EACC

OECD | Services trade liberalised in 2021, showing significant decrease in volume and effects of new measures

Global services trade regulations showed signs of liberalisation in 2021, slowing the steady build-up of trade barriers identified in previous years, according to a new OECD report.
OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI): Policy trends up to 2022 shows that liberalisation outpaced new restrictions during the past year, as the erection of new barriers to services trade slowed across almost all major sectors covered. The average cumulative increase in barriers across sectors covered by the Index (STRI) was six times lower in 2021 than in 2020, indicating a significant decrease both in the volume and effect of new trade restrictions.
Most trade liberalisation was identified in air transport services, commercial banking and computer services. Easing of regulations particularly affected services supplied through commercial presence in other markets, and through the temporary movement of people.
The annual report, which covers services trade regulations in 50 countries and 22 services sectors, representing more than 80% of global services exports, identifies top performers in terms of regulatory best practices and liberalisation, including the Czech Republic, Japan and Chile.
It also points out new measures that have created impediments to services trade, notably tighter conditions on the screening of foreign investment, which was already on the rise in 2020, and continued in 2021. Other regulatory changes were implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as governments implemented measures to protect public health and to mitigate the economic consequences. However, most COVID-19 policy measures have marginal bearing on the STRI database, as these are largely temporary or targetting support measures in sectors not covered by the STRI, such as health, protective equipment or essential goods.
The OECD points out that ambitious efforts to ease services trade barriers could yield substantial benefits in reducing trade costs for firms that provide services across borders, especially if the trends identified in 2021 continue in the years to come. On average across sectors, services trade costs could decline by 6% to 16% in the medium term if countries could close half of the regulatory gaps with best performers. An ambitious services trade agenda, including new services market access commitments in comprehensive trade and investment agreements, can drive such gains, the report said.
The trend towards market openness for services trade identified in the OECD’s annual monitoring exercise accompanies the landmark adoption of the WTO Reference Paper on Services Domestic Regulation at the end of 2021, demonstrating collective will to liberalise services trade. OECD analysis demonstrates that full implementation of the new WTO disciplines can unlock annual services trade cost savings in the range of USD 150 billion, with substantial benefits in financial services, business services, communications and transport services.
Open markets for services trade boost supply chain resilience, while lower services trade costs will facilitate recovery from the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic on exporters. Multilateral trade rules and open commitments on services can lock in these benefits and provide certainty to firms seeking to access foreign markets.
For further information on OECD work on the services trade, see: https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/services-trade/.
Contact:

John Drummond, Head of the Trade in Services Division of the OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate | John.Drummond@oecd.org | +33 1 45 24 95 36

Lawrence Speer, OECD Media Office | lawrence.speer@oecd.org | +33 1 45 24 79 70

Compliments of the OECD.
The post OECD | Services trade liberalised in 2021, showing significant decrease in volume and effects of new measures first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

