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EU Commission proposes fishing opportunities for 2023 in the Baltic Sea in an effort to recover species

Today, the European Commission adopted its proposal for fishing opportunities for 2023 for the Baltic Sea. Based on this proposal, EU countries will determine the maximum quantities of the most important commercial fish species that can be caught in the sea basin.
The Commission proposes to increase fishing opportunities for central herring and plaice, while maintaining the current levels for salmon and the levels of by-catch of western and eastern cod, as well as western herring. The Commission proposes to decrease fishing opportunities for the four remaining stocks covered by the proposal, in order to improve the sustainability of those stocks and to allow them to recover.
Virginijus Sinkevičius, Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, said: “I remain worried about the poor environmental status of the Baltic Sea. Despite some improvements, we are still suffering from the combined effects of eutrophication and slow response to tackle this challenge. We must all take responsibility and take action together. This is the only way to ensure that our fish stocks become healthy again and that our local fishers could rely again on them for their livelihoods. Today’s proposal goes in this direction.”
Over the past decade, EU fishermen and women, industry and public authorities have made major efforts to rebuild fish stocks in the Baltic Sea. Where complete scientific advice was available, fishing opportunities had already been set in line with the principle of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for seven out of eight stocks, covering 95% of fish landings by volume. However, commercial stocks of western and eastern cod, western herring, and the many salmon stocks in both the southern Baltic Sea and the rivers of the southern Baltic EU Member States are under severe environmental pressure from habitat loss, due to the degradation of their living environment.
The total allowable catches (TACs) proposed today are based on the best available peer-reviewed scientific advice from the International Council on the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and follow the Baltic multiannual management plan (MAP) adopted in 2016 by the European Parliament and the Council. A detailed table is available below. 
Cod
For eastern Baltic cod, the Commission proposes to maintain the TAC level limited to unavoidable by-catches and all the accompanying measures from the 2022 fishing opportunities. Despite the measures taken since 2019, when scientists first raised the alarm about the very poor status of the stock, the situation has not yet improved.
The condition of western Baltic cod has unfortunately grown worse and the biomass dropped to a historic low in 2021. The Commission, therefore, remains cautious and proposes to maintain the TAC level limited to unavoidable by-catches, and all the accompanying measures from the 2022 fishing opportunities.
Herring
The stock size of western Baltic herring remains below safe biological limits and scientists advise for the fifth year in a row a halt of western herring fisheries. The Commission, therefore, proposes to only allow a very small TAC for unavoidable by-catches and keeping all the accompanying measures from the 2022 fishing opportunities.
For central Baltic herring, the Commission remains cautious, with a proposed increase of 14%. This is in line with the ICES advice, because the stock size has still not reached healthy levels and relies on new-born fish only, which is uncertain. Again, in line with the ICES advice, the Commission proposes to decrease the TAC level for herring in the Gulf of Bothnia by 28%, as the stock has dropped very close to the limit below which it is not sustainable. Finally, for Riga herring, the Commission proposes decreasing the TAC by 4% in line with ICES advice.
Plaice
While the ICES advice would allow for a significant increase, the Commission remains cautious, mainly to protect cod – which is an unavoidable by-catch when fishing for plaice. New rules should soon enter in force, making obligatory the use of new fishing gear that is expected to substantially reduce cod by-catches. The Commission therefore proposes to limit the TAC increase to 25%.
Sprat
ICES advises a decrease for sprat. This is due to the fact that sprat is a prey species for cod, which is not in a good condition, so it would be needed for the cod recovery. In addition, there is evidence of misreporting of sprat, which is in a fragile condition. The Commission, therefore, remains cautious and proposes to reduce the TAC by 20%, in order to set it to the lower maximum sustainable yield (MSY) range.
Salmon
The status of the different river salmon populations in the main basin varies considerably, with some being very weak and others healthy. In order to achieve the MSY objective, ICES advised last year the closure of all salmon fisheries in the main basin. For the coastal waters of the Gulf of Bothnia and the Åland Sea, the advice stated that it would be acceptable to maintain the fishery during the summer. The ICES advice remains unchanged this year, so the Commission proposes to maintain the TAC level and all the accompanying measures from the 2022 fishing opportunities.
Next steps
The Council will examine the Commission’s proposal in view of adopting it during a Ministerial meeting on 17-18 October.
Background
The fishing opportunities proposal is part of the European Union’s approach to adjust the levels of fishing to long-term sustainability targets, called maximum sustainable yield (MSY), by 2020 as agreed by the Council and the European Parliament in the Common Fisheries Policy. The Commission’s proposal is also in line with the policy intentions expressed in the Commission’s Communication “Towards more sustainable fishing in the EU: state of play and orientations for 2023” and with the Multiannual Plan for the management of cod, herring and sprat in the Baltic Sea.
For more information
Proposal for a Council Regulation fixing the fishing opportunities for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks applicable in the Baltic Sea for 2023 and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/109 as regards certain fishing opportunities in other waters – COM/2022/415
Questions & Answers on fishing opportunities in the Baltic Sea in 2023
Table: Overview of TAC changes 2022-2023 (figures in tones except for salmon, which is in number of pieces)

 
2022
2023

Stock and
ICES fishing zone; subdivision
Council agreement   (in tonnes & % change from 2020 TAC)
Commission proposal
(in tonnes & % change from 2021 TAC)

Western Cod 22-24

489 (-88%)
489 (0%)

Eastern Cod 25-32

595 (0%)
595 (0%)

Western Herring 22-24

788 (-50%)
788 (0%)

Bothnian Herring 30-31

111 345 (-5%)
80 074(-28%)

Riga Herring 28.1

47 697 (+21%)
45 643 (-4%)

Central Herring 25-27, 28.2, 29, 32

53 653 (-45%)
61 051 (+14%)

Sprat 22-32

251 943 (+13%)
201 554 (-20%)

Plaice 22-32

9 050 (+25%)
11 313 (+25%)

Main Basin Salmon 22-31

63 811 (-32%)
63 811 (0%)

Gulf of Finland Salmon 32

9 455 (+6%)
9 455 (0%)

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IMF | Achieving Net-Zero Emissions Requires Closing a Data Deficit

High-quality, reliable, and comparable gauges are lacking. Here’s how to close the gap.

