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Joint statement by President von der Leyen and President Biden on U.S.-EU cooperation on energy security

We are jointly committed to Europe’s energy security and sustainability and to accelerating the global transition to clean energy. We also share the objective of ensuring the energy security of Ukraine and the progressive integration of Ukraine with the EU gas and electricity markets.
The EU and the United States cooperate closely on energy policy, decarbonisation and security of supply in the U.S.-EU Energy Council. The EU’s and the United States’ commitments to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, through clean energy, in particular renewables, energy efficiency, and technologies, provide a path to energy security and reduced dependence on fossil fuels. The current challenges to European security underscore our commitment to accelerating and carefully managing the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy.
Over the last decade, the EU has invested in diversification of supply through infrastructure and reinforcement of its internal energy networks, increasing the resilience and flexibility of EU energy markets. The European Commission will intensify work with Member States for security of supply, within transparent and competitive gas markets in a manner compatible with long-term climate goals and reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.
While that process intensifies during this critical decade, we are committed to working closely together to overcome today’s challenges of security of supply and high prices in energy markets.
We commit to intensifying our strategic energy cooperation for security of supply and will work together to make available reliable, and affordable energy supplies to citizens and businesses in the EU and its neighbourhood.
The United States and the EU are working jointly towards continued, sufficient, and timely supply of natural gas to the EU from diverse sources across the globe to avoid supply shocks, including those that could result from a further Russian invasion of Ukraine. The United States is already the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the EU. We are collaborating with governments and market operators on supply of additional volumes of natural gas to Europe from diverse sources across the globe. LNG in the short-term can enhance security of supply while we continue to enable the transition to net zero emissions. The European Commission will work for improved transparency and utilisation of LNG terminals in the EU.
We intend to work together, in close collaboration with EU Member States, on LNG supplies for security of supply and contingency planning. We will also exchange views on the role of storage in security of supply.
More broadly, we call on all major energy producer countries to join us in ensuring world energy markets are stable and well-supplied. This work has already started, and we will take it forward at the meeting of the U.S.-EU Energy Council on February 7.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Brexit crisis looms over Protocol

This article was previously published in the Irish Independent | By John Bruton |
Notwithstanding the positive sounds emanating from Monday’s meeting between Liz Truss and Maros Sefcovic, the talks between the European Commission and the UK government over the Protocol on Northern Ireland are probably heading to a major crisis in the next month. There has been no movement of the UK side, and immovable deadlines are approaching.
The UK agreed to the Protocol as part of their Withdrawal Treaty with the EU. The Protocol was an intrinsic part of the Treaty.  The UK Parliament ratified the Treaty, including the Protocol, but now the UK government is trying to scrap it altogether, under a this pretence of “renegotiating “ it.
The fundamental problem is that the British negotiating strategy is being driven by old fashioned, populist, and simplistic notions about trade. The EU strategy, on the other hand, is driven by a legal imperative to protect the most advanced form of economic and commercial integration between sovereign nations that has ever been achieved. The clash is a clash of mind sets. The arguments of either side are based on fundamentally incompatible assumptions.
There is the added complication that the negotiations between Liz Truss and Maros Sefcovic are taking place in the midst of a political crisis in Britain, in which any compromise is liable to be used as a political weapon in a struggle to lead the Conservative Party.
Conservative Britain always pretended to see the EU as simple free trade area. But the rest of the EU members realized one could not have truly free trade, unless there were four other things

common rules on the quality of products
freedom for people and money to move from country to country,
common trade policies vis a vis the rest of the world, and
a shared set of political goals that facilitated day to day compromise.

