The European economy has lost momentum this year against the background of a high cost of living, weak external demand and monetary tightening. While economic activity is expected to gradually recover going forward, the European Commission’s Autumn Forecast revises EU GDP growth down compared to its summer projections. Inflation is estimated to have dropped to a two-year low in the euro area in October and is set to continue declining over the forecast horizon.
Growth has lost momentum, but a rebound is still expected
Following a robust expansion throughout most of 2022, real GDP contracted towards year-end and barely grew in the first three quarters of 2023. Still high, though declining, inflation, and tightening monetary policy took a heavier toll than previously expected, alongside weak external demand. The latest business indicators and survey data for October point to subdued economic activity also in the fourth quarter of this year, amid increased uncertainty. Overall, the Autumn Forecast projects GDP growth in 2023 at 0.6% in both the EU and the euro area, 0.2 percentage points below the Commission’s summer forecast.
Economic activity is expected to gradually pick up as consumption recovers on the back of a steadily robust labour market, sustained wage growth and continued easing of inflation. Despite tighter monetary policy, investment is projected to continue increasing, supported by overall solid corporate balance sheets and by the Recovery and Resilience Facility. In 2024, EU GDP growth is forecast to improve to 1.3%. This is still a downward revision of 0.1 pps. from the summer. In the euro area, GDP growth is projected to be slightly lower, at 1.2%.
In 2025, with inflation and the drag from monetary tightening subsiding, growth is expected to strengthen to 1.7% for the EU and 1.6% for the euro area.
Inflation to continue easing after falling to two-year low
Inflation remains on a downward trend. It is estimated to have declined to 2.9% in the euro area in October, from its 10.6% peak a year ago. This marks its lowest level since July 2021.
While the moderation in the past year was mainly driven by the sharp fall in energy prices, it has now become increasingly broad-based across all main consumption categories, beyond energy and food.
As monetary tightening works its way through the economy, inflation is set to continue declining, though at a more moderate pace, reflecting a slower, but more broad-based, easing of inflationary pressures in food, manufactured goods and services. Headline inflation in the euro area is projected to fall from 5.6% in 2023 to 3.2% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025. In the EU, headline inflation is set to decrease from 6.5% in 2023 to 3.5% in 2024 and 2.4% in 2025.
Labour market to remain resilient
The EU labour market continued to perform strongly in the first half of 2023, despite the slowdown in economic growth. In the second quarter, activity and employment rates in the EU reached their highest level on record, and in September the unemployment rate remained at 6% of the labour force, close to its record low.
Although latest information from surveys points to some cooling and some Member States have seen an uptick in unemployment, the labour market is set to remain resilient over the forecast horizon. Employment growth in the EU is projected at 1.0% this year, before easing to 0.4% in both 2024 and 2025. The unemployment rate in the EU is expected to remain broadly stable at 6.0% in 2023 and in 2024, and to edge down to 5.9% in 2025. Real wages are expected to turn positive as of next year on the back of continued nominal wage growth and declining inflation.
Public deficits decrease as fiscal support is phased out
The phase-out of pandemic-related temporary measures, a reduction in subsidies to private investment and a lower net budgetary impact of energy-related measures are expected to offset the pressure on the fiscal balances from a less favourable economic environment and higher interest expenditure. Consequently, the EU general government deficit is projected to decline slightly in 2023, to 3.2% of GDP. Continued restraint in discretionary fiscal support is expected to further reduce the EU public deficit to 2.8% of GDP in 2024 and to 2.7% in 2025. The main driver of this decline is set to be the sizeable reduction in energy-related measures next year and their phase out in 2025.
The EU debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue to decline in 2023, to 83%. This is supported by high inflation, while higher interest rates on new debt issuances raise interest expenditure only gradually given the long average maturity of public debts in the EU. In 2024 and 2025, the debt ratio is forecast to broadly stabilise above the 2019 level of around 79%.
Risks and uncertainty increase amid geopolitical tensions
Uncertainty and downside risks to the economic outlook have increased in recent months amid Russia’s protracted war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East. So far, the latter’s impact on energy markets has been contained, but there is a risk of disruptions to energy supplies that could potentially have a significant impact on energy prices, global output and the overall price level. Economic developments in the EU’s major trading partners, especially China, could also pose risks.
On the domestic side, the transmission of monetary tightening may weigh on economic activity for longer and to a larger degree than projected in this forecast, as the adjustment of firms, households and government finances to the high interest rate environment could prove more challenging. Finally, extreme weather events like heatwaves, fires, droughts and floods, which have been raging across the continent and beyond with increasing frequency and scope, illustrate the dramatic consequences that climate change can have not only for the environment and the people affected, but also for the economy.
New candidate countries covered for the first time
This Autumn Economic Forecast for the first time covers Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Ukraine, to which the European Council granted EU candidate status last year. In Ukraine, the economy has shown remarkable resilience in 2023. Growth is forecast to reach 4.8% in 2023, 3.7% in 2024 and 6.1% in 2025, after collapsing by 29% in 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion.
This rebound can be attributed to exceptional harvests and government stimulus underpinned by the unwavering support of international partners, as well as to the authorities’ commitment to ensure macrofinancial stability.
Background
This forecast is based on a set of technical assumptions concerning exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices with a cut-off date of 25 October. For all other incoming data, including assumptions about government policies, this forecast takes into consideration information up until, and including, 31 October. Unless new policies are announced and specified in adequate detail, the projections assume no policy changes.
The European Commission publishes two comprehensive forecasts (spring and autumn) and two interim forecasts (winter and summer) each year. The two comprehensive forecasts cover a broad range of economic indicators for all EU Member States, candidate countries, EFTA countries and other major advanced and emerging market economies. The interim forecasts cover annual and quarterly GDP and inflation for the current and following year for all Member States, as well as EU and euro area aggregates.
The European Commission’s Winter 2024 Economic Forecast will update the GDP and inflation projections in this publication and is expected to be presented in February 2024.
 
