Blog | Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are on the rise. This blog shows how shifts in their borrowing and investment portfolios constrain financing for euro area firms and affect the transmission of monetary policy.
Two trends have diverted financing away from euro area firms in recent years. First, euro area NBFIs have shifted their portfolios towards foreign assets – particularly US equities. Second, banks have channelled more lending to NBFIs outside the euro area. Together, these cross-border flows via NBFIs contributed to a sluggish recovery in firms’ external financing over recent years.
NBFIs are reshuffling their portfolios at the expense of euro area firms
NBFIs, such as investment funds and insurers, play a crucial role in financing firms through both equity and bond markets. In recent years, euro area NBFI securities holdings have grown substantially, rising from around €11 trillion in early 2018 to €17 trillion by the end of 2025 (Chart 1, panel a). Investment funds account for roughly 60% of the total.[1] Strikingly, however, the composition of these portfolios has been shifting away from European assets more recently.[2]
Most of this reflects the exceptional performance of US stocks – especially in the tech sector. This has systematically raised their value relative to European holdings. But the changing composition of NBFIs’ portfolios is not just a valuation story: NBFIs, particularly investment funds, do not just hold US equities, they have also been buying them.
Since late 2023 euro area NBFIs have increased their allocation to US corporate equities by around 2.7 percentage points through net purchases. At the same time, they have reduced their allocation to euro area corporate equities by about 1.5 percentage points (Chart 1, panel b, left). The reallocation has come, to a lesser extent, at the expense of euro area government bonds and bank equities.

Chart 1
Developments in NBFI equity and debt portfolios

a) NBFI debt and equity holdings, by issuer sector and geography

b) NBFI holding of firm equity

EUR trillion

percentage points

Source: ECB (SHSS), ECB calculations and Henricot, D., Mendicino, C., Molestina Vivar, L. and Pelizzon, L. (2026).
Notes: For panel a) amounts are in market value. The holdings are for euro area NBFIs (ICPF, IF, MMF and OFIs). For panel b), left-hand scale, the chart shows NBFIs’ cumulative transaction-based firm equity portfolio share changes for NFCs in the euro area, the United States and other countries in relation to the fourth quarter of 2023. NBFIs include ICPFs, IFs, MMFs, and OFIs. The right-hand scale is based on a coefficient from a regression of euro area NFC equity shares on US NFC equity shares in euro area NBFI portfolios, based on sector-level data and controlling for NBFI sector and quarter fixed effects (2014-25).
The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2025.

These developments clearly matter for the financing of euro area firms. Research by Henricot, Mendicino, Molestina Vivar and Pelizzon finds that increases in the share of US corporate equities in NBFI portfolios are associated with declines in the share of euro area equities. An increase of 1 percentage point in the share of US equities in NBFI portfolios is associated with a 0.3 percentage point reduction in the share of euro area corporate equities (Chart 2, panel b, right).[3] While the substitution effect is not one-for-one, it is meaningful and material. And it suggests that the growing appetite for US assets may be squeezing out equity financing for European businesses.
Banks are lending more to non-bank financial institutions and less to firms
A similar dynamic is playing out on the banking side. Bank exposures to NBFIs have grown steadily in recent years, reaching around 11% of total assets by the end of 2025 (Chart 1, panel a).[4] Most of this takes the form of direct loans predominantly to investment funds and other financial institutions – mainly short-term collateralised loans (reverse repos). A substantial share of these loans is directed to entities operating outside the euro area.[5]

Chart 2
Bank loans to non-banks and firms

a) Bank asset-side exposure to NBFIs

b) Bank loans to non-banks and firms

percentages of total assets

LHS: percentage points; RHS: coefficient

Source: For panel a) ECB (Supervisory Reporting) and ECB calculation; for panel b) ECB (Supervisory Reporting, AnaCredit), Orbis, ECB calculations and Li, Ma, Mendicino, Supera (2025).
Notes: Panel b), left-hand scale, shows cumulated change relative to the fourth quarter of 2023. NBFIs stands for non-bank financial institutions. Bank loans exclude loans held for trading. The sample consists of a balanced sample of significant institutions reporting under IFRS. The right-hand scale is based on a coefficient from a regression of firm borrowing, on the dynamics of bank lending to NBFIs by each firm’s relationship banks, between 2019-25.
The latest observations are for Q4 2025.