A big segment of English opinion never accepted this latter concept of the EU. This makes it difficult for them to even to understand the necessary implications of the Protocol .
The Protocol makes Northern Ireland part of the EU Single market for goods produced in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile Britain has left the EU Single Market.  Britain has no more than a bare bones trade agreement with the EU. This makes a big difference. But it is what the UK government and Parliament agreed.
Goods produced in Northern Ireland (NI) are being treated as EU goods, whereas goods produced in Britain are non EU goods.
In the case of goods made up of parts, ingredients or components coming from different countries, The parts, ingredients or components produced in Northern Ireland qualify, for rules of origin purposes, as “European”. Meanwhile parts, ingredients or components originating in Britain are of non EU origin.
This distinction can be very important in deciding whether a final product is sufficiently “European” to benefit from duty free access to the EU market. If one wants to ensure that a sufficient percentage of a final product is “European”, it makes sense to source ingredients or parts in NI rather than in  another part of the UK.
Goods coming into NI will be subject to EU Customs rules and tariffs, whereas goods coming into Britain will be subject to (potentially very different) UK Customs rules and tariffs.
This gap has to be policed, if there is not to be abuse. In the Protocol the EU and the UK agreed  how this gap is to be policed.
The gap will become progressively wider, if the UK seeks to exploit the freedom it won by Brexit by making new (and different) British standards to replace the old standards that it might claim had been “imposed by Brussels”.
The more the standards diverge, the more will checks be needed on goods entering the EU market through NI, to ensure that they comply with EU requirements.
Then there is the question of the European Court interpreting EU rules as  they apply to NI  goods circulating freely in the EU Single Market .  The UK agreed to this but now is objecting to it.
For NI businesses to be free to export their products within the EU Single Market under the Protocol they have to be able to convince their competitors and customers in France and Germany that NI goods are fully compliant with EU rules. These rules are interpreted, in final analysis, by the European Court of Justice. That ensures consistency.
The rules must be interpreted in the same way for NI goods,  as they are for goods produced  in France or Germany. The role of the ECJ in the Protocol is the passport for NI goods into Europe,  one of the biggest markets in the world.
The role of the ECJ is, of course, confined to  EU rules applying to goods. It will have no general jurisdiction in NI on other matters. There the final arbiter will be the UK Supreme Court.
There is a logjam in the negotiations because the UK side keeps repeating the same talking points ,  pocketing EU concessions without reciprocity, and withholding cooperation with the EU authorities on access to data. It is also stalling on building installations in Belfast Port that would allow customs officials there to do their work safely and conveniently. The UK is using “grace periods” to defer indefinitely controls it  agreed to. It is almost as if the UK does not want to face up to the implications of Brexit.
The UK, and some unionists, talk about using Article 16 as if this would allow the ending of checks in Belfast port. That is not legally possible. Article 16 only allows limited and temporary derogations. To use it to go beyond that would be a straightforward breach of international law.
We are facing a moment of truth.
Author:

John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) and former European Union Ambassador to the United States

Compliments of John Bruton.
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IMF | Global Inflation Pressures Broadened on Food and Energy Price Gains

The chart of the week shows how surging energy costs have boosted inflation, especially in Europe, after fossil-fuel prices nearly doubled in the past year. Rising food prices have also helped to boost inflation.
Meanwhile, continuing supply chain disruptions, clogged ports, logistics strains and strong demand for merchandise have broadened these price pressures, especially in the United States. Higher imported goods prices have contributed to inflation in some regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean.
Inflation is likely to remain elevated. Price gains this year will average 3.9 percent in advanced economies and 5.9 percent in emerging market and developing economies, before subsiding next year, according to our January World Economic Outlook update.
Assuming inflation expectations remain well-anchored and the pandemic eventually eases its grip, higher inflation should fade as supply chain woes ease, central banks raise interest rates, and demand tilts more toward services again instead of goods-intensive consumption.
Oil futures contracts indicate crude prices will rise about 12 percent this year as natural gas prices climb about 58 percent. Such increases for both commodities would be considerably less than their gains last year, and would likely be followed by falling prices in 2023 as supply-demand imbalances ease further.
Similarly, food prices are likely to climb at a more moderate pace of about 4.5 percent this year and decline next year—after a rise of 23.1 percent last year, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. This should ease spending pressures for millions of people around the world, especially in countries with lower incomes.
Such burdens fall most heavily on residents of emerging and low-income nations, where food typically makes up a third to half of consumer spending. That share is smaller in advanced economies, such as the United States, where food accounts for less than one-seventh of household shopping bills.
Authors:

Jorge Alvarez is an economist in the World Economic Studies Division of the IMF’s Research Department

Philip Barrett is an economist in the IMF’s Research Department

Compliments of the IMF.
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ECB | The euro: a trusted and safe means of payment

Euro banknote counterfeiting at historically low level in 2021

347,000 counterfeit euro banknotes withdrawn from circulation in 2021, a historically low level in proportion to banknotes in circulation
About two-thirds of total withdrawn counterfeits were €20 and €50 banknotes
Euro banknotes remain a trusted and safe means of payment
Authenticity of euro banknotes can be verified using “feel, look and tilt” method