You can read the forecast in full here.

 
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On November 17, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement on revising EU procedures and control measures for waste shipments. The agreed law aims to protect the environment and human health more effectively, while contributing to achieve the EU’s climate neutrality, circular economy and zero pollution goals.

Strengthening the rules governing exports of waste outside the EU
EU exports of certain non-hazardous wastes and mixtures of non-hazardous wastes for recovery (i. e. to be used for other purposes) will be allowed only to those non-OECD countries that consent and fulfil the criteria to treat such waste in an environmentally sound manner, including by complying with international labour and workers’ rights conventions. The Commission will draw up a list of such recipient countries, to be updated at least every two years.
Parliament ensured that plastic waste can no longer be exported to non-OECD countries within two and a half years after the entry into force of the regulation. Plastic waste exports to OECD countries will be subject to stricter conditions, including an obligation to apply the prior written notification and consent procedure, and closer compliance monitoring.
Better information exchange and clearer rules for shipments within the EU
Negotiators agreed that all shipments of waste destined for disposal in another EU country are generally prohibited and allowed only in exceptional cases. Waste shipments destined for recovery operations will have to meet strict requirements on prior written notification, consent and information.
The new law also foresees, two years after its entry into force, that the exchange of information and data on waste shipments in the EU will be digitalised, through a central electronic hub, to improve reporting and transparency.
Reinforcing prevention and detection of illegal shipments
The deal endorses the establishment of an enforcement group to improve cooperation between EU countries to prevent and detect illegal shipments. The Commission will be able to carry out inspections, in cooperation with national authorities, where there is sufficient suspicion that there are illegal waste shipments occurring.
Quote
Rapporteur Pernille Weiss (EPP, DK) said: “The result of our negotiations will bring more certainty to Europeans, that our waste will be appropriately managed no matter where it is shipped. The EU will finally assume responsibility for its plastic waste by banning its export to non-OECD countries. Once again, we follow our vision that waste is a resource when it is properly managed, but should not in any case be causing harm to the environment or human health.”
Next steps
Parliament and Council need to formally approve the agreement before it can come into force.
Background
On 17 November 2021, the Commission tabled a proposal to reform the EU’s rules on waste shipments, laying down procedures and control measures for the shipment of waste, depending on its origin, destination and transport route, the type of waste shipped and the type of waste treatment applied when it reaches its destination.
At international level, the Basel Convention regulates the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal. The OECD also adopted a legally binding decision (the “OECD control system”) to facilitate and control transboundary movements of wastes destined for recovery operations between OECD countries.

