One year ago today, Russia launched its unprovoked, unjustifiable and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
Within hours of the invasion, the OECD Council condemned Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms as a clear violation of international law and a serious threat to the rules-based international order, expressing its solidarity with the Ukrainian people.
Since then, building on our work together over several decades, the OECD has continued to further broaden, deepen and strengthen our engagement and cooperation with Ukraine.
We have worked with our Members to support the reception and integration of Ukraine’s refugees and displaced persons, and to help address their needs with a particular focus on educational and employment continuity.
We have worked with donors and other partners on the international coordination of support to Ukraine.
We have worked closely with the government of Ukraine in support of its rebuilding, reconstruction and reform agenda.
We were pleased to welcome President Volodymyr Zelensky, virtually from Kyiv, to our annual Ministerial Council meeting and Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal to our final Council meeting of 2022.
We have formally recognised Ukraine as a prospective Member, committing to an initial accession dialogue designed to increase its adherence to OECD standards and participation in OECD bodies.
We have established the new OECD-Ukraine Liaison Office, initially from Paris.
Today I can announce the official opening of the OECD-Ukraine Liaison office in Kyiv.
From 1 March 2023, the office will start operating from its premises hosted by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Ukraine in Kyiv.
I thank Slovakia most sincerely for this important support and also warmly recognise the financial support provided by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania as well as Slovakia to enable the establishment and operation of this office.
At full capacity, a team of four OECD officials will coordinate the implementation of a new OECD-Ukraine Country Programme on the ground from Kyiv.
As we go forward, the most immediate focus must remain on securing, as soon as possible, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace for the people of Ukraine, consistent with international law and with the terms of the UN resolution passed with the overwhelming support of its Members yesterday. Such a peace is not only in the best interest of the people of Ukraine, but of people all around the world, including the people of Russia.
In the meantime, the OECD will continue to support Ukraine’s determined efforts to plan and prepare now for the reconstruction and recovery effort, to help rebuild better, stronger and consistent with the values of a free, open, market based democracy and the high standards expected of a prospective Member of the OECD.
Compliments of the OECD.
The post OECD | Statement by the OECD Secretary-General on Ukraine first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The United States and the European Union share the most comprehensive and dynamic economic relationship in the world. Our partnership is based on shared values and principles, including the responsibility to protect our planet for future generations and defend our workers. Today, the United States and the European Union are taking new steps to deepen our economic relationship as we build the clean energy economies of the future and address shared economic and national security challenges.
Building the Clean Economies of the Future
The United States and European Union are committed to addressing the climate crisis, accelerating the global clean energy economy, and building resilient, secure, and diversified clean energy supply chains. Both parties recognize that these objectives are at the heart of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Green Deal Industrial Plan. By building and strengthening our own clean energy industrial bases and investing in the industries of the future, the United States and the European Union will create good-paying jobs and spark virtuous cycles of innovation that drive down costs for clean energy technologies in the global market, making those technologies more affordable and advancing a global just energy transition that will leave no community behind.
The EU-U.S. Task Force on the Inflation Reduction Act has productively deepened our partnership on these common goals, and has taken practical steps forward on identified challenges to align our approaches on strengthening and securing supply chains, manufacturing, and innovation on both sides of the Atlantic.
We will deepen our cooperation on diversifying critical mineral and battery supply chains, recognizing the substantial opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic to build out these supply chains in a strong, secure, and resilient manner. To that end, we intend to immediately begin negotiations on a targeted critical minerals agreement for the purpose of enabling relevant critical minerals extracted or processed in the European Union to count toward requirements for clean vehicles in the Section 30D clean vehicle tax credit of the Inflation Reduction Act. This kind of agreement would further our shared goals of boosting our mineral production and processing and expanding access to sources of critical minerals that are sustainable, trusted, and free of labor abuses. Cooperation is also necessary to reduce unwanted strategic dependencies in these supply chains, and to ensure that they are diversified and developed with trusted partners.
We further recognize the need to make bold investments to build clean energy economies and industrial bases, including in electric vehicle batteries and clean hydrogen. Today, the United States and the European Commission announced the launch of the Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue to coordinate our respective incentive programs so that they are mutually reinforcing. Both sides will take steps to avoid any disruptions in transatlantic trade and investment flows that could arise from their respective incentives. We are working against zero-sum competition so that our incentives maximize clean energy deployment and jobs—and do not lead to windfalls for private interests. The Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue will become a part of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council where it will also facilitate information-sharing on non-market policies and practices of third parties—such as those employed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—to serve as the basis for joint or parallel action and coordinated advocacy on these issues in multilateral or other fora.
We are committed to achieving an ambitious outcome in the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum negotiations by October 2023. The arrangement will ensure the long-term viability of our industries, encourage low-carbon intensity steel and aluminum production and trade, and restore market-oriented conditions globally and bilaterally. Together, we will incentivize emission reductions in these carbon-intensive sectors and level the playing field for our workers. The arrangement will be open to all partners demonstrating commitment to countering non-market excess capacity and reducing carbon-intensity in these sectors.
We are working together to support countries around the world as they develop their economies to deliver inclusive and resilient growth, while fostering sustainable pathways to net zero emissions as well as boosting the security of global supply chains. Through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, we are identifying opportunities to generate significantly more public and private financing for quality climate and energy security investments in developing countries. We are also advancing an ambitious agenda to evolve the multilateral development banks, starting with the World Bank, to better respond to global challenges like climate change, while also enhancing their work on poverty alleviation and meeting the Sustainable Development Goals.
Recognizing our shared history as well as our joint visions for the future, we believe that people to people exchanges strengthen the transatlantic partnership, especially for younger generations. We will discuss how to deepen our cooperation.
Standing Together to End Russia’s War Against Ukraine