ECB | Christine Lagarde, Luis de Guindos: Monetary policy statement

Monetary policy statement by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, and Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB | Frankfurt am Main, 3 February 2022 |
Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference.
The euro area economy is continuing to recover and the labour market is improving further, helped by ample policy support. But growth is likely to remain subdued in the first quarter, as the current pandemic wave is still weighing on economic activity. Shortages of materials, equipment and labour continue to hold back output in some industries. High energy costs are hurting incomes and are likely to dampen spending. However, the economy is affected less and less by each wave of the pandemic and the factors restraining production and consumption should gradually ease, allowing the economy to pick up again strongly in the course of the year.
Inflation has risen sharply in recent months and it has further surprised to the upside in January. This is primarily driven by higher energy costs that are pushing up prices across many sectors, as well as higher food prices. Inflation is likely to remain elevated for longer than previously expected, but to decline in the course of this year.
The Governing Council therefore confirmed the decisions taken at its monetary policy meeting last December, as detailed in the press release published at 13:45 today. Accordingly, we will continue reducing the pace of our asset purchases step by step over the coming quarters, and will end net purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) at the end of March. In view of the current uncertainty, we need more than ever to maintain flexibility and optionality in the conduct of monetary policy. The Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation stabilises at its two per cent target over the medium term.
I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing, and will then talk about our assessment of financial and monetary conditions.
Economic activity
Economic growth weakened to 0.3 per cent in the final quarter of last year. Nevertheless, output reached its pre-pandemic level at the end of 2021. Economic activity and demand will likely remain muted in the early part of this year for several reasons. First, containment measures are affecting consumer services, especially travel, tourism, hospitality and entertainment. Although infection rates are still very high, the impact of the pandemic on economic life is now proving less damaging. Second, high energy costs are reducing the purchasing power of households and the earnings of businesses, which constrains consumption and investment. And third, shortages of equipment, materials and labour in some sectors continue to hamper the production of manufactured goods, delay construction and hold back the recovery in parts of the services sector. There are signs that these bottlenecks may be starting to ease, but they will still persist for some time.
Looking beyond the near term, growth should rebound strongly over the course of 2022, driven by robust domestic demand. As the labour market is improving further, with more people having jobs and fewer in job retention schemes, households should enjoy higher income and spend more. The global recovery and the ongoing fiscal and monetary policy support also contribute to this positive outlook. Targeted and productivity-enhancing fiscal measures and structural reforms, attuned to the conditions in different euro area countries, remain key to complement our monetary policy effectively.
Inflation
Inflation increased to 5.1 per cent in January, from 5.0 per cent in December 2021. It is likely to remain high in the near term. Energy prices continue to be the main reason for the elevated rate of inflation. Their direct impact accounted for over half of headline inflation in January and energy costs are also pushing up prices across many sectors. Food prices have also increased, owing to seasonal factors, elevated transportation costs and the higher price of fertilisers. In addition, price rises have become more widespread, with the prices of a large number of goods and services having increased markedly. Most measures of underlying inflation have risen over recent months, although the role of temporary pandemic factors means that the persistence of these increases remains uncertain. Market-based indicators suggest a moderation in energy price dynamics in the course of 2022 and price pressures stemming from global supply bottlenecks should also subside.
Labour market conditions are improving further, although wage growth remains muted overall. Over time, the return of the economy to full capacity should support faster growth in wages. Market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations have remained broadly stable at rates just below two per cent since our last monetary policy meeting. The latest survey-based measures stand at around two per cent. These factors will also contribute further to underlying inflation and will help headline inflation to settle durably at our two per cent target.
Risk assessment
We continue to see the risks to the economic outlook as broadly balanced over the medium term. The economy could perform more strongly than expected if households become more confident and save less than expected. By contrast, although uncertainties related to the pandemic have abated somewhat, geopolitical tensions have increased. Furthermore, persistently high costs of energy could exert a stronger than expected drag on consumption and investment. The pace at which supply bottlenecks are resolved is a further risk to the outlook for growth and inflation. Compared with our expectations in December, risks to the inflation outlook are tilted to the upside, particularly in the near term. If price pressures feed through into higher than anticipated wage rises or the economy returns more quickly to full capacity, inflation could turn out to be higher.
Financial and monetary conditions
Market interest rates have increased since our December meeting. However, bank funding costs have so far remained contained. Bank lending rates for firms and households continue to stand at historically low levels and financing conditions for the economy remain favourable. Lending to firms has picked up, supported by both short and longer-term loans. Robust demand for mortgages is sustaining lending to households. Banks are now as profitable as they were before the pandemic and their balance sheets remain solid.
According to our latest Bank Lending Survey, loan demand by firms increased strongly in the last quarter of 2021. This was driven by both higher working capital needs, stemming from supply bottlenecks, and increased financing of longer-term investment. In addition, banks continue to hold an overall benign view of credit risks, mainly because of their positive assessment of the economic outlook.
Conclusion
Summing up, the euro area economy continues to recover, but growth is expected to remain subdued in the first quarter. While the outlook for inflation is uncertain, inflation is likely to remain elevated for longer than previously expected, but to decline in the course of this year. We will remain attentive to the incoming data and carefully assess the implications for the medium-term inflation outlook. We stand ready to adjust all of our instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation stabilises at its two per cent target over the medium term.
We are now ready to take your questions.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Christine Lagarde, Luis de Guindos: Monetary policy statement first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

New approach to enable global leadership of EU standards promoting values and a resilient, green and digital Single Market

