight in place.
In my view, crypto-assets are very dangerous animals. They are not money, they are contracts that are perfectly fine for gamblers. We should try to protect consumers as much as possible. And we know from recent experience that those crypto-assets are largely used for criminal activities. We also have the issue of energy consumption. Bitcoin mining, for example, uses a huge amount of energy. This is not sustainable.
When will this supervision start? When is PISA coming into force?
By the end of this year, I hope. But we also need the MiCA regulation, because it is complementary to our PISA framework.
Let’s talk about monetary policy and the implications for that. You talked about imposing negative interest rates on digital euro to disincentivise people from holding too much of it. Could it be a way to make interest rates even more negative?
No, because first of all, we’re not planning to withdraw cash. The reason why there is an effective lower bound for monetary policy is that if you bring interest rates too low, people would turn to cash, as the cost of storing cash would become lower than the cost of holding a non-cash instrument.
We’re not introducing the digital euro because we want to change the way we implement monetary policy in any way. We’re not planning to withdraw cash. So we would never use the digital euro for monetary policy, and we would never use it to impose deeply negative interest rates by design, because we’ll continue to supply cash.
Have you got any idea of the cost of launching the digital euro project? 
Currently we pay for the costs of producing banknotes and end users are not charged, but we are not losing money. Quite the contrary, because we earn seigniorage – which results from the difference between the face value of money and the cost of issuing it. Likewise, with the digital euro we won’t charge end users and we will incur some costs, but we won’t lose money. Seigniorage means we’ll have more liabilities and more assets, and we’ll make money out of that investment under normal market conditions. As part of the investigation phase, we’ll discuss the overall architecture and how the various stakeholders involved in the transactions charge each other, but citizens paying with digital euro won’t be charged. And I don’t think that the cost of issuing a digital euro will be large. We already have experience with wholesale and retail payments. Suppose that we use TIPS – the technology is already in place. And national central banks already use DLT. So I don’t expect the cost to be prohibitive. And the proceeds would be very large, because that’s a way of maintaining the size of the balance sheet, which means that you have more liabilities and more assets. This means that you’ll earn more seigniorage.
Will intermediaries make money on it?
The ECB as the issuer will not charge users. Intermediaries will offer services with digital euro inside to cover their costs. This is a complicated issue that will have to be addressed: the interaction between banks, intermediaries and customers. And competition has to be ensured to limit the fees and charges for customers.
How will this change the world of finance, the world of money for the consumer out there? 
This would be a very powerful push for digitalisation. It would allow everybody to have access to a safe, risk-free, cost-free means of payment in the digital era. We’re currently still in a period of transition, but 20 years from now, everybody will be using digital instruments. The digital euro and cash could co-exist, but I’m sure that everybody would be using digital means of payment. You can build programmable products at lower cost. For instance, users could decide to allow automatic payments for routine transactions, such as paying bills, using a toll road, going to the cinema or parking.
So is this just for the eurozone or will it be available to people outside the eurozone? And if so, is there a danger you erode the monetary sovereignty of smaller countries? 
There is indeed such a danger, and that is why we’re considering which potential users should have access to digital euro. Within the euro area, €3,000 would already be above the cash requirements of most people today. But in some countries, including some not far from us, with lower GDP per capita, €3,000 in digital euro form could be too large an amount, as it could trigger financial instability by depleting bank deposits. We’ll have to reflect very carefully on access and limits for foreign users. Of course, foreigners that come to the euro area as tourists should have access to digital euro. But here too, we would use limits.
Then there is another and more positive international dimension: the possibility of doing cross-border payments. We’re already cooperating at the international level. The advantages of introducing central bank digital currencies would be maximised if we made them interoperable, as they could make cross-border payments more efficient and much cheaper.

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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FTC | Looking for small business financing?

