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EU Digital COVID Certificate: EU Commission adopts binding acceptance period of nine months for vaccination certificates

Today, the Commission adopted rules relating to the EU Digital COVID Certificate, establishing a binding acceptance period of 9 months (precisely 270 days) of vaccination certificates for the purposes of intra-EU travel. A clear and uniform acceptance period for vaccination certificates will guarantee that travel measures continue to be coordinated, as called for by the European Council following its latest meeting of 16 December 2021. The new rules will ensure restrictions are based on the best available scientific evidence as well as objective criteria. Continued coordination is essential for the functioning of the Single Market and it will provide clarity for EU citizens in the exercise of their right to free movement.
The EU Digital COVID Certificate is a success story of the EU. The Certificate continues to facilitate safe travel for citizens across the European Union during these times of the pandemic. So far, 807 million certificates were issued in the EU. The EU Digital COVID Certificate has set a global standard: by now 60 countries and territories across five continents have joined the system.
The new rules for intra-EU travel harmonise the different rules across Member States. This validity period takes into account the guidance of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, according to which booster doses are recommended at the latest six months after the completion of the first vaccination cycle. The Certificate will remain valid for a grace period of an additional three months beyond those six months to ensure that national vaccination campaigns can adjust and citizens will have access to booster doses.
The new rules on the acceptance period of vaccination certificates apply for the purposes of travel. When introducing different rules to use the certificates at national level, Member States are encouraged to align them to these new rules to provide certainty for travellers and reduce disruptions.
In addition, today the Commission has also adapted the rules for the encoding of vaccination certificates. This is necessary to ensure that vaccination certificates showing completion of the primary series can always be distinguished from vaccination certificates issued following a booster dose.
Boosters will be recorded as follows:

3/3 for a booster dose following a primary 2-dose vaccination series.

2/1 for a booster dose following a single-dose vaccination or a one dose of a 2-dose vaccine administered to a recovered person.

Members of the College said:
Stella Kyriakides, Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, said: “A harmonised validity period for EU Digital COVID Certificate is a necessity for safe free movement and EU level coordination. The strength and success of this invaluable tool for citizens and business lies in its coherent use across the EU. What is needed now is to ensure that booster campaigns proceed as quickly as possible, that as many citizens are protected by an additional dose and that our certificates remain a key tool for travel and protection of public health.” 
Didier Reynders, Commissioner for Justice, said: “The EU Digital COVID Certificate is a success story. We should keep it that way and adjust to changing circumstances and new knowledge. Unilateral measures in the Member States would bring us back to the fragmentation and uncertainties we have seen last spring. The acceptance period of nine months for vaccination certificates will give citizens and businesses the certainty they need when planning their travels with confidence. It’s now up to the Member States to ensure boosters will be rolled out swiftly to protect our health and ensure safe travelling.”
Commissioner for Internal Market, Thierry Breton, said: “The EU Digital COVID certificate has become a global standard. By reflecting the latest scientific insights on boosters, the certificate remains an essential tool to combat the different waves of the pandemic. Together with the large-scale production and supply of vaccines, the certificate will help Member States accelerate the roll-out of boosters – a necessity to protect public health, while preserving the free movement of our citizens.”
Background
To facilitate safe free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Parliament and the Council adopted, on 14 June 2021, the Regulation on the EU Digital COVID Certificate. When this Regulation was adopted, reliable data about how long people would be protected after the primary series of a COVID-19 vaccine was not yet available. As a result, the data fields to be included in vaccination certificates do not include data concerning an acceptance period, unlike the data fields included in certificates of recovery. Up until now, it was, therefore, up to Member States to set rules on how long to accept vaccination certificates in the context of travel.
As COVID-19 vaccine booster doses are now being rolled out, recently more and more Member States have adopted rules as to how long vaccination certificates indicating the completion of the primary vaccination series should be accepted. These take into account that vaccine-induced protection from infection with COVID-19 appears to be waning over time. These rules either apply to domestic use-cases only or also to the use of vaccination certificates for the purpose of travel.
The Delegated Act is consistent with the approach adopted by the Commission in its proposal for a new Council Recommendation on a coordinated approach to facilitate safe free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, from 25 November 2021. Vaccination certificates will be accepted by Member States for a period of nine months since the administration of the last dose of the primary vaccination. For a single-dose vaccine, this means 270 days from the first and only shot. For a two-dose vaccine it means 270 days from the second shot, or, in line with the vaccination strategy of the Member State of vaccination, the first and only shot after having recovered from the virus. Under these new EU rules for intra-EU travel, Member States must accept any vaccination certificate that has been issued less than nine months since the administration of the last dose of the primary vaccination. Member States are not able to provide for a shorter nor for a longer acceptance period.
Member States should immediately take all necessary steps to ensure access to vaccination for those population groups whose previously issued vaccination certificates approach the limit of the standard acceptance period. As of yet, no standard acceptance period will apply to certificates issued following the administration of booster doses, given that sufficient data regarding the period of protection is not yet available.
The acceptance period will not be encoded in the certificate itself. Instead, the mobile applications used to verify the EU Digital COVID Certificates will be adjusted: If the date of vaccination is longer than 270 days ago, the mobile application used for verification will indicate the certificate as expired.
To allow for sufficient time for technical implementation of the acceptance period and for Member States’ booster vaccination campaigns, these new rules should apply from 1 February 2022.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post EU Digital COVID Certificate: EU Commission adopts binding acceptance period of nine months for vaccination certificates first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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The EU Commission proposes the next generation of EU own resources