Today, the Commission is presenting a new Standardisation Strategy outlining our approach to standards within the Single Market as well as globally. The Strategy is accompanied by a proposal for an amendment to the Regulation on standardisation, a report on its implementation, and the 2022 annual Union work programme for European standardisation. This new Strategy aims to strengthen the EU’s global competitiveness, to enable a resilient, green and digital economy and to enshrine democratic values in technology applications.
Standards are the silent foundation of the EU Single Market and global competitiveness. They help manufacturers ensure the interoperability of products and services, reduce costs, improve safety and foster innovation. Standards are an invisible but fundamental part of our daily life: from Wi-Fi frequencies, to connected toys or ski bindings, just to mention a few. Standards give confidence that a product or a service is fit for purpose, is safe and will not harm people or the environment. Compliance with harmonised standards guarantees that products are in line with EU law.
The fast pace of innovation, our green and digital ambitions and the implications of technological standards for our EU democratic values require an increasingly strategic approach to standardisation. The EU’s ambitions towards a climate neutral, resilient and circular economy cannot be delivered without European standards. Having a strong global footprint in standardisation activities and leading the work in key international fora and institutions will be essential for the EU to remain a global standard-setter. By setting global standards, the EU exports its values while providing EU companies with an important first-mover advantage.
Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age, Margrethe Vestager, said: “Ensuring that data is protected in artificial intelligence or ensuring that mobile devices are secure from hacking, rely on standards and must be in line with EU democratic values. In the same way, we need standards for the roll-out of important investment projects, like hydrogen or batteries, and to valorise innovation investment by providing EU companies with an important first-mover advantage.”
Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, said: “Technical standards are of strategic importance. Europe’s technological sovereignty, ability to reduce dependencies and protection of EU values will rely on our ability to be a global standard-setter. With today’s Strategy, we are crystal-clear on our standardisation priorities and create the conditions for European standards to become global benchmarks. We take action to preserve the integrity of the European standardisation process, putting European SMEs and the European interest at the centre”.
The Strategy presented today proposes five key sets of actions:

Anticipate, prioritise and address standardisation needs in strategic areas: we need standards faster and in tune with the European innovation and policy agenda. The Commission has identified standardisation urgencies as regards COVID-19 vaccine and medicine production, critical raw materials recycling, the clean hydrogen value chain, low-carbon cement, chips certification and data standards. As of this year, standardisation priorities will be clearly identified in the 2022 annual Union work programme for European standardisation. A High-level Forum will be set up to inform future standardisation priorities. The Commission will establish the function of a Chief Standardisation Officer to ensure high-level guidance across the Commission on standardisation activities, which will be supported by an EU excellence hub on standards composed of Commission services.

Improve the governance and integrity of the European standardisation system: European standards, which support EU policy and legislation, must be decided by European players. The Commission is proposing an amendment to the Regulation on standardisation to improve the governance in the European standardisation system. While the European system will remain open, transparent, inclusive and impartial, the proposal prescribes that mandates at the request of the Commission to the European standardisation organisations must be handled by national delegates – the national standardisation bodies – from the EU and EEA Member States. This will avoid any undue influence of actors from outside the EU and EEA in the decision-making processes during the development of standards for key areas, like cybersecurity or hydrogen standards. The Commission will further pay close attention to the inclusiveness of the system, the role of SMEs and civil society. It calls on the European standardisation organisations to modernise their governance structures and will launch a peer review process among Member States and national standardisation bodies to achieve better inclusiveness for civil society, users and SMEs-friendly conditions for standardisation. At the same time, the Commission will launch the evaluation of the Regulation on standardisation.

Enhance European leadership in global standards: the Commission will work through the High-Level Forum to set up a new mechanism with EU Member States and national standardisation bodies to share information, coordinate and strengthen the European approach to international standardisation. The Commission will also pursue more coordination between EU Member States and like-minded partners. The EU will fund standardisation projects in African and the Neighbourhood countries.

Support innovation: the Commission is proposing to better tap into the potential of EU-funded research to valorise innovation projects through standardisation activities and anticipate early standardisation needs. A ‘standardisation booster’ to support researchers under Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe to test the relevance of their results for standardisation, will be launched. The development of a Code of Practice for researchers on standardisation will be initiated to strengthen the link between standardisation and research/innovation through the European Research Area (ERA), by mid-2022.

Enable the next generation of standardisation experts: standards rely on the best experts and Europe is facing a generation shift. The Commission will promote more academic awareness on standards, for instance through the future organisation of EU University Days and training of researchers.

Background
Today, standards have become a matter of global importance. Other regions are reinforcing their global footprint by being more strategic and assertive. The European standardisation system needs to evolve to respond to these challenges. The Commission’s plans for a new Standardisation Strategy and legislative adjustment to the standardisation Regulation were announced in the Commission’s ‘Updating the 2020 New Industrial Strategy: Building a stronger Single Market for Europe’s recovery‘.
A harmonised standard is a European standard developed by a recognised European Standards Organisation (CEN, CENELEC or ETSI) following a request from the European Commission. Once accepted, these standards become part of EU law and provide manufacturers using them across the Single Market with a presumption of conformity with the requirements of EU legislation, helping to reduce costs for small businesses. The process is based on a public-private-partnership between the Commission and the standardisation community, where the division of roles and responsibilities is guided by the 2012 standardisation Regulation.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post New approach to enable global leadership of EU standards promoting values and a resilient, green and digital Single Market first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

Joint statement by President von der Leyen and President Biden on U.S.-EU cooperation on energy security