It’s exciting to see so many “open” signs appearing in store windows across the country. But some companies making the transition to an in-person workplace may find themselves in a short-term cash flow crunch. Even before the pandemic, the FTC raised concerns about deceptive practices related to small business financing. With many companies working to regain their footing, the FTC has tips on protecting yourself when looking for financing.
Consider close to home. If you already have financing through a local lender, that may be the first place to look for additional credit. A hometown financial institution knows you well and understands the business conditions in your community.
Looking online? Don’t rely just on search results. Online lenders may broaden the market for small business financing, but they also require careful vetting on your part. Don’t just type in “small business loan” and assume that the search results and rankings can tell you anything about those companies. Whether you’re considering a Main Street institution or an online company, investigate them thoroughly.
Don’t click on links in unsolicited emails. Scammers know that many consumers and small businesses are looking for loans right now, so they have shifted their pitches accordingly. If an email arrives out of the blue with a financing offer, treat it with the utmost suspicion. Even clicking on a link is risky. It could hide malware.
Ask questions before turning over confidential information. If a random stranger asked you for corporate or personal financial data, you’d tell them to hit the bricks. Follow that same policy when applying for financing. Don’t fill out an online loan application without first determining who’s at the other end. Some companies may appear to offer loans, but what they really do is sell your information to third parties. Other outfits are flat-out fraudsters looking to commit identity theft. Have you spotted a sketchy business financing offer? Report it to the FTC.
Understand the ins and outs of new financing options. When it comes to small business financing, many companies in the marketplace operate differently from what you may be used to. Study the offer carefully before signing on the dotted line. Does the deal require a personal guarantee? What happens if a payment is missed? If there is anything you don’t understand, contact the lender or provider and insist on an answer in writing. When it’s your money on the line, there’s no such thing as a silly question. And if you feel that a sales person is rushing you, that’s a sure sign for you to rush in the opposite direction.
Seek advice from trustworthy experts. Don’t you wish you had a hotline to a successful business executive who could offer you advice on money matters, including ways to access capital? As it happens, you probably do. Reach out to a respected person in your circle – maybe it’s someone in your neighborhood, at your place of worship, or in the local business community – and extend an invitation for coffee. In addition, look into groups like Small Business Development Centers(link is external) – a public-private partnership of the SBA and universities, state agencies, and the private sector – or other organizations in your area that offer free consulting for small business owners. The important point is that before committing to a financing offer, bounce ideas off a trustworthy person not affiliated with the prospective lender.
Compliments of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.
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NextGenerationEU: European Commission raises €20 billion in first transaction to support Europe’s recovery

On June 15, the European Commission, in its first NextGenerationEU transaction, raised a €20 billion via a ten-year bond due on 4 July 2031 to finance Europe’s recovery from the coronavirus crisis and its consequences. This is the largest-ever institutional bond issuance in Europe, the largest-ever institutional single tranche transaction and the largest amount the EU has raised in a single transaction.
The bond has attracted a very strong interest by investors across Europe and the world, thanks to which the Commission has obtained very favourable pricing conditions, similarly to the repeatedly successful issuances under the SURE programme.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said: “Today is a truly historic day for our European Union. We successfully conducted the first funding operation for NextGenerationEU. As a strong Union, we are raising money at the markets together and investing in a common recovery from this crisis. It is an investment in our single market. And even more importantly, it is an investment in the future of Europe’s next generations as they face the challenges of digitisation and climate change. Money can now start flowing to help reshaping our continent, to build a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe. I will now visit every Member State, to see NextGenerationEU impact on the ground.”
Commissioner in charge of Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn, said: ”Today, we have reached a key milestone in implementing NextGenerationEU. After laying all the foundation at record speed, we have today successfully conducted the first borrowing operation under the Recovery Plan. This is just a very first step of a long journey, bringing over €800 billion in current prices into the EU economy. NextGenerationEU has now become a reality and is set to drive our collective recovery from the pandemic, setting Europe on a green, digital and resilient path.”
The funds will now be used for the first payments under NextGenerationEU, under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and various EU budget programmes.
By the end of 2021, the Commission expects to raise some €80 billion in bonds, to be complemented by short-term EU-Bills, as per the funding plan published in June 2021. The exact amount of both EU-Bonds and EU-Bills will depend on the precise funding needs, and the Commission will revise its initial assessment in the autumn. In this way, the Commission will be able to fund, over the second half of the year, all planned grants and loans to Member States under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, as well as cover the needs of the EU policies that receive NextGenerationEU funding.
Background
NextGenerationEU is a temporary recovery instrument of some €800 billion in current prices to support Europe’s recovery from the coronavirus pandemic and help build a greener, more digital and more resilient Europe.
To finance NextGenerationEU, the European Commission – on behalf of the EU – will raise from the capital markets up to around €800 billion between now and end-2026. €407.5 billion available for grants (under RRF and other EU budget programmes); €386 billion for loans. This will translate into borrowing volumes of an average of roughly €150 billion per year.
Given the volumes, frequency and complexity of the borrowing operations ahead, the Commission will follow the best practices used by large and frequent issuers, and implement a diversified funding strategy.
This strategy presents a diverse range of instruments and techniques, going beyond the back-to-back approach that the Commission has used so far to borrow from the markets, including in the framework of the SURE programme. Over the past 40 years, the European Commission has run several lending programmes to support EU Member States and third countries. All of these lending operations were financed on a back-to-back basis, mainly through syndicated bond issuances.
Technical section

