EACC & Member News

Houthoff: Reverse solicitation under MiCA

In the previous editions of our series on the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”), we discussed the two routes by which crypto-asset services can be provided from 31 December 2024: (1) the licence and (2) notification. MiCA offers an exemption from the licence requirement in the event of reverse solicitation. But what is reverse solicitation, and to what extent can crypto-asset service providers (“CASPs”) rely on the exemption when entering the EU market without licence or notification? We will answer those questions in this edition.

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EACC

U.S. Remains World’s Top Destination for Foreign Direct Investment for 12th Consecutive Year

The United States has been ranked as the top destination for foreign direct investment for the 12th consecutive year according to Kearney’s Global Business Policy Council’s 2024 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Confidence Index. 
The annual survey of global senior executives and investors found that the United States maintains its lead ranking for over a decade due to the growing strength of the U.S. economy and rebounding consumer sentiment.
Foreign investors were encouraged by higher-than-anticipated GDP growth in 2023, which was attributed to strong consumer and government expenditure, and robust export levels. The ranking is also testament to the United States’ lead in technological innovation, a top priority for investors and the Biden-Harris Administration’s economic agenda.
“For the 12th year in a row, the United States was once again the number one destination for foreign direct investment in 2023, reflecting the Department of Commerce’s commitment to constantly increasing our economic competitiveness,” said U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo. “Through our efforts to secure FDI across the United States, we are delivering on the Biden-Harris Administration’s promise to create good-paying jobs for working families and increase economic development in all communities across the country.”
The United States’ ranking in the FDI Confidence Index is underpinned by the work of the U.S. Department of Commerce’s SelectUSA program that facilitates job-creating business investment into the United States and raises awareness of the critical role that economic development plays in the U.S. economy. Since its inception, SelectUSA has facilitated more than $200 billion in client-verified FDI, supporting more than 200,000 jobs throughout the United States and its territories.
As part of the Biden-Harris Administration’s effort to attract foreign direct investment, Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo will host the 2024 SelectUSA Investment Summit from June 23-26 at the Gaylord National Resort and Convention Center in National Harbor, Maryland. The Investment Summit is the premier event in the United States dedicated to promoting foreign direct investment and provides prospects for investors from global markets and economic development organizations across the nation to interact and create investment opportunities.
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About SelectUSA
Housed within the International Trade Administration, SelectUSA promotes and facilitates business investment into the United States by coordinating related federal government agencies to serve as a single point of contact for investors and raises awareness of the critical role that economic development plays in the U.S. economy. SelectUSA assists U.S. economic development organizations to compete globally for investment by providing information, a platform for international marketing, and high-level advocacy for the United States as an investment destination. SelectUSA also helps foreign companies find the information they need to make decisions, connect to the right people at the local level, navigate the federal regulatory system, and find solutions to issues related to the federal government. For more information, visit www.trade.gov/selectusa. For more information about the 2024 SelectUSA Investment Summit, visit www.selectusasummit.us.
About the International Trade Administration
The International Trade Administration (ITA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce is the premier resource for American companies competing in the global marketplace. Operating in more than 100 U.S. locations and 80 markets worldwide, ITA promotes trade and investment, assists U.S. businesses and workers to export and expand globally, and ensures fair trade and compliance by enforcing U.S. trade laws and agreements. For more information on ITA, visit www.trade.gov.
 
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Secretary Raimondo’s Meeting with Stakeholders on Open AI Models

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and Assistant Secretary Alan Davidson gave remarks at a roundtable with leading AI developers, civil society organizations, and academics on the benefits, risks, and policy options regarding open AI models, in relation to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) Request for Comment on the topic.
Secretary Raimondo moderated the discussion, which addressed the marginal benefits and risks of open AI models, systems of accountability and risk mitigation, the national security and societal impacts of open AI models, and existing and emerging approaches to AI evaluation.
The Secretary commented on the Department of Commerce’s focus on the understanding the full spectrum of benefits and risks associated with development of open AI models, and the Department’s ongoing efforts to develop policy that manages security and societal risks without forgoing benefits to innovation, safety research, competition and more.
Attendees included representation from Anthropic, the Center for Democracy & Technology, Demos, Google DeepMind, Greylock, Meta, MLCommons, OpenAI, RAND, Scale AI, the Stanford Center for Research on Foundation Models, and Upturn. Comments on NTIA’s RFC on Dual Use Foundation Models with Widely Available Model Weights are due within 30 days of publication of the Request for Comment in the Federal Register, or March 27, 2024.