Compliments of the European Parliament.The post European Parliament | Deal Reached on Stricter EU Rules for Waste Shipments first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

On 16 November, EU Commissioner for Climate Action, Wopke Hoekstra met China’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, Xie Zhenhua, in Beijing, to prepare for the COP28 UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai. In a frank and constructive exchange, they agreed to increase cooperation on tackling the climate crisis, which no single country can solve on its own.
Both parties wholeheartedly underlined that climate science shows the urgency of action in this decade to meet the targets of the Paris Agreement. The impacts of the climate crisis are dramatically felt both in China and the EU and remind us of the responsibility to fully commit to emissions reductions while making our economies more resilient.
They discussed the key issues at stake at COP28 including the Global Stocktake, decarbonisation of the energy systems, climate adaptation, climate finance and carbon pricing, and the operationalisation of the loss and damage fund.
Commissioner Hoekstra highlighted the importance of ambition on emission reductions at COP28 via the outcome of the Global Stocktake. In particular he raised the importance of peaking global emissions as soon as possible this decade, and of tripling renewable energy capacity, and doubling energy efficiency measures by 2030, to contribute to the phase out of fossil fuels. They discussed at length what the end of coal and other fossil fuels means for industrial restructuring and how to make these efforts compatible with energy security concerns.
On the issue of climate finance, the Commissioner underlined that all parties able to contribute should do so in general, and in particular for the loss and damage fund. He also recalled the EU’s role as the world’s largest provider of international climate finance.
Commissioner Hoekstra agreed to work closely together with Special Envoy Xie ahead of and during COP28 to ensure a successful outcome for all parties. Decades of continuous cooperation by the EU and China in the multilateral climate negotiations provide a strong foundation.
Commissioner Hoekstra commended Special Envoy Xie on China’s massive increase in renewable energy capacity over recent years. Beyond COP, he committed to continue close EU-China cooperation on climate issues such as carbon pricing and the implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), measuring and reducing methane emissions, and scientific analysis. The Commissioner also raised concerns from the European side about the global level playing field, and expressed his commitment to creating mutual benefits from the green transition in areas such as innovation, clean technologies and industrial decarbonisation.