The new 10-year bond carries a coupon of 0% and came at a re-offer yield of 0.086% providing a spread of -2 bps to mid-swaps, which is equivalent to 32.3 bps over the 0.00% Bund due 02/2031.
The final order book was in excess of €142 billion, which meant that the bond has been over seven times oversubscribed.
The joint lead managers were BNP Paribas, DZ BANK, HSBC, IMI-Intesa Sanpaolo and Morgan Stanley. Co-leads were Danske Bank and Santander.
The demand was dominated by fund managers (37%), and bank treasuries (25%) followed by central banks / official institutions (23%). In terms of region, 87% of the deal was distributed to European investors, 10% to Asian investors and 3% Investors from the Americas, the Middle East and Africa.

Summary of the distribution:
By Geography

Germany
13%

France
10%

UK
24%

Benelux
15%

Nordics
10%

Italy
5%

Other Europe
10%

Asia
10%

Americas
3%

Total
100%

By Investor Type

Central Banks / Official Institutions
23.0%

Fund Managers
37.0%

Insurance and Pension Funds
12.0%

Bank Treasuries
25.0%

Banks
2.0%

Hedge Funds
1.0%

Total
100%

Compliments of the European Commission.
The post NextGenerationEU: European Commission raises €20 billion in first transaction to support Europe’s recovery first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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IMF | A Proposal to Scale Up Global Carbon Pricing

Between one quarter and one half. That’s how much carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases must fall over the next decade to keep alive the goal of restricting global warming to below 2°C. The fastest and most practical way to achieve this is by creating an international carbon price floor arrangement.

‘Climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies.’