It is especially notable that this trend has come at the expense of lending to firms (Chart 1, panel b).[6] Research by Li, Ma, Mendicino and Supera shows that when the bank a firm borrows from increases its NBFI lending by 1 percentage point, that firm’s access to bank credit falls by 0.55 percentage points on average (Chart 1, panel b). Crucially, firms cannot easily make up the shortfall by turning to other banks or NBFIs for alternative funding.[7]
In the current geopolitically uncertain environment[8], reverse repos to NBFIs are an attractive option for banks, particularly those with weaker capital positions. It is therefore unsurprising that this expansion aligns with the risk-averse attitudes banks have reported in recent surveys.[9]
Conclusion
The two trends described in this post point in the same direction: cross-border flows via NBFIs weigh on the recovery of firm financing over the ECB’s easing cycle.
When euro area investment funds reshuffle their portfolios in favour of US equities, European firms find it harder to raise capital in markets. When banks shift towards foreign NBFIs over domestic borrowing firms, European firms find it harder to secure loans. The result is a sluggish financing recovery that is lagging behind policy rates.[10] This is a reminder that as NBFIs grow in global importance their cross-border behaviour deserves close and sustained attention from policymakers.
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
 
 
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The Council presidency and European Parliament negotiators reached a provisional agreement on a proposal to streamline certain rules regarding artificial intelligence (AI).
The proposal forms part of the so-called ‘Omnibus VII’ legislative package in the EU’s simplification agenda. The package includes proposals for two regulations aiming to simplify the EU’s digital legislative framework and the implementation of harmonised rules on AI.
“Today’s agreement on the AI act significantly supports our companies by reducing recurring administrative costs. It ensures legal certainty and a smoother and more harmonised implementation of the rules across the Union, strengthening EU’s digital sovereignty and overall competitiveness. At the same time, we are stepping up the protection of children targeting risks linked to the AI systems. This agreement is clear evidence of our institutions’ ability to act swiftly and deliver on our commitments. It marks the first deliverable under the ‘One Europe, One Market’ roadmap agreed by the three institutions, well within the set deadline.” – Marilena Raouna, Deputy Minister for European affairs of the Republic of Cyprus
The Commission had proposed to adjust the timeline for applying rules on high-risk AI systems by up to 16 months, so that the rules start to apply once the Commission confirms the needed standards and tools are available. The Commission had also proposed further targeted amendments to the AI act that would extend certain regulatory exemptions granted to SMEs also to small mid-caps (SMCs), reduce requirements in a very limited number of cases, extend the possibility to process sensitive personal data for bias detection and mitigation, reinforce the AI Office’s powers and reduce governance fragmentation. Given that provisions on high-risk AI systems are due to enter into force on 2 August 2026, the co-legislators have treated the proposal with utmost priority, and, in that perspective, broadly maintained the thrust of the Commission’s proposal.
Main amendments introduced by the co-legislators
The co-legislators added a new provision in the AI act, prohibiting AI practices regarding the generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content or child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The provisional agreement also introduces a fixed timeline for the delayed application of high-risk rules: the new application dates would be 2 December 2027 for stand-alone high-risk AI systems and 2 August 2028 for high-risk AI systems embedded in products.
Furthermore, the provisional agreement reinstates the obligation for providers to register AI systems in the EU database for high-risk systems, where they consider their systems to be exempted from classification as high-risk. It also reinstates the standard of strict necessity for the processing of special categories of personal data for the purpose of ensuring bias detection and correction.
The provisional agreement postpones the deadline for the establishment of AI regulatory sandboxes by competent authorities at national level until 2 August 2027 and reduces the grace period for providers to implement transparency solutions for artificially generated content from 6 months to 3 months, with the new deadline set on 2 December 2026. The deal between the co-legislators also clarifies the competences of the AI Office for the supervision of AI systems based on general-purpose AI models where the model and that system are developed by the same provider by listing exceptions where national authorities remain competent, including law enforcement, border management, judicial authorities and financial institutions.
As for the AI act’s rules for industrial AI and their interplay with sectoral legislation in sectors such as medical devices, toys, lifts, machinery and watercraft, a compromise was found between the co-legislators on a mechanism that allows to resolve situations in which sectoral law has similar AI-specific requirements to the AI act, by limiting the latter’s application in those specific cases through implementing acts. In addition to this, a compromise was found to exempt the machinery regulation from direct applicability of the AI act. The Commission was also empowered to adopt delegated acts under the machinery regulation which would add health and safety requirements in respect of AI systems that are classified as high-risk pursuant to the AI act. This solution effectively addresses any possible overlaps between the high-risk requirements from the AI act and those from sectoral legislation. The provisional agreement also adds a new obligation for the Commission to provide guidance to assist economic operators of high-risk AI systems covered by sectoral harmonisation legislation in complying with the high-risk requirements of the AI act in a manner that minimises compliance burden.
Next steps
Today’s provisional agreement must be now endorsed by the Council and the European Parliament before being submitted to a legal/linguistic revision with a view to the formal adoption of the legislative act by the co-legislators in the coming weeks.
Background
In October 2024, the European Council called on all EU institutions, member states and stakeholders, as a matter of priority, to take work forward, notably in response to the challenges identified in the reports by Enrico Letta (‘Much more than a market’) and Mario Draghi (‘The future of European competitiveness’). The Budapest declaration of 8 November 2024 subsequently called for ‘launching a simplification revolution’, by ensuring a clear, simple and smart regulatory framework for businesses and drastically reducing administrative, regulatory and reporting burdens, in particular for SMEs.
Since February 2025, as a follow-up to the call by EU Leaders at that and subsequent meetings, the Commission has put forward ten ‘Omnibus’ packages aiming to simplify existing legislation on sustainability, investment, agriculture, small mid-caps, digitalisation and common specifications, defence readiness, chemical products, digital issues including on AI, environment, the automotive sector and food and feed safety.
 