 
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post European Commission | Readout of the meeting between EU Commissioner for Climate Action and China’s Special Envoy on Climate Change first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Keynote address of Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director at Singapore Fintech Festival |  President Tharman, excellencies, distinguished guests: good morning! It’s a pleasure to be in Singapore again. And it’s an honor to join you this morning at this impressive forum to take stock of how far we’ve come and set the course for the future.
There is no better place to look into this future than Singapore — a place where fintech flourishes and where this festival brings the unlimited energy of fintech enthusiasts.
FinTech innovation has already been transformative — and will continue to be so — changing the world of finance and making it much more accessible to hundreds of millions of businesses and people who used to be cut off from it.
I am proud the IMF is part of this great community and that I am with you today. I come in the footsteps of my predecessor, Christine Lagarde, who five years ago gave a speech here encouraging policymakers to follow the “winds of change,” and embark on a digital money voyage by exploring the use of central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, and fintech.
Five years on, I’m here to provide an update on that voyage. I have four main messages. First, countries did set sail. Many are investigating CBDCs and are developing regulation to guide digital money developments. Second, we have not yet reached land. There is so much more space for innovation and so much uncertainty over use-cases. Third, this is not the time to turn back. The public sector should keep preparing to deploy CBDCs and related payment platforms in the future. Fourth, these platforms should be designed from the start to facilitate cross-border payments, including with CBDCs.
We’ve left port and are now on the high seas. This calls for courage and determination. We can learn from you: entrepreneurs, business leaders, and investors. You are sailors in the world of fintech. Every day you brave the open waters. Waves and winds are your inspiration. 
If anything, we need to raise another sail to pick up speed. The world is changing faster than most imagined. Just take artificial intelligence – a key theme of this festival. Look at the number of months before various applications reached 100 million users. The average is 3 years. It took ChatGPT 2 months!
The CBDC voyage
Adoption of CBDCs is nowhere close. But about 60 percent of countries are exploring them in some form today. CBDCs can replace cash which is costly to distribute in island economies. They can offer resilience in more advanced economies. And they can improve financial inclusion where few hold bank accounts.
In some countries the case seems dim today, but even they should remain open to potentially deploy CBDCs tomorrow. Why?
First, the benefits of CBDCs will stem from what happens in the payments environment. How many other countries will adopt CBDCs? To what extent will cash become obsolete? And will private forms of money proliferate?
Libra was a wake-up call that turned out to be a false alarm. But others, more compliant, will come knocking. In that case, CBDCs would offer a safe and low-cost alternative. They would also offer a bridge to go between private monies and a yardstick to measure their value, just like cash today which we can withdraw from our banks.
Second, the success of CBDCs will rely on policy decisions and how the private sector responds. The actions of many of you here today will matter!
Country authorities wishing to introduce CBDCs may need to think a little more like entrepreneurs. Communication strategies, and incentives for distribution, integration, and adoption, are as important as design considerations.
Will you, fintech leaders and developers, spend the resources onboarding merchants so they accept CBDCs? Will you make it easy for CBDCs to be integrated into financial services and messaging apps so people can pay each other from any environment? It depends on your return, that’s only fair.
Third, the benefits of CBDCs will depend on how technologies evolve.
AI, for instance, could amplify some of the benefits of CBDCs. It could improve financial inclusion by providing rapid, accurate credit scoring based on various data. It could provide personalized support to people with low financial literacy. To be sure, we need to protect personal privacy and data security, and avoid embedded biases so we don’t perpetuate inequality but aim to reduce it. Managed prudently, AI could help.
Another important potential transformation resulting from the work of many of you is the tokenization of financial assets, such as bonds issued on blockchains. This opens another door to CBDC, potentially in wholesale form, to pay for those assets.
So countries should continue exploring CBDCs.
In that spirit, I am delighted to announce the launch of a CBDC Handbook available on the IMF website starting today. The Handbook is intended to collect and share knowledge on CBDCs for policymakers around the world—to help them to sail ahead.
The cross-border payments voyage
To the extent CBDCs are deployed, they must be built to facilitate cross-border payments, which are at present expensive, slow, and available to few. Again, we must start this work today so we don’t have to backpedal tomorrow.
Efficient cross-border payments allow for capital to get more quickly to where it is needed. Small businesses can grow beyond borders, and households can receive needed funds from abroad. While we see encouraging declines in the cost of remittances, they remain above Sustainable Development Goal targets. We must ensure that countries do not get stuck on the wrong side of the digital divide.
We know what to do to make cross-border payments more efficient in the short term: improve what we already have. This is the spirit of the G20 Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments. In fact, I’m happy to announce that the IMF and World Bank will soon publish a common plan to provide capacity development to countries in just this area.
But in the medium term, new cross-border platforms may help. Think of these as next-generation virtual town-squares where central banks, commercial banks, and potentially even households and firms, can gather to exchange CBDCs in wholesale or retail form. Such platforms can even be built to interface with traditional forms of money and manage risks from payments.
These platforms are being actively explored by a range of players.
Banks and fintech companies are at the forefront. They are building infrastructure to pay each other, and to exchange financial assets on common blockchain networks.
The public sector is also pushing the frontier, including with the help of the BIS Innovation Hub. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is particularly active. Its project Guardian explores platforms to exchange digital money and assets. IMF staff will participate in project Guardian as observers to advise on the implications for the international monetary system. Thank you, Ravi Menon, for including us!
As you all know, there are many ships sailing these waters. And that is very good.
But we may be at a point where the public sector needs to offer a little more guidance. Not to crowd out, not to disrupt. But to act as a catalyst, to ensure safety and efficiency—and to counter fragmentation.
What we need in this voyage is a compass.
One way to provide a compass is to establish the desirable properties of cross-border platforms from a policy standpoint. For instance, platforms must allow countries to manage capital flows and retain control over their money supply. Equally important, we need common rules of the game on fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, and on data protection for instance.
AI could help here as well. AI solutions known as RegTech could reduce costs of compliance. It would be like using priority lanes in airports, skipping over the long queues at security.
Again, like CBDCs, we don’t need to decide today whether cross-border platforms are desirable. It’s about keeping the option open, building capacity, and setting the design contours to support the integration and stability of the international monetary system. If not, we may actually end up fragmenting it.
No one institution can provide such guidance. We will have to collaborate tightly across international institutions, central banks, and ministries of finance. The IMF can and will play its part.
Conclusion
Let me conclude with the following: We will be in the high seas for some time. But the potential payoff is clear—a more inclusive international financial system that meets our future needs.
So let us not disembark at the first island. Nor turn back. There is value in the voyage itself.
As Marcel Proust once said, “The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.”
That speaks to the strength of the Singapore Fintech Festival, and of all of you gathered here – the strength of many eyes. The power to bring fresh perspectives to problems and challenges old and new. I look forward to continuing this voyage with all of you. Let us sail together.
 