This matters to the IMF because climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies. The right climate policies can address these risks and also bring tremendous opportunities for transformative investments, economic growth, and green jobs—so much so that our Board recently approved proposals to include climate change in our regular country economic surveillance and our financial stability assessment program.
At the heart of our policy discussions with member countries is carbon pricing—now widely accepted as the most important policy tool to achieve the drastic cuts to emissions we need. By making polluting energy sources more expensive than clean sources, carbon pricing provides incentives to improve energy efficiency and to re-direct innovation efforts towards green technologies. Carbon pricing needs to be supported by a broader package of measures to enhance its effectiveness and acceptability including public investment in clean technology networks (like grid upgrades to accommodate renewables) and measures to assist vulnerable households, workers, and regions. Nonetheless, at the global level, additional measures equivalent to a carbon price of $75 per ton or more are required by 2030.
Ahead of the United Nations’ 26th annual climate change conference (COP26) in November—the most important climate conference since Paris 2015—we see promising signs of growing climate ambition. Many countries have stated new climate objectives—60 countries have already pledged to be emissions-neutral by midcentury and some, including the European Union and United States, have offered stronger near-term pledges. Importantly, carbon pricing schemes are proliferating—more than 60 have been implemented globally, including key initiatives this year in China and Germany.
Yet stronger and more coordinated action in the decade ahead is critical.
While some countries are moving ahead aggressively, ambition varies country-by-country such that four-fifths of global emissions remain unpriced and the global average emissions price is only $3 per ton. As a knock-on effect, some countries and regions with high or rising carbon prices are considering placing charges on the carbon content of imports from places without similar schemes. From a global climate perspective, however, such border carbon adjustments are insufficient instruments as carbon embodied in trade flows is typically less than 10 percent of countries’ total emissions.
In part, the slower progress reflects how hard it can be for countries to unilaterally scale up mitigation policies to meet their Paris Agreement commitments—not least because of concerns about how it may affect their competitiveness and worries that others may not match their policy actions. The near-universal country participation in the Paris Agreement, so critical for its legitimacy, does not make for easy negotiation.
So how do we get carbon pricing to where it needs to be within ten years? A new paper from IMF staff, still under discussion with the IMF Board and membership, proposes the creation of an international carbon price floor arrangement that complements the Paris Agreement and is:
1. Launched by the largest emitters. The chart shows, that China, India, the US and the EU will account for nearly two-thirds of projected global CO2 emissions in 2030 (if no new mitigation actions are taken). Including the full G20 takes this to 85 percent. Once launched, the scheme could gradually expand to encompass other countries.
2. Anchored on a minimum carbon price. This is an efficient, concrete, and easily understood policy instrument. Simultaneous action among large emitters to scale up carbon pricing would deliver collective action against climate change while decisively addressing competitiveness concerns. The focus on a minimum carbon price parallels the current discussion on a minimum for the tax rate in international corporate taxation. More broadly, international harmonization through tax rate floors has a long tradition in Europe.
3. Designed pragmatically. The arrangement needs to be equitable, flexible and account for the differentiated responsibilities of countries given, among other factors, historical emissions and development levels. One way to do this is to have, say, two or three different price levels in the agreement that vary according to accepted measures of a country’s development. The arrangement could also accommodate countries where carbon pricing is not currently feasible for domestic political reasons, so long as they achieve equivalent emissions reductions through other policy instruments.
An illustrative example shows that reinforcing Paris Agreement pledges with a three-tier price floor among just six participants (Canada, China, European Union, India, United Kingdom, United States) with prices of $75, $50, and $25 for advanced, high, and low-income emerging markets, respectively and in addition to current policies, could help achieve a 23 percent reduction in global emissions below baseline by 2030. This is enough to bring emissions in line with keeping global warming below 2°C.
The application of carbon pricing across Canadian provinces gives a good prototype for how a price floor could translate to the international level. The federal government requires provinces and territories to implement a minimum carbon price rising progressively from CAN$10 per ton in 2018 to CAN$50 in 2022 and CAN$170 in 2030. Jurisdictions are free to meet this requirement through carbon taxes or emissions trading systems.
At the international level, a well-designed carbon price floor agreement would yield benefits to individual countries as well as to the collective. All participants would be better off from stabilizing the global climate system, and countries would enjoy domestic environmental benefits from curbing fossil fuel combustion—most importantly, fewer deaths from local air pollution.
There is no time to waste in putting in place such an arrangement. Imagine us in 2030. Let us make sure that we will not look back at 2021 just to regret the missed opportunity for effective action. Let us instead look back with pride at global progress towards keeping global warming below the 2oC threshold. We need coordinated action now—and it should be centered on an international carbon price floor.
Authors:

Vitor Gaspar
Ian Parry

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | A Proposal to Scale Up Global Carbon Pricing first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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IMF | A New Era of Digital Money

Digital forms of money could be a boon for emerging market and lower-income economies if the transition is well managed and regulated
Digital money has the potential to transform the financial sector. Emerging markets and lower-income countries stand to gain the most from this dramatic shift. Broad and inexpensive access to digital money and phone-based transactions could open the door to financial services for 1.7 billion people without traditional bank accounts. And countries may grow increasingly connected, facilitating trade and market integration. The real-world impact is significant.
But with any opportunity comes risk. The passage to this new world could exclude those on the other side of the digital divide. It also opens the door to fragmentation, currency substitution, and loss of policy effectiveness. The transition must be well managed, coordinated, and soundly regulated.