Related Bureaus and Offices: National Telecommunications and Information Administration

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International Maritime Organization | IMO Agrees Possible Outline for Maritime “Net-zero Framework”

​IMO has agreed on an illustration of a possible draft outline of an “IMO net-zero framework” for cutting greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from international shipping.
This marks a step forward in the legal process towards adopting global regulations, referred to as “mid-term GHG reduction measures”, that will help achieve the targets contained in the 2023 IMO Strategy on the Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships.
At the conclusion of the eighty-first session of the Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 81), held in London from 18 to 22 March 2024, IMO Secretary-General Mr. Arsenio Dominguez said: “Your Committee is indeed a forum to consider issues of critical relevance for all parts of the marine environment, and this week you made very important progress.”
The draft outline illustration of a possible IMO net-zero framework lists regulations under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which will be adopted or amended to allow for a new global fuel standard and a new global pricing mechanism for maritime GHG emissions.
These may include a proposed new Chapter 5 of MARPOL Annex VI containing regulations on the IMO net-zero framework, to include:

a goal-based marine fuel standard regulating the phased reduction of the marine fuel’s GHG intensity; and
an economic mechanism(s) to incentivize the transition to net-zero.

The goal-based marine fuel standard and pricing mechanism are mid-term GHG reduction measures specified in the revised IMO Strategy on the Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, adopted in July 2023. Several different proposals of what these measures should entail are currently being considered.
The possible draft outline for the IMO net-zero framework will be used as a starting point to consolidate the different proposals into a possible common structure, to support further discussions with the understanding that this outline would not prejudge any possible future changes to it as deliberations progress.
Next steps on GHG emissions 
In addition to progress on the legal framework, MEPC agreed on the following next steps, ahead of its next meeting (MEPC 82), scheduled for 30 September to 4 October 2024:

Comprehensive impact assessment on the impact of the proposed mid-term measures on Member States to be finalized and submitted to MEPC 82;
A two-day expert workshop (Fifth GHG Expert Workshop – GHG-EW 5) to be held to discuss the preliminary findings of the comprehensive impact assessment, covering all aspects, including the modelling of revenue disbursement. The outcome will be reported to MEPC 82;
The Seventeenth Intersessional Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (ISWG-GHG 17) to meet to consider the outcomes of the comprehensive impact assessment, the GHG-EW5, and other submitted documents for further discussions around the development of mid-term measures, and report to MEPC 82;
ISWG-GHG 17 to develop draft terms of reference for a Fifth IMO GHG Study;
Establishment of a GESAMP Working Group on the Life Cycle GHG Intensity of Marine Fuels. GESAMP is the Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environmental Protection. The GESAMP-LCA WG will be tasked to provide best possible scientific and technical assessment of issues related to the implementation of the LCA Guidelines. These guidelines allow for the calculation of GHG emissions over the full production cycle and end-use of marine fuels, known as “well-to-wake”;
Two correspondence group have been established which will report to MEPC 83: the first group is tasked to develop a work plan on the development of a regulatory framework for the use of onboard carbon capture systems and to look into Tank-to Wake methane and nitrous oxide emissions;  the second group will look into social and economic sustainability themes and aspects of marine fuels for possible inclusion in the LCA Guidelines.

Revised greenhouse gas life cycle guidelines adopted  
MEPC adopted revised Guidelines on life cycle GHG intensity of marine fuels (LCA Guidelines). The updated guidelines include revised calculations for default emission factors; updated appendix 4 on template for well-to-tank default emission factor submission; and new appendix 5 template for Tank-to-Wake (TtW) emission factors.
 
 
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ECB | Who Buys Bonds Now? How Markets Deal With a Smaller Eurosystem Balance Sheet

Blog post by Federico Maria Ferrara, Tom Hudepohl, Pamina Karl, Tobias Linzert, Benoit Nguyen, Lia Vaz Cruz[1] |  The Eurosystem is shrinking its balance sheet, which makes more government bonds available for purchase. The ECB Blog looks at how markets are adjusting to this new situation with regard to bond price volatility, liquidity and the impact on repo markets.

Since mid-2022 the Eurosystem’s balance sheet declined by around €2,000 billion, or more than 22 per cent. The largest part of this decline is due to banks having repaid a substantial share of the loans taken from the Eurosystem via the targeted long-term refinancing operations. This has released many assets previously used as collateral back to the market, including government bonds. Moreover, the Eurosystem owns smaller amounts of bonds since it no longer reinvests maturing bonds under its asset purchase programme.
The reduction of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and the fact that governments across the euro area have issued record amounts of debt have substantially increased the availability of bonds to the market. This has helped to bring the Eurosystem’s footprint in government bond markets closer to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 1).
But how have markets adjusted, and which other investors are stepping in to absorb the increasing amount of government bonds available to the market?