The EU Commission has today proposed to establish the next generation of own resources for the EU budget by putting forward three new sources of revenue: the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the proposed EU carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to EU Member States under the recent OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”). At cruising speed, in the years 2026-2030, these new sources of revenue are expected to generate on average a total of up to €17 billion annually for the EU budget.
The new own resources proposed today will help to repay the funds raised by the EU to finance the grant component of NextGenerationEU. The new own resources should also finance the Social Climate Fund. The latter is an essential element of the proposed new Emissions Trading System covering buildings and road transport, and will contribute to ensuring that the transition to a decarbonised economy will leave no one behind.
Johannes Hahn, Commissioner in charge of Budget and Administration, said: “With today’s package, we lay the foundations for the repayment of NextGenerationEU and provide essential support to the Fit for 55 package by putting in place the financing of the Social Climate Fund. With the set of new own resources, we, therefore, ensure that the next generation will truly benefit from NextGenerationEU.”
Today’s proposal builds on the Commission’s commitment undertaken as part of the political agreement on the 2021-2027 long-term budget and the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument. Once adopted, this package will strengthen the reform of the revenue system started in 2020 with the inclusion of the non-recycled plastic waste-based own resources.
EU emissions trading
The Fit for 55 package of July 2021 aims to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in the EU by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990, to stay on track to reach climate neutrality by 2050. This package includes a revision of the EU Emissions Trading System. In future, emissions trading will also apply to the maritime sector, auctioning of aviation allowances will increase, and a new system for buildings and road transport will be established.
Under the current EU Emissions Trading System, most revenues from the auctioning of emission allowances are transferred to national budgets. Today, the Commission proposes that in future, 25% of the revenue from EU emissions trading flows into the EU budget. At cruising speed, revenues for the EU budget are estimated at around €12 billion per year on average over 2026-2030 (€9 billion on average between 2023-2030).
In addition to the repayment of NextGenerationEU funds, these new revenues would finance the Social Climate Fund, put forward by the Commission in July 2021. This Fund will ensure a socially fair transition and support vulnerable households, transport users and micro-enterprises to finance investments in energy efficiency, new heating and cooling systems and cleaner mobility, as well as, when appropriate, temporary direct income support. The total financial envelope of the Fund in principle corresponds to an amount equivalent to around 25% of the expected revenue from the new emissions trading system for buildings and road transport.
Carbon border adjustment mechanism
The objective of the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which the Commission also proposed in July 2021, is to reduce the risk of carbon leakage by encouraging producers in non-EU countries to green their production processes. It will put a carbon price on imports, corresponding to what would have been paid, had the goods been produced in the EU. This mechanism will apply to a targeted selection of sectors and is fully consistent with WTO rules.
The Commission proposes to allocate to the EU budget 75% of the revenues generated by this carbon border adjustment mechanism. Revenues for the EU budget are estimated at around €1 billion per year on average over 2026-2030 (€0.5 billion on average between 2023-2030). CBAM is not expected to generate revenue in the transitional period from 2023 to 2025.
Reform of the international corporate taxation framework
On 8 October 2021, more than 130 countries that are members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting agreed on a reform of the international tax framework: a two-pillar solution to tackle tax avoidance and aims at ensuring that profits are taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. The signatory countries representing more than 90% of global GDP. Pillar One of this agreement will reallocate the right to tax a share of so-called residual profits from the world’s largest multinational enterprises to participating countries worldwide. The Commission proposes an own resource equivalent to 15% of the share of the residual profits of in-scope companies that are reallocated to EU Member States.
The Commission has committed to propose a Directive in 2022, once the details of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework agreement on Pillar One are finalised, implementing the Pillar One agreement in line with the requirements of the Single Market. This process is complementary to the Pillar Two Directive for which the Commission adopted a separate proposal today. Pending the finalisation of the agreement, revenues for the EU budget could amount to roughly between €2.5 and €4 billion per year.
Legislative process
In order to incorporate these new own resources in the EU budget, the EU needs to amend two key pieces of legislation:
First, the Commission proposes to amend the Own Resources Decision to add the three proposed new resources to the existing ones.
Secondly, the Commission also puts forward a targeted amendment of the regulation on the current long-term EU budget 2021-2027, also known as the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF Regulation). This amendment offers the legal possibility to start repaying the borrowing for NextGenerationEU already during the current MFF. At the same time, it proposes to increase the relevant MFF expenditure ceilings for the years 2025-2027 to accommodate the additional expenditure for the Social Climate Fund.
The Own Resources Decision needs to be approved unanimously in Council after consulting the European Parliament. The decision can enter into force once it is approved by all EU countries in line with their constitutional requirements. The MFF Regulation needs to be adopted unanimously by the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
Next Steps
The European Commission will now work hand in hand with the European Parliament and the Council towards swift implementation of the package within the timelines set in the interinstitutional agreement.
Furthermore, the Commission will present a proposal for a second basket of new own resources by the end of 2023. This second package will build on the ‘Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation (BEFIT)’ proposal foreseen for 2023.
Background
As an answer to the unprecedented pandemic challenge, the European Union agreed in 2020 on a record stimulus package of more than €2 trillion – boosting the long-term budget with more than €800 billion firepower of the temporary recovery instrument NextGenerationEU (in current prices).
With NextGenerationEU, the Commission has been enabled to issue bonds on a large scale backed by the EU budget. That means the Union can incur debt supporting all Member States to fight the crisis and build resilience. To help repay the borrowing, the EU institutions agreed to introduce new own resources as this would allow more diversified and resilient types of revenue, directly related to our common political priorities. New own resources will avoid that NextGenerationEU repayments lead to undue cuts to EU programmes or excessive increases in Member States contributions.
In 2021, the Commission has raised €71 billion (in current prices) via long-term bonds and currently has €20 billion of short-term EU-Bills outstanding under a sovereign-style diversified funding strategy.
[All prices are quoted in 2018 prices unless stated otherwise.]
Compliments of the European Commission.
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2021 in review: A year of transitions