Climate change is transforming the global investment landscape, creating new risks and opportunities. Physical risks, from rising sea levels to the lethal heat waves scorching Europe and elsewhere, affect asset values for everything from stocks to real estate and infrastructure. So-called transition risk—including government policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—lowers the value of fossil fuel companies.
To evaluate these risks and support the transition to a low-carbon economy, investors and others in the financial world need information. For example, they may want to know if a company’s assets are physically vulnerable, the volume of greenhouse gases it emits, and what its plans are for lowering emissions.
In addition, heightened geopolitical risks, notably due to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the deterioration of the global economic outlook may make the transition to a low-carbon economy more complex, expensive and disorderly.

Banks, pension funds, and other investment firms need better climate data to assess risks.

Energy policy decisions could also be affected by the amount of carbon lock-in—which occurs when fossil fuel-intensive systems perpetuate, delay or prevent the low-carbon transition—that is generated in the near term, including by a delayed phase-out of thermal coal.
Data deficit
Currently, however, financial market participants face a lack of high-quality, reliable, and comparable data needed to efficiently price climate related risks and avoid greenwashing—spurious attempts by financial or non-financial companies to burnish their environmental credentials.
This data deficit poses a serious obstacle to the energy and ecological transition, which requires migrating capital toward low-carbon industries and massive new investments in mitigation and adaptation. It also makes it more difficult for financial supervisors to assess risks to financial stability given uncertainties and challenges to quantifying climate-related impacts. Therefore policymakers urgently need to ensure that better climate data are made available.
A new report from the Network for Greening the Financial System takes an important step. It features a directory that evaluates available climate data, identifies gaps, and offers practical, concrete ways to close those gaps.
The report, a product of a working group co-chaired by the IMF and the European Central Bank, strengthens what we call climate information architecture. This has three building blocks: high quality, comparable data; global disclosure standards; and climate alignment approaches and methodologies, including taxonomies of assets and activities.
The report makes three contributions. First, it highlights that, despite the substantial progress on the climate data front since COP26, challenges remain, including:

Insufficient coverage in disclosures of non-publicly listed companies and small and medium-sized companies
Limited availability of comparable and science-based forward-looking information, such as targets, commitments, and emissions pathways, that are needed to assess physical and transition risks
Auditability is needed to build trust and enhance the quality of data, yet it remains limited

Second, the report makes tangible policy recommendations:

Foster convergence toward common and consistent global disclosure standards, for example by increasing availability of granular emissions data and improving the reliability of reported climate-related data
Increase efforts toward shared principles for taxonomies, for example by increasing the linkages between taxonomies and disclosures
Develop well-defined metrics and methodological standards, for example by better harmonizing forward-looking metrics and reinforcing public and private cooperation to improve methodologies
Better leverage available data sources, approaches, and tools, for example by improving use of new technologies

The third and most important contribution is the climate-data directory, which surveys available data based on the needs of the financial sector and how information is used.
For example, banks, pension funds, and other investment firms apply scenario analyses and stress testing to analyze climate-related risks from individual securities and companies themselves, in combination with credit ratings. They need climate-related data to assess vulnerability to these risks at the sector, company, household, and sovereign level, and to evaluate the determinants of physical risks and transition risks.
Policymakers may need other data to determine whether a sharp drop in asset prices could hurt balance sheets of financial companies, putting financial stability at risk.
Climate data directory
The climate data directory can shape evidence-based conclusions on the main data gaps. For example, it shows where raw data aren’t available to construct metrics such as the exposure to climate policy relevant sectors, or the share of assets such as coal-fired power plants in energy portfolios. Missing are accounting data and exact geographic location of assets, as well as data on greenhouse-gas emissions and effects related to biodiversity, forest depletion, floods, droughts, and storms.
Though not offering direct access to underlying data, the directory is a public good, a living tool aimed at better disseminating climate-related data and offering practical solutions to bridge data gaps. It’s designed to help financial professionals identify relevant sources to meet their needs, facilitate access, and better disseminate existing climate-related data. It can play a decisive role in fostering progress on the four policy recommendations described above.
The report’s findings and accompanying policy recommendations line up closely with the IMF’s work on climate data, disclosures, and taxonomies and other methodologies intended to align financial portfolios with Paris Agreement goals.
Metrics and methodologies
For example, the Fund’s Climate Change Indicators Dashboard, a statistical initiative to address the growing need for data used in macroeconomic and financial stability analysis, may benefit from the directory’s improved metrics and underlying methodologies.
The IMF is also leading a joint project to provide guidance on the Group of Twenty’s high-level principles for taxonomies and other sustainable-finance alignment approaches. This work is particularly relevant for emerging market and developing economies, which face considerable challenges in reducing greenhouse-gas emissions and attracting private capital to finance the transition.
The IMF participates in the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation’s new standard-setting board for sustainability and climate disclosures, which plays a key role in such work. It also co-leads the Financial Stability Board’s Climate Vulnerabilities and Data workstream to incorporate climate in the organization’s regular vulnerabilities assessment.
These efforts aim to address areas of concern in climate vulnerabilities, metrics, and data based on their materiality and their cross-border and cross-sectoral relevance. Finally, the IMF has started to include climate-related risk analysis in its financial sector assessment programs.
Late last year, the IMF dedicated its annual statistical forum to gauging climate change, and discussed with other international bodies how to close climate finance data gaps. And in October, we will publish an analytical chapter of the Global Financial Stability Report that takes a more in-depth look at financial markets and instruments in scaling up of private climate finance in emerging market and developing economies.
Authors:

Charlotte Gardes-Landolfini
Fabio Natalucci

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FSB Annual Financial Report: 2021-22

This report contains the audited financial statements of the FSB, for the 12-month period from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2022. It also provides details on the FSB governance arrangements and its transparency and accountability mechanisms.
A detailed explanation of the activities undertaken to implement the mandate and tasks of the FSB is provided in the FSB’s Annual Report, which is a separate report that will be published in November.

Available as: PDF

Compliments of the U.S. Financial Stability Board.
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IMF | Public Sector Must Play Major Role in Catalyzing Private Climate Finance

Sharing the risks between public and private sectors would direct a greater share of the world’s financial assets to climate projects.
Climate change is one of the most critical macroeconomic and financial policy challenges that IMF members face in coming decades. The recent spikes in the cost of fuel and food—and the resulting risks of social unrest—underline the importance of investing in green energy and boosting resilience to shocks.
It will require massive global investments to address the climate challenge and vulnerabilities to shocks. Estimates range from $3 trillion to $6 trillion per year until 2050. The current level at about $630 billion is just a fraction of what’s really needed—and very little goes to developing countries.

That’s why we need a major shift to harness public and, especially, private financing. With $210 trillion in financial assets across firms, or roughly twice the gross domestic product of the entire world, the challenge for policymakers and investors is how to direct a big share of these holdings to climate mitigation and adaptation projects.
This is the focus of a new IMF Staff Climate Note on mobilizing private climate financing in emerging market and developing economies. It explores the factors that limit climate finance and what policymakers can do to address them.
Constraints
What prevents money from flowing in greater volumes to climate projects outside of advanced economies?
Incentives are at the heart of the problem. Investors have plenty of alternative options to generate returns—including fossil fuels in the absence of robust carbon pricing. And currently, green projects in emerging markets and developing economies simply do not justify the risks.
For example, both mitigation and adaptation investments often come with high upfront costs, multiple technical challenges, a long time horizon, and unproven business models. Add to that poor data, risks associated with currency fluctuations, macroeconomic conditions, an unpredictable business environment, and the perceived potential for political upheaval.
As a result, many climate opportunities are unable to secure sufficient financing. Those that do are most likely to attract a small pool of specialized investors demanding high returns in a developing and relatively illiquid asset class, with debt being the main instrument.
This is particularly the case for renewable energy companies, which operate in illiquid markets and have long-term financing needs. For instance, there is evidence that large investors screen out companies with a market capitalization of below $200 million, a threshold that relatively few renewable energy companies clear. And the compensation that the market expects in exchange for owning the asset and bearing the risk of ownership, termed as cost of equity, for climate investments for impact investors is in the 12-15 percent range in frontier emerging market and developing economies. This suggests it could be even higher for commercial investors.
Unleashing private sector financing
These obstacles are not insurmountable. But addressing them—to change the incentives for domestic and foreign investors—will require coordinated and determined action across the public and private sector.
The role of the public and the private sector financing varies across countries depending on country-specific characteristics and the local economic and institutional context. Blending public and private sector finance is useful to de-risk these investments for private sector capital in general, through for example first loss investments or performance guarantees.
For example, the public sector could invest equity—which brings higher risks, if the underlying asset loses value—or provide credit enhancements to improve creditworthiness of the projects. Both would lower the cost of investment by reducing risk to the private sector. By taking an equity position in climate investments, the public sector would bear much of the investment risk, but it would also see upside benefits when investments succeed.
Multilateral development banks will have an important role in this type of arrangement. They are already major providers of climate finance, especially debt which makes up more than two-thirds of the $32 billion disbursed in 2020. More innovative approaches—such as equity—would help to leverage more private capital and would be particularly helpful to the many emerging markets and developing economies already carrying heavy debt burdens.
Other financing instruments will also have a role to play. Think of public-private partnerships or multi-sovereign guarantees that help achieve higher leverage ratios. And underwriting the risks from specific factors such as project completion or political instability can be particularly helpful in easing high-risk premia that serve to impede private capital. A forthcoming analytical chapter of the October Global Financial Stability Report will take a more in-depth look at financial markets and instruments in scaling up of private climate finance in emerging market and developing economies.
Of course, all these tools must be deployed carefully. Prominent among the pitfalls is the potentially large public debt increases through the crystallization of contingent liabilities—so hard limits on the state’s exposure should be appropriately judged. In Uruguay, for instance, a law caps the state’s total public-private-partnership liabilities and fiscal transfers to private operators to 7 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, of the preceding year’s GDP.
The role of policy
Beyond financing, governments can use several policy tools to help attract private sector capital toward climate opportunities.
A first priority is robust and predictable carbon pricing. This would help generate incentives for private investment in low-carbon projects, promote a more transparent market and allow investors to make informed decisions in different markets.
The public sector can also provide leadership in establishing a strong climate information architecture to further improve decision-making and risk pricing, as well as preventing “greenwashing.” Ideally, this would comprise high-quality, reliable, and comparable data and statistics; a globally harmonized and consistent set of climate disclosure standards; and globally agreed principles for climate finance taxonomies. Here, the IMF had rich discussions on how to close climate finance data gaps with other international organizations and stakeholders at a statistical forum in November, and recently co-authored a report for the Network for Greening the Financial System setting out the urgent steps that are needed to bridge the data gaps.
What the IMF is doing
The IMF is also contributing elsewhere, including through surveillance, capacity development, financial sector risk assessments, and climate data and diagnostic tools. Of particular importance are programs to promote climate-friendly management of public finances and public investments. As well as promoting accountability, transparency and more effective spending, these measures can also increase domestic revenues and mobilize external funding from donors and the private sector.
Where emerging markets and developing economies have limited fiscal space, the new IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust could help. With its focus on longer-term structural changes, such as climate change, we expect it to play a catalytic role and thus create a conducive investment environment.
Again, the goal is to attract additional financing particularly from the private sector. After all, climate change is a global challenge that requires financing on a global level.
Authors:

Kristalina Georgieva
Tobias Adrian

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Ukraine: the EU has coordinated the delivery of more than 60,000 tonnes of life-saving assistance

As of today, the EU has coordinated the delivery of 66,224 tonnes of in-kind assistance to Ukraine from 30 countries via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. The assistance delivered includes 180 ambulances, 125 fire-fighting vehicles, 300 power generators, 35 heavy machinery vehicles, and 4 pontoon bridges. This is by far the largest, longest lasting and most complex operation via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism since it was established in 2001, with an estimated value so far of over €425 million. To support this operation, logistics hubs have been set up in Poland, Romania and Slovakia where assistance is then chanelled directly to Ukraine.
Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarčič said: “We are all horrified by Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine. By providing emergency assistance, we can at least ease the immense pressure on Ukraine’s emergency response systems. Today we have reached an important milestone – over 60,000 tonnes of in-kind assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has arrived in Ukraine. I am extremely grateful to every single Member State, together with Norway, Turkey and North Macedonia for having offered help that we have then channelled most effectively through the Mechanism. This solidarity is the proof that the EU is with Ukraine not only in words but in actions.”
On 15 February, Ukraine activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in preparation for a large-scale emergency. Ever since, the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre has maintained close contact with the Ukrainian authorities to determine the specific needs, and to coordinate the EU’s crisis response.
The EU continues receiving new offers to Ukraine from its Member States still today. The latest offers via the Mechanism include, hospital beds and hygiene kits from Austria, an ambulance and medical equipment from Norway, shelter equipment from Finland, Protective personal equipment  from Germany, medicines from Czechia and Slovakia, power generators from Italy and energy supply equipment from France.
The EU’s Emergency Response Coordination Centre is operating 24/7 to provide further assistance based on the specific needs indicated by Ukraine.
Background
Since the start of Russia’s invasion on 24 February, the humanitarian needs in Ukraine have risen to unprecedented levels. The ongoing war endangers the lives of civilians and causes severe damage to housing, water and electricity supply, heating, but also public infrastructure such as schools and health facilities. Millions of people have no access to basic needs. The EU has mobilised all possible resources to enable emergency assistance into Ukraine.
In response to the Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, the European Commission is coordinating its largest ever operation under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. All 27 EU countries, plus Norway, Turkey and North Macedonia, have offered in-kind assistance ranging from medical supplies and shelter items to vehicles and energy equipment. Given the immense need for medical supplies in Ukraine, the EU has also deployed its strategic rescEU reserves.
The European Commission has allocated €348 million for humanitarian aid programmes to help civilians affected by the war in Ukraine. This includes respectively €335 million for Ukraine and €13 million for Moldova. EU humanitarian funding is helping people inside Ukraine by providing them with food, water, essential household items, health care, psychosocial support, emergency shelter, protection, and cash assistance to help to cover their basic needs.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Federal Reserve Board announces final guidelines that establish a transparent, risk-based, and consistent set of factors for Reserve Banks to use in reviewing requests to access Federal Reserve accounts and payment services

The Federal Reserve Board on Monday announced final guidelines that establish a transparent, risk-based, and consistent set of factors for Reserve Banks to use in reviewing requests to access Federal Reserve accounts and payment services. The final guidelines are substantially similar to those proposed by the Board in its May 2021 proposal and March 2022 supplemental proposal.
“The new guidelines provide a consistent and transparent process to evaluate requests for Federal Reserve accounts and access to payment services in order to support a safe, inclusive, and innovative payment system,” said Vice Chair Lael Brainard.
Institutions offering new types of financial products or with novel charters have grown in recent years and many have requested access to accounts – often referred to as “master accounts” – and payment services offered by Federal Reserve Banks. The guidelines will be used by Reserve Banks to evaluate those requests with a transparent and consistent set of factors.
The new guidelines include a tiered review framework to provide additional clarity on the level of due diligence and scrutiny that Reserve Banks will apply to different types of institutions with varying degrees of risk. For example, institutions with federal deposit insurance would be subject to a more streamlined level of review, while institutions that engage in novel activities and for which authorities are still developing appropriate supervisory and regulatory frameworks would undergo a more extensive review. In response to public comments, the tiered review framework in the final guidelines was refined to provide more comparable treatment between non-federally-insured institutions chartered under state and federal law.