Some 347,000 counterfeit euro banknotes were withdrawn from circulation in 2021 (180,000 in the second half of the year), a decrease of 24.6% when compared with 2020. €20 and €50 notes continued to be the most counterfeited banknotes, jointly accounting for about two-thirds of the total. 95.4% of counterfeits were found in euro area countries, while 4.2% were found in non-euro area EU Member States and 0.4% in other parts of the world.
There is little likelihood of receiving a counterfeit, as the number of counterfeits remains very low in proportion to the number of genuine euro banknotes in circulation. In 2021, 12 counterfeits were detected per 1 million genuine banknotes in circulation, which is a historically low level (see the chart below).
Low-quality reproductions are continuously withdrawn from circulation. Counterfeits are easy to detect as they have no security features, or only very poor imitations of them. The public does not need to be concerned about counterfeiting, but should nevertheless remain vigilant. You can check your notes by using the simple “feel, look and tilt” method described in the dedicated section of the ECB’s website and on the websites of the national central banks of the euro area. The Eurosystem also helps professional cash handlers by ensuring that banknote-handling and processing machines can reliably identify counterfeits and withdraw them from circulation.
Using counterfeits for payments is a criminal offence that may lead to prosecution. If you receive a suspect banknote, compare it directly with one you know to be genuine. If your suspicions are confirmed please contact the police or – depending on national practice – your national central bank or your own retail or commercial bank. The Eurosystem supports law enforcement agencies in their fight against currency counterfeiting.
The Eurosystem has a duty to safeguard the integrity of euro banknotes and to continue improving banknote technology. The second series of banknotes – the Europa series – is even more secure and is helping to maintain public trust in the currency.

Chart 1
Number of counterfeits detected annually per 1 million genuine notes in circulation

Image courtesy of the ECB.

Table 1
Yearly figures in comparison

Period
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

Number of counterfeits
684,000
694,000
563,000
559,000
460,000
347,000

Table 2
Breakdown by denomination in 2021

Denomination
€5
€10
€20
€50
€100
€200
€500

Percentage of total
2.4%
15.7%
32.1%
33.8%
9.5%
5.5%
1.0%

Contact:

Georgina Garriga Sánchez | georgina.garriga_sanchez@ecb.europa.eu | tel.: +49 69 1344 95368.

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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IMF | Pandemic Tests Resilience and Credibility of Fiscal Rules

Record debt and deficits during the pandemic prompted many nations to suspend their fiscal rules.
Since 1990, a growing number of countries have adopted fiscal rules to strengthen budgetary discipline and enhance the credibility of public finances. These numerical limits on spending, deficits, or debt signal a government’s commitment to prudence. At the same time, fiscal councils are becoming more common to provide independent oversight and monitor the compliance of rules.
What happens when a country must respond to a large shock such as the pandemic? Governments must strike the right balance between the imperative of emergency support and the credibility of the rules-based fiscal framework.
Our new research shows how countries navigate this challenge—particularly during the pandemic. As the crisis wears on, high deficit and debt levels will further challenge the credibility of fiscal policy frameworks anchored by rules.

‘Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse.’

Large deviations
Governments have used all the flexibility of the rules to appropriately respond to the health crisis. Nearly 40 percent of economies with fiscal rules activated escape clauses during the pandemic, including the European Union, Jamaica, Paraguay and the United Kingdom. That compares with 5 percent during the global financial crisis, when these clauses were often not part of the framework. These clauses permit a deviation from the numerical rules within the limits defined by the framework. Without such clauses, countries must resort to ad hoc suspensions or modifications of the rules.
Fiscal councils also played an important role by assessing the crisis-related policy responses and the appropriate use of escape clauses. These councils are independent, non-partisan agencies that provide fiscal oversight, including costing policy measures, assessing budgetary forecasts, and monitoring rules. Their role is key to ensuring the transparency and credibility of the framework. In some cases, they gave advice on the size and type of fiscal support and stressed the need for greater transparency of COVID-19 fiscal measures.
The unprecedented rise of deficits and debts during the pandemic has led to large deviations from fiscal rules. In 2020, about 90 percent of countries had deficits larger than the rule limits—by about 4 percent of gross domestic product, on average—while public debt exceeded the limit for over half of the countries with rules in place. Public debt surpassed the limits by about 50 percent of GDP on average in advanced economies and by about 25 percent in emerging markets, adding to already large pre-crisis deviations.
The return to fiscal rules
A key challenge for many countries will be whether and how to modify the rules-based framework after major deviations.
Deviations from the rules—especially debt limits or anchors—are difficult to reverse. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, for example, advanced economies slowly returned to pre-crisis deficit rule limits, but their debts remained elevated. In emerging markets and developing economies, deficits first declined toward the limits but then widened again after 2014 when commodities prices fell.
Governments face difficult choices in the post-pandemic environment. Regardless of the paths to reinstate or revise the rules, robust fiscal institutions and medium-term frameworks will be important to preserve the credibility of policies in the transition period. Empirical evidence suggests that deviations from deficit limits are associated with higher financing costs. A credible transition helps to limit the costs of public finance.
Countries could use this opportunity to further strengthen fiscal rules. While frameworks have been flexible during crises, they have failed to prevent a large and persistent buildup of public debt, even if debt service costs were contained, reflecting the trend declines in inflation and real interest rates.
Each country will have to choose its own path. But in all cases, effective rules-based frameworks require strong political commitment, including a good record of compliance, the right incentives to build buffers during good times, and well-designed escape clauses to manage large adverse shocks. Strengthening fiscal councils’ ability to operate independently and fulfill their mandates would also improve the credibility and accountability of policies.
New datasets
The IMF has just released updates of two global datasets on fiscal rules and fiscal councils.
Both are becoming a more common feature of policy frameworks globally. As of end-2021, about 105 countries had rules, an increase from fewer than 10 in 1990. The number of countries with fiscal councils has also risen from 19 in 2010 to 49 today.
The first dataset provides information on national and supranational fiscal rules in 106 countries from 1985 to 2021. It also presents details on the types and characteristics of rules, such as their legal basis, coverage, escape clauses, as well as enforcement procedures, and takes stock of key supporting features in place, including monitoring bodies and fiscal responsibility laws.
The second describes key features of fiscal councils as of December across the IMF’s membership. The dataset includes the main features of the council’s remit, their tasks, and channels of influence; and key institutional characteristics such as independence, accountability, and human resources.
These resources aim to help policymakers strengthen their fiscal governance on the basis of the best available international evidence.
Authors:

W. Raphael Lam is a Senior Economist in the Fiscal Affairs Department

Paulo Medas is Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and oversees the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor

Compliments of the IMF.
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IMF | Low Real Interest Rates Support Asset Prices, But Risks Are Rising

A large and sudden jump in real interest rates could lead to a further selloff in stocks.
Supply disruptions coupled with strong demand for goods, rising wages and higher commodities prices continue to challenge economies worldwide, pushing inflation above central bank targets.
To contain price pressures, many economies have started tightening monetary policy, leading to a sharp increase in nominal interest rates, with long-term bond yields, often an indicator of investor sentiment, recovering to pre-pandemic levels in some regions such as the United States.
Investors often look beyond nominal rates and base their decisions on real rates—that is, inflation-adjusted rates—which help them determine the yield on assets. Low real interest rates induce investors to take more risks.
Despite somewhat tighter monetary conditions and the recent upward move, longer-term real rates remain deeply negative in many regions, supporting elevated prices for riskier assets. Further tightening may still be required to tame inflation, but this puts asset prices at risk. More and more investors could decide to sell risky assets as those would become less attractive.
Differing outlooks
While shorter-term market rates have climbed since central banks’ hawkish turn in advanced economies and some emerging markets, there is still a sharp difference between policymakers’ expectations of how high their benchmark rates will rise and where investors expect the tightening will end.
This is most obvious in the United States, where Federal Reserve officials project that their main interest rate will reach 2.5 percent. That’s more than half a point higher than what 10-year Treasury yields indicate.
This divergence between markets and policymakers’ views on the most likely path for borrowing costs is significant because it means investors may adjust their expectations of Fed tightening upward both further and faster.
In addition, central banks might tighten more than they currently anticipate because of persistent inflation. For the Fed, this means the main interest rate at the end of the tightening cycle might exceed 2.5 percent.
Implications of the rate-path divide
The path of policy rates has important implications for financial markets and the economy. As a result of high inflation, real rates are historically low, despite the recent rebound in nominal interest rates, and are expected to remain so. In the United States, long-term rates are hovering around zero while short-term yields are deeply negative. In Germany and the United Kingdom, real rates remain extremely negative at all maturities.
Such very low real interest rates reflect pessimism about economic growth in coming years, the global savings glut due to aging societies, and demand for safe assets amid higher uncertainty exacerbated by the pandemic and recent geopolitical concerns.
The unprecedented low real interest rates continue to boost riskier assets, notwithstanding the recent upward move. Low long-term real rates are associated with historically elevated price-to-earnings ratios in equity markets, as they are used to discount expected future earnings growth and cash flows. All things being equal, monetary policy tightening should trigger a real interest rate adjustment and lead to higher discount rate, resulting in lower stock prices.
Despite the recent tightening in financial conditions and concerns about the virus and inflation, global asset valuations remain stretched. In credit markets, spreads are also still below pre-pandemic levels despite some modest widening recently.
After an exceptional year supported by solid earnings, the US equity market started 2022 with a steep retreat amid high inflation, uncertainty about growth and weaker earnings prospects. As a result, we expect that a sudden and substantial rise in real rates could cause a significant drop for US stocks, particularly in highly valued sectors such as technology.
Already this year, the 10-year real yield has increased by nearly half a percentage point. Stock volatility soared on greater investor nervousness, with the S&P 500 down more than 9 percent for the year and the Nasdaq Composite measure tumbling 14 percent.
Impact on economic growth
Our growth-at-risk estimates, which link future economic growth downside risks to macrofinancial conditions, could increase substantially if real rates rise suddenly and broader financial conditions tighten. Easy conditions helped global governments, consumers, and businesses withstand the pandemic, but this could reverse as monetary policy tightens to curb inflation, moderating economic expansions.
In addition, capital flows to emerging markets could be at risk. Stock and bond investments in those economies are generally seen as being less safe, and tightening global financial conditions may cause capital outflows, especially for countries with weaker fundamentals.
Looking ahead, with persistent inflation, central banks face a balancing act. All the while, real interest rates remain very low in many countries. Monetary policy tightening must be accompanied by some tightening of financial conditions. But there could be unintended consequences if global financial conditions tighten substantially. A higher and sudden increase in real interest rates could lead potentially to a disruptive price revaluation and an even larger selloff in stocks. As financial vulnerabilities remain elevated in several sectors, monetary authorities should provide clear guidance about the future stance of policy to avoid unnecessary volatility and safeguard financial stability.
Authors:

Nassira Abbas is a deputy division chief in the Global Markets Monitoring and Analysis Division of the Monetary and Capital Markets Department and an author of the Global Financial Stability Report

Tobias Adrian is the Financial Counsellor and Director of the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department

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COVID-19: EU Council adopts a revised recommendation on measures affecting free movement, based on the individual situation of persons and no longer on the region of origin

The EU Council today adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to facilitate safe free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. This recommendation responds to the significant increase in vaccine uptake and the rapid roll-out of the EU digital COVID certificate, and replaces the previously existing recommendation. It will enter into force on 1 February 2022, on the same day as a delegated act amending the digital COVID-19 certificate regulation and providing for an acceptance period of 270 days for vaccination certificates.
Infographic – A common approach to COVID-19 travel measures in the EU – See full infographic
Under the new recommendation, COVID-19 measures should be applied taking into account the status of the person instead of the situation at regional level, with the exception of areas where the virus is circulating at very high levels. This means that a traveller’s COVID-19 vaccination, test or recovery status, as evidenced by a valid EU digital COVID certificate, should be the key determinant. A person-based approach will substantially simplify the applicable rules and will provide additional clarity and predictability to travellers.
Person-based approach
Travellers in possession of a valid EU digital COVID certificate should not be subject to additional restrictions to free movement.
A valid EU digital COVID certificate includes:

A vaccination certificate for a vaccine approved at European level if at least 14 days and no more than 270 days have passed since the last dose of the primary vaccination series or if the person has received a booster dose. Member states could also accept vaccination certificates for vaccines approved by national authorities or the WHO.
A negative PCR test result obtained no more than 72 hours before travel or a negative rapid antigen test obtained no more than 24 hours before travel.
A certificate of recovery indicating that no more than 180 days have passed since the date of the first positive test result.

Persons who are not in possession of an EU digital COVID certificate could be required to undergo a test prior to or no later than 24 hours after arrival. Travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under 12 should be exempt from this requirement.
Map of EU regions
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) should continue to publish a map of member states’ regions indicating the potential risk of infection according to a traffic light system (green, orange, red, dark red). The map should be based on the 14-day case notification rate, vaccine uptake and testing rate.
Based on this map, member states should apply measures regarding travel to and from dark red areas, where the virus is circulating at very high levels. They should in particular discourage all non-essential travel and require persons arriving from those areas who are not in possession of a vaccination or recovery certificate to undergo a test prior to departure and to quarantine after arrival.
Certain exceptions to these measures should apply to travellers with an essential function or need, cross-border commuters and children under the age of 12.
Emergency brake
Under the new recommendation, the emergency brake to respond to the emergence of new variants of concern or interest is strengthened. When a member state imposes restrictions in response to the emergence of a new variant, the Council, in close cooperation with the Commission and supported by the ECDC, should review the situation. The Commission, based on the regular assessment of new evidence on variants, may also suggest a discussion within the Council.
During the discussion, the Commission could propose that the Council agree on a coordinated approach regarding travel from the areas concerned. Any situation resulting in the adoption of measures should be reviewed regularly.
Background
The decision on whether to introduce restrictions on free movement to protect public health remains the responsibility of member states; however, coordination on this topic is essential. On 13 October 2020, the Council adopted a recommendation on a coordinated approach to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was updated on 1 February 2021 and 14 June 2021. This recommendation establishes common criteria and a common framework for possible measures for travellers.
The Council recommendation is not a legally binding instrument. The authorities of the member states remain responsible for implementing the content of the recommendation.
Compliments of the EU Council.
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EU Commission puts forward declaration on digital rights and principles for everyone in the EU