Looking back, I would define 2021 as a year of transitions. Geopolitical changes have intensified with power politics repeatedly challenging the EU and its values. We must respond with all the determination we can muster.
The pandemic has carried on longer than we imagined a year ago and the omicron variant is yet again requiring the introduction of major restrictions and threatening the recovery. Still, we know that vaccines are making a major difference. Thanks to the common purchase mechanism, a majority of Europeans have received at least two doses. The EU has also exported COVID-19 vaccines since December 2020 without interruption. Out of a total of 2 billion doses produced, the EU has exported over 1.1 billion doses to 61 countries and Team Europe has shared more than 385 million doses. The EU has therefore surpassed its target for 2021, which was to share 250 million doses by the end of the year, and the aim of Team Europe is to have donated a total of 700 million doses by mid-2022.
“We need to do more to reverse vaccination disparities and tackle growing imbalances and inequalities.”  
Still, unequal vaccination rates across continents underline the need to accelerate donations and develop local vaccine production capacities, especially in Africa. Indeed, while in Europe 60% of the population is fully vaccinated (EU: 68%), full vaccination rates stand at 61% in South America, 56% in North/Central America and the Caribbean, 57% in Oceania, 53% in Asia and only 8% in Africa. On top of these disparities, the pandemic has put a stop to the developing world catching up, leading to an increase in world hunger and poverty, with the number of people falling below poverty line due to COVID estimated at around 150 million by the World Bank. We need to do more to reverse this trend and tackle growing imbalances and inequalities.
In addition to handling the pandemic, we have tended to run from one crisis to the next, with Belarus, Ukraine, Mali, Sudan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Venezuela dominating the international and EU agenda. Being in permanent crisis management mode has sometimes weakened our capacity to address transversal, longer-term issues that should be at the centre of our foreign policy, such as revitalising multilateralism, or handling migration in a balanced way, or the energy and climate crises or the rules for the digital transition.
“Being in permanent crisis management mode has sometimes weakened our capacity to address transversal, longer-term issues.”
While in 2021 there were many setbacks and challenges, we also had some positive developments. For example, we were able to present the Strategic Compass to the EU member states. Its purpose is to strengthen the EU’s role as a security provider. Until now, Europeans have too often lived in a ‘security bubble’, despite a fast-worsening security environment. The EU does not aim to be a military power in traditional terms, but we do need to be better able to defend ourselves. The Compass should be adopted next March and allow us to take our own security and defence more seriously.
Another positive example is how EU climate diplomacy played a leading role in the fight against climate change at COP26 in Glasgow. Negotiating with 197 parties implies compromises and the EU played its part, for instance, with the Methane Pledge which it initiated and 100 countries eventually signed.
“The Strategic Compass should allow us to take our own security and defence more seriously.”
2021 also saw the relaunch of EU-US relations under President Biden. The new direction of the US administration enabled us to make progress, for example on climate change, on the Iran nuclear negotiations and on corporate taxation. While the way in which the departure from Afghanistan and AUKUS decision unfolded was unfortunate, at the end of the year we held close EU-US consultations on China and the Indo-Pacific and also agreed to launch a dedicated EU-US dialogue on security and defence.
This year we increased our engagement with Latin America, including inter alia the first high-level EU visit to Brazil in nine years and the inauguration of the EllaLink fibre optic submarine cable between the EU and Brazil. The EU-Latin American and Caribbean Leaders’ meeting of early December should also trigger new developments in the coming months.
On China we maintained EU unity, recognising that the EU sees the country as a partner, competitor and systemic rival, all at the same time. In 2021, the worsening of the human rights situation inside China, its regional behaviour, as well as the decision to sanction MEPs and other EU official bodies and most recently its coercion of Lithuania have all taken their toll.
Overall, we have put the emphasis on diversifying our partnerships across the Indo-Pacific. Our new Indo-Pacific strategy(link is external) promotes EU’s engagement in the region to not only boost trade and investment, but also to cooperate more on security issues, for example maritime or cyber security. My visit to Jakarta in June consolidated our engagement with ASEAN. We have also engaged more closely with Central Asia and started to improve our cooperation with the Gulf countries.
In Africa, the year was unfortunately marked by many conflicts and the overall deterioration of the situation in the Sahel. The civil war in Ethiopia in particular took on a dramatic dimension. We are now preparing the AU-EU summit to be held in February where, as the EU, we will have to deliver on our rhetoric, notably on vaccines and climate finance.
The situation in Libya seems to have stabilised, with elections having been postponed again, and tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean have tended to ease this year. The recently held Regional Forum of the Union for the Mediterranean and the EU-Southern Neighbourhood Ministerial Meeting in Barcelona at the end of November were also reminders of the urgent need to close the growing gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean and seize new opportunities for example around the green transition.
“In 2021, we have worked to defend EU interests and values and strengthen a rules-based global order in this year of transitions.”
In our eastern neighbourhood, 2021 featured clear examples of power politics, as we saw in the cases of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. To face these threats, the EU has provided political as well as operational support to its partners in a firm and unified manner, for example with the 5th package of sanctions against the Lukaschenko regime in Belarus. As hybrid conflicts proliferate, we must continue to back Ukraine or Moldavia in resisting the pressure from Russia, and maintain an unyielding approach to Belarus. On that regard, The Eastern Partnership Summit reaffirmed EU’s strategic, ambitious and forward-looking approach with our Eastern European partners. The rise in divisive rhetoric and actions across the Western Balkans especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina have also hampered efforts to bring the six countries closer to their European future.
This brief overview of the past year is by no means exhaustive, but I wanted to recall some of the most salient issues. In 2021, we have worked to defend EU interests and values and strengthen a rules-based global order in this year of transitions. That work must continue in 2022 with all the determination we can muster.
Author:

Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission

Compliments of the European Commission.
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EU Commission presents guide for a fair transition towards climate neutrality