We are jointly committed to Europe’s energy security and sustainability and to accelerating the global transition to clean energy. We also share the objective of ensuring the energy security of Ukraine and the progressive integration of Ukraine with the EU gas and electricity markets.
The EU and the United States cooperate closely on energy policy, decarbonisation and security of supply in the U.S.-EU Energy Council. The EU’s and the United States’ commitments to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, through clean energy, in particular renewables, energy efficiency, and technologies, provide a path to energy security and reduced dependence on fossil fuels. The current challenges to European security underscore our commitment to accelerating and carefully managing the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy.
Over the last decade, the EU has invested in diversification of supply through infrastructure and reinforcement of its internal energy networks, increasing the resilience and flexibility of EU energy markets. The European Commission will intensify work with Member States for security of supply, within transparent and competitive gas markets in a manner compatible with long-term climate goals and reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.
While that process intensifies during this critical decade, we are committed to working closely together to overcome today’s challenges of security of supply and high prices in energy markets.
We commit to intensifying our strategic energy cooperation for security of supply and will work together to make available reliable, and affordable energy supplies to citizens and businesses in the EU and its neighbourhood.
The United States and the EU are working jointly towards continued, sufficient, and timely supply of natural gas to the EU from diverse sources across the globe to avoid supply shocks, including those that could result from a further Russian invasion of Ukraine. The United States is already the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the EU. We are collaborating with governments and market operators on supply of additional volumes of natural gas to Europe from diverse sources across the globe. LNG in the short-term can enhance security of supply while we continue to enable the transition to net zero emissions. The European Commission will work for improved transparency and utilisation of LNG terminals in the EU.
We intend to work together, in close collaboration with EU Member States, on LNG supplies for security of supply and contingency planning. We will also exchange views on the role of storage in security of supply.
More broadly, we call on all major energy producer countries to join us in ensuring world energy markets are stable and well-supplied. This work has already started, and we will take it forward at the meeting of the U.S.-EU Energy Council on February 7.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Joint statement by President von der Leyen and President Biden on U.S.-EU cooperation on energy security first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

Brexit crisis looms over Protocol

This article was previously published in the Irish Independent | By John Bruton |
Notwithstanding the positive sounds emanating from Monday’s meeting between Liz Truss and Maros Sefcovic, the talks between the European Commission and the UK government over the Protocol on Northern Ireland are probably heading to a major crisis in the next month. There has been no movement of the UK side, and immovable deadlines are approaching.
The UK agreed to the Protocol as part of their Withdrawal Treaty with the EU. The Protocol was an intrinsic part of the Treaty.  The UK Parliament ratified the Treaty, including the Protocol, but now the UK government is trying to scrap it altogether, under a this pretence of “renegotiating “ it.
The fundamental problem is that the British negotiating strategy is being driven by old fashioned, populist, and simplistic notions about trade. The EU strategy, on the other hand, is driven by a legal imperative to protect the most advanced form of economic and commercial integration between sovereign nations that has ever been achieved. The clash is a clash of mind sets. The arguments of either side are based on fundamentally incompatible assumptions.
There is the added complication that the negotiations between Liz Truss and Maros Sefcovic are taking place in the midst of a political crisis in Britain, in which any compromise is liable to be used as a political weapon in a struggle to lead the Conservative Party.
Conservative Britain always pretended to see the EU as simple free trade area. But the rest of the EU members realized one could not have truly free trade, unless there were four other things

common rules on the quality of products
freedom for people and money to move from country to country,
common trade policies vis a vis the rest of the world, and
a shared set of political goals that facilitated day to day compromise.