The United States and the European Union have taken a strong and united stand against Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war against Ukraine. We, along with a broad coalition of partners, have imposed swift and sweeping sanctions that are reducing Russia’s revenue to fund its war and its military-industrial base. Putin thought that he would divide us, and yet we are more united than ever. We stand together in our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.
One year ago, the United States and the European Commission launched a new partnership to rapidly reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate Europe’s green transition. This partnership has exceeded our goals, delivering more than double the U.S. liquefied natural gas supplies to Europe than our baseline pledge. We note the significant European efforts to diversify their energy supplies and accelerate the energy transition, which have helped limit the impact of the global energy crisis in Europe. We will continue to work together to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe by diversifying sources, lowering energy consumption, and reducing Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels. We will also continue our close coordination to support Ukraine’s energy security through its further integration into Europe’s energy markets. We will continue our cooperation for stable and balanced global markets and security of supply and step up the clean energy transition globally, including by efforts to reduce methane emissions in the energy sector.
We have also taken unprecedented, coordinated, and effective sanctions and other economic measures together to further degrade Russia’s capacity to wage its illegal war and its military-industrial system. We are deepening our joint work to aggressively enforce our sanctions and export control measures and also to end and deter circumvention and backfill, including by expanded authorities to close down Russia’s access to all inputs that can support its war machine. As part of this, we are taking new steps together to target additional third-country actors across the globe to disrupt support for Russia’s war from any corner of the world where it is identified. We are working in lockstep to limit Russian revenue even further while ensuring continued energy supplies to emerging market and developing countries via the G7+ price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products. We will continue to work together to strengthen our economic restrictions to ensure that the costs to Russia of its illegal war continue to grow.
The United States and European Union are working to ensure that Ukraine has the security, economic, and humanitarian support it needs for as long as it takes. We have worked together to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the military equipment and training it needs to defend itself from Russian aggression. We, together with Ukraine, are co-chairing the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform, and, in line with its European path, are helping advance Ukraine’s reform agenda, laying the foundation for sustainable growth and reconstruction, and ensuring assistance is delivered in a coherent, transparent, and accountable manner. We remain committed to providing and mobilizing international support including from the private sector for Ukraine’s economic and financial stability. We support the International Monetary Fund delivering an ambitious program by end March 2023 to provide necessary budget support to Ukraine throughout and beyond 2023.
Strengthening Economic Security and National Security
The United States and the European Union are working to reinforce, through transatlantic cooperation, our essential security interests and the resilience of our economies. We affirm that our cooperation to strengthen our economic security and national security should be rooted in maintaining the rules-based system. We will continue our work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council and the G7 and strengthen our bilateral coordination by tasking our Sherpas to formulate key recommendations on economic security by the summer.
We will continue work to strengthen our economic security, responding to concrete threats we have identified. The United States and the European Union share concerns about the challenges posed by, among other issues, economic coercion, the weaponization of economic dependencies, and non-market policies and practices. We will continue our work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council and the G7 to strengthen coordination with each other and other likeminded partners to diversify our supply chains, and to increase our collective preparedness, resilience, and deterrence to non-market policies and practices and to economic coercion.
We are increasing our cooperation to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies, as well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil-military fusion strategies. Our respective existing controls related to exports, inbound investment, and research cooperation are essential tools and need to be upgraded to correspond to a changing geostrategic environment. We have a common interest in preventing our companies’ capital, expertise, and knowledge from fueling technological advances that will enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of our strategic rivals, including through outbound investment. As we develop and upgrade our toolkit, we will coordinate efforts across the Atlantic to avoid the backfilling of any controlled exports and investments and will continue to share lessons and seek to align our approaches where feasible to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Joint Statement by President Biden and President von der Leyen first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The United States and the European Union share the most comprehensive and dynamic economic relationship in the world. Our partnership is based on shared values and principles, including the responsibility to protect our planet for future generations and defend our workers. Today, the United States and the European Union are taking new steps to deepen our economic relationship as we build the clean energy economies of the future and address shared economic and national security challenges. 
Building the Clean Economies of the Future
The United States and European Union are committed to addressing the climate crisis, accelerating the global clean energy economy, and building resilient, secure, and diversified clean energy supply chains. Both parties recognize that these objectives are at the heart of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Green Deal Industrial Plan. By building and strengthening our own clean energy industrial bases and investing in the industries of the future, the United States and the European Union will create good-paying jobs and spark virtuous cycles of innovation that drive down costs for clean energy technologies in the global market, making those technologies more affordable and advancing a global just energy transition that will leave no community behind.
The EU-U.S. Task Force on the Inflation Reduction Act has productively deepened our partnership on these common goals, and has taken practical steps forward on identified challenges to align our approaches on strengthening and securing supply chains, manufacturing, and innovation on both sides of the Atlantic.
We will deepen our cooperation on diversifying critical mineral and battery supply chains, recognizing the substantial opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic to build out these supply chains in a strong, secure, and resilient manner. To that end, we intend to immediately begin negotiations on a targeted critical minerals agreement for the purpose of enabling relevant critical minerals extracted or processed in the European Union to count toward requirements for clean vehicles in the Section 30D clean vehicle tax credit of the Inflation Reduction Act. This kind of agreement would further our shared goals of boosting our mineral production and processing and expanding access to sources of critical minerals that are sustainable, trusted, and free of labor abuses. Cooperation is also necessary to reduce unwanted strategic dependencies in these supply chains, and to ensure that they are diversified and developed with trusted partners.