Today, the EU Commission issues policy guidance for a fair and inclusive transition towards climate neutrality to complement the package on delivering the Green Deal presented in July. The proposed Council Recommendation sets out specific guidance to help Member States devise and implement policy packages that ensure a fair transition towards climate neutrality, by addressing the relevant employment and social aspects linked to the transition in a comprehensive manner. The proposal pays particular attention to addressing the needs of the people and households that are highly dependent on fossil fuels and could be most affected by the green transition, and invites Member States to make optimal use of public and private funding and work in close cooperation with social partners.
Fairness and solidarity are defining principles of the European Green Deal. Policy actions to support people and their active participation are key for a successful green transition. With the right actions and policies in place, the green transition has the potential to create an additional 1 million jobs by 2030 in the EU and some 2 million jobs by 2050. At the same time, it is important to ensure that no one is left behind, and that the EU and its Member States continue to improve their capacities to anticipate change and to provide targeted support to the regions, industries, workers and households facing future challenges.
Putting people at the heart of the green transition
To fully realise the employment and social potential of the green transition, it is essential to use all available tools and put the right policies in place at EU, national, regional and local levels. Today’s proposal encourages Member States to take measures and actions, adapted to their particular circumstances, including:

Measures to support quality employment and facilitate job-to-job transitions. This includes for instance offering tailored job search assistance and promoting job creation, and facilitating access to finance and markets for micro, small and medium-sized businesses, in particular those contributing to climate and environmental objectives.

Measures to support equal access to quality education and training. This concerns for example developing up-to-date intelligence on skills needs in the labour market, providing high-quality and inclusive education and training on skills and competences relevant for the green transition, and increasing adult participation in lifelong learning.

Measures to support fair tax-benefit and social protection systems. The proposal invites Member States to assess and, where necessary, adapt these systems, for instance by further shifting the tax burden away from labour towards other sources contributing to climate and environmental objectives.

Measures to support affordable access to essential services. Member States are invited to continue to mobilise public and private financial support to invest into renewable energy, tackle mobility challenges and promote cost-saving opportunities linked to the circular economy.

Measures to coordinate policy action, follow a whole-of-economy approach, and actively involve social partners, civil society, regional and local authorities and other stakeholders. Measures to further strengthen the evidence base and advance the consistency of definitions and methodologies are also important to improve the targeting of social and labour market policies.

Optimal use of public and private funding. Member States have a wide range of EU and other funding at their disposal to implement the necessary measures for a fair transition to climate neutrality. The proposed Social Climate Fund of €72.2 billion in particular will support vulnerable households, transport users and micro-enterprises affected by the introduction of emissions trading for fuels used in road transport and buildings. It will be funded by the revenues of the emission trading. Other available EU funding under NextGenerationEU includes the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM) and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the EU’s main instrument for investing in people with a budget of €99.3 billion in 2021-2027. A significant share of reforms and investments in Member States’ Recovery and Resilience Plans financed by the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will be directed to social policies, with specific support for the fair green transition by for example promoting the creation of green jobs and the development of green skills.

Members of the College said
Frans Timmermans, Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal said: “With the Green Deal we will create a modern, sustainable economy with jobs that last for decades to come. Europe’s transition to climate neutrality will not be easy and we need to have policies across the economy that bring everyone along. Today we complement our proposals on the Social Climate Fund, the Just Transition Mechanism and others with additional policy guidance to make sure we leave no one behind on our path to a healthy, green, and fair future.”
Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice-President for an Economy that Works for People, said: “To protect our planet and future generations, we must build a sustainable economy that works for everyone. The green transition has significant economic and job creation potential. It is essential that we make the most of the opportunities offered by the green transition, while making sure it is fair and inclusive so that no one is left behind. For this, we must invest in skills, quality jobs and affordable services.”
Nicolas Schmit, Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights, said: “The Green Deal is an economic and climate imperative, and we all have to collectively ensure its success. But we do not underestimate the social and employment impact of the green transition. Social fairness must be at its heart, reflecting the values of the European social market economy. This policy guidance provides detailed, tangible ways for Member States, regions and local communities to protect the people who are at risk of poverty and social exclusion, as well as to enable people to make the most of the opportunities that the climate transition offers.”
Background
The European Green Deal, launched in 2019, sets out the EU strategy to become the first climate-neutral continent and transform the Union into a sustainable, fairer and more prosperous society that respects the planetary boundaries. The need for a fair transition is an integral part of the Green Deal which underlined that no person and no place should be left behind.
This is in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement, the European Council’s Strategic Agenda 2019-24 and the European Climate Law in force since July 2021. The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan complements and supports the green and digital transitions in line with a strong social Europe, notably through three EU headline targets in the areas of employment, skills, and social inclusion, endorsed by EU leaders in May and June 2021.
In July 2021, the Commission adopted the ‘Fit for 55′ package to deliver on the EU’s binding 2030 climate target of reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% on the path to climate neutrality by 2050. This included the Social Climate Fund which aims to mobilise €72.2 billion to address the impacts of emissions trading in road transport and buildings on vulnerable households, micro-enterprises and transport users, to be funded by the revenues of the new emissions trading system. As part of the ‘Fit for 55′ package, the Commission announced a proposal for a Council Recommendation by the end of 2021 to provide further guidance to Member States on how to best address the social and labour aspects of the green transition.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post EU Commission presents guide for a fair transition towards climate neutrality first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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IMF | The World’s Top Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment

A Japanese automobile manufacturer builds an assembly plant in Mexico. An Italian software company opens a sales office in Kenya to reach the Kenyan market with their services. A large Australian mining company acquires a smaller Angolan one for diversification.
All are examples of foreign direct investment where a business decision is made to somehow take a stake or interest in a company by an investor located outside its borders.
According to the latest results of our Coordinated Direct Investment Survey , and as shown in our Chart of the Week, the world’s top ten recipients of foreign direct investment by end-2020 were the United States, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, China, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Switzerland, Ireland, and Germany. Total reported foreign direct investment positions increased by $2.2 trillion—or six percent—from 2019 to 2020 (among economies that reported data for both 2019 and 2020).
Despite the uncertainties created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the increase in foreign direct investment positions is largely in line with the average annual increase over the past five years. Foreign direct investment in the reporting economy is also called inward direct investment.
The surge from 2019 to 2020 was led by increases in Europe and Asia Pacific. In Europe, the United Kingdom and Germany topped the list, accounting for 18 percent and 15 percent, respectively. In Asia Pacific, the increase was mainly driven by China. In fact, China showed the largest reported increase in both inward and outward direct investment worldwide. At the same time, foreign direct investment positions in Africa decreased slightly from 2019, mostly driven by lower positions in Nigeria.
The United States took the leadership position as the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in 2019 and consolidated that position in 2020, mainly driven by higher direct investments from Japan, Germany, and the Netherlands. Together, these three economies accounted for most of the increase in foreign direct investment in the United States over the last three years.
Low-tax jurisdictions such as the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and Ireland remained among the top direct investors and investee economies. They continued to be attractive destinations for different types of investments, including those channeled through special purpose entities (subsidiaries created by parent companies in countries of convenience). Information on cross-border flows of special purpose entities will be made available in early 2022 through the IMF’s inaugural data collection initiative for special purpose entities.
The Coordinated Direct Investment Survey is the only worldwide survey of foreign direct investment positions, conducted annually by the IMF. The database presents detailed data on bilateral direct investment relations among economies. It aims to provide a geographic distribution of inward and outward direct investments worldwide, contribute to a better understanding of the extent of globalization, and support the analysis of cross-border linkages and spillovers in an increasingly interconnected world.
Compliments of the IMF.
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New transport proposals target greater efficiency and more sustainable travel

To support the transition to cleaner, greener, and smarter mobility, in line with the objectives of the European Green Deal, the Commission today adopted four proposals that will modernise the EU’s transport system. By increasing connectivity and shifting more passengers and freight to rail and inland waterways, by supporting the roll-out of charging points, alternative refuelling infrastructure, and new digital technologies, by placing a stronger focus on sustainable urban mobility, and by making it easier to choose different transport options in an efficient multimodal transport system, the proposals will put the transport sector on track to cutting its emissions by 90%.
Executive Vice President for the European Green Deal, Frans Timmermans, said: “Europe’s green and digital transition will bring big changes to the ways we move around. Today’s proposals set European mobility on track for a sustainable future: faster European rail connections with easy-to-find tickets and improved passenger rights support for cities to increase and improve public transport and infrastructure for walking and cycling, and making the best possible use of solutions for smart and efficient driving.”
Transport Commissioner, Adina Vălean, said: “Today we are proposing higher standards along the TEN-T network, boosting high speed rail and embedding multimodality, and a new north-south Corridor in Eastern Europe. With our Intelligent Transport Systems Directive we are embracing digital technologies and data-sharing. We want to make travel in the EU more efficient – and safer – for drivers, passengers and businesses alike. The cities linked by EU infrastructure are our economic powerhouses, but they must also be lean cities – for inhabitants and commuters. That is why we are recommending a dedicated framework for sustainable urban mobility – to guide the faster transition to safe, accessible, inclusive, smart and zero-emission urban mobility.”
A smart and sustainable TEN-T
The TEN-T is an EU-wide network of rail, inland waterways, short-sea shipping routes, and roads. It connects 424 major cities with ports, airports and railway terminals. When the TEN-T is complete, it will cut travel times between these cities. For example, passengers will be able to travel between Copenhagen and Hamburg in 2.5 hours by train, instead of the 4.5 hours required today.
To address the missing links and modernise the entire network, today’s proposal:

Requires that the major TEN-T passenger rail lines allow trains to travel at 160 km/h or faster by 2040 thus creating competitive high-speed railway connections throughout the Union. Canals and rivers must ensure good navigation conditions, unhindered for example by water levels, for a minimum number of days per year.
Calls for more transhipment terminals, improved handling capacity at freight terminals, reduced waiting times at rail border crossings, longer trains to shift more freight onto cleaner transport modes, and the option for lorries to be transported by train network-wide. To ensure infrastructure planning meets real operational needs, it also creates nine ‘European Transport Corridors’ that integrate rail, road, and waterways.
Introduces a new intermediary deadline of 2040 to advance the completion of major parts of the network ahead of the 2050 deadline that applies to the wider, comprehensive network. So new high-speed rail connections between Porto and Vigo, and Budapest and Bucharest – among others – must be completed for 2040.
Requires all 424 major cities along the TEN-T network to develop Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans to promote zero-emission mobility and to increase and improve public transport and infrastructure for walking and cycling.

Increasing long-distance and cross-border rail traffic
Rail remains one of the safest and cleanest transport modes and is therefore at the heart of our policy to make EU mobility more sustainable. Today’s TEN-T proposal is accompanied by an Action Plan on long-distance and cross-border rail that lays out a roadmap with further actions to help the EU meet its target of doubling high-speed rail traffic by 2030, and tripling it by 2050.
Although the number of people travelling by train has increased in recent years, only 7% of rail kilometres travelled between 2001 and 2018 involved cross-border trips. To encourage more people to consider the train for trips abroad, the Action Plan sets out concrete actions to remove barriers to cross-border and long-distance travel, and make rail travel more attractive for passengers. The actions include:

a multimodal legislative proposal in 2022 to boost user-friendly multimodal ticketing;
allowing passengers to find the best tickets at the most attractive price and better supporting passengers faced with disruption, and a commitment to investigating an EU-wide VAT exemption for train tickets;
the repeal of redundant national technical and operational rules;
an announcement of proposals for 2022 on timetabling and capacity management, which will boost quicker and more frequent cross-border rail services;
guidelines for track access pricing in 2023 that will ease rail operators’ access to infrastructure, increasing competition and allowing for more attractive ticket prices for passengers.