 
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With the EU Biotech Act marking a major push to strengthen Europe’s biotechnology sector, new OECD research offers a timely check on where the bloc stands. The evidence shows that Europe still lags competitors in biotech start-up creation, patenting and venture capital funding. This blog unpacks the gap and explores how agile regulation and smarter financing tools can help EU policymakers build a more competitive biotechnology start-up ecosystem.
Biotechnology has the potential to drive economic growth and high-value job creation, deliver life-saving treatments, and offer sustainable alternatives in manufacturing. The European Commission’s publication of the EU Biotech Act Part I (with a Part II focused on non-health biotechnologies and the broader bioeconomy expected in late 2026) reflects the scale of that ambition.
New OECD research suggests that the bloc has significant ground to make up: across indicators including start-up creation, patenting activity, and venture capital investment, the EU trails other major research economies.
Why Europe’s biotech research prowess isn’t producing start-ups
The European Union is a recognised world leader in foundational biotechnology research. In 2022, it held 21% of the global share of the top 10 most cited publications in biology, biomedical research and clinical medicine, close to the United States’ 22% and China’s 24%. Yet this strength is not translating into commercial activity. Data from the OECD Start-ups Database shows the EU has consistently produced around half as many biotechnology start-ups as the US over the past two decades. Whilst this gap has narrowed in recent years, this appears to be driven by a contraction in the US rather than growth in Europe.
This points to weaknesses in the EU biotechnology innovation ecosystem, ones that become clearer when examining two key enablers of start-up creation: intellectual property and funding.
Shortcomings in European patenting and VC funding
Patenting reflects an ecosystem’s ability to turn R&D into commercially viable intellectual property and is critical for start-ups seeking to protect innovations and secure financing. Yet, between 2000 and 2022, EU biotechnology start-ups fell steadily behind their US counterparts in patent filing. The gap peaked in 2022 with US start-ups filing almost four times as many patents. While this partly reflects the larger number of US start-ups, it still points to a comparative weakness in European biotechnology innovation.

