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IMF | Pandemic Tests Resilience and Credibility of Fiscal Rules

Record debt and deficits during the pandemic prompted many nations to suspend their fiscal rules.
Since 1990, a growing number of countries have adopted fiscal rules to strengthen budgetary discipline and enhance the credibility of public finances. These numerical limits on spending, deficits, or debt signal a government’s commitment to prudence. At the same time, fiscal councils are becoming more common to provide independent oversight and monitor the compliance of rules.
What happens when a country must respond to a large shock such as the pandemic? Governments must strike the right balance between the imperative of emergency support and the credibility of the rules-based fiscal framework.
Our new research shows how countries navigate this challenge—particularly during the pandemic. As the crisis wears on, high deficit and debt levels will further challenge the credibility of fiscal policy frameworks anchored by rules.

‘Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse.’

Large deviations
Governments have used all the flexibility of the rules to appropriately respond to the health crisis. Nearly 40 percent of economies with fiscal rules activated escape clauses during the pandemic, including the European Union, Jamaica, Paraguay and the United Kingdom. That compares with 5 percent during the global financial crisis, when these clauses were often not part of the framework. These clauses permit a deviation from the numerical rules within the limits defined by the framework. Without such clauses, countries must resort to ad hoc suspensions or modifications of the rules.
Fiscal councils also played an important role by assessing the crisis-related policy responses and the appropriate use of escape clauses. These councils are independent, non-partisan agencies that provide fiscal oversight, including costing policy measures, assessing budgetary forecasts, and monitoring rules. Their role is key to ensuring the transparency and credibility of the framework. In some cases, they gave advice on the size and type of fiscal support and stressed the need for greater transparency of COVID-19 fiscal measures.
The unprecedented rise of deficits and debts during the pandemic has led to large deviations from fiscal rules. In 2020, about 90 percent of countries had deficits larger than the rule limits—by about 4 percent of gross domestic product, on average—while public debt exceeded the limit for over half of the countries with rules in place. Public debt surpassed the limits by about 50 percent of GDP on average in advanced economies and by about 25 percent in emerging markets, adding to already large pre-crisis deviations.
The return to fiscal rules
A key challenge for many countries will be whether and how to modify the rules-based framework after major deviations.
Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, for example, advanced economies slowly returned to pre-crisis deficit rule limits, but their debts remained elevated. In emerging markets and developing economies, deficits first declined toward the limits but then widened again after 2014 when commodities prices fell.
Governments face difficult choices in the post-pandemic environment. Regardless of the paths to reinstate or revise the rules, robust fiscal institutions and medium-term frameworks will be important to preserve the credibility of policies in the transition period. Empirical evidence suggests that deviations from deficit limits are associated with higher financing costs. A credible transition helps to limit the costs of public finance.
Countries could use this opportunity to further strengthen fiscal rules. While frameworks have been flexible during crises, they have failed to prevent a large and persistent buildup of public debt, even if debt service costs were contained, reflecting the trend declines in inflation and real interest rates.
Each country will have to choose its own path. But in all cases, effective rules-based frameworks require strong political commitment, including a good record of compliance, the right incentives to build buffers during good times, and well-designed escape clauses to manage large adverse shocks. Strengthening fiscal councils’ ability to operate independently and fulfill their mandates would also improve the credibility and accountability of policies.
New datasets
The IMF has just released updates of two global datasets on fiscal rules and fiscal councils.
Both are becoming a more common feature of policy frameworks globally. As of end-2021, about 105 countries had rules, an increase from fewer than 10 in 1990. The number of countries with fiscal councils has also risen from 19 in 2010 to 49 today.
The first dataset provides information on national and supranational fiscal rules in 106 countries from 1985 to 2021. It also presents details on the types and characteristics of rules, such as their legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, as well as enforcement procedures, and takes stock of key supporting features in place, including monitoring bodies and fiscal responsibility laws.
The second describes key features of fiscal councils as of December across the IMF’s membership. The dataset includes the main features of the council’s remit, their tasks, and channels of influence; and key institutional characteristics such as independence, accountability, and human resources.
These resources aim to help policymakers strengthen their fiscal governance on the basis of the best available international evidence.
Authors:

W. Raphael Lam is a Senior Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department

Paulo Medas is Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and oversees the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor

Compliments of the IMF.
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IMF | Low Real Interest Rates Support Asset Prices, But Risks Are Rising