Federal Register notice: Guidelines for Evaluating Account and Services Requests (PDF)
Board Memo: Proposed Guidelines to Evaluate Requests for Accounts and Services at Federal Reserve Banks (PDF)
Statement by Governor Bowman

Contact:

For media inquiries, please call 202-452-2955 or email media@frb.gov

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COVID-19 vaccines: EU Commission and Moderna adapt delivery schedules for late summer and winter

The European Commission and Moderna have reached an agreement to better address Member States needs for COVID-19 vaccines for the late summer and winter period. This will ensure national authorities have access to the vaccines, including variant-adapted vaccines if authorised, at the time they need them for their own vaccination campaigns and to support their global partners.
This agreement will adapt the originally agreed contractual delivery schedules. Doses originally scheduled for delivery in the summer will now be delivered in September and during the autumn and winter period 2022, when Member States will more likely need additional stocks of vaccines for national campaigns and meeting their international solidarity commitments.
The agreement also ensures that, if one or more adapted vaccines receive marketing authorisation, Member States may choose to receive those adapted vaccines under the current contract.
In this context, at the request of some Member States, the agreement also secures additional 15 million doses of Omicron-containing vaccine booster candidates from Moderna, subject to marketing authorisation within timelines that would allow the use of these doses for their vaccination campaigns.
Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, Stella Kyriakides, said: “Increasing COVID-19 vaccination and booster rates will be crucial as we plan ahead for the autumn and winter months. To best ensure our common preparedness, Member States must have the necessary tools. This includes vaccines adapted to variants, as and when they are authorised by the European Medicines Agency. This agreement will ensure that Member States will have access to the vaccine doses they need at the right time to protect our citizens”.
Background
In 2020, the European Union invested heavily in the global production of a number of COVID-19 vaccines. It was crucial to have vaccines as early as possible and at the scale needed, requiring important investments before knowing whether any of these vaccines would prove successful.
These actions taken at risk in 2020 have clearly paid off, as the development of vaccines has been highly successful: Member States had equal access to safe and effective vaccines at the earliest opportunity, and at the scale needed, allowing all EU citizens to be offered primary and booster vaccinations, saving lives and mitigating the impact of the pandemic upon social and economic life.
Moreover, a large number of these vaccines could also be used in the global efforts to tackle the pandemic.  As of end July 2022, the EU exported more than 2.4 billion vaccine doses to 168 countries. Member States have shared over 478 million doses of which around 406 million have already been delivered to recipient countries (around 82% of these via COVAX). At the same time, Member States must continue to ensure they have the strategic stocks of vaccines they need to deal with the potential epidemiological evolution of the COVID-19 virus, given the uncertainties over its future evolution and impact. The EU’s Vaccines Strategy provides Member States with certainty that they will have the supply they need, including of adapted vaccines.
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U.S. Fed | Speech by Governor Bowman on fighting inflation in challenging times