Venture capital is particularly important to biotech start-ups, which face long development cycles, high upfront R&D costs and complex regulatory processes, making early-stage funding critical for survival and growth. Here too, the EU lags significantly. OECD analysis shows the US has consistently outpaced the EU in biotech venture capital investment over the past decade, peaking in 2021 when US funding was up to 10 times greater.

How EU biotechnology regulation impacts innovation and investment
These gaps reflect many interconnected factors, from entrepreneurship culture to international competition. But regulation deserves particular attention, given its direct influence on investment patterns and start-up development.
OECD research has found that EU biotechnology regulation is both complex and fragmented, with overlapping rules at both the European and Member State level creating uncertainty for innovators. In some cases, existing legislation even works actively against biotechnology adoption. The Fertilizing Products Regulation, for example, only permits microbial strains in fertilizer products if they are not genetically modified, effectively blocking novel biotech alternatives to traditional chemical fertilisers.
Beyond complexity, the EU regulatory approval process is notably slow. Strict data requirements and limited scope for derogation and pre-submission consultations between innovators and regulators all contribute to lengthy and costly timelines. In contrast, jurisdictions like the US and Singapore routinely offer pre-submission consultations, helping innovators clarify expectations and avoid delays. The difference in outcomes is notable. Industry studies suggest that approving genetically modified crops for food and feed, for example, can take up to 6 years in the EU, compared to 1.8 years in the United States, 1 year in Australia, and 5 months in Canada.
What can EU policymakers do to boost biotech start-up competitiveness?
OECD research points to agile regulation as a way to make approval processes more adaptable. In practice, this means tools like regulatory sandboxes and innovation testbeds that allow for controlled real-world experimentation, and early structured engagement between regulators and innovators to streamline complex approval pathways.
Strategic foresight approaches and participatory technology assessments can also help by identifying where these tools are most needed across the policy cycle (see diagram below).
The United Kingdom’s Engineering Biology Sandbox Fund offers a concrete example. In 2024, it provided £1.6 million to the Food Standards Agency Cell-Cultivated Product (CCP) Sandbox Programme, which allowed regulators to build familiarity with novel technologies while helping participating companies reduce approval timelines and attract scale-up investment.

Smarter financing can also help close the gap. De-risking tools – such as risk transfer mechanisms, blended finance structures, and public co-investment and guarantees – can support biotech start-ups at the costly stages of demonstration and scale-up, where private capital is the hardest to attract. Demand-side measures can work alongside these efforts. The United States Department of Agriculture’s BioPreferred Program, for example, requires federal buyers to prefer bio-based products across 139 categories (e.g. paints, lubricants), backed by a database of almost 10 000 products. This kind of demand gives investors confidence that markets exist for biotechnology innovations, a signal that European policymakers could replicate.
Can the EU Biotech be a game changer for biotechnology start-ups?
The EU Biotech Act Part I appears to address several of the barriers and solutions outlined above. For example, it introduces regulatory sandboxes to allow controlled experimentation with novel technologies, expands pre-submission consultations to help innovators navigate regulatory submission processes, creates a strategic project designation to fast-track funding and regulatory clearance, and establishes a €10 billion Health Biotechnology Investment Pilot with the European Investment Bank to mobilise private capital through risk-sharing instruments.
These are substantive measures. But their long-term impact will depend on whether regulation becomes more agile in practice, and whether financing instruments reach biotech start-ups at the costly stages of demonstration and scale-up. Closing the gap in biotechnology start-up creation, venture capital investment and patenting will require measures designed with start-ups explicitly in mind: faster, simpler and more accessible pathways that turn Europe’s research excellence into commercial activity.