Chart 1
Size of euro area government bond market and the Eurosystem market footprint (EUR billions and %)

Sources: Eurosystem, CSDB.
Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the size of the euro area government bond market and splits it into the Eurosystem holdings (yellow) and mobilised collateral (green), and what is not held or mobilised as collateral with the Eurosystem (blue). The Eurosystem market footprint is a relative measure, computed as the share of the Eurosystem’s euro area government bond (EGB) holdings compared to nominal amount outstanding. Outright holdings are EGBs held by the Eurosystem via purchase programmes, adjusted with EGBs lent back via the securities lending against cash collateral facilities; mobilised collateral includes EGBs mobilised as collateral for open market operations. Last observation: 29 February 2024.
How to read the figures: In 2020 the euro area government bond market had a capitalisation of almost €8 trillion. At that time Eurosystem holdings and collateral had a value of more than €3.5 trillion, which accounted for 31.5 percent of the market.

Who stepped into the government bond market?
Chart 2 shows that various types of investors have stepped in and compensated for the Eurosystem’s reduced presence. While the Eurosystem has not actively sold bonds, it only partially replaced maturing bonds in its monetary policy portfolios[2]. Two sectors have clearly contributed the most to absorbing the new debt since the Eurosystem began to reduce its balance sheet: households and foreign investors.

Chart 2
Sectoral absorption of government securities in 2023 (%)

Sources: ECB, SHS.
Notes: The chart shows the flows into euro area government debt securities in 2023, split between a range of euro area investors (banks, households, etc.) and foreign investors. As an example, the last column for the euro area shows that foreign investors, followed by euro area households, had the largest inflows into euro area government securities in 2023, while the Eurosystem had the largest outflow (as it reduced its reinvestment amounts overall). The bars in each column add up to 100%. Last observation: 31 December 2023.

Historically, foreign investors were the largest holders of euro area government securities, accounting for 40% of holdings prior to the start of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase programme (Chart 3). When the Eurosystem expanded its balance sheet, however, they halved their share of euro area government bonds. As the Eurosystem ended reinvestments under the APP, they returned and absorbed a considerable amount of the net issuance of government bonds (Chart 2). Nevertheless, their share is still far smaller than it was a decade ago (Chart 3).
This return of foreign investors may not be surprising. The sector includes foreign investment funds and hedge funds, which traditionally show a high sensitivity to changes in yields, especially those of bonds issued by higher-rated euro area governments.

Chart 3
Selected holders of euro area government securities (%)

Sources: SHS, ECB.
Note: Last observation: 31 December 2023.

In contrast, the speed and intensity of purchases by the household sector is noteworthy. The share of government securities owned by households has returned to nearly 3.5%, close to the level prevailing before the Eurosystem launched its public sector purchase programme (PSPP) in 2015.
Several factors have made purchasing government bonds attractive for private households. Higher yields, together with governments offering dedicated retail-focused products, attracted investment from households, especially as many commercial banks were slow to pass-through higher policy rates to deposit rates. In addition, increased savings during the pandemic meant households had more money available to invest in bonds and bills.
Why did government bond markets react so smoothly?
The Eurosystem started to reduce its monetary policy bond portfolio in an environment of high government bond issuance and heightened market volatility as central banks around the world increased their policy rates to fight elevated inflation. In these conditions, the Eurosystem’s balance sheet reduction went very smoothly, with net issuance of bonds being absorbed by domestic and foreign investors.
The ability to buy or sell bonds has remained stable or even improved in recent months. This is visible from the relationship between volatility and liquidity in euro area government bond markets shown in Chart 4. Higher volatility is likely to decrease market liquidity as it increases risks to trade in the market. A clear sign of market dysfunction would be to see a deterioration of market liquidity that goes beyond what could be explained by an increase in market volatility. This is what happened in March 2020 at the beginning of the pandemic, when euro area bond markets faced severe disruptions as liquidity deteriorated dramatically and became disconnected from volatility (yellow dots). In contrast to that stress situation, recent data points (red dots) are in line with the usual relationship between bond market volatility and liquidity since 2015. This evidence is one indication that government bond markets have been functioning well during the recent period of balance sheet normalisation.

Chart 4
Relationship between liquidity and volatility in euro area government bond market

Source: ECB calculations.
Notes: Liquidity conditions proxied by a euro area weighted average composite indicator of liquidity in 10-year government bond markets and implied volatility based on euro-denominated 3-month Swaptions. Higher values of the composite liquidity indicator correspond to worse liquidity conditions. Blue dots indicate observations starting in January 2015. Yellow dots indicate observations from March 2020. Red dots indicate observations from March 2023 to February 2024. The light blue regression line is estimated based on all observations except those from March 2020. The yellow regression is estimated based on March 2020 observations. Last observation: 5 February 2024.