A large and sudden jump in real interest rates could lead to a further selloff in stocks.
Supply disruptions coupled with strong demand for goods, rising wages and higher commodities prices continue to challenge economies worldwide, pushing inflation above central bank targets.
To contain price pressures, many economies have started tightening monetary policy, leading to a sharp increase in nominal interest rates, with long-term bond yields, often an indicator of investor sentiment, recovering to pre-pandemic levels in some regions such as the United States.
Investors often look beyond nominal rates and base their decisions on real rates—that is, inflation-adjusted rates—which help them determine the yield on assets. Low real interest rates induce investors to take more risks.
Despite somewhat tighter monetary conditions and the recent upward move, longer-term real rates remain deeply negative in many regions, supporting elevated prices for riskier assets. Further tightening may still be required to tame inflation, but this puts asset prices at risk. More and more investors could decide to sell risky assets as those would become less attractive.
Differing outlooks
While shorter-term market rates have climbed since central banks’ hawkish turn in advanced economies and some emerging markets, there is still a sharp difference between policymakers’ expectations of how high their benchmark rates will rise and where investors expect the tightening will end.
This is most obvious in the United States, where Federal Reserve officials project that their main interest rate will reach 2.5 percent. That’s more than half a point higher than what 10-year Treasury yields indicate.
This divergence between markets and policymakers’ views on the most likely path for borrowing costs is significant because it means investors may adjust their expectations of Fed tightening upward both further and faster.
In addition, central banks might tighten more than they currently anticipate because of persistent inflation. For the Fed, this means the main interest rate at the end of the tightening cycle might exceed 2.5 percent.
Implications of the rate-path divide
The path of policy rates has important implications for financial markets and the economy. As a result of high inflation, real rates are historically low, despite the recent rebound in nominal interest rates, and are expected to remain so. In the United States, long-term rates are hovering around zero while short-term yields are deeply negative. In Germany and the United Kingdom, real rates remain extremely negative at all maturities.
Such very low real interest rates reflect pessimism about economic growth in coming years, the global savings glut due to aging societies, and demand for safe assets amid higher uncertainty exacerbated by the pandemic and recent geopolitical concerns.
The unprecedented low real interest rates continue to boost riskier assets, notwithstanding the recent upward move. Low long-term real rates are associated with historically elevated price-to-earnings ratios in equity markets, as they are used to discount expected future earnings growth and cash flows. All things being equal, monetary policy tightening should trigger a real interest rate adjustment and lead to higher discount rate, resulting in lower stock prices.
Despite the recent tightening in financial conditions and concerns about the virus and inflation, global asset valuations remain stretched. In credit markets, spreads are also still below pre-pandemic levels despite some modest widening recently.
After an exceptional year supported by solid earnings, the US equity market started 2022 with a steep retreat amid high inflation, uncertainty about growth and weaker earnings prospects. As a result, we expect that a sudden and substantial rise in real rates could cause a significant drop for US stocks, particularly in highly valued sectors such as technology.
Already this year, the 10-year real yield has increased by nearly half a percentage point. Stock volatility soared on greater investor nervousness, with the S&P 500 down more than 9 percent for the year and the Nasdaq Composite measure tumbling 14 percent.
Impact on economic growth
Our growth-at-risk estimates, which link future economic growth downside risks to macrofinancial conditions, could increase substantially if real rates rise suddenly and broader financial conditions tighten. Easy conditions helped global governments, consumers, and businesses withstand the pandemic, but this could reverse as monetary policy tightens to curb inflation, moderating economic expansions.
In addition, capital flows to emerging markets could be at risk. Stock and bond investments in those economies are generally seen as being less safe, and tightening global financial conditions may cause capital outflows, especially for countries with weaker fundamentals.
Looking ahead, with persistent inflation, central banks face a balancing act. All the while, real interest rates remain very low in many countries. Monetary policy tightening must be accompanied by some tightening of financial conditions. But there could be unintended consequences if global financial conditions tighten substantially. A higher and sudden increase in real interest rates could lead potentially to a disruptive price revaluation and an even larger selloff in stocks. As financial vulnerabilities remain elevated in several sectors, monetary authorities should provide clear guidance about the future stance of policy to avoid unnecessary volatility and safeguard financial stability.
Authors:

Nassira Abbas is a deputy division chief in the Global Markets Monitoring and Analysis Division of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department and an author of the Global Financial Stability Report

Tobias Adrian is the Financial Counsellor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department

Compliments of the IMF.
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Update to the transfer pricing guidelines

On Thursday the 20th of January 2022 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (also known as: ‘OECD’)  released an update to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. This update mainly incorporates earlier released documents, but it also makes some consistency changes to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines of 2017. These consistency changes were needed to produce the consolidated version of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and were approved by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS on the 7th of January 2022.

The following documents are incorporated in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2022:

Revised Guidance on the Application of the Transactional Profit Split Method

The guidance set out in this report responds to the mandate under Action 10 of the BEPS Action Plan, which requires the development of:

“rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in transactions which would not, or would only very rarely, occur between third parties. This will involve adopting transfer pricing rules or special measures to: … (ii) clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular profit splits, in the context of global value chains”

Since 2010, the Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that the most appropriate method should always be used. This method can be (among others) the profit split method. This revised guidance provides clarification and significantly expands the guidance on when a profit split method may be the most appropriate method. It describes certain indicators such as the unique and valuable contributions each party makes to the transaction and the share of economically significant risk. Furthermore, the revised guidance includes several examples illustrating the principles discussed.

Guidance for Tax Administrations on the Application of the Approach to Hard-to-Value Intangibles

BEPS Action 8 addresses transfer pricing issues to controlled transactions involving intangibles, since intangibles are by definition mobile and they are often hard-to-value which makes base erosion and profit shifting possible. The OECD states that misallocation of these profits has heavily contributed to base erosion and profit shifting.