WHAT IS DIGITAL MONEY?
Digital money is the digital representation of value. The public sector can issue digital money called central bank digital currency—essentially a digital version of cash that can be stored and transferred using an internet or mobile application. The private sector can also issue digital money. Some forms can be redeemed for cash at a fixed face value. These are fully backed with very safe and liquid assets and are usually referred to as e-money. Stablecoins can be a form of e-money, but also come in other designs whose value is more volatile. Crypto assets, such as Bitcoin, are issued in their own denominations and are especially volatile—too much to be considered a form of digital money (they are usually considered an investment asset). Click here for a detailed discussion of different forms of digital money.

Emerging markets lead the way
Consider a worker in the United States. In the near future, an employer could deposit her paycheck in a digital wallet, allowing her to send money to relatives in Guatemala, the Philippines, or any other country more cheaply and efficiently. Fees for wiring money often take up to 7 percent of the value of a transaction, and the World Bank estimates that cutting fees to 2 percent could give a $16 billion a year boost to remittances to low-income countries.
This future is not distant. Private sector innovation in emerging markets has already made a mark in the area of mobile money. The M-pesa mobile money transfer service, which started in Kenya, is being replicated in dozens of countries in Africa and Asia. It has brought payments to many without bank accounts—but with a flip phone in their pocket—and has opened the door to other financial services, like savings and credit products.
Today, there are a billion registered mobile money accounts across 95 countries, with close to $2 billion transacted through these accounts every day. Sub-Saharan Africa is a leader in mobile money, accounting for almost half of mobile money accounts worldwide. The widespread use of mobile phones has made this possible. Digital identities, which many countries have rolled out, are another important innovation. These digital versions of passports allow mobile money providers to onboard customers at low cost while complying with local regulations.
The public sector too is taking steps to provide a digital payment infrastructure in emerging markets. The Bahamas is the first country in the world with a central bank digital currency (a digital form of a country’s currency). Called the “sand dollar,” it will increase financial inclusion for inhabitants spread out across the country’s 700 islands, where banking services such as cash machines are not always available.
Other countries are not far behind. The most ambitious project is being piloted by China’s central bank. If the e-Renminbi experiment is successful, it could boost digitalization, innovation, and financial inclusion in one of the world’s largest and most vibrant economies, possibly encouraging other countries to follow suit.
Maintaining a balance
But many of these potential benefits require careful and farsighted policy support. To start, new infrastructure is essential to allow poorer households in isolated areas to connect to new digital payment services. Global satellite networks (Starlink, OneWeb, and others) are expected to provide widely accessible broadband services, including to lower-income countries, as soon as 2022. But a financial inclusion strategy cannot rely on a signal simply falling from the sky.
A synchronized infrastructure investment push is needed including to broaden internet access to poorer and remote areas. In fact, when many countries act at the same time, public infrastructure investment can help lift growth domestically and abroad through trade linkages. These investments are necessary to support a viable digital payment strategy.
In many countries, financial inclusion may mean trade-offs when it comes to privacy and competition policy. Digital payment companies are increasingly capturing and monetizing consumer data. Without collateral to offer, poorer households and microenterprises can offer their data, but at the cost of their privacy. Regulation will have to strike just the right balance, including to incentivize market entry of new payment companies while limiting their dominance.
In fact, countries will need to ramp up regulatory and supervisory capacity more generally before payment innovations hit the market. Regulation and careful supervision are key to anchoring trust in new digital forms of money. However, questions still abound. Payment providers may well be required to fully back coin issuance with safe and liquid assets, but which assets? Should these be kept in commercial banks or perhaps even in central banks? What backstops might the state be prepared to offer? And what if the digital money is being offered by a foreign firm—how should regulators cooperate across borders? These questions are new and need to be pondered carefully.
Clear legal frameworks are also essential. Central bank–issued digital currencies will likely require adaptation to central bank law and monetary law. And public law must clarify the legal status of privately issued money. Should new arrangements be treated as electronic money, bank deposits, securities, commodities, or something else? Answers to these questions will have enormous bearing on the development of digital money. For instance, classifying a form of digital money as a security will significantly complicate its exchange, given the complexity of securities regulation.
Other risks must also be contained. New digital forms of money must stand up to cyberattacks, outages, technical glitches, fraud risks, and faulty algorithms. And without proper regulation, digital money could be a virtual safe haven for criminals’ illicit financial transactions. Effective implementation of a robust framework to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism is needed. However, digital money also brings regulatory opportunities, such as more effective real-time data analytics and monitoring.