Click here to access the interactive charts.
 
 
 

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Today, the EU and US signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals and agreed an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. These initiatives reflect the EU’s commitment to deepen cooperation on critical raw materials. This is a key step in enhancing resilience and diversification of supply chains, amid shared geopolitical and economic challenges.
Signed today by Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maros Šefčovič and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington DC, the MoU formalises the EU-US strategic partnership to build secure, sustainable critical minerals supply chains. It foresees bilateral cooperation across the full value chain – spanning exploration, extraction, processing, refining, recycling and recovery, while supporting innovation, investment and geological mapping as well as supply- and demand-side measures.
Additionally, Commissioner Šefčovič and US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer set out an Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience, which paves the way towards a possible plurilateral trade initiative with global partners.
Under the Action Plan, the EU and the US intend to work together to explore a broad range of trade policies and instruments to reinforce coordinated international action. These may include border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, price gap subsidies and offtake agreements. In addition, cooperation is expected to focus on the development of common standards for mining, processing and recycling; the promotion of investment; joint research and innovation; stockpiling strategies; and mechanisms for rapid response to supply disruptions.
Both sides plan to continue working on critical minerals resilience in relevant international fora, including the G7 and the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE).
Both, the MoU and the Action Plan follow up on shared commitments decided on at the Critical Minerals Ministerial meeting held in Washington DC on 4 February 2026, alongside Japan. Closer cooperation in the area of critical minerals is foreseen in the Joint Statement of 21 August 2025 between the EU and the US.
 
“Secure and sustainable access to critical minerals is vital for the competitiveness and resilience of the EU economy. The MoU with the United States is the EU’s 16th bilateral instrument on critical raw materials. Together, these MoUs make a significant part of our strategy to reduce dependencies, foster innovation, and ensure that our supply chains are resilient against global disruptions. By working together with partners across the globe, we can shape fair and transparent markets that benefit our economies and industries. ” – Stéphane Séjourné, Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy
“It is encouraging to see EU-US cooperation on critical raw materials taking concrete shape. The vision is there – now the real test is execution, by turning shared ambitions into impactful projects. This will define our success. Critical minerals sit at the core of every future-facing industry – resilience is therefore inevitable and addressing vulnerabilities an imperative.” – Maroš Šefčovič, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security; Interinstitutional Relations and Transparency
 
 
 
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Resilience, supervision, and international coordination are essential to safeguarding global financial markets as new AI tools enable attackers.
Artificial intelligence is transforming how the financial system copes with vulnerabilities and reacts to incidents. Yet it is also amplifying cyber threats that can undermine financial stability when the offensive capabilities of intruders outpace defenses.
IMF analysis suggests that extreme cyber‑incident losses could trigger funding strains, raise solvency concerns, and disrupt broader markets.
The financial system relies on shared digital infrastructure that’s highly interconnected, including software, cloud services, and networks for payments and other data. Advanced AI models can dramatically reduce the time and cost needed to identify and exploit vulnerabilities, raising the likelihood of simultaneously discovering and targeting weaknesses in widely used systems. As a result, cyber risk is increasingly about correlated failures that could disrupt financial intermediation, payments, and confidence at the systemic level.
Anthropic’s recent controlled release of its Claude Mythos Preview, an advanced AI model with exceptional cyber capabilities, underscored how quickly risks are increasing. Mythos could find and exploit vulnerabilities in every major operating system and web browser—even when used by non-experts. This foreshadows how fast‑moving, AI‑driven cyber risks could destabilize the financial system if not managed carefully, and why authorities must focus on building resilience through supervision and coordination—rather than treating these developments as purely technical or operational issues.
On the other hand, OpenAI’s specialized, restricted cyber version of GPT‑5.5 assumes vulnerabilities and attacks will grow, and emphasizes equipping defenders more quickly and at scale, under appropriate governance and trusted access models.
Advances change risk equation
Models such as Mythos illustrate the nature of the challenge because they amplify existing cyberattack techniques by operating at machine speed. Attackers have the advantage over defenders because discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities can occur faster than patching and remediation. In a financial system built on common software and shared service providers, this can create simultaneous vulnerabilities across many institutions.
For now, some mitigating factors remain. Advanced AI cyber capabilities are not yet widely available, and closed, industry‑specific financial software is harder to target than open‑source infrastructure. But these buffers are likely to erode quickly as model training expands, capabilities diffuse, and leaks occur. Temporary containment is unlikely to substitute for durable defenses.
Financial stability implications
The new AI‑enabled cyber tools focus the discussion on financial stability:

Risks are systemic. Attacks become more dangerous when discovery and exploitation scale rapidly, with implications for financial stability.
Risks cut across sectors. The financial sector shares digital foundations with energy, telecommunications, and public services. That means AI‑assisted attacks can propagate across sectors that rely on the same infrastructure.
AI may further concentrate risk and failures with one vulnerability rippling across many institutions. Reliance on a small number of software platforms, cloud providers, or AI models increases the impact of any single exploited weakness.

These features elevate cyber risk to a potential macro‑financial shock. Confidence effects, payment disruptions, liquidity strains, and fire‑sale dynamics could follow if multiple institutions are affected simultaneously. For financial authorities, the question is whether the system is prepared to absorb cyber incidents without destabilizing core financial functions.
AI in cyber defense
AI is also a critical part of the solution. When attackers operate at machine speed, defenders must do the same. Financial institutions increasingly use AI‑supported tools to detect threats, prevent fraud, identify vulnerabilities, and respond to incidents.
AI also can help reduce vulnerabilities at the development stage rather than patching them after release. For widely used financial infrastructure, these gains can meaningfully reduce systemic exposure. But these benefits will materialize only if institutions invest in integration, governance, and human oversight—areas that supervisors increasingly need to assess. This also includes business continuity and disaster recovery, cyber and quality assurance programs, and good cyber hygiene practices.
Resilience-first policy framework
AI-driven cyber risk demands a policy response that treats cybersecurity as a core financial stability issue. Existing measures remain relevant, but they must be expanded and sharpened for a world of faster, automated, and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Policymakers should prioritize robust resilience standards, supervision focused on systemic transmission channels, and close public-private collaboration on threat intelligence and incident response.
Defenses will inevitably be breached, so resilience must also be a priority, specifically to limit how far incidents spread and ensure rapid recovery. Controls to stop the spread of attacks can prevent local breaches from escalating into system‑wide disruptions. These measures are often costly and complex, but they are among the most effective tools for containing AI‑enabled attacks.
From a supervisory perspective, this underscores the need to focus not only on prevention, but on response, recovery, and continuity of critical functions. Cyber stress testing, scenario analysis, and board‑level oversight of cyber risk are becoming indispensable components of financial stability frameworks.
International cooperation is vital
The Mythos episode also highlights governance challenges. Cyber risk does not respect borders. As AI capabilities spread across countries, inconsistent oversight could weaken a globally interconnected system.
Emerging and developing economies, which often have more severe resource constraints, may be disproportionately exposed to attackers targeting regions with weaker defenses. That’s why stronger international coordination, more information sharing, and expanded capacity development are critical to preserving global financial stability.
As AI reshapes the cyber landscape, the central question for authorities is whether the financial system can continue to function under severe stress. Answering that question requires putting systemic risk—and the tools to manage it—at the center of the AI‑cyber conversation.
 