Several factors have supported the smooth functioning of financial markets.
First, the timely communication of the eventual reduction in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet made it easier for market actors, such as banks, insurers, and hedge funds, to plan and adapt. Decreasing the balance sheet in a predictable and gradual manner has supported orderly market conditions.
Second, suppliers of bonds have strategically adjusted their behaviour. Bond issuers – both governments and private companies – reacted to the new environment by initially shortening the maturities of their bonds, and some issued dedicated investment products for retail investors.
Finally, dealer banks have a critical role for secondary markets to remain liquid and efficient. Since the start of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet reduction, they mobilized sufficient space on their balance sheet that smoothly facilitated the buying and selling of bonds between investors in the secondary market.
Did more availability of governments bonds help in repo markets?
The increased availability of euro area government bonds had a positive effect on another crucial market segment: the repo market, where banks lend and borrow from each other against collateral. In 2022, repo market functioning was partly impaired due to the scarcity of high-quality securities that are used as collateral in secured money market trades. This had driven a wedge between repo rates and the ECB’s main policy rate, which contributed to delaying the transmission of monetary policy in the early stages of the tightening cycle.
The improved availability of collateral helped to significantly alleviate such shortages of assets and helped bring repo rates closer in line with our main policy rate. While at the end of 2022 almost 50% of all repo volumes were conducted more than 30 bps below the deposit facility rate (DFR), this share shrank drastically during 2023. Currently more than 50% of all repo volumes are within 10 bps of the DFR (Chart 5).
The overall improvement in repo market functioning has been conducive to the transmission of monetary policy to euro area money markets, as repo market rates have adjusted without delay to policy rate hikes in the later part of the hiking cycle.[3]

Chart 5
Share of euro area repo market trading below the DFR and Eurosystem market footprint (%)

Sources: MMSR, ECB, 20-day averages are displayed.
Notes: The Eurosystem’s footprint in the EGB market is measured as the share of the Eurosystem’s holdings of EGBs compared to the total nominal amount of EGBs outstanding (see chart 1). Specialness of repo market is displayed as share of volumes per rate bucket below the deposit facility rate (DFR). Last observation: 29 February 2024. How to read the figures: At the end of 2022, almost 50% of all repo volumes traded at a spread of more than 30 bps below the DFR. Since then, this scarcity premium has reduced drastically with more than 50% of repo volumes currently trading less than 10 bps below DFR.

Conclusion
The reduction of the Eurosystem balance sheet has taken place in a context of high government bond issuance, requiring private investors to step up their demand in bond markets. Supported by the predictable and gradual reduction of the Eurosystem’s footprint, investors, issuers and intermediaries adapted well to the new conditions, ensuring the smooth functioning of bond markets. Importantly, the increased availability of bonds contributed to improving market functioning in the repo market by alleviating collateral shortages. While the conditions for a continued smooth absorption are in place, market functioning must be monitored closely going forward.
 
The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
For more information, please Check out The ECB Blog.

 
Footnotes:

We are grateful to Rita Besugo, Mihail Medvedi and Raúl Novelle Araujo for their contribution to this blog post.
For the asset purchase programme the Eurosystem started to reduce its holdings in March 2023, first by only partly reinvesting redemptions, and as of July 2023 by not reinvesting any redemptions. For the pandemic emergency purchase programme redemptions were fully reinvested in 2023 and until the end of the first half of 2024. The Governing Council announced its intention to reduce the reinvestments in the second half of 2024.
Accordingly, the need to provide bonds back to the market via the Eurosystem’s securities lending facility (especially against cash) has also declined.

 
 
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European Commission | Eurobarometer Survey Shows Positive Perceptions About the Economy and the Quality of Life in the EU Regions

On March 25th the Commission published a Flash Eurobarometer conducted at the regional level, showing that EU citizens look positively at the economic situation and the quality of life in their region.
Over eight out of ten Europeans (82%) say that the quality of life in their region is good. At the same time, 65% of Europeans say that the current situation of the economy of their region is good.
Europeans tend to think that the most important issues facing their region at the moment are the cost of living (31%), the economic situation and unemployment (26%), and health (26%). These are followed by housing (20%), the environment and climate change (19%), and the educational system (18%).
At the same time, they identify economy, social justice and jobs (29%) as one of the most important dimensions for the future of Europe, followed by climate change and the environment (24%), education, culture, youth and sport (24%), democracy, values and rights and rule of law (21%), health (21%), EU security and defence (20%) and migration (19%).
Trust in regional and local authorities remains high, as does trust in the EU. 58% of respondents tend to trust regional and local authorities and 38% tend not to trust them. The same proportions are observed when it comes to trust in the EU.
A majority of Europeans continue to show optimism. 66% of them are optimistic regarding the future of their region while 32% are pessimistic. At the same time, 55% are optimistic regarding the future of the EU while 42% are pessimistic.
The survey also shows that a majority of Europeans (47%) continue to have a positive image of the EU. while 21% have a negative image and 30% have a neutral image.
 