We further recognize the need to make bold investments to build clean energy economies and industrial bases, including in electric vehicle batteries and clean hydrogen. Today, the United States and the European Commission announced the launch of the Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue to coordinate our respective incentive programs so that they are mutually reinforcing. Both sides will take steps to avoid any disruptions in transatlantic trade and investment flows that could arise from their respective incentives. We are working against zero-sum competition so that our incentives maximize clean energy deployment and jobs—and do not lead to windfalls for private interests. The Clean Energy Incentives Dialogue will become a part of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council where it will also facilitate information-sharing on non-market policies and practices of third parties—such as those employed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—to serve as the basis for joint or parallel action and coordinated advocacy on these issues in multilateral or other fora.
We are committed to achieving an ambitious outcome in the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum negotiations by October 2023. The arrangement will ensure the long-term viability of our industries, encourage low-carbon intensity steel and aluminum production and trade, and restore market-oriented conditions globally and bilaterally. Together, we will incentivize emission reductions in these carbon-intensive sectors and level the playing field for our workers. The arrangement will be open to all partners demonstrating commitment to countering non-market excess capacity and reducing carbon-intensity in these sectors.
We are working together to support countries around the world as they develop their economies to deliver inclusive and resilient growth, while fostering sustainable pathways to net zero emissions as well as boosting the security of global supply chains. Through the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, we are identifying opportunities to generate significantly more public and private financing for quality climate and energy security investments in developing countries. We are also advancing an ambitious agenda to evolve the multilateral development banks, starting with the World Bank, to better respond to global challenges like climate change, while also enhancing their work on poverty alleviation and meeting the Sustainable Development Goals.
Recognizing our shared history as well as our joint visions for the future, we believe that people to people exchanges strengthen the transatlantic partnership, especially for younger generations. We will discuss how to deepen our cooperation.
Standing Together to End Russia’s War Against Ukraine
The United States and the European Union have taken a strong and united stand against Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war against Ukraine. We, along with a broad coalition of partners, have imposed swift and sweeping sanctions that are reducing Russia’s revenue to fund its war and its military-industrial base. Putin thought that he would divide us, and yet we are more united than ever. We stand together in our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.
One year ago, the United States and the European Commission launched a new partnership to rapidly reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate Europe’s green transition. This partnership has exceeded our goals, delivering more than double the U.S. liquefied natural gas supplies to Europe than our baseline pledge. We note the significant European efforts to diversify their energy supplies and accelerate the energy transition, which have helped limit the impact of the global energy crisis in Europe. We will continue to work together to advance energy security and sustainability in Europe by diversifying sources, lowering energy consumption, and reducing Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels. We will also continue our close coordination to support Ukraine’s energy security through its further integration into Europe’s energy markets. We will continue our cooperation for stable and balanced global markets and security of supply and step up the clean energy transition globally, including by efforts to reduce methane emissions in the energy sector.
We have also taken unprecedented, coordinated, and effective sanctions and other economic measures together to further degrade Russia’s capacity to wage its illegal war and its military-industrial system. We are deepening our joint work to aggressively enforce our sanctions and export control measures and also to end and deter circumvention and backfill, including by expanded authorities to close down Russia’s access to all inputs that can support its war machine. As part of this, we are taking new steps together to target additional third-country actors across the globe to disrupt support for Russia’s war from any corner of the world where it is identified. We are working in lockstep to limit Russian revenue even further while ensuring continued energy supplies to emerging market and developing countries via the G7+ price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products. We will continue to work together to strengthen our economic restrictions to ensure that the costs to Russia of its illegal war continue to grow.
The United States and European Union are working to ensure that Ukraine has the security, economic, and humanitarian support it needs for as long as it takes. We have worked together to supply the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the military equipment and training it needs to defend itself from Russian aggression. We, together with Ukraine, are co-chairing the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform, and, in line with its European path, are helping advance Ukraine’s reform agenda, laying the foundation for sustainable growth and reconstruction, and ensuring assistance is delivered in a coherent, transparent, and accountable manner. We remain committed to providing and mobilizing international support including from the private sector for Ukraine’s economic and financial stability. We support the International Monetary Fund delivering an ambitious program by end March 2023 to provide necessary budget support to Ukraine throughout and beyond 2023.
Strengthening Economic Security and National Security
The United States and the European Union are working to reinforce, through transatlantic cooperation, our essential security interests and the resilience of our economies. We affirm that our cooperation to strengthen our economic security and national security should be rooted in maintaining the rules-based system. We will continue our work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council and the G7 and strengthen our bilateral coordination by tasking our Sherpas to formulate key recommendations on economic security by the summer.
We will continue work to strengthen our economic security, responding to concrete threats we have identified. The United States and the European Union share concerns about the challenges posed by, among other issues, economic coercion, the weaponization of economic dependencies, and non-market policies and practices. We will continue our work through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council and the G7 to strengthen coordination with each other and other likeminded partners to diversify our supply chains, and to increase our collective preparedness, resilience, and deterrence to non-market policies and practices and to economic coercion.
We are increasing our cooperation to prevent the leakage of sensitive emerging technologies, as well as other dual-use items, to destinations of concern that operate civil-military fusion strategies. Our respective existing controls related to exports, inbound investment, and research cooperation are essential tools and need to be upgraded to correspond to a changing geostrategic environment. We have a common interest in preventing our companies’ capital, expertise, and knowledge from fueling technological advances that will enhance the military and intelligence capabilities of our strategic rivals, including through outbound investment. As we develop and upgrade our toolkit, we will coordinate efforts across the Atlantic to avoid the backfilling of any controlled exports and investments and will continue to share lessons and seek to align our approaches where feasible to maximize the effectiveness of our efforts.