 
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The Council today provisionally agreed new rules to strengthen the fight against value added tax (VAT) fraud in the EU by ramping up cooperation between member states, the European public prosecutor’s office (EPPO) and the European anti-fraud office (OLAF).
The new framework will give EPPO and OLAF more direct access to key VAT data on cross-border business transactions in the EU, including information held by Eurofisc – the EU’s anti-VAT fraud network.
” We have taken massive strides in tackling VAT fraud over recent years. But our budgets still lose out to the tune of billions of euros every year and authorities need the right tools to tackle these criminal activities more quickly. Today’s agreement will give EU investigative bodies the targeted information they need to pursue criminals swiftly and to protect national and EU revenues that benefit us all.”- Makis Keravnos, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Cyprus
Cross-border VAT fraud, in particular missing trader intra-community fraud (commonly known as carousel fraud), is a serious problem in the EU. According to the European Commission, this criminal activity costs member state treasuries and the EU budget between €12.5 billion and €32.8 billion annually and is carried out mostly by organised crime groups.
In practice, the new framework means that EPPO and OLAF will have the first-hand information they need to launch and support investigations under their competences into suspected cross-border VAT fraud. This will improve coordination between the various actors, speed up investigations, and strengthen the EU’s overall capacity to detect and combat VAT fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests. At the same time, it will help put the EU’s legitimate businesses on a more level playing-field.
Background
The new rules take the form of a regulation amending Council regulation 904/2010 on administrative cooperation and combating VAT fraud. The measure follows the agreement in March last year to make VAT reporting obligations for companies who sell goods and services to businesses in another EU member state fully digital by 2030 which should further support the fight against VAT fraud.
Next steps
Once the European Parliament has adopted its opinion on the file – currently expected in July 2026 – the Council will proceed to formally adopt the new rules. The regulation will enter into force twenty days after its publication in the official journal of the EU.
 
 
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The energy price index rose 12.1% in April, driven largely by crude oil (+8.7%). The non-energy price index increased 3.2%.
Agricultural prices gained 1.5% in April, led by food prices (+1.5%); raw materials rose 2.5%, while beverage prices edged up 0.4%. Fertilizer prices surged 14%
Metals edged up 1.4% in April, led by aluminum (+6.7%), zinc (+5.7%), and nickel (+5.2%). Precious metals fell 2.7%, weighed down by a decline in gold (-2.8%).
The Pink Sheet is the World Bank’s monthly report on commodity price movements.

The energy price index rose 12.1% in April, driven largely by crude oil (+8.7%). The non-energy price index increased 3.2%.
Agricultural prices gained 1.5% in April, led by food prices (+1.5%); raw materials rose 2.5%, while beverage prices edged up 0.4%. Fertilizer prices surged 14%
Metals edged up 1.4% in April, led by aluminum (+6.7%), zinc (+5.7%), and nickel (+5.2%). Precious metals fell 2.7%, weighed down by a decline in gold (-2.8%).
The Pink Sheet is the World Bank’s monthly report on commodity price movements.

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The Digital Markets Act (DMA) is a key instrument to improve market openness and fairness, competition, and user choice in the EU

New challenges posed by generative AI and cloud services need to be addressed

External pressure must not compromise the EU’s sovereignty and autonomy to define its rules

Effective and proportionate fines essential to ensure deterrence and safeguarding DMA’s effectiveness