The hard-to-value intangibles approach disarms the negative effects of information asymmetry, by ensuring that tax administrations can consider ex post outcomes as presumptive evidence about the appropriateness of the ex-ante pricing arrangements. I.e. administrations can take later outcomes in consideration of the earlier dealt with pricing agreement. At the same time, taxpayers have the possibility to rebut such presumptive evidence by demonstrating the reliability of the information supporting the pricing methodology adopted at the time of the controlled transaction took place. This is to prevent later information to rule over the earlier information, which would certainly subvert the legal security of the taxpayer.

The guidance aims at reaching a common understanding and practice among tax administrations on how to apply adjustments resulting from the application of the hard-to-value intangibles approach. The guidance should improve consistency and reduce the risk of economic double taxation.

Transfer Pricing Guidance on Financial Transactions

The 2020 report on financial transactions pertains to Action 4 and provides guidance in the accurate delineation of financial transactions, particularly in capital structures of multinational enterprises. Furthermore, it analyses the pricing of a controlled financial transaction. The report describes the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions such as intra-group loans, treasury functions, cash pooling, hedging, guarantees and captive insurance.

Action 4 constitutes the limitations on interest deductions, and aims to limit base erosion through the use of interest expenses to achieve interest deduction or to finance the production of exempt or deferred income.

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COVID-19: EU Council adopts a revised recommendation on measures affecting free movement, based on the individual situation of persons and no longer on the region of origin

The EU Council today adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to facilitate safe free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. This recommendation responds to the significant increase in vaccine uptake and the rapid roll-out of the EU digital COVID certificate, and replaces the previously existing recommendation. It will enter into force on 1 February 2022, on the same day as a delegated act amending the digital COVID-19 certificate regulation and providing for an acceptance period of 270 days for vaccination certificates.
Infographic – A common approach to COVID-19 travel measures in the EU – See full infographic
Under the new recommendation, COVID-19 measures should be applied taking into account the status of the person instead of the situation at regional level, with the exception of areas where the virus is circulating at very high levels. This means that a traveller’s COVID-19 vaccination, test or recovery status, as evidenced by a valid EU digital COVID certificate, should be the key determinant. A person-based approach will substantially simplify the applicable rules and will provide additional clarity and predictability to travellers.
Person-based approach
Travellers in possession of a valid EU digital COVID certificate should not be subject to additional restrictions to free movement.
A valid EU digital COVID certificate includes:

A vaccination certificate for a vaccine approved at European level if at least 14 days and no more than 270 days have passed since the last dose of the primary vaccination series or if the person has received a booster dose. Member states could also accept vaccination certificates for vaccines approved by national authorities or the WHO.
A negative PCR test result obtained no more than 72 hours before travel or a negative rapid antigen test obtained no more than 24 hours before travel.
A certificate of recovery indicating that no more than 180 days have passed since the date of the first positive test result.

Persons who are not in possession of an EU digital COVID certificate could be required to undergo a test prior to or no later than 24 hours after arrival. Travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under 12 should be exempt from this requirement.
Map of EU regions
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) should continue to publish a map of member states’ regions indicating the potential risk of infection according to a traffic light system (green, orange, red, dark red). The map should be based on the 14-day case notification rate, vaccine uptake and testing rate.
Based on this map, member states should apply measures regarding travel to and from dark red areas, where the virus is circulating at very high levels. They should in particular discourage all non-essential travel and require persons arriving from those areas who are not in possession of a vaccination or recovery certificate to undergo a test prior to departure and to quarantine after arrival.
Certain exceptions to these measures should apply to travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under the age of 12.
Emergency brake
Under the new recommendation, the emergency brake to respond to the emergence of new variants of concern or interest is strengthened. When a member state imposes restrictions in response to the emergence of a new variant, the Council, in close cooperation with the Commission and supported by the ECDC, should review the situation. The Commission, based on the regular assessment of new evidence on variants, may also suggest a discussion within the Council.
During the discussion, the Commission could propose that the Council agree on a coordinated approach regarding travel from the areas concerned. Any situation resulting in the adoption of measures should be reviewed regularly.
Background
The decision on whether to introduce restrictions on free movement to protect public health remains the responsibility of member states; however, coordination on this topic is essential. On 13 October 2020, the Council adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was updated on 1 February 2021 and 14 June 2021. This recommendation establishes common criteria and a common framework for possible measures for travellers.
The Council recommendation is not a legally binding instrument. The authorities of the member states remain responsible for implementing the content of the recommendation.
Compliments of the EU Council.
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EU Commission puts forward declaration on digital rights and principles for everyone in the EU