Background
The Flash Eurobarometer “Public Opinion in the EU Regions” is conducted every three years at the regional level and gives a granular picture of the opinion of European citizens. This edition was conducted between the 11th of January and the 15th of February 2024. 62,091 interviews were conducted by telephone across 194 regions.
 
 
For more Information, please check out the Flash Eurobarometer 539
 
 
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IMF | Executing a Soft Landing for a Lasting Recovery [in Europe]

Speech by Alfred Kammer, Director – European Department, IMF  |  Thank you, Dean Muštra, for your opening remarks and Governor Vujčić for the invitation to attend this year’s Regional Governors’ Meeting in Split.
Today’s gathering comes two years after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a subsequent energy-price roller coaster, and the advent of a more fragmented global economy.
Against this backdrop Europe has done well, because governments acted fast and decisively.
Unemployment rates have remained low, inflation has declined sharply, and the EU announced a new accession effort—stemming the tide of fragmentation.
I will focus today on what comes next for Europe and in particular the Central, Eastern and Southeastern European or, in short, CESEE region:

What can businesses and those of you who are getting ready to join the labor market expect in the short term; and…
…what economic policies are needed to move CESEE and Europe onto the path of a lasting recovery over the medium term.

Global environment
Let me start with an overview of the global setting for this and next year.
The good news is that the global economy is growing faster compared to the difficult pandemic period, when global output contracted and only slowly recovered thereafter.
But—and here is the bad news—the global economy still lacks dynamism.
At around 3 percent, global growth is well below the historical average of 3.8 percent, which was recorded during 2000 to 2019 and, hence, provides little positive spillovers to Europe.
We expect the US economy to slow as its post-pandemic recovery runs its course.
Similarly, activity in China is cooling as weaknesses in the property sector are expected to persist.

For Europe––after suffering an exceptionally large energy price shock in 2022––we project a gradual recovery.
Compared to dire predictions of a recession at that time, this outcome would be a remarkable accomplishment.
Specifically, we expect growth in the euro area overall to rise from below 1 percent this year to 1.7 percent in 2025.
And in the CESEE region we expect the economies to grow close to 3 percent this year and 3.5 percent next year.
For Croatia which joined the euro area a year ago, growth is robust..
This positive development is the result of strong policies but also helped by a resilient tourism sector.

Our forecast constitutes what has been called a “soft landing.”
By this we mean that the decline of inflation in 2024-25 to previous levels is accompanied by only a mild growth slowdown.
This is not a common outcome as I will explain.
As of last month, inflation rates have fallen to approximately one-third of their peaks at end-2022. (Figure LHS).
The fact that the economic costs of the energy price shock and higher interest rates—which have been raised to slow down price increases—have so far been mild is quite remarkable.
As we have documented in a recent study, the drops in economic activity have typically been much larger during previous episodes of disinflation, as the red bar indicates.
But there are some reasons for concern.
Let me start by noting that the prospects of a soft landing are not equally strong across Europe.
The disinflation process has been uneven.
Core inflation, a measure of underlying price dynamics which excludes volatile food and energy price  components, is higher in emerging European economies than in advanced European economies.
In both country groupings, core inflation is coming down only slowly.
And even within CESEE, we are seeing differences.
For example, the decline of the inflation rate is progressing more slowly in Romania, Moldova, Montenegro, Hungary, and Serbia than elsewhere in the CESEE region.[1]
But the more general point here is that the forecast for a soft landing rests on strong assumptions.

One important factor especially in emerging European economies is that labor markets need to cool at just the right pace.

Labor markets cannot remain too strong as they may keep wage growth above long-term productivity growth and steady state inflation rates–thereby leading to protracted inflation and a loss of competitiveness.
But labor markets should also not cool so much that labor income would no longer be able to support robust private consumption.

Where are we in this respect?
As of end 2023, wages in the CESEE region were growing at above 10 percent year over year.
On the one hand, robust wage growth will help restore some of the purchasing power that households lost due to inflation.
By the end of last year, average household wages in real terms recovered enough to bring real wages back to at least their 2019 levels.
On the other hand, if wages are growing too fast, this might backfire and re-ignite inflation.
Our analysis shows that wage growth in the CESEE region at around 4-6 percent this year would balance the need to restore purchasing power and return inflation back to target levels.