MEPs are pushing for the Commission’s timely and effective enforcement of the EU’s Digital Markets Act and closer scrutiny of AI-driven search tools and cloud services.
In a resolution adopted on Thursday by show of hands, Parliament urges the Commission to quickly and consistently enforce the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) and to make full use of its enforcement powers. MEPs point to the growing strategic importance of cloud computing services and the increasing uptake of AI-driven search tools (such as Google’s AI overview), stressing the need for closer scrutiny under the DMA framework.
EU’s sovereignty must not be compromised
MEPs warn against political pressure from third countries seeking to weaken the DMA and underline that such interference should not compromise the EU’s sovereignty and autonomy to enforce its own rules. The Commission should make full use of the DMA’s enforcement instruments (including regulatory dialogue, investigations, non-compliance proceedings, and fines) to prevent gatekeepers, regardless of their place of establishment, from bypassing the law.
Ongoing non-compliance proceedings should be concluded without undue delay, MEPs say. They also regret the modest fines imposed on Meta and Apple and stress that effective and proportionate fines are essential to ensure deterrence.
Gatekeeper action
With gatekeepers having to comply with the DMA since 2024, smaller players continue to face discriminatory practices and gatekeeper-imposed restrictions, slowing innovation and reducing consumer choice. Concerns remain around Google’s persistent self-preferencing practices, TikTok’s consent screens using behavioural techniques to obtain consent, the change of default settings and easily accessing competing services by Microsoft , and the continued use of prohibited parity clauses by Booking.com. MEPs are also worried about restricted access to audiovisual media services on connected TVs and call on the Commission to monitor this segment of the market, to avoid replicating unfair practices such as those by Android on smartphones.
Real-world results
Parliament urges the Commission to prioritise the enforcement of interoperability, data access, anti-steering and anti-self-preferencing obligations, while taking into account relevant market developments. The text says compliance with the DMA should be assessed in relation to practical, real-world outcomes on market openness, competition and user choice, while its effectiveness depends on empowered end-users.
Background
In November 2025, the Commission launched investigations into Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure to determine if they should be designated as gatekeepers for their cloud computing services. In April 2025, it issued its first non-compliance decisions and fines against Meta regarding its “pay or consent” advertising model and Apple for breaching its anti-steering obligations. On 28 April 2026, the Commission published the first review of the DMA, assessing the DMA’s impact and identifying areas of future focus, such as cloud services and AI.
 
 
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On 1 May, the EU-Mercosur Interim Trade Agreement (ITA) will start being provisionally applied. This will allow EU producers, exporters, and farmers to start reaping the benefits of this deal as of day one. 
The provisional application of the ITA will create new opportunities, supporting the exports of industrial goods, services, and agri-food products to Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. It will immediately remove or drastically reduce tariffs on key exports such as cars, pharmaceuticals, and foresee a first tariff cut for most agri-food products such as wine, spirits and olive oil, immediately creating new export opportunities for EU farmers.
Benefits for exporters of goods and services
Exporters of goods will benefit from immediate tariff relief as of 1 May, when the first tariff cuts start applying.
Moreover, EU companies can start bidding for public and government contracts in Mercosur on an equal footing with local companies. The deal removes most preferences given to domestic firms in government contracts both at federal and state level, making the tendering for contracts procedures simpler and more transparent.
Services exporters will immediately benefit from new opportunities as well, thanks to the implementation of clear licensing rules, non-discriminatory procedures, and movement of workers.
1 May also marks the start of eliminating non-tariff barriers and technical barriers to trade, with rules on conformity assessment, rules on labelling and respect of international standards being applied. This will ensure that EU companies can operate in an easier and faster manner, delivering immediate commercial benefits.
Benefits for farmers and agri-food exporters
The provisional application of the deal creates a better and more competitive environment for EU agri-food producers to export their products to the four countries of Mercosur.
The EU is the world’s biggest exporter of food and drink products, and our high-quality products are renowned across the globe. The agreement is expected to lead to a 50% increase in EU agri-food exports to the Mercosur region. As of 1 May, the EU will have access to the first part of tariff rate quota volumes, while a first tariff cut for most agri-food products will create new export opportunities for EU farmers immediately.
Last but not least, Mercosur countries will start protecting 344 EU Geographical Indications (GIs) as of 1 May, banning imitations as well as misleading terms, symbols, flags or images. Only genuine products, such as, for example, Roquefort cheese made in Roquefort, France, will carry the GI name.
The agreement also provides an unprecedented set of measures to protect sensitive agri-food sectors and ensure level-playing field and reciprocity, including carefully calibrated tariff rate quotas, a robust safeguard mechanism, and enhanced controls.
Background 
Provisional application follows the European Council decision in January to empower the Commission to provisionally apply the agreement as from the first ratification by one Mercosur country. On 27 February, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU would proceed with provisional application. Provisional application allows the EU to immediately benefit from this deal, while ensuring democratic process and sensitivities are fully respected.
 
 
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