Today, the Commission is proposing to the European Parliament and Council to sign up to a declaration of rights and principles that will guide the digital transformation in the EU.
The draft declaration on digital rights and principles aims to give everyone a clear reference point about the kind of digital transformation Europe promotes and defends. It will also provide a guide for policy makers and companies when dealing with new technologies. The rights and freedoms enshrined in the EU’s legal framework, and the European values expressed by the principles, should be respected online as they are offline. Once jointly endorsed, the Declaration will also define the approach to the digital transformation which the EU will promote throughout the world.
Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age, Margrethe Vestager, said: “We want safe technologies that work for people, and that respect our rights and values. Also when we are online. And we want everyone to be empowered to take an active part in our increasingly digitised societies. This declaration gives us a clear reference point to the rights and principles for the online world.”
Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, said: “We want Europeans to know: living, studying, working, doing business in Europe, you can count on top class connectivity, seamless access to public services, a safe and fair digital space. The declaration of digital rights and principles also establishes once and for all that what is illegal offline should also be illegal online. We also aim to promote these principles as a standard for the world.”
Rights and principles in the digital age
The draft declaration covers key rights and principles for the digital transformation, such as placing people and their rights at its centre, supporting solidarity and inclusion, ensuring the freedom of choice online, fostering participation in the digital public space, increasing safety, security and empowerment of individuals, and promoting the sustainability of the digital future.
These rights and principles should accompany people in the EU in their everyday life: affordable and high-speed digital connectivity everywhere and for everybody, well-equipped classrooms and digitally skilled teachers, seamless access to public services, a safe digital environment for children, disconnecting after working hours, obtaining easy-to-understand information on the environmental impact of our digital products, controlling how their personal data are used and with whom they are shared.
The declaration is rooted in EU law, from the Treaties to the Charter of Fundamental rights but also the case law of the Court of Justice. It builds on the experience of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Former European Parliament President David Sassoli promoted the idea of the access to the Internet as a new human right back in 2018. Promoting and implementing the principles set out in the declaration will be a shared political commitment and responsibility at both Union and Member State level within their respective competences. To make sure the declaration will have concrete effects on the ground, the Commission proposed in September to monitor progress, evaluate gaps and provide recommendations for actions through an annual report on the ‘State of the Digital Decade’.
Next Steps
The European Parliament and the Council are invited to discuss the draft declaration, and to endorse it at the highest level by this summer.
Background
On 9 March 2021, the Commission laid out its vision for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030 in its Communication on the Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade. In September 2021, the Commission introduced a robust governance framework to reach the digital targets in the form of a Path to the Digital Decade. In a speech at the ‘Leading the Digital Decade’ event in Sines, Portugal, on 1 June 2021, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared: “We embrace new technologies. But we stand by our values.”
The Commission also conducted an open public consultation which showed broad support for European Digital Principles – 8 EU citizens out of 10 consider it useful for the European Union to define and promote a common European vision on digital rights and principles – as well as a special Eurobarometer survey. Yearly Eurobarometer surveys will collect qualitative data, based on citizens’ perception of how the digital principles enshrined in the declaration are implemented in the EU.
The declaration also builds on previous initiatives from the Council including the Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment, the Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-based Digital Government, and the Lisbon Declaration – Digital Democracy with a Purpose for a model of digital transformation that strengthens the human dimension of the digital ecosystem with the Digital Single Market as its core.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Federal Reserve Board releases discussion paper that examines pros and cons of a potential U.S. central bank digital currency (CBDC)

The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday released a discussion paper that examines the pros and cons of a potential U.S. central bank digital currency, or CBDC. It invites comment from the public and is the first step in a discussion of whether and how a CBDC could improve the safe and effective domestic payments system. The paper does not favor any policy outcome.
“We look forward to engaging with the public, elected representatives, and a broad range of stakeholders as we examine the positives and negatives of a central bank digital currency in the United States,” Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell said.
The paper summarizes the current state of the domestic payments system and discusses the different types of digital payment methods and assets that have emerged in recent years, including stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies. It concludes by examining the potential benefits and risks of a CBDC, and identifies specific policy considerations.
Consumers and businesses have long held and transferred money in digital forms, via bank accounts, online transactions, or payment apps. The forms of money used in those transactions are liabilities of private entities, such as commercial banks. Conversely, a CBDC would be a liability of a central bank, like the Federal Reserve.
While a CBDC could provide a safe, digital payment option for households and businesses as the payments system continues to evolve, and may result in faster payment options between countries, there may also be downsides. They include how to ensure a CBDC would preserve monetary and financial stability as well as complement existing means of payment. Other key policy considerations include how to preserve the privacy of citizens and maintain the ability to combat illicit finance. The paper discusses these and other factors in more detail.
To fully evaluate a potential CBDC, the Board’s paper asks for public comment on more than 20 questions. Comments will be accepted for 120 days and can be submitted here.
Contact:

For media inquiries, please email media@frb.gov or call 202-452-2955

Compliments of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.
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ECB Interview | Inflation expected to decline over 2022