Compliments of the European Commission

IMPORTANT NOTE IN THIS CONTEXT: The EACC Network is at the center of #TransatlanticBusinessRelations, if you are not a member yet we invite YOU to join us to be part of this important conversation and to be where the action is when it comes to implementing the ambitious goals set by this agreement. More here https://eaccny.com/membership. Don’t miss out! We look forward to hearing from you.
The post EU & US Manage to Overcome Trade Tensions – Joint Statement by President Biden and President von der Leyen first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Europe must speed up its green and digital transition. For that, we need to complete the Capital Markets Union to provide effective financing. This is the plea made by the five Presidents of the ECB, EIB, European Council, European Commission and Eurogroup in a joint post

The European Union is determined to fast-forward its green and digital transition. What we decide today will affect the generations to come. It is our collective responsibility to get it right. Creating net-zero industries, boosting technological competitiveness, and diversifying supply chains will be paramount for Europe’s continued prosperity and strategic sovereignty in the coming decades.
The financing needs are huge, and the lion’s share will need to come from private capital. The role of public investment is to give policy direction and to incentivise massive crowding-in of private capital, including through, but not limited to, the involvement of the European Investment Bank Group and national promotional banks.
We have been too slow on the Capital Markets Union
The Single Market has underpinned Europe’s prosperity since its creation 30 years ago by eliminating obstacles to trade within the EU and attracting foreign investment. And the Economic and Monetary Union has been a further driver of market integration. But we have been too slow for too long on one essential building block: the Capital Markets Union.
Right now, banks in Europe provide the bulk of investment funding. They alone, however, cannot help the EU win the global investment race, especially in comparison with the United States. Bank loans account for 75% of corporate borrowing in the EU and bond markets for 25% – while the inverse is true in the United States.
Our start-ups and scale-ups are looking for capital. Businesses, especially SMEs, are struggling to find the patient and risk-bearing funding they need to invest in the green and digital transition. For example, the EU’s stock market capitalisation is less than half that of the United States, in percentage of GDP, and lower than that of Japan, China and the United Kingdom. Yet, Europeans save much more than Americans.
It is our responsibility to make sure that European companies have the financing opportunities they seek, here, in the EU. We need a Capital Markets Union that channels Europe’s vast savings into tomorrow’s engines of growth. We must overcome the current patchwork of national frameworks, and in some cases underdeveloped capital markets, to unlock their full potential. This will strengthen the EU as an investment destination and make the euro an even more attractive currency.
The EU has already taken some decisive steps in creating a Single Market for capital. Still, we need to step up our efforts and our ambitions to remove remaining barriers to cross-border finance and allow for deeper harmonisation. This includes more aligned insolvency laws, more easily accessible financial information, simplified access to capital markets, particularly for smaller companies, robust market infrastructures, and more-integrated capital markets supervision.
Deepening the Capital Markets Union requires a collective effort, involving policymakers and market participants across the EU. It needs strong political will and ownership at all levels of government. It needs the European Parliament and the Member States in the Council to urgently finalise negotiations on key legislative texts. It requires courage and openness to change. We are determined to see progress going through.
Time is of the essence. We have made notable progress toward Europe’s financial integration in the past two decades, but it is time to show greater ambition. A genuine Capital Markets Union is within reach. The coming decades will see the greatest industrial transformation of our times. Our long-term competitiveness will depend on it. Let’s make sure we have the capital to make it happen.
This ECB Blog post appeared as an opinion piece in various newspapers and on websites across Europe.
Authors:

Paschal Donohoe, President of the Eurogroup

Werner Hoyer, President of the European Investment Bank

Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank

Charles Michel, President of the European Council

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Channelling Europe’s savings into growth first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Introductory remarks by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the meeting of the Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures | Frankfurt am Main, 8 March 2023 |
The proliferation of cyber threat actors combined with an increase in remote working and greater digital interconnectedness is raising the risk, frequency and severity of cyberattacks.[1] Increasingly, cyber criminals are launching ransomware attacks and demanding payment in crypto. Cyberattacks related to geopolitical developments – Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in particular – have also become a more common feature of the cyber-threat landscape.
The Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures (ECRB) has played a key role in protecting the security and integrity of the financial system from these threats. The last three years have shown that we can work under adverse conditions towards a common goal. Our financial infrastructures have proven their resilience to cyber threats. But this does not mean we can become complacent or any less vigilant in the face of cyber threats. We simply cannot afford to fall behind the curve: cybersecurity must be the backbone of digital finance.
Today I will take stock of the ECRB’s work. I will then discuss current cyber threats and emerging risks before outlining the implications for our work in the future.
The contribution of the Euro Cyber Resilience Board
The ECRB brings together private and public stakeholders across pan-European financial infrastructures, critical service providers, central banks and other authorities. This offers a unique prism through which the ECRB can identify and fix any weaknesses which cyberattacks could potentially exploit in order to propagate, which in turn would cause systemic ripples throughout the European financial ecosystem.
Let me give three examples of why the ECRB is such a useful forum for cooperation.
First, in the area of information sharing, the ECRB’s Cyber Information and Intelligence Sharing Initiative (CIISI-EU)[2] allows members to exchange information about cyber threats and mitigation in a secure and trusted group environment.
Second, the ECRB has established a crisis coordination protocol that facilitates cooperation and coordination, allowing members to exchange and respond to major cyber threats and incidents.
Third, in the area of training and awareness, the ECRB conducts joint assessments and training sessions to increase common knowledge and understanding. A key pillar of the ECB’s cyber strategy for financial infrastructures is the TIBER-EU framework for threat-led penetration testing, also known as red teaming. In June 2022 the ECRB organised a dedicated roundtable on TIBER-EU where members shared their experience of these kinds of exercises.[3]
In view of their systemic role in the financial system, we will continue to focus on pan-European financial infrastructures. Nonetheless, financial infrastructures are increasingly interdependent through horizontal and vertical links and common participants. They are also reliant on information and communication technology and on third-party service providers. As a result, these infrastructures are exposed to common risks and vulnerabilities through which cyberattacks could propagate swiftly if they are not rigorously managed. The ECRB allows us to join forces to address these risks on a sector-wide level.
Adapting to a constantly changing cyber threat landscape
Let me now turn to the cyber threat landscape.
Threats are becoming increasingly complex. Recent attacks call for constant vigilance at an operational level, and the continuous reassessment of regulatory and oversight frameworks to see whether they need to be updated.[4] Significant but unpredictable shifts can occur at any time. We must therefore be prepared to understand them and to adapt quickly in order to mitigate the financial ecosystem’s susceptibility to cyberattacks.
The ECRB has identified supply chain attacks and ransomware as key threats in the current environment, and artificial intelligence (AI) as an emerging threat. We have also witnessed how geopolitical developments, most recently Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, have weaponised cyberspace. The most prominent examples are distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against government and financial entities.[5]
Let me discuss the key current and emerging threats in more detail.
Supply chain attacks
The financial ecosystem’s reliance on third-party products and services is a key risk, especially when financial entities outsource critical functions to them. An attack on these third parties or on their products and services can disrupt and harm the financial infrastructures that rely on them, with spillovers to interconnected entities.
When such third-party products and services are widely used in the financial ecosystem, a cyberattack can have widespread, possibly systemic effects by having an impact on multiple financial entities at once. That is why cyber threat actors target these third parties. In so doing, they can compromise numerous financial entities simultaneously.
The recent cyberattack on the third-party provider ION Cleared Derivatives shows how an attack on one software provider may cascade onto their clients. In this specific case, the disruptions to the trading and clearing of financial derivatives remained limited, but we cannot ignore scenarios where the attacks could have propagated quickly, disrupting the financial system.
This case signalled the need for financial entities to review their third-party providers, the providers of these third-parties, their cyber resilience levels and the systemic impact that may ensue from a cyberattack on any of these providers. In particular, it is vital to assess critical service dependencies on third-party products and services which could be disrupted or even terminated as a result of a cyberattack. Mitigating measures need to be put in place.
Against this background, the G7 recently updated its Fundamental Elements for Third-Party Cyber Risk Management in the Financial Sector[6]. In addition, the ECRB set up a working group in 2022 to support third-party cyber risk management.
We must have a cyber resilience mindset at all times. The question we must ask is not if a cyberattack will happen, but whether we are ready to respond when it happens. Over the past year, the ECRB has worked on a conceptual model for how the financial infrastructure ecosystem could manage such a crisis if it occurred. It has also developed protocols and networks aimed at supporting a collective, consistent and comprehensive response to a cyber crisis by stakeholders.
Ransomware
The proliferation of ransomware is one of the most significant challenges currently facing financial entities. Not only may ransomware attacks result in financial loss, they may also severely disrupt operations. Even after a ransom is paid, there is no guarantee the decryption key will actually work or that the stolen data will not be publicly disclosed or further misused to extort victims’ customers, for example.
Ransomware attacks are growing more sophisticated and damaging, which in turn may enable ransomware threat actors to obtain even more resources. 2022 was one of the most active years for ransomware activity.[7] However, it was also the first year that the majority of victims of ransomware attacks decided not to pay up[8], which indicates that the approach towards ransomware attacks is changing.
Authorities globally are stepping up their efforts to counter ransomware. For instance, the G7 issued Fundamental Principles on Ransomware Resilience in October 2022[9].
We need to tackle ransomware attacks from various angles.
First, every firm must be ready to repel ransomware attacks, either through the use of proper cyber hygiene practices or by ensuring that data is backed up regularly and is kept up-to-date and tamper-proof.
Second, enforcement agencies need to conduct forensic analyses, locate attackers and join forces to prosecute them.
Third, crypto-assets – especially unbacked crypto-assets, which are used to make ransomware payments owing to the anonymity and money laundering possibilities they offer[10] – need to be strictly regulated.[11] Similarly, crypto-asset transfers must be traceable.
The proposed EU Regulation for Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) and revision to the Regulation on information accompanying transfers of funds, which extends the “travel rule”[12] to crypto-assets, are important steps. However, to be effective and prevent regulatory arbitrage, regulation must be stepped up globally.[13] Implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) guidance for crypto-assets and its enforcement at international level are therefore crucial.[14]
In addition, all firms need to have the highest level of cyber controls in place to prevent attacks from being successful and to detect and recover from ransomware attacks. Moreover, insurance firms can lend their support by obtaining assurances from their clients that they have high-level cyber resilience plans in place before providing cyber risk insurance policies, thus ensuring that these very same policies do not lower firms’ incentives to prepare for cyberattacks.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Even if we do not realise it, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is already widespread. We use AI every day, including on our phones, in our homes and at the workplace. And firms use it to harness big data.
AI can help to strengthen cybersecurity, for instance, by improving the detection of highly sophisticated cyberattacks through its ability to identify abnormal system behaviour compared with an established baseline. This is the kind of potential that we need to leverage.
But AI can also multiply cyber risks by, for instance, helping malicious individuals, even those who have limited or no technical skills, draft very convincing phishing emails or identify topics that will achieve the maximum engagement from those being targeted. To make matters worse, AI can even create and fix code that can be used to exploit and compromise the endpoint.[15] This opens up new possibilities for malicious individuals to use AI to launch cyberattacks. Although AI development firms try to install safeguards to prevent its unethical use, they can be circumvented.
The risks from AI need to be clearly understood and addressed through regulation and oversight. By exchanging information among its members and organising roundtables and training, the ECRB is in a strong position to raise awareness of risks at an early stage and accumulate knowledge of these types of threats. For its part, the European Commission has proposed a Regulation on artificial intelligence that aims to address some of the key risks associated with AI.[16]

Chart 1
Cyber threat landscape for financial market infrastructures in Europe

Note: Threats are arranged in descending order of estimated severity.