By 2030, the Commission will support the launch of at least 15 cross-border pilot to test the Action Plan’s approach, ahead of the entry into force of the new TEN-T requirements.
Intelligent transport services for drivers
Smart mobility makes our mobility more sustainable. The Commission is therefore proposing to update the 2010 ITS Directive, adapting to the emergence of new road mobility options, mobility apps and connected and automated mobility. Our proposal will stimulate the faster deployment of new, intelligent services, by proposing that certain crucial road, travel and traffic data is made available in digital format, such as speed limits, traffic circulation plans or roadworks, along the TEN-T network and ultimately covering the entire road network. It will also ensure that essential safety-related services are made available for drivers along the TEN-T network.
Today’s proposal will update the Directive in line with new priorities on better multimodal and digital services.
Cleaner, greener, easier urban mobility
The new Urban Mobility Framework will benefit transport users and all the people around them. Cities are home to millions of people. Today’s proposal addresses some of the mobility challenges stemming from this intense economic activity – congestion, emissions, noise. The Urban Mobility Framework sets out European guidance on how cities can cut emissions and improve mobility, including via Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans. The main focus will be on public transport, walking and cycling. The proposal also prioritises zero-emission solutions for urban fleets, including taxis and ride-hailing services, the last mile of urban deliveries, and the construction and modernisation of multimodal hubs, as well as new digital solutions and services. Today’s proposal maps out the funding options for local and regional authorities to implement these priorities. In 2022, the Commission will propose a Recommendation to EU Member States for the development of national plans to assist cities in developing their mobility plans.
Background
This is the second package of proposals to support a transition to cleaner, greener transport following the publication of the Commission’s Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy in December 2020. The Strategy is a roadmap, guiding the sector towards the objectives of the European Green Deal.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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IMF | Global Debt Reaches a Record $226 Trillion

Policymakers must strike the right balance in the face of high debt and rising inflation.
In 2020, we observed the largest one-year debt surge since World War II, with global debt rising to $226 trillion as the world was hit by a global health crisis and a deep recession. Debt was already elevated going into the crisis, but now governments must navigate a world of record-high public and private debt levels, new virus mutations, and rising inflation.
Global debt rose by 28 percentage points to 256 percent of GDP, in 2020, according to the latest update of the IMF’s Global Debt Database.
Borrowing by governments accounted for slightly more than half of the increase, as the global public debt ratio jumped to a record 99 percent of GDP. Private debt from non-financial corporations and households also reached new highs.

‘The debt surge amplifies vulnerabilities, especially as financing conditions tighten.’

Debt increases are particularly striking in advanced economies, where public debt rose from around 70 percent of GDP, in 2007, to 124 percent of GDP, in 2020. Private debt, on the other hand, rose at a more moderate pace from 164 to 178 percent of GDP, in the same period.
Public debt now accounts for almost 40 percent of total global debt, the highest share since the mid-1960s. The accumulation of public debt since 2007 is largely attributable to the two major economic crises governments have faced—first the global financial crisis, and then the COVID-19 pandemic.
The great financing divide
Debt dynamics, however, differ markedly across countries. Advanced economies and China accounted for more than 90 percent of the $28 trillion debt surge in 2020. These countries were able to expand public and private debt during the pandemic, thanks to low interest rates, the actions of central banks (including large purchases of government debt), and well-developed financial markets. But most developing economies are on the opposite side of the financing divide, facing limited access to funding and often higher borrowing rates.
Looking at overall trends, we see two distinct developments.
In advanced economies, fiscal deficits soared as countries saw revenues collapse due to the recession and put in place sweeping fiscal measures as COVID-19 spread. Public debt rose 19 percentage points of GDP, in 2020, an increase like that seen during the global financial crisis, over two years: 2008 and 2009. Private debt, however, jumped by 14 percentage points of GDP in 2020, almost twice as much as during the global financial crisis, reflecting the different nature of the two crises. During the pandemic, governments and central banks supported further borrowing by the private sector to help protect lives and livelihoods. Whereas during the global financial crisis, the challenge was to contain the damage from excessively leveraged private sector.
Emerging markets and low-income developing countries faced much tighter financing constraints, but with large disparities across countries. China alone accounted for 26 percent of the global debt surge. Emerging markets (excluding China) and low-income countries accounted for small shares of the rise in global debt, around $1–$1.2 trillion each, mainly due to higher public debt.
Nevertheless, both emerging markets and low-income countries are also facing elevated debt ratios driven by the large fall in nominal GDP in 2020. Public debt in emerging markets reached record highs, while in low-income countries it rose to levels not seen since the early 2000s, when many were benefiting from debt relief initiatives.
Difficult balancing act
The large increase in debt was justified by the need to protect people’s lives, preserve jobs, and avoid a wave of bankruptcies. If governments had not taken action, the social and economic consequences would have been devastating.
But the debt surge amplifies vulnerabilities, especially as financing conditions tighten. High debt levels constrain, in most cases, the ability of governments to support the recovery and the capacity of the private sector to invest in the medium term.
A crucial challenge is to strike the right mix of fiscal and monetary policies in an environment of high debt and rising inflation. Fiscal and monetary policies fortunately complemented each other during the worst of the pandemic. Central bank actions, especially in advanced economies, pushed interest rates down to their limit and made it easier for governments to borrow.
Monetary policy is now appropriately shifting focus to rising inflation and inflation expectations. While an increase in inflation, and nominal GDP, helps reduce debt ratios in some cases, this is unlikely to sustain a significant decline in debt. As central banks raise interest rates to prevent persistently high inflation, borrowing costs rise. In many emerging markets, policy rates have already increased and further rises are expected. Central banks are also planning to reduce their large purchases of government debt and other assets in advanced economies—but how this reduction is carried out will have implications for the economic recovery and fiscal policy.
As interest rates rise, fiscal policy will need to adjust, especially in countries with higher debt vulnerabilities. As history shows, fiscal support will become less effective when interest rates respond—that is, higher spending (or lower taxes) will have less impact on economic activity and employment and could fuel inflation pressures. Debt sustainability concerns are likely to intensify.
The risks will be magnified if global interest rates rise faster than expected and growth falters. A significant tightening of financial conditions would heighten the pressure on the most highly indebted governments, households, and firms. If the public and private sectors are forced to deleverage simultaneously, growth prospects will suffer.
The uncertain outlook and heightened vulnerabilities make it critical to achieve the right balance between policy flexibility, nimble adjustment to changing circumstances, and commitment to credible and sustainable medium-term fiscal plans. Such a strategy would both reduce debt vulnerabilities and facilitate the work of central banks to contain inflation.
Targeted fiscal support will play a crucial role to protect the vulnerable (see the October 2021 Fiscal Monitor).
Some countries—especially those with high gross financing needs (rollover risks) or exposure to exchange rate volatility—may need to adjust faster to preserve market confidence and prevent more disruptive fiscal distress. The pandemic and the global financing divide demand strong, effective international cooperation and support to developing countries.
Authors:

Vitor Gaspar, a Portuguese national, is Director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department

Paulo Medas is Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and oversees the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor

Roberto Perrelli is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Policy and Surveillance Division, Fiscal Affairs Department, where he also works on the IMF Fiscal Monitor

Virat Singh, Andrew Womer, and Yuan Xiang provided valuable research assistance updating the Global Debt Database.

Compliments of the IMF.
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IMF | Making Electronic Money Safer in the Digital Age

As e-money use grows, regulators need to focus on consumer protection and the integrity of the overall payments system.
Imagine you go to pay for your morning coffee and your stored-value card returns an error message, or the wallet in the payments app on your phone isn’t opening because the company providing the payment service has gone bankrupt. Worse, what if you live in a rural area and the e-money service provided through your mobile phone was the only access you have to the financial system? Or your government now relies on the e-money system to transfer benefits or collect taxes on a large scale?

‘With the growing importance of e-money issuers, a comprehensive, robust framework for regulation and safeguarding customer funds is critical.’

Digital forms of money—including central bank digital currencies, privately issued stable coins, and e-money—continue to evolve and find new ways to become more integral in people’s day-to-day lives. In essence e-money is a digital representation of fiat currency guaranteed by its issuer. Customers exchange regular money into e-money, which they can use to make payments through an app on their cellphone to individuals and businesses alike with ease and immediate effect. Compared to other recently developed forms of digital money, such as stablecoins, e-money has been around for some time and its customer base continues to rapidly increase. Unlike most privately issued stablecoins, e-money operates in a regulated framework.
For regulators and supervisors charged with protecting consumers and ensuring a level playing field for all financial intermediaries, keeping pace with new developments can be challenging. Regulators and supervisors need to consider how to best protect customers from the failure of (potentially systemic) e-money issuers, including preventing the loss of their funds.
A new IMF staff paper considers these and other scenarios that may put consumers and—potentially—entire e-money systems at risk. We examine how regulatory practices are evolving on a country-by-country basis and put forward a set of policy recommendations on regulating e-money issuers and safeguarding their customers’ funds.
E-money offers payment solutions for the unbanked
We can think of e-money as an electronic store of monetary value on a prepaid card or an electronic device, often a mobile phone, that may be widely used for making payments. The stored value also represents an enforceable claim against the e-money issuer, by which its customers can demand at any time to be repaid the funds they used to purchase e-money.
E-money is already a vital part of daily life for billions of people, especially in many developing countries, where many lack access to the banking system. As shown in the chart below, a high percentage of the population across a number of East African countries now use e-money, making it important from a macro-financial perspective. It is estimated, for instance, that two-thirds of the combined adult population of Kenya (where M-PESA has reached a high degree of market penetration), Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda use e‑money regularly. Many of these people do not have bank accounts or other access to the formal financial system, so they store significant shares of their disposable funds in e‑money wallets and access them using mobile phones or computers.
Protecting financial systems and consumers alike
With the growing importance of e-money issuers, a comprehensive, robust framework for regulation and safeguarding customer funds is critical. Issuers should be subject to proportionate prudential regulatory requirements. For example, they should establish operational risk governance and management systems to identify and limit risks. They should also be prohibited from retail lending. And, in order to protect consumers who may be less sophisticated than bank customers, rules should be put in place governing how issuers disclose fees, protect consumer data, and handle complaints.
One of the most important regulatory measures identified in our paper is that in order to protect customers’ money, all e-money issuers need to implement mechanisms to safekeep and segregate those funds. Issuers need to maintain a secure pool of liquid funds that is equivalent to the amounts of customers’ balances, and which is kept separate from the issuer’s own funds. This is a fundamental safeguard against misuse of the funds and should allow, in principle, for recovery of those funds in the event of bankruptcy of an issuer.
Keeping the customers’ funds segregated, however, does not resolve all the problems if a potentially systemic issuer were to fail. In the absence of specific bankruptcy rules, segregation by itself does not ensure that the customers would get quick access to their funds, and this discontinuity may create severe problems if the issuer plays a potentially systemic role in the payments system and in day-to-day transactions of the country.
Potentially systemic, potentially problematic
Regulators and supervisors may need to significantly strengthen prudential oversight and user-protection arrangements, depending on the business model and size of the e-money system. In countries with a potentially systemic e-money issuer or sector, the protection in place should seek to preserve customers’ funds and ensure continuity of critical payment services.
While some countries have sought to extend deposit insurance to e-money, further efforts may be needed to operationalize such protection and ensure that it would work effectively in practice. In particular, customers should not lose access to their funds and, therefore, services should be restorable or replaceable quickly, preferably within hours. But putting e‑money deposit insurance into practice remains untested so far—at least in practical terms. The costs and benefits of extending deposit insurance coverage effectively to e-money should be carefully considered.
As with many issues in the fintech sphere, best practices are still taking shape, making policy decisions challenging. However, the pandemic has only increased the importance of prudent e-money frameworks, as the number of online transactions and e-money’s growth has accelerated. For regulators and supervisors, the time for action is now.
Compliments of the IMF.
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Government support cushions tax revenues in OECD countries from the worst impacts of the COVID-19 crisis