Inflation will remain high at the start of 2022 but will fall later on, especially towards the end of the year, Chief Economist Philip R. Lane tells Verslo žinios. Our current projections foresee inflation below the 2% target in 2023 and 2024.
I just read the news this morning that the latest Purchasing Managers’ Index published this Monday shows that the eurozone economic recovery weakened further in January. This is due to the new restrictions imposed to contain the Omicron variant of the coronavirus (COVID-19). So what is your opinion on the state of the eurozone today, after two years of the pandemic and what are the prospects?
In the near term, there are some risks from the Omicron variant. But I think it’s increasingly clear that the impact is only for a few weeks. So it is not turning out to be a factor that will influence the activity levels for the year, it’s more the activity levels for a few weeks. In that sense, I think there’s less concern about Omicron than we had in December. In terms of the overall pandemic, I think it is fair to say that the recovery so far has been stronger than expected − compared to, for example, early 2020 when the pandemic hit. In the initial months of the pandemic there was a lot of concern. But essentially, when the vaccines have been rolled out during 2021, it turned out that the euro area economy and the world economy has recovered more quickly than expected. And looking to this year, 2022, we expect another strong year of recovery. So essentially, there’s been a strong recovery, supported by a lot of policy measures, both fiscal policy and monetary policy. I think in overall terms the sense is that, between the public health measures and other measures, it’s turning out that we can hope that the euro area can recover quite well from the pandemic.
Let’s go to the start of the pandemic. The euro area economy as a whole shrank more than 6 per cent in 2020. However, Ireland’s economy grew 3.4 per cent. And the Lithuanian economy escaped the recession too. To your mind, why did the Lithuanian economy and the Irish economy manage to decouple from the recessionary trends in the euro area last year?
What I think is that some sectors in the world economy were able to continue during the pandemic. So in those sectors where the pandemic might cause an interruption for a few months, even during 2020 it turned out there was a good recovery. The sectors where Lithuania is a big producer and the sectors where Ireland is a big producer, including a lot of multinational firms, turned out to be quite strong. But I would say both in Ireland and in Lithuania many sectors suffered. The fact that in overall terms, these economies did grow, should not take away from the fact that many service-type industries would have been damaged by the pandemic.
Euro area inflation hit a record high of 5 per cent in December of last year. Are you worried about further rising inflation in the eurozone?
We should think about these years of the pandemic, 2020, 2021 and 2022 as part of a pandemic cycle. In the first year 2020, inflation was relatively low. In the second half of 2021, inflation turned out to be quite high. And then, as we look into this year, 2022, we think inflation will remain high at the start of this year, but will fall later this year, especially towards the end of the year. So it’s a year, essentially, where in the first part of the year, we’ll still see inflation remaining high. But we do expect it to fall quite a bit later this year.
Do you expect inflation to rise further than 5 per cent at the start of the year? And what levels do you expect at the end of the year?
We are clear from our December forecast that we expect inflation − in overall terms for this year − to be around 3.2 per cent in the euro area, and then to be below 2 per cent in 2023 and 2024. Compared with the peak, that’s quite a big decline. We will see exactly the timing of how quickly inflation falls. So rather than focus on month by month, we have a clear vision in terms of the overall direction: that the inflation rate will fall later this year. And in fact, as you know, our current view from December is that inflation will fall below the 2 per cent target in the next couple of years.
What ECB monetary policy adjustments do you expect in the face of rising energy goods and services prices if the rise is higher than your forecasts?
I think we are always clear that we’re guided by our intentions to deliver an inflation rate of 2 per cent over the medium term. So we will adjust all of our policies − whether that’s asset purchases, the targeted lending programme, our interest rates − to deliver that goal. You’ve given me a hypothetical, the hypothetical is: what happens if inflation is above our forecast. So let me in turn make clear that what is very important is whether inflation will essentially settle at around our target of 2 per cent, which would be essentially what we want, or whether there might be signs of inflation being above 2 per cent in a significant way for a significant amount of time. And if we saw the data coming in to suggest that inflation would be too high relative to 2 per cent, then of course we would respond. We also have been clear on our sequence. The first decision under that scenario would be to end net purchasing. And only after ending net asset purchases would we look at the criteria for raising the interest rates. So we will be driven by the data, driven by our assessment. And every month, every quarter, we’re going to learn more about where the data are going.
Is there a risk of inflationary second round effects such as salary growth?
We spend a lot of time looking at the interlinkages. One linkage is that an increase in the cost of living may be a factor in wage negotiations. We think that is clear. The question is how much, because, remember, energy is both a direct cost to the consumer, but also a cost to other firms. Rising energy prices can also mean rising food prices, rising prices of goods and services. We are also examining how much the increase in energy prices might show up in rising goods prices and services prices. So far, we do not see a big response of wages. We do expect a response of wages but what is critical is how big. Because, remember, in the euro area, for inflation to be around 2 per cent and allowing for a typical increase in labour productivity of about 1 per cent, then wages should be growing around 3 per cent a year in the euro area on average to be consistent with the 2 per cent target. We are not, right now, seeing wage increases in that zone. But of course, we will continue to look at this throughout the year.
Some of your colleagues have mentioned another risk. Do you see any pressure to the rise of inflation in the euro area due to the green energy investments?
I think this is a complicated issue. Let me also emphasise that what we have right now is an increase in global energy prices. The euro area imports energy from the rest of the world. So this is a very different scenario from a scenario, which we would expect to occur in the coming years. Which is essentially, if there’s, for example, policies that increase the price of carbon, as part of the transition away from a high-carbon economy. If we see an increase in the price of carbon because of taxes or regulation, driven by domestic policy, those revenues from a carbon tax, for example, can be recycled in the domestic economy and can stimulate the economy. Wheras what we have right now is different. We have an increase in import prices from the rest of the world. And this is reducing living standards, increasing the import bill. It has a negative channel to lower incomes, lower consumption. So I think it’s a very interesting, very important debate about the future of green energy policies. That is playing some role right now. But the main role right now is a global issue, rather than the transition. So we will return to this topic, no doubt.
So overall, what scenarios do you see where interest rates in the eurozone could be lifted?
Let me mention three scenarios. And again, to repeat, we’re examining hypotheticals here. One scenario is in fact that the forces that generated low inflation before the pandemic essentially become visible again after the pandemic. So one scenario is that the world economy will return to quite low inflation rates. A second scenario is that some of these headwinds will not return and, in fact, it may be easier for us to deliver our target of 2 per cent. So that is a kind of middle scenario where inflation will stabilise at 2 per cent. And then the third scenario is, if inflation picks up and there is a risk that inflation will be significantly above 2 per cent. In this third scenario, where inflation is significantly above 2 per cent on a persistent basis, then that will call for a monetary policy tightening. We would have to respond. In the middle scenario where inflation stabilises at 2 per cent, then clearly over time we would normalise monetary policy. The policies we need to fight very low inflation would no longer be needed if inflation were stable around 2 per cent. And in the first scenario where inflation is significantly below 2 per cent, then the policies that we have employed to fight low inflation would still remain relevant. So this is the way I think about the world, but there are three scenarios. One, we remain with a low inflation problem. Two, we stabilise — in a kind of smooth way — inflation around 2 per cent. And three, if inflation turns out to be persistently above 2 per cent, we would have to tighten. And so those are three very different scenarios.
Which of these three scenarios do you see as the most likely scenario in this economic environment?
In the December round of projections, the assessment was that, in fact, we saw inflation returning to below 2 per cent. But we also emphasised that in a world of uncertainty, as we have more data come in, of course the data can change. But in the euro area context, I would say that it’s also possible that we may enter a world where inflation stabilises around 2 per cent. I find it less likely to think about a scenario where inflation is persistently, significantly above 2 per cent, which would require a serious tightening. That scenario, would, I think, in the context of the euro area, be less likely than the other two scenarios.
Higher sovereign borrowing costs after the financial crisis of 2007-09 turned into a eurozone debt crisis in 2010-13 that hit some southern European Member States, also Ireland. Debt levels have significantly risen during the pandemic. Is there any risk of another debt crisis this time provided interest rates will rise?
Let me make two important points here. One, at that time, there was a significant combination which, by and large, countries had of both high private sector debt – many households, many firms were highly indebted – and there was high government debt. That is a major problem. What we’ve seen in this pandemic is: yes, governments have borrowed more, and some types of firms have borrowed more. But households have been saving a lot. In the banking sector, we also have banks which are better able to handle debt, because they have increased their capital positions. So, when you have a situation where, essentially, in the euro area, debt levels have gone up for the sovereign and for some corporates but have gone down for households, and where the banks, that are kind of in the middle of the system, are in better shape, then I think it’s a different scenario to ten years ago. And then the other issue is: we think the trend level of interest rates is lower today than ten years ago. So, when interest rates go up, it’s from a very low level. And that’s important.
Finally, I have one question as to the elephant in the room: the deteriorating geopolitical situation in Ukraine these days due to the possible Russian military offensive. Do you see any side effects to the ECB monetary policy, should the geopolitical situation in Europe deteriorate further?
Geopolitics always matters. I think if you look at the history of the world economy, the European economy, geopolitical events matter a lot via trade, via global prices, via uncertainty. So, of course, we will be looking very closely at such factors. We already talked about the very high energy prices. And of course, there’s a connection between higher energy prices and these tensions. So of course, it’s very directly relevant for us.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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IMF | A Disrupted Global Recovery