Conclusion
As we realised some years ago, cyber threats are here to stay. Many highly-adaptable threat actors exist who will systematically try to exploit any weakness or vulnerability for illegal purposes. Existing threats are becoming more dangerous and new threats are on the horizon. We therefore need to adapt our operational and cyber resilience frameworks constantly at the individual level as well as collectively through strict regulation, enforcement and prosecution. Future cooperation between public and private institutions will also be crucial. The ECRB can make a decisive contribution to this effort in relation to the financial system.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.

Footnotes:
1. See Forbes (2022), “The Pandemic’s Lasting Effects: Are Cyber Attacks One of Them?”, 20 July.
2. See European Central Bank (2020), “Cyber Information and Intelligence Sharing Initiative (CIISI-EU). Cyber information and intelligence sharing: a practical example”.
3. See European Central Bank (2022), ”Key takeaways from the ECRB roundtable on red teaming (TIBER-EU)”.
4. See Financial Times (2023), “The financial system is alarmingly vulnerable to cyber attack”, 6 February.
5. See Reuters (2023), “Russian ‘hacktivists’ briefly knock German websites offline”, 25 January.
6. See “G7 Fundamental Elements for Third-Party Cyber Risk Management in the Financial Sector”, October 2022.
7. See Techcrunch (2022), “Ransomware is a global problem that needs a global solution”, November.
8. See Security Week (2023), “Ransomware revenue plunged in 2022 as more victims refuse to pay up”, January.
9. See “G7 Fundamental Elements of Ransomware Resilience for the Financial Sector”, October 2022.
10. According to recent reports, ransomware attackers extorted at least €430 million in 2022, while the number of ransomware strains saw a sharp increase. The actual amount extorted may be even higher, as may the number of attacks. See “The 2023 Crypto Crime Report”, Chainalysis, February 2023.
11. See Panetta, F. (2022), “Crypto dominos: the bursting crypto bubbles and the destiny of digital finance”, keynote speech at the Insight Summit held at the London Business School, 7 December.
12. The “travel rule” requires that information on the source of the asset and its beneficiary travels with the transaction and is stored on both sides of the transfer. See European Parliament (2022), “Crypto-assets: deal on new rules to stop illicit flows in the EU”, 29 June.
13. See Panetta, F. (2023), “Caveat emptor does not apply to crypto”, Financial Times, 4 January.
14. See Financial Action Task Force (2021), ”Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers”, October.
15. See Forbes (2023), “Does ChatGPT pose a cybersecurity threat? Here’s the AI bot’s answer”, February.
16. See European Commission, “Regulatory framework proposal on artificial intelligence”. The proposed rules will address risks specifically created by AI applications, propose a list of high-risk applications, set clear requirements for AI systems for high-risk applications, define specific obligations for AI users and providers of high-risk applications, propose a conformity assessment before the AI system is put into service or placed on the market, propose enforcement after such an AI system is placed in the market, and propose a governance structure at European and national level.
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On 7 March 2023, the European Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of companies and an association active in the fragrance industry in various Member States. In parallel, the Commission has sent out formal requests for information to several companies active in the same sector.
The inspections and requests for information concern possible collusion in relation to the supply of fragrances and fragrance ingredients. Fragrances are used in the manufacture of consumer products such as household and personal care products.
The Commission has concerns that companies and an association in the fragrance industry worldwide may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
The Commission has been in contact with the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice, the UK Competition and Markets Authority and the Swiss Competition Commission in relation to this matter and the inspections were conducted in consultation with them. The Commission officials were accompanied by their counterparts from the national competition authorities of the Member States where the inspections were carried out.
Unannounced inspections are a preliminary investigatory step into suspected anticompetitive practices. The fact that the Commission carries out such inspections does not mean that the companies are guilty of anti-competitive behaviour nor does it prejudge the outcome of the investigation itself. The Commission respects the rights of defence, in particular the right of companies to be heard in antitrust proceedings.
There is no legal deadline to complete inquiries into anticompetitive conduct. Their duration depends on a number of factors, including the complexity of each case, the extent to which the undertakings concerned co-operate with the Commission and the exercise of the rights of defence.
Under the Commission’s leniency programme companies that have been involved in a secret cartel may be granted immunity from fines or significant reductions in fines in return for reporting the conduct and cooperating with the Commission throughout its investigation. Individuals and companies can report cartel or other anti-competitive behaviour on an anonymous basis through the Commission’s whistle-blower tool. Further information on the Commission’s leniency programme and whistle-blower tool is available on DG Competition’s website.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Antitrust: EU Commission confirms unannounced inspections in the fragrance sector first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Under the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Commission is empowered to impose a fee on providers under its supervision, which is expected to be levied for the first time in autumn 2023.  The Commission has now set the detailed rules and procedures for such supervisory fees to be levied.
The delegated regulation aims to provide legal certainty to the service providers designated as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) or Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs) under the DSA. It specifies the methodology and procedures to calculate and levy the supervisory fee, provides further details on the calculation of the overall estimated costs to be covered with the levied fees and on the determination of the individual fees.
The DSA entered into force on 16 November 2022. The obligations for service providers designated as VLOPs or VLOSEs will become applicable four months after their formal designation in accordance with the DSA.
The delegated regulation proposed today follows a public consultation on the draft which took place between 22 December 2022 and 19 January 2023.
Following today’s adoption, the delegated act will now be transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council, which have 3 months to scrutinise it. At their request, the scrutiny period can be extended by 3 months.
More information