Today, the Commission is proposing to the European Parliament and Council to sign up to a declaration of rights and principles that will guide the digital transformation in the EU.
The draft declaration on digital rights and principles aims to give everyone a clear reference point about the kind of digital transformation Europe promotes and defends. It will also provide a guide for policy makers and companies when dealing with new technologies. The rights and freedoms enshrined in the EU’s legal framework, and the European values expressed by the principles, should be respected online as they are offline. Once jointly endorsed, the Declaration will also define the approach to the digital transformation which the EU will promote throughout the world.
Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age, Margrethe Vestager, said: “We want safe technologies that work for people, and that respect our rights and values. Also when we are online. And we want everyone to be empowered to take an active part in our increasingly digitised societies. This declaration gives us a clear reference point to the rights and principles for the online world.”
Commissioner for the Internal Market, Thierry Breton, said: “We want Europeans to know: living, studying, working, doing business in Europe, you can count on top class connectivity, seamless access to public services, a safe and fair digital space. The declaration of digital rights and principles also establishes once and for all that what is illegal offline should also be illegal online. We also aim to promote these principles as a standard for the world.”
Rights and principles in the digital age
The draft declaration covers key rights and principles for the digital transformation, such as placing people and their rights at its centre, supporting solidarity and inclusion, ensuring the freedom of choice online, fostering participation in the digital public space, increasing safety, security and empowerment of individuals, and promoting the sustainability of the digital future.
These rights and principles should accompany people in the EU in their everyday life: affordable and high-speed digital connectivity everywhere and for everybody, well-equipped classrooms and digitally skilled teachers, seamless access to public services, a safe digital environment for children, disconnecting after working hours, obtaining easy-to-understand information on the environmental impact of our digital products, controlling how their personal data are used and with whom they are shared.
The declaration is rooted in EU law, from the Treaties to the Charter of Fundamental rights but also the case law of the Court of Justice. It builds on the experience of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Former European Parliament President David Sassoli promoted the idea of the access to the Internet as a new human right back in 2018. Promoting and implementing the principles set out in the declaration will be a shared political commitment and responsibility at both Union and Member State level within their respective competences. To make sure the declaration will have concrete effects on the ground, the Commission proposed in September to monitor progress, evaluate gaps and provide recommendations for actions through an annual report on the ‘State of the Digital Decade’.
Next Steps
The European Parliament and the Council are invited to discuss the draft declaration, and to endorse it at the highest level by this summer.
Background
On 9 March 2021, the Commission laid out its vision for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030 in its Communication on the Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade. In September 2021, the Commission introduced a robust governance framework to reach the digital targets in the form of a Path to the Digital Decade. In a speech at the ‘Leading the Digital Decade’ event in Sines, Portugal, on 1 June 2021, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared: “We embrace new technologies. But we stand by our values.”
The Commission also conducted an open public consultation which showed broad support for European Digital Principles – 8 EU citizens out of 10 consider it useful for the European Union to define and promote a common European vision on digital rights and principles – as well as a special Eurobarometer survey. Yearly Eurobarometer surveys will collect qualitative data, based on citizens’ perception of how the digital principles enshrined in the declaration are implemented in the EU.
The declaration also builds on previous initiatives from the Council including the Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment, the Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-based Digital Government, and the Lisbon Declaration – Digital Democracy with a Purpose for a model of digital transformation that strengthens the human dimension of the digital ecosystem with the Digital Single Market as its core.
Compliments of the European Commission.
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Federal Reserve Board releases discussion paper that examines pros and cons of a potential U.S. central bank digital currency (CBDC)

The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday released a discussion paper that examines the pros and cons of a potential U.S. central bank digital currency, or CBDC. It invites comment from the public and is the first step in a discussion of whether and how a CBDC could improve the safe and effective domestic payments system. The paper does not favor any policy outcome.
“We look forward to engaging with the public, elected representatives, and a broad range of stakeholders as we examine the positives and negatives of a central bank digital currency in the United States,” Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell said.
The paper summarizes the current state of the domestic payments system and discusses the different types of digital payment methods and assets that have emerged in recent years, including stablecoins and other cryptocurrencies. It concludes by examining the potential benefits and risks of a CBDC, and identifies specific policy considerations.
Consumers and businesses have long held and transferred money in digital forms, via bank accounts, online transactions, or payment apps. The forms of money used in those transactions are liabilities of private entities, such as commercial banks. Conversely, a CBDC would be a liability of a central bank, like the Federal Reserve.
While a CBDC could provide a safe, digital payment option for households and businesses as the payments system continues to evolve, and may result in faster payment options between countries, there may also be downsides. They include how to ensure a CBDC would preserve monetary and financial stability as well as complement existing means of payment. Other key policy considerations include how to preserve the privacy of citizens and maintain the ability to combat illicit finance. The paper discusses these and other factors in more detail.
To fully evaluate a potential CBDC, the Board’s paper asks for public comment on more than 20 questions. Comments will be accepted for 120 days and can be submitted here.
Contact:

For media inquiries, please email media@frb.gov or call 202-452-2955

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ECB Interview | Inflation expected to decline over 2022