A big segment of English opinion never accepted this latter concept of the EU. This makes it difficult for them to even to understand the necessary implications of the Protocol .
The Protocol makes Northern Ireland part of the EU Single market for goods produced in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile Britain has left the EU Single Market.  Britain has no more than a bare bones trade agreement with the EU. This makes a big difference. But it is what the UK government and Parliament agreed.
Goods produced in Northern Ireland (NI) are being treated as EU goods, whereas goods produced in Britain are non EU goods.
In the case of goods made up of parts, ingredients or components coming from different countries, The parts, ingredients or components produced in Northern Ireland qualify, for rules of origin purposes, as “European”. Meanwhile parts, ingredients or components originating in Britain are of non EU origin.
This distinction can be very important in deciding whether a final product is sufficiently “European” to benefit from duty free access to the EU market. If one wants to ensure that a sufficient percentage of a final product is “European”, it makes sense to source ingredients or parts in NI rather than in  another part of the UK.
Goods coming into NI will be subject to EU Customs rules and tariffs, whereas goods coming into Britain will be subject to (potentially very different) UK Customs rules and tariffs.
This gap has to be policed, if there is not to be abuse. In the Protocol the EU and the UK agreed  how this gap is to be policed.
The gap will become progressively wider, if the UK seeks to exploit the freedom it won by Brexit by making new (and different) British standards to replace the old standards that it might claim had been “imposed by Brussels”.
The more the standards diverge, the more will checks be needed on goods entering the EU market through NI, to ensure that they comply with EU requirements.
Then there is the question of the European Court interpreting EU rules as  they apply to NI  goods circulating freely in the EU Single Market .  The UK agreed to this but now is objecting to it.
For NI businesses to be free to export their products within the EU Single Market under the Protocol they have to be able to convince their competitors and customers in France and Germany that NI goods are fully compliant with EU rules. These rules are interpreted, in final analysis, by the European Court of Justice. That ensures consistency.
The rules must be interpreted in the same way for NI goods,  as they are for goods produced  in France or Germany. The role of the ECJ in the Protocol is the passport for NI goods into Europe,  one of the biggest markets in the world.
The role of the ECJ is, of course, confined to  EU rules applying to goods. It will have no general jurisdiction in NI on other matters. There the final arbiter will be the UK Supreme Court.
There is a logjam in the negotiations because the UK side keeps repeating the same talking points ,  pocketing EU concessions without reciprocity, and withholding cooperation with the EU authorities on access to data. It is also stalling on building installations in Belfast Port that would allow customs officials there to do their work safely and conveniently. The UK is using “grace periods” to defer indefinitely controls it  agreed to. It is almost as if the UK does not want to face up to the implications of Brexit.
The UK, and some unionists, talk about using Article 16 as if this would allow the ending of checks in Belfast port. That is not legally possible. Article 16 only allows limited and temporary derogations. To use it to go beyond that would be a straightforward breach of international law.
We are facing a moment of truth.
Author:

John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) and former European Union Ambassador to the United States

Compliments of John Bruton.
The post Brexit crisis looms over Protocol first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | Global Inflation Pressures Broadened on Food and Energy Price Gains

The chart of the week shows how surging energy costs have boosted inflation, especially in Europe, after fossil-fuel prices nearly doubled in the past year. Rising food prices have also helped to boost inflation.
Meanwhile, continuing supply chain disruptions, clogged ports, logistics strains and strong demand for merchandise have broadened these price pressures, especially in the United States. Higher imported goods prices have contributed to inflation in some regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean.
Inflation is likely to remain elevated. Price gains this year will average 3.9 percent in advanced economies and 5.9 percent in emerging market and developing economies, before subsiding next year, according to our January World Economic Outlook update.
Assuming inflation expectations remain well-anchored and the pandemic eventually eases its grip, higher inflation should fade as supply chain woes ease, central banks raise interest rates, and demand tilts more toward services again instead of goods-intensive consumption.
Oil futures contracts indicate crude prices will rise about 12 percent this year as natural gas prices climb about 58 percent. Such increases for both commodities would be considerably less than their gains last year, and would likely be followed by falling prices in 2023 as supply-demand imbalances ease further.
Similarly, food prices are likely to climb at a more moderate pace of about 4.5 percent this year and decline next year—after a rise of 23.1 percent last year, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. This should ease spending pressures for millions of people around the world, especially in countries with lower incomes.
Such burdens fall most heavily on residents of emerging and low-income nations, where food typically makes up a third to half of consumer spending. That share is smaller in advanced economies, such as the United States, where food accounts for less than one-seventh of household shopping bills.
Authors:

Jorge Alvarez is an economist in the World Economic Studies Division of the IMF’s Research Department

Philip Barrett is an economist in the IMF’s Research Department

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | Global Inflation Pressures Broadened on Food and Energy Price Gains first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

EACC

ECB | The euro: a trusted and safe means of payment

Euro banknote counterfeiting at historically low level in 2021

347,000 counterfeit euro banknotes withdrawn from circulation in 2021, a historically low level in proportion to banknotes in circulation
About two-thirds of total withdrawn counterfeits were €20 and €50 banknotes
Euro banknotes remain a trusted and safe means of payment
Authenticity of euro banknotes can be verified using “feel, look and tilt” method