Speech by Governor Michelle W. Bowman at the 2022 CEO & Senior Management Summit sponsored by the Kansas Bankers Association, Colorado Springs, Colorado |
Thanks to the Kansas Bankers Association for the invitation to share my perspective on the economy and bank regulation. It is always a pleasure to be here with you for this annual gathering. I am especially looking forward to hearing what is on your minds about supervision and regulation, how you are navigating current economic conditions, and your expectations going forward.
I’ll start with a recap of the decision from July’s Federal Open Market Committee meeting and then move on to my thoughts about the current economic uncertainty and challenges that lie ahead. The number one challenge, of course, is inflation, which continues to be much too high, and a heavy burden for households and businesses. As I’m sure you all already know, the Federal Open Market Committee decided last week to raise the federal funds rate by 75 basis points, to a range of 2-1/4 to 2-1/2 percent. I will share my reasoning for supporting this increase and why I support continued increases until inflation is on a consistent path to significantly decline. I will then touch on the current federal regulatory climate and the Fed’s agenda for supervision.
Inflation continued to climb in June, reaching 9.1 percent as measured by the consumer price index. This is yet another concerningly high reading, and it set another 40-year record high despite the expectation of many forecasters that inflation had peaked earlier in the year. I have seen few, if any, concrete indications that support this expectation, and I will need to see unambiguous evidence of this decline before I incorporate an easing of inflation pressures into my outlook.
Many of the underlying causes of excessive inflation are the same as they have been over the past year or so—supply chain issues, including those related to China’s COVID containment policies, constrained housing supply, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, fiscal stimulus, and limitations on domestic energy production.
Regardless of the source of the inflationary pressure, the Federal Reserve has a duty to bring inflation down to our 2 percent target. This duty is mandated by Congress to carry out monetary policy that results in price stability—meaning low and stable inflation. We all understand why this is a critically important responsibility, especially in times of extreme inflation. Rising prices for food, housing, and energy negatively impact affordability for all Americans, but especially those with low or moderate incomes. For those workers who drive long distances to get to work, high inflation is especially concerning, requiring some to make tradeoffs between feeding their families and buying fuel to fill gas tanks. Some workers have seen their wages grow significantly over the past two years, but most have seen any gains in wages far outpaced by higher prices. Therefore, in my mind, it is absolutely critical that we continue to use our monetary policy tools until we are successful in returning inflation to our 2 percent goal.
Businesses are also suffering from elevated inflation through rising and volatile prices for inputs and the need to price their own goods and services to cover costs without losing customers. This dynamic is evident in agriculture and what we are hearing directly from farmers and ranchers, who are dealing with added weather challenges and on-going drought. Prices for commodities have declined lately but are still at historically high levels. In contrast, prices for fertilizer and many crop inputs continue to rise. In some areas, high input costs and drought conditions are contributing to record early season cattle auction sales, as many ranchers choose to sell herds early to limit further outlays for input expenses.
I see a significant risk of high inflation into next year for necessities including food, housing, fuel, and vehicles. Rents have grown dramatically, and while home sales have slowed, the continued increasing price of single-family homes indicates to me that rents won’t decline anytime in the near future. Recently, gasoline prices have moderated but are still roughly 80 percent higher than pre-pandemic levels due to constrained domestic supply and the disruption of world markets. And I see continued inflation risk from motor vehicle prices, as auto manufacturers struggle with supply chain problems that haven’t improved significantly. Demand for cars continues to exceed supply, and retail used car prices are still very high, about 50 percent more than before the pandemic.
The supply problems pushing up inflation seem likely to persist. Indications are that the conflict in Ukraine will continue, and that the effects of shipping disruptions of agriculture products and limits on energy supplies from Russia will continue to be a significant problem. Even with the recent agreement intended to facilitate Ukrainian grain exports, it is unclear whether supply pressures on global markets will ease as a result. An announced reduction in Russian natural gas supplies to Western Europe has driven European prices even higher, causing ripple effects on world energy markets and raising concerns about shortages this winter. China has eased some of its most stringent COVID containment measures but recently revived travel restrictions in some areas, and its approach to the pandemic remains an upside risk for inflation. Despite a slowdown in sales of new and existing homes, inventories of homes for sale and rental vacancies remain low, supporting ongoing increases in housing costs.
On the other side of our dual mandate, maximum employment, we continue to see a tight labor market, though there are some emerging signs that would support expectations of loosening. Yesterday’s job report showed continued significant growth in hiring with the unemployment rate finally returning to the pre-pandemic level of 3.5 percent. As I am sure you all know, the job market in Kansas is even stronger, with an unemployment rate of 2.4 percent in June. In our state, finding workers is a bigger problem in most communities than finding a job.
One aspect of the job market that has not recovered is labor force participation. Based on the pre-pandemic trend, there are nearly four million people who are still sitting out of a strong labor market.
In contrast to this labor market strength in Kansas and nationwide, output growth has slowed this year. Real gross domestic product, GDP, edged lower in the second quarter, following a larger decline in the first quarter.
My base case is for a pickup in growth during the second half of this year and for moderate growth in 2023. As we learned during the summer and fall of 2021, both GDP and jobs numbers are subject to significant revision, both in subsequent months and then again the next year. From my perspective, had we known at the time about the eventual large upward revisions in last year’s employment data, we likely would have significantly accelerated our monetary policy actions. Going forward, we have to consider the possibility of these kinds of revisions when making real-time judgments as policymakers, which includes looking at other kinds of indicators instead of relying too heavily on the data. Taking all of that on board, while the data on economic activity are indeed lower and the view is murky, the evidence on inflation is absolutely clear, which brings me to the implications for monetary policy.
Based on current economic conditions and the outlook I just described, I supported the FOMC’s decision last week to raise the federal funds rate another 75 basis points. I also support the Committee’s view that “ongoing increases” would be appropriate at coming meetings. My view is that similarly-sized increases should be on the table until we see inflation declining in a consistent, meaningful, and lasting way.
On the subject of forward guidance, I am pleased to see that following the July meeting, the FOMC ended the practice of providing specific forward guidance in our post-meeting communications. I believe that the overly specific forward guidance implemented at the December 2020 FOMC meeting requiring “substantial further progress” unnecessarily limited the Committee’s actions in beginning the removal of accommodation later in 2021. In my view, that, combined with data revisions that were directly relevant to our decision making, led to a delay in taking action to address rising inflation.
It is helpful that the FOMC provided clear direction earlier this year that it was prepared to act quickly to tighten monetary policy. Since we have now taken actions to raise rates and finally reduce the Fed’s balance sheet, we are following through on that commitment. Looking ahead, the FOMC will be getting two months of data on inflation and another month on employment before our next meeting in September, and while I expect that ongoing rate increases will be appropriate, given the uncertainty in how those data and conditions will evolve, I will allow that information to guide my judgment on how big the increases will need to be.
I do expect that the labor market will remain strong as we continue to increase interest rates and allow the balance sheet to run off, but there is a risk that our actions will slow job gains, or even reduce employment. Growth has softened, and perhaps this is an indication that our actions to tighten monetary policy are having the desired effect, with the ultimate goal of bringing demand and supply into greater balance.
When considering the risks to the labor market, these risks must be viewed in the context of its current strength and with the understanding that our primary challenge is to get inflation under control. In fact, the larger threat to the strong labor market is excessive inflation, which if allowed to continue could lead to a further economic softening, risking a prolonged period of economic weakness coupled with high inflation, like we experienced in the 1970s.
In any case, we must fulfill our commitment to lowering inflation, and I will remain steadfastly focused on this task.
With my outlook out of the way, let me turn to another of my responsibilities at the Fed, which is bank regulation and supervision. I am sure that we will have the opportunity to discuss many issues of interest to you during our discussion, but I’d like to mention a pending rulemaking that would update the Community Reinvestment Act. I understand that the draft rule was intended to provide greater clarity to banks regarding community development activities and their consideration for CRA. While I am a strong supporter of the fundamentals behind CRA, and I support community development activities, I am concerned that the proposal does not adequately account for the costs and benefits of certain provisions, and that no attempt has even been made to either ensure that or to analyze whether the benefits exceed the costs, which is a fundamental element of effective regulation. The comment period for the proposal ended on August 5, and I will repeat what I have said in the past: if this proposal affects you or your business, I hope that you made your voice heard by submitting a comment to the more than 600-page proposal within the short 90-day comment period. Public comments really do matter when considering the content of proposed rulemakings.
Of course, my comments about the benefits of public participation in rulemaking apply beyond the CRA proposal, and there are other regulatory topics on the horizon that would benefit from robust engagement. One that comes to mind is the regulatory framework for analyzing bank mergers. Earlier this year, the Justice Department requested comment on whether to revise their 1995 Bank Merger Competitive Review guidelines, seeking input on a wide range of issues. The FDIC also issued a request for information on the Bank Merger Act framework. I expect this review will be a focus across the banking agencies, and I will be very interested to see how the framework for small and regional banks is affected by any proposed change. I would be concerned about any changes that would result in making mergers among these institutions more difficult or would not address some of the longstanding issues with the existing framework. Among those are that the framework doesn’t account for new technologies or overwhelming competition posed by credit unions, internet based financial services, and non-bank financial companies. Another concern is that overly strict criteria for mergers could have the unintended consequence of depriving consumers in some areas of access to any banking services. “Banking deserts” in rural and underserved areas are a real problem and regulators should guard against this outcome when proposing or evaluating rules.
I should also briefly mention three other regulatory topics of interest to all banks, including those here today.
First, the Fed’s LIBOR proposal is currently out for comment on a short timeline. That proposal implements the recently passed LIBOR Act by providing default rules for certain contracts that use the soon to be discontinued reference rate. Second, comments are currently under review for the third-party risk management guidance jointly proposed by the Fed with the other banking agencies. Banks and third parties will benefit from clear guidance that helps banks navigate the challenging issues and risks raised by third party engagement.
Finally, another area that could benefit from more regulatory clarity is digital assets, including stablecoins and crypto assets. Some banks are considering expanding into a range of crypto activities, including custody, lending backed by crypto collateral, and facilitating the purchase and sale of these assets for their customers. In the absence of clear guidance, banks should consult with their primary regulator and exercise caution when engaging with customers in these types of activities.
I will conclude with a brief comment on supervision. While the trend of returning to on-site bank examination is continuing, progress has been somewhat slow. This may be driven in part by the varied pace of employees returning to the office. That said, the Fed intends to return to some form of on-site supervision. We find substantial value in those in-person interactions during bank examinations.
In closing, thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you today. I look forward to hearing how high inflation is affecting you and your communities and your thoughts on the regulatory agenda.
Compliments of the U.S. Federal Reserve.
The post U.S. Fed | Speech by Governor Bowman on fighting inflation in challenging times first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