Current regulatory approaches and legal frameworks are fragmented. There is little guidance, and country circumstances differ significantly. The IMF has a role to play in providing policy advice to countries and helping institutions develop sound regulatory approaches and share best practices.
In their effort to join, benefit from, and regulate the digital money revolution, countries must not lose sight of the bigger picture. Regulatory and legal frameworks, as well as central banks’ decision to offer their own digital currencies, will affect private sector participation and innovation. The role of banks may change if they face more intense competition for funding as clients debate whether to exchange their deposits for the potentially safer currency of central banks. Careful decisions must also ensure that new forms of digital money are environmentally sustainable—that the energy they require is kept in check. The path to digital money adoption must be guided by a clear and responsible vision of tomorrow’s broader payment, financial, economic, and environmental landscape.
A global approach
The bigger picture actually extends far beyond each country’s borders. The digital money revolution will happen on a global scale. Emerging markets and lower-income countries will be affected by the introduction of digital forms of money in larger, more advanced economies. They must be aware of these changes, and the IMF will stand beside them to ensure that the international monetary system continues to work for all countries.
‘The IMF will play a key role in the new era of digital money’
The lower costs of obtaining, storing, and spending digital money could make it easier for people and companies to substitute their domestic currency with a more stable currency, especially in countries with high inflation and volatile exchange rates. This practice is already widespread—foreign currency deposits exceed 50 percent in more than 18 percent of countries worldwide. As this level rises, the home country loses control over monetary policy. This has a disproportionate impact on poorer and more vulnerable households, which typically find it harder to diversify their savings to protect against volatile inflation.
Policies are currently being explored. In countries where there is risk of capital outflows, questions arise about the technical feasibility—and policy desirability—of limiting foreign digital currency transactions and holdings. It may be possible to agree on design principles that allow country authorities to set basic parameters for wallets and networks to limit currency substitution. However, these design principles must be coordinated at the global level to ensure that they meet the needs of all countries and that they are widely adopted to limit regulatory arbitrage. This is another area where the IMF can help through its analysis and convening power.
The question also arises of whether existing capital flow management measures—such as taxes on purchasing foreign currency—may be circumvented by digital forms of money. Most IMF member countries, particularly emerging markets and lower-income countries, use some form of capital flow management. Existing regulations and implementation practices must evolve so that capital flow management measures remain strong following the introduction of digital money.
Digital money would also likely increase gross capital flows as transaction costs diminish and financial products become more widely available. This comes with both pros and cons. Markets should become more integrated, offering risk-sharing and hedging opportunities for local households and firms. Yet the risk of financial contagion would also increase, as would the danger of balance of payments problems, since swings in asset valuations are amplified as the stock of foreign assets increases.
Finally, the risk of fragmentation and of a global digital divide is stark. Regional arrangements to settle digital money could proliferate, driven by countries’ desire for autonomy. Such arrangements could become instruments of geopolitical interests and forces—to avoid or impose bilateral sanctions—and could limit currency convertibility.
Yet there are also opportunities. Digital money could be leveraged to foster integration and interoperability of payment systems. New solutions must be explored, such as multilateral settlement and exchange platforms, as well as common norms or principles for the design of digital money to facilitate cross-border payments, such as remittance flows, which are essential for many lower-income countries. The IMF is actively working with the international community—member countries and other international organizations—to defend the integration of payment systems and oppose their fragmentation.
The IMF will play a key role in the new era of digital money. The organization was created to promote international monetary cooperation and oversee the stability of the international monetary system, as well as contribute to countries’ economic and financial stability. Digital money must be regulated, designed, and provided in a way that allows countries to maintain control over monetary policy, financial conditions, capital account openness, and foreign exchange regimes. Payment systems must grow increasingly integrated, not fragmented, and must work to help all countries guard against a digital divide.
Much remains to be done, but the opportunities are immense, to the extent the risks are carefully managed. The key to building a brighter future is cooperation—between the private and public sectors domestically and national authorities and organizations internationally. The IMF, with its near universal membership, stands ready to play its part in this momentous endeavor.
Authors:

Tobias Adrian is the financial counsellor and director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli is division chief in the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.

Compliments of the IMF.
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OECD | Addressing complex housing policy challenges should be a central priority for governments

Access to affordable and decent housing is vital for good health, job opportunities and life satisfaction, but housing remains one of the most complex policy challenges facing societies today. Governments must do more to ensure universal access to affordable, high-quality, environmentally sustainable housing, according to the OECD.
The COVID-19 crisis has uncovered how unevenly housing is distributed across population groups, and has worsened the adverse impacts of poor housing conditions, notably on the most vulnerable.
Launched in 2018, a wide-ranging OECD Housing Project has gathered comparative evidence, analysis and policy recommendations to help governments make housing more affordable, more energy-efficient and better adapted to people’s needs.
“Housing is much more than just a place to live,” said OECD Secretary-General Mathias Cormann. “It is the single largest household budget item and a key element in both economic performance and well-being.”
“The OECD Housing Policy Toolkit we are presenting today will help policymakers design better housing policies that address the reality of developments in housing markets, such as the affordability challenge, and improve the considerable effect housing policy has across societies,” Mr Cormann said.
With housing prices in many countries rising dramatically – lodging costs now absorb more than a third of the budget of the poorest 20%, compared with only a quarter of the budget of the top 20% – and public investment at historically low levels, four key priority areas emerge from the Toolkit.
First, unlocking additional supply will be key to meeting both current and future housing challenges. More public investment in energy-efficient social housing would ease housing difficulties, especially for households on low or unstable incomes. Building green social housing can also act as a catalyst for the energy transition of the construction industry as a whole.
Second, land-use reforms, such as the removal of overly tight building restrictions or minimum parcel size requirements, can reduce obstacles to new residential construction. Decisions on land use and planning must be made based on the needs of whole metropolitan areas rather than via a piecemeal district-by-district approach. Such reforms would put a brake on the strong upward trend in real house prices that has been widespread among OECD countries for the past four decades.
Third, greater flexibility in regulations over landlord-tenant relations, including rent control, can encourage investment in housing. Over the past year, these restrictions have been tightened to protect tenants hit hard by the Covid-19 crisis. Over time, the Toolkit’s overview report notes, such measures can discourage the supply of rental housing, ultimately making access to rental more difficult, especially for those on low or unstable incomes.
Fourth, application of stringent environmental standards, to achieve agreed greenhouse gas emission reduction targets and upgrade the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock, will be essential. This may put upward pressure on housing construction costs or rental prices, but these investments will translate to lower heating costs and preserve the long-term value of the houses.
The Housing Policy Toolkit includes:

An overview report, Brick by Brick: Building Better Housing Policies, which identifies policy levers that can enhance the efficiency, inclusiveness or sustainability of housing markets. It highlights ways to bring progress across these objectives and also discusses addressing trade-offs that can arise among them.
A Dashboard of Housing Indicators, which gathers indicators allowing policymakers to compare outcomes and policy settings across countries by topic.
A set of Country Snapshots offering national overviews of housing conditions and policies.

Compliments of the OECD.
The post OECD | Addressing complex housing policy challenges should be a central priority for governments first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.