Compliments of the IMF.The post IMF | Central Banks Should Continue Digital Currency Development first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The ECB Blog looked at how communication has become a key factor for the transmission of a central bank’s policies in a recent post.[1] Central banks exercise a profound influence on what occurs in the economy through what they say. While banks and financial institutions hang on to their every word as decisions affect financing conditions and the economy, the wider public – which is certainly not less affected by monetary policy decisions – follows the communication of central banks indirectly, if at all.
This is where the news media comes into play. Journalists select and condense information about the activities of central banks for the public. Media coverage thus plays a key role in influencing what the public thinks about monetary policy, and even whether it thinks about it at all.[2]
The ECB regularly offers one occasion during which journalists can address questions directly: the press conference. Eight times a year – immediately after the policy meetings of the Governing Council – the ECB President and the Vice-President are available to answer questions from the media. The Q&A part of the press conference last usually 30 to 45 minutes, during which around 10 journalists get the chance to ask questions. Once they get the floor, the selected journalists are free to ask what they consider appropriate and most interesting.
The press conference is a key communication event: it is closely followed by newspapers, TV and news wires, and it is the basis upon which other media form their own comments and coverage. In this post (and in the ECB Working Paper on which it is based) we take a closer look at who is asking, what kinds of topics they are raising, and we investigate geographic patterns.
Let’s begin with who asks the questions.
Look who’s asking
Chart 1 summarises where questions came from across a ten-year period between May 2012 and July 2022. All in all, President Christine Lagarde and her predecessor Mario Draghi answered a total of 2,166 questions posed by 266 journalists representing 124 media outlets.
The lion’s share of these more than 2,000 questions was posed by international media specialising in economic coverage like the Financial Times, Bloomberg, CNBC, Reuters and The Wall Street Journal. Within the European Union, northern and southern EU outlets asked roughly equal shares of questions (25% and 20%, respectively), while enquiries from eastern EU media accounted for only 1% of the total. While the question of why enquiries come from where they do is an interesting one, here we will focus on the distribution as it actually is.

Chart 1
Number of questions asked by region and audience type

y-axis: number of questions, on top of the bars: percentage over the total

Sources: Angino, S., and Robitu, R., (2023), “One question at a time! A text mining analysis of the ECB Q&A session“, Working Paper Series, No 2852, ECB

It is not all about monetary policy
We used structural topic modelling (STM) to group the questions into topics. STM is a well-known technique in text analysis. It is based on the idea that each text – in our case each question – is a mixture of different topics, with each topic being a distribution of words. It is then up to the researcher to assign a name to these clusters of words.
We identified nine recurring topics among the journalists’ questions, not all of which are about monetary policy. The topics that do relate to the core of the ECB’s work include “Conventional monetary policy”, “Purchase programmes”, “Inflation and economic outlook” and “Deflation and Zero Lower Bound (ZLB)”. Another frequent topic revolves around the “Banking System”, related to keywords such as the state of the banking union, European banking supervision, and even more specific issues: for instance, non-performing loans, and even the situation of individual banks.
Some questions concern past and potential future crises threatening the existence of the monetary union, and the reversibility of the euro. They are captured by the topic “Sovereign debt crisis and European Monetary Union (EMU)”, which was unsurprisingly very prominent between 2012 and 2015.
“National affairs” captures questions on the economic, financial, and political affairs of Member States. This topic comprises structural reforms and fiscal policy, as well as issues on which the ECB cannot comment, such as national elections or referenda.
We also found two topics connected to the internal processes of the ECB. The first is “Governance”, which is mainly connected to the Governing Council deliberations, including the unanimity, or lack thereof, in their decisions. Other issues captured by this topic are legal ones, for instance the rulings of the German Federal Constitutional court on various ECB programmes (like in 2013 or in 2020). The second operational topic is “Communications”. This topic includes references to forward guidance,a monetary policy tool used to provide information about their future monetary policy intentions, but also comprises words like “announcement”, “signal” and “minutes”. This, in our view, adds to the evidence of the increasing interest in central bank communications.
The next question is: do journalists from different parts of the euro area and the world ask about the same topics? And do questions from outlets catering for general audiences differ from those for expert audiences?
Paese che vai, usanza che trovi[3]