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The ECB’s new inflation target one year on

As part of our monetary policy strategy review we adopted a new symmetric 2% inflation target. One year on, we examine how the strategy review has helped anchor financial analysts’ inflation expectations. We also show that recent policy normalisation is grounded in our strategy.

A year ago the Governing Council of the ECB published its new monetary policy strategy.[1] Since then, the monetary policy environment has changed completely. The war in Ukraine and the reopening of the economy as the pandemic abates have contributed to a shift from an era of subdued price increases to a period of elevated inflation. Given the importance of inflation expectations to monetary policy and price stability, in this post we address two key questions. To what extent have inflation expectations become more firmly anchored at the 2% inflation target since the new strategy was announced? And how has the strategy laid the groundwork for monetary policy normalisation in the current phase of undesirably high inflation?[2]
The strategy review challenge: how to re-anchor expectations at target when inflation is low?
In 2020-21 we needed to review our monetary policy strategy to grapple with the structural economic changes over the preceding decades. The most fundamental of these was a decline in the equilibrium real interest rate, which keeps the economy balanced between inflationary or disinflationary forces.[3] The estimated equilibrium rate dropped from close to 3% at the start of the monetary union to levels close to or even below zero in the period before the pandemic. This decline reduced the space available for central banks to carry out monetary easing using conventional interest rate policy.
The new strategy addresses this challenge with an explicitly symmetric 2% inflation target over the medium term, which is slightly higher than our previous target. Being “symmetric” means that it is equally undesirable for inflation to rise above or drop below the target. The strategy also acknowledges that, when the economy is operating close to the lower bound on nominal interest rates, especially forceful or persistent monetary policy action is required. This may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above target.
Bringing low inflation up to our target was the key monetary policy challenge until the summer of 2021. The new target of 2% was expected to help with this by contributing to anchoring longer-term inflation expectations more solidly. There is evidence to confirm that this has indeed happened. Following the announcement of the new strategy, the ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts showed a noticeable increase in the percentage of respondents expecting long-run inflation at 2%, together with a decline in the percentage of respondents expecting inflation below 2% (see Chart 1). According to the latest survey round, the median respondent expects inflation to be exactly 2.0% as of the fourth quarter of 2024, suggesting that both medium-term and long-term inflation expectations are firmly anchored at our new inflation target. Other indicators broadly support this assessment. For instance, according to a special Survey of Professional Forecasters aimed at evaluating our new strategy, survey respondents, on balance, revised their longer-term inflation expectations moderately upwards, with the balance of risks surrounding these expectations coming closer to symmetry.[4]
Today’s challenge: how to keep inflation expectations anchored at 2%?
Only 12 months after publishing our new strategy, the world has changed. The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have fostered inflationary forces. So central banks have had to shift their focus from tackling low inflation to combating high inflation. The ECB’s monetary policy response to the higher inflation outlook can clearly be rationalised based on the new strategy – in particular its symmetric inflation target.
Two aspects of the ECB’s strategy support the continued accommodative monetary policy stance during the initial phase of rising inflation in the second half of 2021.
The first is the flexible medium-term orientation, which allows for inevitable short-term deviations of inflation from target, as well as lags and uncertainty in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy and to inflation. Initially, the unexpected rise in inflation was largely seen as transitory and mainly caused by supply bottlenecks, such as the temporary closure of port terminals. Such supply shocks tend to push inflation higher and economic activity and employment lower. In cases like this, the medium-term orientation enables a lengthening of the horizon over which inflation is brought back to target. This avoids pronounced falls in economic activity and employment, which, if persistent, could jeopardise medium-term price stability. Lengthening this horizon is a viable option as long as inflation expectations remain well-anchored.
The second aspect supporting the policy stance in the second half of 2021 is that the euro area is emerging from a long period with policy interest rates at the lower bound. This is a situation for which our strategy prescribes that monetary policy accommodation should be “especially persistent” and adjustments gradual, so that inflation expectations do not settle below the 2% target.
From the end of 2021 onwards, inflationary pressures broadened and intensified, with core inflation rising above 2% as of October 2021 and more significantly so as of February 2022. This was driven by a sequence of supply shocks, in particular disruptions in energy markets following Russia’s unjustified aggression towards Ukraine, combined with a rebound in demand reflecting pandemic restrictions being lifted. A succession of supply-side shocks has the potential to destabilise inflation expectations, with the risk that the increase in inflation becomes self-sustained. In response, the ECB began normalising monetary policy in December 2021, with the decision to end net purchases under the pandemic emergency purchase programme at the end of March 2022.
In early 2022 concerns increased that inflation expectations might become unanchored from the 2% target. Our April monetary policy statement reflected those concerns, stating “initial signs of above-target revisions in those measures [of inflation expectations] warrant close monitoring”. Data and analysis in the following months raised the need for further steps to be taken on the path towards policy normalisation, most importantly the ending of net asset purchases to pave the way for an increase – by 50 basis points – in the ECB’s key policy rates at the July Governing Council meeting. This ended an eight-year period of negative rates.[5]
To sum up, the new ECB strategy has contributed to a more solid anchoring of inflation expectations at 2%. Monetary policy decisions taken by the ECB’s Governing Council since July 2021 have been firmly grounded in the strategy. In the light of rising inflationary pressures, in December 2021 the Governing Council decided to embark on a path of monetary policy normalisation. Since then the Governing Council has repeatedly emphasised that it will ensure inflation returns to the 2% target over the medium term, in line with its commitment to symmetry.
It is always worth noting that, at any point in time, it is likely that several monetary policy options are each consistent with the overall strategy. While a strategic framework provides a fundamental anchor for the medium-orientation of monetary policy, meeting-by-meeting decisions still require considerable judgement in terms of assessing the latest conjunctural information and determining the appropriate speed in adjusting the monetary policy stance.