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on tax revenues was less pronounced than during previous crises, in part due to government support measures introduced to support households and businesses, according to new OECD research published today.
The 2021 edition of the OECD’s annual Revenue Statistics publication shows that the OECD average tax-to-GDP ratio has risen slightly to 33.5% in 2020, an increase of 0.1 percentage points since 2019. Although nominal tax revenues fell in most OECD countries, the falls in countries’ GDP were often greater, resulting in a small increase in the average tax-to-GDP ratio.
This year’s edition includes the first comparable analysis on the initial tax revenue impacts of COVID-19 across OECD countries, which suggests that government support measures contributed to the relative stability of tax revenues by protecting employment and reducing corporate bankruptcies to a considerably greater extent than in the global financial crisis in 2008-2009.
The report also finds that many of the tax policy measures implemented to support households and businesses often had a direct revenue cost via reductions in tax liabilities, enhanced tax credits and allowances and reductions in tax rates. The sharp reduction in economic activity in 2020 reduced labour force participation, household consumption and business profits, further affecting tax revenues, although the shock was shorter and more sector-specific than the global financial crisis, contributing to its more muted impact on tax revenues.
The report shows that countries’ tax-to-GDP ratios in 2020 ranged from 17.9% in Mexico to 46.5% in Denmark, with increases seen in 20 countries and decreases in the other 16 for which 2020 data were available. The largest increases in tax-to-GDP ratios in 2020 were seen in Spain (1.9 percentage points), which experienced the largest fall in nominal GDP and a lower fall in nominal tax revenues. Other large increases were seen in Mexico (1.6 p.p.) and Iceland (1.3 p.p.). The largest decreases were seen in Ireland (1.7 p.p.), partially due to lower VAT revenues following a temporary reduction in VAT and decreased economic activity. Other large decreases were seen in Chile (1.6 p.p.) and Norway (1.3 p.p.). In Norway, the fall was due to a sharp decrease in corporate income tax revenues due to temporary changes in the Petroleum Tax Act during the pandemic.

Across the OECD, corporate income tax and excise tax revenues were the most negatively affected by the COVID-19 crisis. Corporate income tax revenues saw the largest average decrease (0.4 p.p. of GDP, with declines in 26 countries); and lower fuel use due to mobility restrictions led to a small but widespread decrease for excise revenues (0.1 p.p. on average with declines in 28 countries).
By contrast, personal income taxes and social security contributions saw an increase in revenues, on average (by 0.3 p.p. in both cases, and in 28 and 29 countries respectively). The fact that revenues from these two taxes held up most likely reflects that governments provided considerable support to maintaining the connection between workers and the labour market in this crisis. No change was seen in property taxes or VAT as a share of GDP, on average.
To access the Revenue Statistics report, data, overview and country notes, go to http://oe.cd/revenue-statistics.
Contacts:

Lawrence Speer in the OECD Media Office | Lawrence.Speer@oecd.org

Pascal Saint-Amans | pascal.saint-amans@oecd.org

David Bradbury in the OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration | David.Bradbury@oecd.org

Compliments of the OECD.
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Competition: EU-US launch Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue to foster cooperation in competition policy and enforcement in technology sector

Today, European Commission Executive Vice-President Margrethe Vestager, US Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust of the US Department of Justice Jonathan Kanter have launched the EU-US Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue in Washington DC.
The European Commission, the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice have issued a joint statement.
Margrethe Vestager, European Commission Executive Vice-President in charge of competition policy, said: “The European Commission and the US competition authorities have a longstanding tradition of cooperation in competition policy and enforcement. Today, with the launch of the EU-US Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue, we reinforce this cooperation with a particular attention to the fast evolving technology sector.”
In June 2021, in parallel to the launch of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the EU and the US have set up a Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue (TCPD) that will focus on developing common approaches and strengthening the cooperation on competition policy and enforcement in the technology sector.
In the joint statement published today, the European Commission, the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice have underlined the shared democratic values and a common belief in the importance of well-functioning and competitive markets, cornerstones for the continued strengthening of the EU-US economic and trade relationship. They have underlined the intention to collaborate to ensure and promote fair competition, on the basis of the common belief that vigorous and effective competition enforcement benefits consumers, businesses, and workers on both sides of the Atlantic.
The European Commission and the US authorities face common challenges in competition enforcement in digital investigations, such as network effects, the role of massive amounts of data, interoperability, and other characteristics typically found in new technology and digital markets. The TCPD aims at sharing insights and experience with an aim towards coordinating as much as possible on policy and enforcement.
Following today’s launch, the TCPD will continue with high-level meetings, as well as regular discussions at technical level.
Background
On 15 June 2021, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and President Joe Biden of the United States launched the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC). The TTC serves as a forum for the United States and European Union to coordinate approaches to key global trade, economic, and technology issues and to deepen transatlantic trade and economic relations based on shared democratic values.
The European Commission, the US Federal Trade Commission, and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice have a longstanding tradition of close cooperation in antitrust enforcement and policy. This cooperation began even before the formal 1991 Agreement between the Commission of the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, subsequently complemented by the 1998 agreement on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws. In 2011, the three agencies reaffirmed their strong commitment to this mutually beneficial cooperative relationship by adopting joint Best Practices on Merger Cooperation.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Competition: EU-US launch Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue to foster cooperation in competition policy and enforcement in technology sector first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.