Some 347,000 counterfeit euro banknotes were withdrawn from circulation in 2021 (180,000 in the second half of the year), a decrease of 24.6% when compared with 2020. €20 and €50 notes continued to be the most counterfeited banknotes, jointly accounting for about two-thirds of the total. 95.4% of counterfeits were found in euro area countries, while 4.2% were found in non-euro area EU Member States and 0.4% in other parts of the world.
There is little likelihood of receiving a counterfeit, as the number of counterfeits remains very low in proportion to the number of genuine euro banknotes in circulation. In 2021, 12 counterfeits were detected per 1 million genuine banknotes in circulation, which is a historically low level (see the chart below).
Low-quality reproductions are continuously withdrawn from circulation. Counterfeits are easy to detect as they have no security features, or only very poor imitations of them. The public does not need to be concerned about counterfeiting, but should nevertheless remain vigilant. You can check your notes by using the simple “feel, look and tilt” method described in the dedicated section of the ECB’s website and on the websites of the national central banks of the euro area. The Eurosystem also helps professional cash handlers by ensuring that banknote-handling and processing machines can reliably identify counterfeits and withdraw them from circulation.
Using counterfeits for payments is a criminal offence that may lead to prosecution. If you receive a suspect banknote, compare it directly with one you know to be genuine. If your suspicions are confirmed please contact the police or – depending on national practice – your national central bank or your own retail or commercial bank. The Eurosystem supports law enforcement agencies in their fight against currency counterfeiting.
The Eurosystem has a duty to safeguard the integrity of euro banknotes and to continue improving banknote technology. The second series of banknotes – the Europa series – is even more secure and is helping to maintain public trust in the currency.

Chart 1
Number of counterfeits detected annually per 1 million genuine notes in circulation

Image courtesy of the ECB.

Table 1
Yearly figures in comparison

Period
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

Number of counterfeits
684,000
694,000
563,000
559,000
460,000
347,000

Table 2
Breakdown by denomination in 2021

Denomination
€5
€10
€20
€50
€100
€200
€500

Percentage of total
2.4%
15.7%
32.1%
33.8%
9.5%
5.5%
1.0%

Contact:

Georgina Garriga Sánchez | georgina.garriga_sanchez@ecb.europa.eu | tel.: +49 69 1344 95368.

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | The euro: a trusted and safe means of payment first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | Pandemic Tests Resilience and Credibility of Fiscal Rules

Record debt and deficits during the pandemic prompted many nations to suspend their fiscal rules.
Since 1990, a growing number of countries have adopted fiscal rules to strengthen budgetary discipline and enhance the credibility of public finances. These numerical limits on spending, deficits, or debt signal a government’s commitment to prudence. At the same time, fiscal councils are becoming more common to provide independent oversight and monitor the compliance of rules.
What happens when a country must respond to a large shock such as the pandemic? Governments must strike the right balance between the imperative of emergency support and the credibility of the rules-based fiscal framework.
Our new research shows how countries navigate this challenge—particularly during the pandemic. As the crisis wears on, high deficit and debt levels will further challenge the credibility of fiscal policy frameworks anchored by rules.

‘Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse.’

Large deviations
Governments have used all the flexibility of the rules to appropriately respond to the health crisis. Nearly 40 percent of economies with fiscal rules activated escape clauses during the pandemic, including the European Union, Jamaica, Paraguay and the United Kingdom. That compares with 5 percent during the global financial crisis, when these clauses were often not part of the framework. These clauses permit a deviation from the numerical rules within the limits defined by the framework. Without such clauses, countries must resort to ad hoc suspensions or modifications of the rules.
Fiscal councils also played an important role by assessing the crisis-related policy responses and the appropriate use of escape clauses. These councils are independent, non-partisan agencies that provide fiscal oversight, including costing policy measures, assessing budgetary forecasts, and monitoring rules. Their role is key to ensuring the transparency and credibility of the framework. In some cases, they gave advice on the size and type of fiscal support and stressed the need for greater transparency of COVID-19 fiscal measures.
The unprecedented rise of deficits and debts during the pandemic has led to large deviations from fiscal rules. In 2020, about 90 percent of countries had deficits larger than the rule limits—by about 4 percent of gross domestic product, on average—while public debt exceeded the limit for over half of the countries with rules in place. Public debt surpassed the limits by about 50 percent of GDP on average in advanced economies and by about 25 percent in emerging markets, adding to already large pre-crisis deviations.
The return to fiscal rules
A key challenge for many countries will be whether and how to modify the rules-based framework after major deviations.
Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, for example, advanced economies slowly returned to pre-crisis deficit rule limits, but their debts remained elevated. In emerging markets and developing economies, deficits first declined toward the limits but then widened again after 2014 when commodities prices fell.
Governments face difficult choices in the post-pandemic environment. Regardless of the paths to reinstate or revise the rules, robust fiscal institutions and medium-term frameworks will be important to preserve the credibility of policies in the transition period. Empirical evidence suggests that deviations from deficit limits are associated with higher financing costs. A credible transition helps to limit the costs of public finance.
Countries could use this opportunity to further strengthen fiscal rules. While frameworks have been flexible during crises, they have failed to prevent a large and persistent buildup of public debt, even if debt service costs were contained, reflecting the trend declines in inflation and real interest rates.
Each country will have to choose its own path. But in all cases, effective rules-based frameworks require strong political commitment, including a good record of compliance, the right incentives to build buffers during good times, and well-designed escape clauses to manage large adverse shocks. Strengthening fiscal councils’ ability to operate independently and fulfill their mandates would also improve the credibility and accountability of policies.
New datasets
The IMF has just released updates of two global datasets on fiscal rules and fiscal councils.
Both are becoming a more common feature of policy frameworks globally. As of end-2021, about 105 countries had rules, an increase from fewer than 10 in 1990. The number of countries with fiscal councils has also risen from 19 in 2010 to 49 today.
The first dataset provides information on national and supranational fiscal rules in 106 countries from 1985 to 2021. It also presents details on the types and characteristics of rules, such as their legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, as well as enforcement procedures, and takes stock of key supporting features in place, including monitoring bodies and fiscal responsibility laws.
The second describes key features of fiscal councils as of December across the IMF’s membership. The dataset includes the main features of the council’s remit, their tasks, and channels of influence; and key institutional characteristics such as independence, accountability, and human resources.
These resources aim to help policymakers strengthen their fiscal governance on the basis of the best available international evidence.
Authors:

W. Raphael Lam is a Senior Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department

Paulo Medas is Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and oversees the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | Pandemic Tests Resilience and Credibility of Fiscal Rules first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

IMF | Low Real Interest Rates Support Asset Prices, But Risks Are Rising

A large and sudden jump in real interest rates could lead to a further selloff in stocks.
Supply disruptions coupled with strong demand for goods, rising wages and higher commodities prices continue to challenge economies worldwide, pushing inflation above central bank targets.
To contain price pressures, many economies have started tightening monetary policy, leading to a sharp increase in nominal interest rates, with long-term bond yields, often an indicator of investor sentiment, recovering to pre-pandemic levels in some regions such as the United States.
Investors often look beyond nominal rates and base their decisions on real rates—that is, inflation-adjusted rates—which help them determine the yield on assets. Low real interest rates induce investors to take more risks.
Despite somewhat tighter monetary conditions and the recent upward move, longer-term real rates remain deeply negative in many regions, supporting elevated prices for riskier assets. Further tightening may still be required to tame inflation, but this puts asset prices at risk. More and more investors could decide to sell risky assets as those would become less attractive.
Differing outlooks
While shorter-term market rates have climbed since central banks’ hawkish turn in advanced economies and some emerging markets, there is still a sharp difference between policymakers’ expectations of how high their benchmark rates will rise and where investors expect the tightening will end.
This is most obvious in the United States, where Federal Reserve officials project that their main interest rate will reach 2.5 percent. That’s more than half a point higher than what 10-year Treasury yields indicate.
This divergence between markets and policymakers’ views on the most likely path for borrowing costs is significant because it means investors may adjust their expectations of Fed tightening upward both further and faster.
In addition, central banks might tighten more than they currently anticipate because of persistent inflation. For the Fed, this means the main interest rate at the end of the tightening cycle might exceed 2.5 percent.
Implications of the rate-path divide
The path of policy rates has important implications for financial markets and the economy. As a result of high inflation, real rates are historically low, despite the recent rebound in nominal interest rates, and are expected to remain so. In the United States, long-term rates are hovering around zero while short-term yields are deeply negative. In Germany and the United Kingdom, real rates remain extremely negative at all maturities.
Such very low real interest rates reflect pessimism about economic growth in coming years, the global savings glut due to aging societies, and demand for safe assets amid higher uncertainty exacerbated by the pandemic and recent geopolitical concerns.
The unprecedented low real interest rates continue to boost riskier assets, notwithstanding the recent upward move. Low long-term real rates are associated with historically elevated price-to-earnings ratios in equity markets, as they are used to discount expected future earnings growth and cash flows. All things being equal, monetary policy tightening should trigger a real interest rate adjustment and lead to higher discount rate, resulting in lower stock prices.
Despite the recent tightening in financial conditions and concerns about the virus and inflation, global asset valuations remain stretched. In credit markets, spreads are also still below pre-pandemic levels despite some modest widening recently.
After an exceptional year supported by solid earnings, the US equity market started 2022 with a steep retreat amid high inflation, uncertainty about growth and weaker earnings prospects. As a result, we expect that a sudden and substantial rise in real rates could cause a significant drop for US stocks, particularly in highly valued sectors such as technology.
Already this year, the 10-year real yield has increased by nearly half a percentage point. Stock volatility soared on greater investor nervousness, with the S&P 500 down more than 9 percent for the year and the Nasdaq Composite measure tumbling 14 percent.
Impact on economic growth
Our growth-at-risk estimates, which link future economic growth downside risks to macrofinancial conditions, could increase substantially if real rates rise suddenly and broader financial conditions tighten. Easy conditions helped global governments, consumers, and businesses withstand the pandemic, but this could reverse as monetary policy tightens to curb inflation, moderating economic expansions.
In addition, capital flows to emerging markets could be at risk. Stock and bond investments in those economies are generally seen as being less safe, and tightening global financial conditions may cause capital outflows, especially for countries with weaker fundamentals.
Looking ahead, with persistent inflation, central banks face a balancing act. All the while, real interest rates remain very low in many countries. Monetary policy tightening must be accompanied by some tightening of financial conditions. But there could be unintended consequences if global financial conditions tighten substantially. A higher and sudden increase in real interest rates could lead potentially to a disruptive price revaluation and an even larger selloff in stocks. As financial vulnerabilities remain elevated in several sectors, monetary authorities should provide clear guidance about the future stance of policy to avoid unnecessary volatility and safeguard financial stability.
Authors:

Nassira Abbas is a deputy division chief in the Global Markets Monitoring and Analysis Division of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department and an author of the Global Financial Stability Report

Tobias Adrian is the Financial Counsellor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | Low Real Interest Rates Support Asset Prices, But Risks Are Rising first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Read More
EACC

COVID-19: EU Council adopts a revised recommendation on measures affecting free movement, based on the individual situation of persons and no longer on the region of origin

The EU Council today adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to facilitate safe free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. This recommendation responds to the significant increase in vaccine uptake and the rapid roll-out of the EU digital COVID certificate, and replaces the previously existing recommendation. It will enter into force on 1 February 2022, on the same day as a delegated act amending the digital COVID-19 certificate regulation and providing for an acceptance period of 270 days for vaccination certificates.
Infographic – A common approach to COVID-19 travel measures in the EU – See full infographic
Under the new recommendation, COVID-19 measures should be applied taking into account the status of the person instead of the situation at regional level, with the exception of areas where the virus is circulating at very high levels. This means that a traveller’s COVID-19 vaccination, test or recovery status, as evidenced by a valid EU digital COVID certificate, should be the key determinant. A person-based approach will substantially simplify the applicable rules and will provide additional clarity and predictability to travellers.
Person-based approach
Travellers in possession of a valid EU digital COVID certificate should not be subject to additional restrictions to free movement.
A valid EU digital COVID certificate includes:

A vaccination certificate for a vaccine approved at European level if at least 14 days and no more than 270 days have passed since the last dose of the primary vaccination series or if the person has received a booster dose. Member states could also accept vaccination certificates for vaccines approved by national authorities or the WHO.
A negative PCR test result obtained no more than 72 hours before travel or a negative rapid antigen test obtained no more than 24 hours before travel.
A certificate of recovery indicating that no more than 180 days have passed since the date of the first positive test result.

Persons who are not in possession of an EU digital COVID certificate could be required to undergo a test prior to or no later than 24 hours after arrival. Travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under 12 should be exempt from this requirement.
Map of EU regions
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) should continue to publish a map of member states’ regions indicating the potential risk of infection according to a traffic light system (green, orange, red, dark red). The map should be based on the 14-day case notification rate, vaccine uptake and testing rate.
Based on this map, member states should apply measures regarding travel to and from dark red areas, where the virus is circulating at very high levels. They should in particular discourage all non-essential travel and require persons arriving from those areas who are not in possession of a vaccination or recovery certificate to undergo a test prior to departure and to quarantine after arrival.
Certain exceptions to these measures should apply to travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under the age of 12.
Emergency brake
Under the new recommendation, the emergency brake to respond to the emergence of new variants of concern or interest is strengthened. When a member state imposes restrictions in response to the emergence of a new variant, the Council, in close cooperation with the Commission and supported by the ECDC, should review the situation. The Commission, based on the regular assessment of new evidence on variants, may also suggest a discussion within the Council.
During the discussion, the Commission could propose that the Council agree on a coordinated approach regarding travel from the areas concerned. Any situation resulting in the adoption of measures should be reviewed regularly.
Background
The decision on whether to introduce restrictions on free movement to protect public health remains the responsibility of member states; however, coordination on this topic is essential. On 13 October 2020, the Council adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was updated on 1 February 2021 and 14 June 2021. This recommendation establishes common criteria and a common framework for possible measures for travellers.
The Council recommendation is not a legally binding instrument. The authorities of the member states remain responsible for implementing the content of the recommendation.
Compliments of the EU Council.
The post COVID-19: EU Council adopts a revised recommendation on measures affecting free movement, based on the individual situation of persons and no longer on the region of origin first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.