Delegated regulation
Digital Services Act package

Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Digital Services Act: Commission sets rules on supervisory fees for very large online platforms and very large online search engines first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Following a dialogue with EU consumer protection authorities and the European Commission (CPC network), WhatsApp committed to being more transparent on changes to its terms of service. Moreover, the company will make it easier for users to reject updates when they disagree with them, and will clearly explain when such rejection leads the user to no longer be able to use WhatsApp’s services. Also, WhatsApp confirmed that users’ personal data are not shared with third-parties or other Meta companies – including Facebook – for advertising purposes. The dialogue was coordinated by the Swedish Consumer Agency and the Irish Competition and Consumer Protection Commission and facilitated by the Commission.
Commissioner for Justice, Didier Reynders, said: “I welcome WhatsApp’s commitments to changing its practices to comply with EU rules, actively informing users of any changes to their contract, and respecting their choices instead of asking them each time they open the app. Consumers have a right to understand what they agree to and what that choice entails concretely, so that they can decide whether they want to continue using the platform.”
The CPC Network first sent a letter to WhatsApp in January 2022, following an alert by the European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) and eight of its member associations on alleged unfair practices in the context of WhatsApp’s updates to their terms of service and privacy policy. In June 2022, the CPC Network sent a second letter to WhatsApp reiterating their request that consumers must be clearly informed about WhatsApp’s business model and, in particular, whether WhatsApp derives revenues from commercial policies relating to users’ personal data. Following discussions among the CPC Network, the Commission and WhatsApp, the company confirmed that it does not share users’ personal data for advertising purposes.
Overview of commitments
For any future policy updates, WhatsApp will:

 explain what changes it intends to make to the users’ contracts and how they could affect their rights;
include the possibility to reject updated terms of service as prominently as the possibility to accept them;
ensure that the notifications informing about the updates can be dismissed or the review of the updates can be delayed, as well as respect users’ choices and refrain from sending recurring notifications.

Next steps
The Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) will actively monitor how WhatsApp implements these commitments when making any future updates to its policies and, where necessary, enforce compliance – including by the possibility of imposing fines.
Moreover, a recent Commission study and the last CPC sweep on “dark patterns” showed that many companies use “dark patterns”, for example making it more difficult to unsubscribe from a service than to subscribe to it. The CPC Network, with the support of   the Commission, will continue to intensify their efforts to addres such illegal practices where they occur.
Background
The new Digital Services Act foresees i.a. an obligation for services to have clear terms and conditions, explaining to the user in comprehensible language when their content or their account can be affected by certain restrictions, and an obligation to apply such restrictions in a diligent, objective and proportionate manner. The DSA will complement rules such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive or the General Data Protection Regulation, ensuring that no regulatory gap is left for platforms to manipulate users.
The Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) is a network of authorities responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer protection laws. To tackle cross-border issues, their actions are coordinated at EU level.
National authorities are responsible for the enforcement of EU consumer protection laws. Thanks to the  Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation, they  have a common toolbox of strong powers to detect irregularities and take speedy and coordinated action against non-compliant traders.
Moreover, the new Directive on better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules, amended existing EU consumer law instruments by further enhancing transparency for consumers when they buy on online marketplaces.
Cooperation applies to consumer rules covering various areas such as unfair commercial practices, e-commerce, geo-blocking, package holidays, online selling, and passenger rights.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Consumer protection: WhatsApp agrees to comply fully with EU rules, informing users better and respecting their choices on contract updates first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The word “recyclable” shows up in a lot of environmental claims for consumer products, but what do people understand the term to mean? Does that perception reflect the current state of recycling practices? And have there been changes in perception or practices that might suggest updates to the FTC’s Green Guides? Those are some of the topics on the table at Talking Trash at the FTC: Recyclable Claims and the Green Guides, a half-day workshop scheduled for May 23, 2023.
The FTC announced the workshop as part of the ongoing review of its Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims. Panelists will discuss the kinds of “recyclable” claims consumers are seeing in the marketplace, including new representations that may have emerged since the FTC’s last review of the Green Guides in 2012; what research shows about how people perceive those claims; and the current state of recycling practices.
The workshop is set for Tuesday, May 23rd, from 8:30 AM to 12:30 PM at the FTC’s Constitution Center conference room in Washington, DC. You can attend in person or follow the webcast online. Watch this space for more information about the agenda.
You’re also invited to file public comments on the subject of “recyclable” by June 13, 2023. The Federal Register Notice includes details about how to file online.
Compliments of the Federal Trade Commission.
The post Next step in FTC’s Green Guides review: A closer look at “recyclable” claims first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Today, the European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom reached a political agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework. This constitutes a comprehensive set of joint solutions aimed at addressing, in a definitive way, the practical challenges faced by citizens and businesses in Northern Ireland, thereby providing them with lasting certainty and predictability.
The joint solutions cover, amongst other things, new arrangements on customs, agri-food, medicines, VAT and excise, as well as specific instruments designed to ensure that the voices of the people of Northern Ireland are better heard on specific issues particularly relevant to the communities there. These new arrangements are underpinned by robust safeguards to ensure the integrity of the EU’s Single Market, to which Northern Ireland has a unique access.
Today’s political agreement in principle allows the two sides to open a new chapter in our partnership, based on mutual trust and full cooperation, also allowing to unlock the full potential of their relationship.
President Ursula von der Leyen said: “The Windsor Framework was made possible by genuine political will and hard work guided by the fundamental principle that the interests and needs of people should always come first. Supporting and protecting the hard-earned gains of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement was the prerequisite of our endeavour. Today, our achievement allows us to put forward definitive solutions that work for people and businesses in Northern Ireland and that protect our Single Market. It also allows us to turn the page towards a bilateral relationship that mirrors the one of close allies standing shoulder to shoulder in times of crisis.”
The joint solutions, found within the framework of the Withdrawal Agreement, are based on the following starting points:

A comprehensive, cross-cutting and definitive solution, addressing practical difficulties in the operation of the Protocol;
A balance between flexibilities for the movement of goods for end use in Northern Ireland and effective safeguards guaranteeing the protection of the EU’s Single Market;
A clear distinction between goods at risk and goods not at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market.