Inflation will remain high at the start of 2022 but will fall later on, especially towards the end of the year, Chief Economist Philip R. Lane tells Verslo žinios. Our current projections foresee inflation below the 2% target in 2023 and 2024.
I just read the news this morning that the latest Purchasing Managers’ Index published this Monday shows that the eurozone economic recovery weakened further in January. This is due to the new restrictions imposed to contain the Omicron variant of the coronavirus (COVID-19). So what is your opinion on the state of the eurozone today, after two years of the pandemic and what are the prospects?
In the near term, there are some risks from the Omicron variant. But I think it’s increasingly clear that the impact is only for a few weeks. So it is not turning out to be a factor that will influence the activity levels for the year, it’s more the activity levels for a few weeks. In that sense, I think there’s less concern about Omicron than we had in December. In terms of the overall pandemic, I think it is fair to say that the recovery so far has been stronger than expected − compared to, for example, early 2020 when the pandemic hit. In the initial months of the pandemic there was a lot of concern. But essentially, when the vaccines have been rolled out during 2021, it turned out that the euro area economy and the world economy has recovered more quickly than expected. And looking to this year, 2022, we expect another strong year of recovery. So essentially, there’s been a strong recovery, supported by a lot of policy measures, both fiscal policy and monetary policy. I think in overall terms the sense is that, between the public health measures and other measures, it’s turning out that we can hope that the euro area can recover quite well from the pandemic.
Let’s go to the start of the pandemic. The euro area economy as a whole shrank more than 6 per cent in 2020. However, Ireland’s economy grew 3.4 per cent. And the Lithuanian economy escaped the recession too. To your mind, why did the Lithuanian economy and the Irish economy manage to decouple from the recessionary trends in the euro area last year?
What I think is that some sectors in the world economy were able to continue during the pandemic. So in those sectors where the pandemic might cause an interruption for a few months, even during 2020 it turned out there was a good recovery. The sectors where Lithuania is a big producer and the sectors where Ireland is a big producer, including a lot of multinational firms, turned out to be quite strong. But I would say both in Ireland and in Lithuania many sectors suffered. The fact that in overall terms, these economies did grow, should not take away from the fact that many service-type industries would have been damaged by the pandemic.
Euro area inflation hit a record high of 5 per cent in December of last year. Are you worried about further rising inflation in the eurozone?
We should think about these years of the pandemic, 2020, 2021 and 2022 as part of a pandemic cycle. In the first year 2020, inflation was relatively low. In the second half of 2021, inflation turned out to be quite high. And then, as we look into this year, 2022, we think inflation will remain high at the start of this year, but will fall later this year, especially towards the end of the year. So it’s a year, essentially, where in the first part of the year, we’ll still see inflation remaining high. But we do expect it to fall quite a bit later this year.
Do you expect inflation to rise further than 5 per cent at the start of the year? And what levels do you expect at the end of the year?
We are clear from our December forecast that we expect inflation − in overall terms for this year − to be around 3.2 per cent in the euro area, and then to be below 2 per cent in 2023 and 2024. Compared with the peak, that’s quite a big decline. We will see exactly the timing of how quickly inflation falls. So rather than focus on month by month, we have a clear vision in terms of the overall direction: that the inflation rate will fall later this year. And in fact, as you know, our current view from December is that inflation will fall below the 2 per cent target in the next couple of years.
What ECB monetary policy adjustments do you expect in the face of rising energy goods and services prices if the rise is higher than your forecasts?
I think we are always clear that we’re guided by our intentions to deliver an inflation rate of 2 per cent over the medium term. So we will adjust all of our policies − whether that’s asset purchases, the targeted lending programme, our interest rates − to deliver that goal. You’ve given me a hypothetical, the hypothetical is: what happens if inflation is above our forecast. So let me in turn make clear that what is very important is whether inflation will essentially settle at around our target of 2 per cent, which would be essentially what we want, or whether there might be signs of inflation being above 2 per cent in a significant way for a significant amount of time. And if we saw the data coming in to suggest that inflation would be too high relative to 2 per cent, then of course we would respond. We also have been clear on our sequence. The first decision under that scenario would be to end net purchasing. And only after ending net asset purchases would we look at the criteria for raising the interest rates. So we will be driven by the data, driven by our assessment. And every month, every quarter, we’re going to learn more about where the data are going.
Is there a risk of inflationary second round effects such as salary growth?
We spend a lot of time looking at the interlinkages. One linkage is that an increase in the cost of living may be a factor in wage negotiations. We think that is clear. The question is how much, because, remember, energy is both a direct cost to the consumer, but also a cost to other firms. Rising energy prices can also mean rising food prices, rising prices of goods and services. We are also examining how much the increase in energy prices might show up in rising goods prices and services prices. So far, we do not see a big response of wages. We do expect a response of wages but what is critical is how big. Because, remember, in the euro area, for inflation to be around 2 per cent and allowing for a typical increase in labour productivity of about 1 per cent, then wages should be growing around 3 per cent a year in the euro area on average to be consistent with the 2 per cent target. We are not, right now, seeing wage increases in that zone. But of course, we will continue to look at this throughout the year.