Growth slows as economies grapple with supply disruptions, higher inflation, record debt and persistent uncertainty.
The continuing global recovery faces multiple challenges as the pandemic enters its third year. The rapid spread of the Omicron variant has led to renewed mobility restrictions in many countries and increased labor shortages. Supply disruptions still weigh on activity and are contributing to higher inflation, adding to pressures from strong demand and elevated food and energy prices. Moreover, record debt and rising inflation constrain the ability of many countries to address renewed disruptions.
Some challenges, however, could be shorter lived than others. The new variant appears to be associated with less severe illness than the Delta variant, and the record surge in infections is expected to decline relatively quickly. The IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook therefore anticipates that while Omicron will weigh on activity in the first quarter of 2022, this effect will fade starting in the second quarter.
Other challenges, and policy pivots, are expected to have a greater impact on the outlook. We project global growth this year at 4.4 percent, 0.5 percentage point lower than previously forecast, mainly because of downgrades for the United States and China. In the case of the United States, this reflects lower prospects of legislating the Build Back Better fiscal package, an earlier withdrawal of extraordinary monetary accommodation, and continued supply disruptions. China’s downgrade reflects continued retrenchment of the real estate sector and a weaker-than-expected recovery in private consumption. Supply disruptions have led to markdowns for other countries too, such as Germany. We expect global growth to slow to 3.8 percent in 2023. This is 0.2 percentage point higher than in the October 2021 WEO and largely reflects a pickup after current drags on growth dissipate.
We have revised up our 2022 inflation forecasts for both advanced and emerging market and developing economies, with elevated price pressures expected to persist for longer. Supply-demand imbalances are assumed to decline over 2022 based on industry expectations of improved supply, as demand gradually rebalances from goods to services, and extraordinary policy support is withdrawn. Moreover, energy and food prices are expected to grow at more moderate rates in 2022 according to futures markets. Assuming inflation expectations remain anchored, inflation is therefore expected to subside in 2023.
Even as recoveries continue, the troubling divergence in prospects across countries persists. While advanced economies are projected to return to pre-pandemic trend this year, several emerging markets and developing economies are projected to have sizeable output losses into the medium-term. The number of people living in extreme poverty is estimated to have been around 70 million higher than pre-pandemic trends in 2021, setting back the progress in poverty reduction by several years.
The forecast is subject to high uncertainty and risks overall are to the downside. The emergence of deadlier variants could prolong the crisis. China’s zero-COVID strategy could exacerbate global supply disruptions, and if financial stress in the country’s real estate sector spreads to the broader economy the ramifications would be felt widely. Higher inflation surprises in the United States could elicit aggressive monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve and sharply tighten global financial conditions. Rising geopolitical tensions and social unrest also pose risks to the outlook.