In the sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) area, the joint solutions ensure that the same food will be available on supermarket shelves in Northern Ireland as in the rest of the UK. In practice, agri-food retail products for end consumption in Northern Ireland will be able to move from Great Britain with minimal certification requirements and controls. UK public health standards will apply for those agri-food retail goods for end consumption in Northern Ireland, whilst EU plant and animal health rules remain applicable for the protection of the EU Single Market. This arrangement is commensurate with a set of existing and new safeguards, including SPS inspection facilities and labelling which will be introduced gradually. When these safeguards are fully in place, identity checks will be reduced to only 5%. Physical checks will follow a risk-based and intelligence-led approach. Moreover, travelling with pets will be easy, thanks to a simple pet travel document, a microchip, and a declaration by the owner that the pet will not travel to the EU.
New arrangements in the area of customs are based on an expanded trusted trader scheme that will also be open to businesses in Great Britain. Goods moved by trusted traders and not at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market will benefit from dramatically simplified procedures and drastically simplified declarations with reduced data requirements. Substantial facilitations were found for freight and the movement of all types of parcels, i.e., business-to-business, business-to-consumer, and consumer-to-consumer, with consumer-to-consumer parcels being entirely exempt from the main customs requirements. These new solutions are made possible especially by new data-sharing arrangements allowing for risk assessments, which would constitute the principle basis for controls. Robust authorisation and monitoring of the trusted trader scheme, and increased market surveillance and enforcement by UK authorities also act as safeguards. Full customs procedures will apply to goods at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market.
A permanent solution has also been found to ensure that people in Northern Ireland have access to all medicines, including novel medicines, at the same time and under the same conditions as people in the rest of the UK. This complements the solution the EU adopted in April 2022 for the supply of generic medicines to Northern Ireland. These new arrangements are made possible by new safeguards, notably labelling, designed to ensure that the medicines do not enter the EU’s Single Market.
New flexibilities were also found for certain VAT and excise rules, accompanied by safeguards protecting the EU from fraud risks or potential distortion of competition. These arrangements include a possibility to set UK VAT rates below EU VAT minima rates for immovable goods with no risk that these goods enter the EU Single Market (e.g., a heat pump for a house). A UK SME VAT exemption scheme is now applicable to both goods and services if the UK respects the EU threshold for the size of SMEs. There is now also a possibility to tax all alcoholic beverages according to their alcoholic strength, and to set reduced duty rates to alcoholic beverages, if served for immediate consumption in hospitality venues in Northern Ireland, as long as the applied rates are not below EU minima duty rates.
With regard to governance, the voices of Northern Ireland people and stakeholders will be better heard through regular engagement at each level of the Withdrawal Agreement structures. There will be enhanced engagement with Northern Ireland stakeholders on Protocol-related matters. New thematic subgroups within the Joint Consultative Working Group will be set up. A new emergency mechanism, the Stormont Brake, will allow the UK government, at the request of 30 Members of the Legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland, to stop the application in Northern Ireland of amended or replacing provisions of Protocol-related EU law that may have a significant and lasting impact specific to the everyday lives of communities there. This mechanism would be triggered under the most exceptional circumstances and as a matter of last resort, in a very well-defined process set out in a Unilateral Declaration by the UK.
The Court of Justice of the European Union remains the sole and ultimate arbiter of EU law.
The joint solutions also address implementation difficulties related to tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the most sensitive categories of steel and clarify the application of State aid rules.
These new arrangements have been carried out within the framework of the Withdrawal Agreement of which the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland is an integral part. Within these pre-established legal parameters, a number of targeted amendments to the Protocol address, in a definitive way, unforeseen circumstances or deficiencies that have emerged since the start of the Protocol.
Next steps
The European Commission and the Government of the United Kingdom will proceed, within the remit of their respective powers, with the necessary steps to translate the joint solutions into legally binding instruments and to implement these swiftly and in good faith. To that effect, a meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee on the Withdrawal Agreement, co-chaired by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič and UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, will also take place in the coming weeks. The Commission has today made proposals to the Council for a Union position as regards, amongst other things, the decisions that need to be adopted in that meeting.
In addition, the Commission has today tabled legislative proposals in the SPS, medicines and TRQs areas, which will now be submitted to the European Parliament and Council.
The respective roles of the European Parliament and Council will be fully respected.
The new arrangements are not compatible with the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill. The Commission welcomes that the UK government is stopping the process of the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, and is not proceeding with it, so that it will fall in the UK Parliament at the end of the Parliamentary session. These arrangements, when implemented, mean that there will no longer be grounds for the existing Commission legal proceedings against the United Kingdom relating to the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland.
Background
The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, as an integral part of the Withdrawal Agreement, was agreed jointly and ratified by both the EU and the UK. It has been in force since 1 February 2020 and has legal effects under international law. The aim of the Protocol is to protect the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its dimensions, maintaining peace and stability in Northern Ireland, avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland, while preserving the integrity of the EU Single Market.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post A new way forward on the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland: political agreement in principle on the Windsor Framework first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.