The topics journalists inquire about differ depending on the geographical sphere of their outlet and on the type of audience they report for.

After having identified the nine topics in the questions, we move onto the differences across media types. We consider five outlet groups: “Northern EU – general audience”, “Northern EU – specialised audience”, “Southern EU – general audience”, “Southern EU – specialised audience”, and “International”. Virtually all outlets in the international group specialise in economics and finance so there is no need to differentiate audiences.
What do we find? First, international media tend to focus on technical topics related to monetary policy more than national outlets. In Chart 2, these are the topics like “Purchase programmes”, “Conventional monetary policy”, and “Deflation and ZLB” – more pertinent for expert audiences than the wider public.

Chart 2
Estimated topic proportions by region and audience

Percentage

Sources: Angino and Robitu (2023).

At the same time, international outlets ask very little about national affairs. The share of their questions that these outlets devote to the topic is 8 percentage points smaller than the equivalent share for national media targeting the wider public, in both the Northern and Southern EU groups. This finding suggests that general audiences are more interested in national affairs than in abstract and technical areas of the ECB’s activities like unconventional monetary policy.
The sovereign debt crisis (yellow in the chart) also features more in the questions of general audience outlets. This topic is especially prominent in Southern EU outlets.
The “Banking System” topic (dark green in the chart) is also very salient in the South. In fact, outlets in that region devote a share of their questions to this topic that is between 8 and 14 percentage points larger than that devoted by outlets elsewhere. This appetite for banking supervision topics squares with evidence from other research on the matter.[4] Why might this be? While this is beyond the scope of our analysis, the banking crises of recent decades and the subsequent reforms in Europe’s south may be an important clue.
Coverage of the “Governance” and “Communications” topics, meanwhile, does not change much across different media spheres.
What about differences between general and specialised audience outlets? They are especially important in the Southern EU group. Specialised outlets in the South tend to be quite similar to international outlets. In the Northern EU group, however, the most sizeable difference is in the “Inflation and economic outlook” topic (light blue). The share of their questions that specialised outlets devote to this topic is 8 percentage points larger than the share devoted to it by general outlets.
So what?
When they have the chance, journalists don’t just ask the ECB about its monetary policy. They often stray into topics well beyond what is usually considered the main role of a central bank. What exactly they focus on depends on their geographical scope and the type of audience they cater to.
Outlets targeting the wider public want to focus on more domestic, political and vivid issues that attract the public’s interest. So the ECB faces a trade-off. By granting questions to these outlets, it can broaden the discussion and speak on topics close to citizens’ hearts. The risk, on the other hand, is being confronted with sensitive issues lying beyond the scope of its mandate.
 
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
 
Footnotes:

For further info see also Blinder, A., et al. (2008), “Central bank communication and monetary policy: A survey of theory and evidence“, Working Paper Series, No 898, ECB or Assenmacher, K., et al. (2021), “Clear, consistent and engaging: ECB monetary policy communication in a changing world“, Occasional Paper Series, No 274, ECB.
According to the latest Knowledge and Attitudes survey, whose fieldwork took place in Autumn 2022, 75% of respondents in the euro area have heard about the ECB on television, 45% via printed press, 40% via online press, 37% on radio, and 29% via at least one social media platform.
Italian proverb referring to how different countries have different customs, broadly equivalent to “when in Rome, do as the Romans do”.
See for instance, ECB communication with the wider public.

 
Compliments of the ECB.The post ECB | A European view on central banking and the economy first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.