‘To address many of the difficulties facing the world economy, it is vital to break the hold of the pandemic.’

Global Efforts
To address many of the difficulties facing the world economy, it is vital to break the hold of the pandemic. This will require a global effort to ensure widespread vaccination, testing, and access to therapeutics, including the newly developed anti-viral medications. As of now, only 4 percent of the population of low-income countries are fully vaccinated versus 70 percent in high-income countries. In addition to ensuring predictable supply of vaccines for low-income developing countries, assistance should be provided to boost absorptive capacity and improve health infrastructure. It is urgent to close the $23.4 billion financing gap for the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator and to incentivize technological transfers to help speed up diversification of global production of critical medical tools, especially in Africa.
At the national level, policies should remain tailored to country specific circumstances including the extent of recovery, of underlying inflationary pressures, and available policy space. Both fiscal and monetary policies will need to work in tandem to achieve economic goals. Given the high level of uncertainty, policies must also remain agile and adapt to incoming economic data.
With policy space diminished in many economies, and strong recoveries underway in others, fiscal deficits in most countries are projected to shrink this year. The fiscal priority should continue to be the health sector, and transfers, where needed, should be effectively targeted to the worst affected. All initiatives will need to be embedded in medium-term fiscal frameworks that lay out a credible path for ensuring public debt remains sustainable.
Monetary policy is at a critical juncture in most countries. Where inflation is broad based alongside a strong recovery, like in the United States, or high inflation runs the risk of becoming entrenched, as in some emerging market and developing economies and advanced economies, extraordinary monetary policy support should be withdrawn. Several central banks have already begun raising interest rates to get ahead of price pressures. It is key to communicate well the policy transition towards a tightening stance to ensure orderly market reaction. Where core inflationary pressures remain subdued, and recoveries incomplete, monetary policy can remain accommodative.
As the monetary policy stance tightens more broadly this year, economies will need to adapt to a global environment of higher interest rates. Emerging market and developing economies with large foreign currency borrowing and external financing needs should prepare for possible turbulence in financial markets by extending debt maturities as feasible and containing currency mismatches. Exchange rate flexibility can help with needed macroeconomic adjustment. In some cases, foreign exchange intervention and temporary capital flow management measures may be needed to provide monetary policy with the space to focus on domestic conditions.
With interest rates rising, low-income countries, of which 60 percent are already in or at high risk of debt distress, will find it increasingly difficult to service their debts. The G20 Common Framework needs to be revamped to deliver more quickly on debt restructuring, and G20 creditors and private creditors should suspend debt service while the restructurings are being negotiated.
At the start of the third year of the pandemic, the global death toll has risen to 5.5 million deaths and the accompanying economic losses are expected to be close to $13.8 trillion through 2024 relative to pre-pandemic forecasts. These numbers would have been much worse had it not been for the extraordinary work of scientists, of the medical community, and the swift and aggressive policy responses across the world.
However, much work remains to ensure the losses are contained and to reduce wide disparities in recovery prospects across countries. Policy initiatives are needed to reverse the large learning losses suffered by children, especially in developing countries. On average, students in middle-income and low-income countries had 93 more days of nation-wide school closures than those in high income countries. On climate, a bigger push is needed to get to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, with carbon pricing mechanisms, green infrastructure investment, research subsidies, and financing initiatives so that all countries can invest in climate change mitigation and adaptation measures.
The last two years reaffirm that this crisis and the ongoing recovery is like no other. Policymakers must vigilantly monitor a broad swath of incoming economic data, prepare for contingencies, and be ready to communicate and execute policy changes at short notice. In parallel, bold, and effective international cooperation should ensure that this is the year the world escapes the grip of the pandemic.

Author:

Gita Gopinath is the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF.