Overall, given current levels of inflation and price and wage dynamics, our forecast suggests that achieving price stability targets will take one year longer in the CESEE region compared to advanced European economies.
In general, the underlying inflationary pressures in the region remain stronger than in advanced economies. Many central banks in the region should therefore maintain a tight monetary stance for longer than for example the ECB.
This does not necessarily mean that policy rates cannot fall. In countries where inflation expectations are dropping fast, nominal rates can be lowered without necessarily changing real rates and the policy stance.
The cost of erring on the side of too-loose monetary policy is significant when inflation is persistent. So, central banks should weigh negative news on inflation more when considering their next policy steps compared to positive news.
This bias is to avoid that upside inflation surprises materialize which could feed into expectations of sustained high inflation—a costly outcome for businesses, households and the economy as a whole.
Bringing inflation towards target also needs the support of fiscal policy.
The planned fiscal consolidations in 2024 and 2025 which roll back extraordinary support extended to households and corporations during the pandemic and the energy crisis are appropriate and will help fight inflation by containing demand.

Achieving a soft landing will not be easy, but it is critical, also because it will help policymakers getting ready for what will be an even more difficult task ahead: raising CESEE’s growth prospects in a durable manner.
Already prior to COVID, the speed of convergence of emerging European economies’ towards advanced European economies’ output-per-capita levels has slowed.
To put the lack of dynamism in perspective:

The growth slowdown in the CESEE region between the early and late 2010s implies that—at that reduced growth rate—CESEE countries would converge to average living standards in the EU (excluding CESEE member) by half a century later, by around 2100.

Four structural developments affecting convergence need attention. They are:

Demographic changes. Population aging is already reducing the labor force. In the CESEE region, pension and health care spending needs are estimated to grow by 5 percentage points of GDP by 2050.

High energy costs. Addressing this issue is intertwined with tackling the next challenge:

Climate change. Adaptation requires investment in infrastructure and clean technologies; the Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds are an important and substantial funding source. Implementation and uptake have been slow in the CESEE region and require attention.

Geoeconomic fragmentation is raising the costs of international trade and limits access to critical commodities. Trade restrictions have already increased sharply, by three-fold in 2022 compared to the pre-pandemic period (chart rhs) raising trade costs and dampening export earnings.

Addressing these challenges requires economic resources, and, to generate them, countries need to grow at a healthy clip.
Here, the CESEE region has its work cut out.

Growth prospects in advanced and emerging European economies have dimmed.
The latest 5-year forecast for Europe’s per-capita growth from last October (2023) is substantially below forecasts made just before the global financial crisis some 15 years ago.
These slower growth prospects are pervasive and apply to all parts of Europe: the euro area, central Europe, south-eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the CESEE region.
But Europe’s growth prospects have not only slowed relative to its own past, Europe has also fallen further behind other advanced economies.
When compared to the US, output per capita is in Europe about 30 percent lower on average after correcting for price and exchange rate changes that do not reflect changes in living standards.
The difference is even bigger for countries in the CESEE region at 45 percent
A decomposition of the gap in per-capita income into contributions from labor, capital, and productivity shows that that the main reason for Europe’s lower per capita GDP—accounting for about two-thirds—is substantially lower productivity.
Thus, the main goal for European policymakers should be to create conditions for faster productivity growth.

Here investment comes into play.
The level of productivity in a country is closely linked to the size of its capital stock.
And new machinery and upgrades in IT equipment and software are some examples how new technologies—embodied in capital goods—enter economic processes and increase productivity.
In the CESEE region, the per-capita level of capital is substantially below levels observed elsewhere in Europe (chart LHS).
What can policymakers do to facilitate more investment?
A recent survey of businesses by the European Investment Bank (RHS) identified several barriers to investment. Specifically:

First, firms are concerned about the availability of skilled labor. Continued support of education and universities remains key. But countries also need to improve active labor market policies—such as reskilling and vocational training for job searchers—to help fill skill gaps. At the EU level, common professional certifications would facilitate labor mobility.

Second, despite the fact that prices have come down considerably, firms remain concerned about high energy costs. Reforms of energy networks regulations but also investments are needed to improve the efficiency of energy production and distribution together with a shift to more renewable energy.
Finally, businesses are concerned about uncertainty about the future.

Policymakers can respond to this uncertainty through credible institutions and responsible policymaking.  By delivering sound macro-fundamentals–– low inflation, sustainable public debt— through trustworthy institutions, policymakers can reduce uncertainty about the economic conditions for businesses and households alike.