Some of your colleagues have mentioned another risk. Do you see any pressure to the rise of inflation in the euro area due to the green energy investments?
I think this is a complicated issue. Let me also emphasise that what we have right now is an increase in global energy prices. The euro area imports energy from the rest of the world. So this is a very different scenario from a scenario, which we would expect to occur in the coming years. Which is essentially, if there’s, for example, policies that increase the price of carbon, as part of the transition away from a high-carbon economy. If we see an increase in the price of carbon because of taxes or regulation, driven by domestic policy, those revenues from a carbon tax, for example, can be recycled in the domestic economy and can stimulate the economy. Wheras what we have right now is different. We have an increase in import prices from the rest of the world. And this is reducing living standards, increasing the import bill. It has a negative channel to lower incomes, lower consumption. So I think it’s a very interesting, very important debate about the future of green energy policies. That is playing some role right now. But the main role right now is a global issue, rather than the transition. So we will return to this topic, no doubt.
So overall, what scenarios do you see where interest rates in the eurozone could be lifted?
Let me mention three scenarios. And again, to repeat, we’re examining hypotheticals here. One scenario is in fact that the forces that generated low inflation before the pandemic essentially become visible again after the pandemic. So one scenario is that the world economy will return to quite low inflation rates. A second scenario is that some of these headwinds will not return and, in fact, it may be easier for us to deliver our target of 2 per cent. So that is a kind of middle scenario where inflation will stabilise at 2 per cent. And then the third scenario is, if inflation picks up and there is a risk that inflation will be significantly above 2 per cent. In this third scenario, where inflation is significantly above 2 per cent on a persistent basis, then that will call for a monetary policy tightening. We would have to respond. In the middle scenario where inflation stabilises at 2 per cent, then clearly over time we would normalise monetary policy. The policies we need to fight very low inflation would no longer be needed if inflation were stable around 2 per cent. And in the first scenario where inflation is significantly below 2 per cent, then the policies that we have employed to fight low inflation would still remain relevant. So this is the way I think about the world, but there are three scenarios. One, we remain with a low inflation problem. Two, we stabilise — in a kind of smooth way — inflation around 2 per cent. And three, if inflation turns out to be persistently above 2 per cent, we would have to tighten. And so those are three very different scenarios.
Which of these three scenarios do you see as the most likely scenario in this economic environment?
In the December round of projections, the assessment was that, in fact, we saw inflation returning to below 2 per cent. But we also emphasised that in a world of uncertainty, as we have more data come in, of course the data can change. But in the euro area context, I would say that it’s also possible that we may enter a world where inflation stabilises around 2 per cent. I find it less likely to think about a scenario where inflation is persistently, significantly above 2 per cent, which would require a serious tightening. That scenario, would, I think, in the context of the euro area, be less likely than the other two scenarios.
Higher sovereign borrowing costs after the financial crisis of 2007-09 turned into a eurozone debt crisis in 2010-13 that hit some southern European Member States, also Ireland. Debt levels have significantly risen during the pandemic. Is there any risk of another debt crisis this time provided interest rates will rise?
Let me make two important points here. One, at that time, there was a significant combination which, by and large, countries had of both high private sector debt – many households, many firms were highly indebted – and there was high government debt. That is a major problem. What we’ve seen in this pandemic is: yes, governments have borrowed more, and some types of firms have borrowed more. But households have been saving a lot. In the banking sector, we also have banks which are better able to handle debt, because they have increased their capital positions. So, when you have a situation where, essentially, in the euro area, debt levels have gone up for the sovereign and for some corporates but have gone down for households, and where the banks, that are kind of in the middle of the system, are in better shape, then I think it’s a different scenario to ten years ago. And then the other issue is: we think the trend level of interest rates is lower today than ten years ago. So, when interest rates go up, it’s from a very low level. And that’s important.
Finally, I have one question as to the elephant in the room: the deteriorating geopolitical situation in Ukraine these days due to the possible Russian military offensive. Do you see any side effects to the ECB monetary policy, should the geopolitical situation in Europe deteriorate further?
Geopolitics always matters. I think if you look at the history of the world economy, the European economy, geopolitical events matter a lot via trade, via global prices, via uncertainty. So, of course, we will be looking very closely at such factors. We already talked about the very high energy prices. And of course, there’s a connection between higher energy prices and these tensions. So of course, it’s very directly relevant for us.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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