Compliments of the IMF.
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UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management: EU Council conclusions on priorities for 2022-2024

The Council approved conclusions today endorsing the new priorities for the 2022-2024 period under the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management.
The Council reiterates the firm commitment made by the EU and its member states to uphold the multilateral rules-based global order with the United Nations at its core, and it commends the achievements and recognises the mutually beneficial nature of the longstanding UN-EU cooperation on peacekeeping and civilian, police and military crisis management.
The Council welcomes the extended scope of the priorities, which aim to respond more effectively to the evolving threat landscape and cross-cutting challenges such as climate change, disruptive technologies and misinformation, and the consequences of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the Council welcomes the inclusion of the matter of children and armed conflict as a cross-cutting priority, as well as the increased attention to the Youth, Peace and Security agenda and the enhanced joint UN-EU efforts on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and gender equality.
The conclusions stress that partnering with the UN helps the EU play its role as a security provider and a global peace and security actor in support of effective multilateralism.
The EU provides the UN with political support as well as expertise, financial backing and political leverage to deliver on UN mandates. Close cooperation helps UN and EU missions and operations act more effectively to ensure they have an impact on the ground. It has a multiplier effect and enables the EU to deliver on its integrated approach.

Council Conclusions on taking the UN-EU strategic partnership on peace operations and crisis management to the next level: Priorities 2022-2024
Reinforcing the EU-UN Strategic Partnership on crisis management, EEAS website
The European Union at the United Nations – Factsheet

Contact:

Maria Daniela Lenzu, Press officer | +32 2 281 21 46 | +32 470 88 04 0

Compliments of the Council of the EU.
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NextGenerationEU: European Commission disburses €271 million in pre-financing to Finland

The European Commission has today disbursed €271 million to Finland in pre-financing, equivalent to 13% of the country’s financial allocation under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The pre-financing payment will help kick-start the implementation of the crucial investment and reform measures outlined in Finland’s recovery and resilience plan.
The Commission will authorise further disbursements based on the implementation of the investments and reforms outlined in Finland’s recovery and resilience plan. The country is set to receive €2.1 billion in total, fully consisting of grants, over the lifetime of its plan.
Since June 2021, the Commission has raised €71 billion for NextGenerationEU via long-term EU Bonds – €12 billion of which through the first-ever NextGenerationEU green bond issuance. On 14 December, the Commission published its funding plan for the first semester of 2022. The plan foresees the issuance of €50 billion of long-term EU Bonds between January and June 2022, to be complemented by short-term EU-Bills. In addition, the Commission currently has around €20.5 billion in EU-Bills outstanding.
The RRF is at the heart of NextGenerationEU which will provide €800 billion (in current prices) to support investments and reforms across Member States. Finland’s plan is part of the unprecedented EU response to emerge stronger from the COVID-19 crisis, fostering the green and digital transitions and strengthening resilience and cohesion in our societies.
Supporting transformative investments and reform projects
The RRF in Finland finances investments and reforms that are expected to have a deeply transformative effect on Finland’s economy and society. Here are some of these projects:

Securing the green transition: Finland’s plan supports the green transition through investments of €319 million in decarbonisation of the energy sector, namely in energy transmission and distribution and in new energy technologies. €156 million will be invested in low-carbon hydrogen along the hydrogen value chain as well as in carbon capture, storage and recovery. The objective of the investments is to contribute to Finland’s goal to achieve carbon neutrality by 2035 by stimulating the introduction of new clean technologies for energy production and use.

Supporting the digital transition: The plan supports the digital transition with investments and reforms amounting to €50 million in high-speed broadband infrastructure across Finland. It increases the quality and availability of communication connections in areas where such connections are not provided based on market mechanisms alone. Digital innovations for social welfare and health care servicesare supported with €100 million.

Reinforcing economic and social resilience: The plan reinforces economic and social resilience by allocating €90 millionto the reform of the Public Employment Services to increase the employment rate. The plan invests €260 million in streamlining healthcare service processes and providing faster and more equal access to social and health services as well as to promote prevention and early identification of health issues.

Members of the College said:
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said: “This first disbursement under NextGenerationEU is great news for Finland and the Finnish people. This is European solidarity at its best, part of the €2.1 billion Finland will receive for its digital transition and helping the country to further prosper and grow while respecting the boundaries of our planet. Therefore the EU supports Finland’s investments in clean energy and decarbonising industry. We will stand by Finland in the years ahead to ensure that the plan delivers on its full potential.”
Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for Budget and Administration, said: “Our NextGenerationEU funds raised on the financial market continue to support the digital and green transition in EU Member States, as just now with the disbursement of the pre-financement to Finland. I am sure that the Finnish citizens, businesses and the society as a whole will profit from the transformative investments and projects.”
Paolo Gentiloni, Commissioner for Economy, said: “Today Finland receives €271 million in pre-financing for its recovery and resilience plan. The Finnish plan is strongly focused on the green transition, with no less than 50% of its total allocation set to support climate objectives. This will help to speed the country towards its ambitious target of carbon neutrality by 2035. The plan also contains an array of measures to boost Finland’s already strong digital competitiveness. I particularly welcome the Finnish plan’s strong social elements, with measures to raise the employment rate, tackle youth unemployment and facilitate access to social and healthcare services.”
Compliments of the European Commission.
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