Credible policies and strong governance are the bedrock for a strong economy.
Several studies have shown that trust in economic institutions plays a critical role in reassuring savers and investors alike of the stability of their economic well being.
During 2021-2023, we could see an erosion of trust in the CESEE region.
A large-scale survey of CESEE countries by the Austrian National Bank shows that the belief in the stability and trustworthiness of local currencies was shaken post-COVID (chart).
Here we have a word of warning.
Several central banks in the region have been under strain from political interference.
Let me be clear, central banks need to be able to fulfill their mandates on inflation.
For this, independence is essential. Interference erodes trust and makes policymaking more costly.
Weak institutions also open the door to poor governance and corruption.
There is resounding evidence that robust governance via resilient anti-corruption frameworks is a precondition for attracting investment into a country.[2]
The good news is that in 2023 trust indicators have improved across all surveyed countries.
By assuring a soft landing, central banks and government can regain this hard-earned trust which is an indispensable underpinning of a healthy business environment.

Another area that deserves the attention of policymakers is the promise of growth from technological progress.
The advances of artificial intelligence are captivating the world. Its applications could jumpstart productivity, boost global growth, and raise incomes around the world.
Yet, AI could also replace jobs and deepen inequality.
It will take some time before we know the impact.
And at this stage, it is difficult to foresee the economic effects, as AI will ripple through economies in complex ways.
Nonetheless we can and should start assessing which types of occupations AI will likely affect; which activities it will complement, and which ones it may replace.
Recent work by the IMF shows that close to 60 percent of all workers in the EU will likely be affected by AI in one way or another (chart). For the CESEE region, the share is close to 50 percent.
Among those affected, for about half of them AI will complement their work and raise their productivity. For the other half, AI will be less complementary and replace some tasks or activities.
In most scenarios, AI will likely worsen overall inequality.
It will be more advantageous to the higher-skilled and reduce the need for medium and low-skilled workers alike. This is a troubling prospect that policymakers should assess and respond to as needed.
The availability of social safety nets and retraining programs mentioned earlier are of even more importance from this perspective. They will help make the AI transition more inclusive and curb inequality.
To conclude.
If there is one key message to leave with you, it is that policies matter.
With the right policy mix, the CESEE economies can secure low inflation and increase the long-term growth trajectory.
At the macroeconomic level this means monetary policy should maintain a tightening bias and carefully assess the timing and speed of easing.
Planned fiscal consolidation is appropriate and should help with disinflation.
Achieving a soft landing is critical to prepare countries for an urgent but critical task, raising CESEE’s growth prospects in a durable manner.
Crosswinds from an aging population, uncertainty about energy costs, and geoeconomic fragmentation call for forceful growth-enhancing reforms.
A prime task is getting the business climate right to help boost investment and productivity.
New investments––and their embodied technology––will also support the energy and green transition.
Here, by strengthening governance and anti-corruption frameworks countries can durably improve conditions to attract investment domestically and from abroad.
Governments need to also facilitate the transition to a more efficient economy by ensuring that education systems equip students with the skills to harness new technologies including AI.
But they also need to develop re-training and upskilling programs as technological progress and AI will affect work more broadly.
Success in the region will require forward looking reforms now that will pay off later.
This is an investment worth making—and one that we at the IMF stand ready to support.
Thank you.

[1] CESEE countries which have either had the smallest decline in core inflation by January 2024 relative to the post-2022 peak core inflation rate or had core inflation rates at or above 8 percent y-y by January 2023.

[2] How Reform Can Aid Growth and Green Transition in Developing Economies. New approaches to governance, business regulation, and trade can boost output by 4 percent in two years and help countries curb emissions Christian Ebeke, Florence Jaumotte September 25, 2023
 

 

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EU Commission | The EU in 2023: Succeeding amidst challenging times

At a time of increased geopolitical tensions, the EU has continued to successfully tackle the issues that concern Europeans most in 2023, whilst remaining on track to deliver on the political priorities. That is according to the new edition of the EU General Report, which was published today.
The report looks at how we have responded to emerging and existing global challenges, with our ongoing, steadfast support for Ukraine being the highlight. We have provided over €88 billion in financial, humanitarian and military assistance, offered protection to over 4 million people fleeing from Ukraine to the EU and are ready to open accession negotiations.
It also looks to the Middle East and how we have responded to the drastic deterioration in the humanitarian situation of Palestinians, quadrupling humanitarian aid to over €100 million in the last year.
At home, the report emphasises the work done in staying the course on key EU priorities

continuing our economic recovery from the pandemic
boosting competitiveness and manufacturing capacity for the technologies and products required to meet our ambitious climate targets
putting in place the legal framework to cut emissions by 55 % by 2030 (a key milestone on the path to climate neutrality)
making progress in ending the EU’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels, thanks to the REPowerEU Plan, and in reforming the design of the EU’s electricity market, to protect consumers against price shocks
working on a first comprehensive law on Artificial Intelligence as part of Europe’s digital transition
strengthening social dialogue and progressing on new rules to improve working conditions of people working through digital market platforms
reaching an important milestone in overhauling our migration system.