Chart 1
Evolution of long-run inflation expectations over survey rounds
(Percentage of respondents)

Source: ECB Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) (all vintages from January 2020 until July 2022 results).
Notes: The three groups are based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices long-run point forecasts provided by respondents on the macroeconomic projections question of the SMA. 2% is calculated as inflation expectations between 1.95% and 2.05%. The number of respondents to the July 2022 SMA was 27. The latest observation (SMA) is for July 2022.

Authors:

Ursel Baumann, Deputy Head of Division · Monetary Policy, Capital Markets/Financial Structure

Christophe Kamps, Deputy Director General

Manfred Kremer, Adviser · Research, Financial Research

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
Footnotes:
1. See the ECB’s monetary policy strategy statement and an overview of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
2. The decision on the ECB monetary policy strategy also covered: the measurement of inflation; the inclusion of owner-occupied housing; the proportionality of monetary policy measures; the instruments within the ECB’s toolkit; the role of fiscal and other policies; considerations relating to balanced growth; employment; financial stability and climate change; the analytical framework; and the communication of ECB policies. An assessment of these topics goes beyond the scope of this blog. For an assessment of the ECB’s first milestone when it comes to incorporating climate change considerations into its monetary policy, see Elderson, F. and Schnabel, I. (2022),“A catalyst for greening the financial system”, The ECB Blog, 8 July.
3. The concept of the equilibrium real interest rate is explained in the ECB Monetary Policy glossary.
4. See European Central Bank (2021), “Results of a special survey of professional forecasters on the ECB’s new monetary policy strategy”, Economic Bulletin, ECB, Issue 7.
5. See Lagarde, C. (2022), “Ensuring price stability”, The ECB Blog, 23 July. To support the effective transmission of monetary policy across all euro area countries, at its July 2022 meeting the ECB’s Governing Council also approved the establishment of the Transmission Protection Instrument.
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IMF | Central Banks Hike Interest Rates in Sync to Tame Inflation Pressures

During the pandemic, central banks in both advanced and emerging market economies took unprecedented measures to ease financial conditions and support the economic recovery, including interest-rate cuts and asset purchases.
With inflation at multi-decade highs in many countries and pressures broadening beyond food and energy prices, policymakers have pivoted toward tighter policy. As our Chart of the Week shows, central banks in many emerging markets proactively started to hike rates earlier last year, followed by their counterparts in advanced economies in the final months of 2021.

The monetary policy cycle is now increasingly synchronized around the world. Importantly, the pace of tightening is accelerating in several countries, particularly in advanced economies, in terms of both frequency and magnitude of rate hikes. Some central banks have begun to reduce the size of their balance sheets, moving further toward normalization of policy.
Stable prices are a crucial prerequisite for sustained economic growth. With risks to the inflation outlook tilted to the upside, central banks must continue normalizing to prevent inflationary pressures from becoming entrenched. They need to act resolutely to bring inflation back to their target, avoiding a de-anchoring of inflation expectations that would damage credibility built over the past decades.
Monetary policy can’t resolve remaining pandemic-related bottlenecks in global supply chains and disruptions in commodities markets due to the war in Ukraine. It can however slow overall demand to address demand-related inflationary pressures, so a tightening of financial conditions is the goal.
The high uncertainty clouding the economic and inflation outlook hampers the ability of central banks to provide simple guidance about the future path of policy. But clear communication by central banks about the need to further tighten policy and steps required to control inflation is crucial to preserve credibility.
Clear communication is also critical to avoid a sharp, disorderly tightening of financial conditions that could interact with, and amplify, existing financial vulnerabilities, putting economic growth and financial stability at risk down the road.
Authors:

Tobias Adrian
Fabio Natalucci

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | Central Banks Hike Interest Rates in Sync to Tame Inflation Pressures first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.