The report is available in all official languages of the EU as a fully illustrated book and an online version which is available below.
Find more information
The EU in 2023: General Report on the Activities of the European Union
The story of the von der Leyen Commission
 
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IMF | More Work is Needed to Make Big Banks Resolvable

Blog post by Tobias Adrian and Marc Dobler |  Almost a year ago, Credit Suisse, a globally systemic bank with $540 billion in assets and the second-largest Swiss lender, founded in 1856, failed and was sold to UBS. In the United States, Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank and First Republic Bank failed at around the same time amid Federal Reserve interest rate hikes to contain inflation. With a combined $440 billion of assets, these were the second, third, and fourth biggest bank resolutions since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created during the Great Depression.

This banking turmoil represented the most significant test since the global financial crisis of ending too-big-to-fail—whereby a systemic bank can be resolved while preserving financial stability and protecting taxpayers.
So, what’s the verdict? In short, while significant progress has been made, further work is required.
On the one hand, as we note in a recent report, the actions of authorities last year successfully avoided deeper financial turmoil, and the financial soundness indicators for most institutions signal continued resilience. In addition, unlike many of the failures during the global financial crisis, this time significant losses were shared with the shareholders and some creditors of the failed banks.
However, taxpayers were once again on the hook as extensive public support was used to protect more than just the insured depositors of failed banks. Amid a massive creditor run, the Credit Suisse acquisition was backed by a government guarantee and liquidity nearly equal to a quarter of Swiss economic output. While the public support was ultimately recovered, it entailed very significant contingent fiscal risk, and created a larger, more systemic bank. Use of standing resolution powers to transfer ownership of Credit Suisse, after bailing in shareholders and creditors, rather than relying on emergency legislation to effect a merger would have seen Credit Suisse shareholders fully wiped out and potentially less public support extended. We expect to learn more in the coming days when a Swiss report on the too-big-to-fail regime is issued.
In the United States, in addition to easing collateral requirements for liquidity support, the authorities cited systemic concerns to invoke an exception allowing protection of all deposits in two of the failed banks. This significantly increased costs for the deposit insurer which will need to be recouped from the industry over time. Even very large and sophisticated depositors were protected—not just the insured.
What we’ve learned
Intrusive supervision and early intervention are critical. Credit Suisse depositors lost confidence after prolonged governance and risk management failures. In the US, the failed banks pursued risky business strategies with inadequate risk management. Supervisors in both cases should have acted faster and been more assertive and conclusive. Our recent review of supervisory approaches found that the ability and will to act remain critical—and can suffer from unclear mandates or inadequate legal powers, resources, and independence as well as powerful financial sector lobbies. Policymakers need to better empower banking supervisors to act early and with authority if needed.
Even smaller banks can be systemic. Supervisory and resolution authorities should ensure sufficient recovery and resolution planning for the sector. This should include banks that may not be systemic in all circumstances but could be in some. This was a key recommendation of our latest Financial Sector Assessment Program for the US.
Resolution regimes and planning need sufficient flexibility. Policymakers should ensure resolution rules and plans are flexible enough to balance financial stability risks and taxpayer interests. Government support may still be required in some circumstances—for example, to avoid a systemic financial crisis. IMF staff recommended the equivalent of a systemic risk exception for the euro area, for example. While authorities should continue pursuing plan A, they need the flexibility to depart and from, and for example combine different resolution tools, as necessitated by the specific circumstances at the time of failure.
Liquidity in resolution is crucial. Banks typically fail because creditors lose confidence, even before the balance sheet reflects potential losses. Rebuilding capital buffers in resolution may not be sufficient on its own to restore confidence. Authorities must make further progress on how quickly banks heading into resolution could receive liquidity support—including prepositioning of collateral and testing preparedness—while still protecting central bank balance sheets.
Authorities in many countries need to strengthen deposit insurance regimes—as we recommended to Switzerland. New technology like 24/7 payments, mobile banking, and social media have accelerated deposit runs. Last year’s failures followed rapid deposit withdrawals, and deposit insurers and other authorities should be ready and able to act more quickly than many currently can. The US banks that failed were outliers—with balance sheets that had grown very rapidly, funded by a high degree of uninsured deposits. Where wider coverage is being considered, it would need to be adequately funded. Particularly in countries with deposit insurance that is not backed by a sovereign with deep pockets, policymakers should be careful not to overextend deposit insurance coverage. If not backed by a commensurate rise in deposit insurance funding, depositors could quickly lose confidence.

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EU Commission | Improving the quality of traineeships in the EU

Trainees all over the EU will benefit from better quality traineeships thanks to new Commission proposals. They will improve and enforce working conditions for trainees, and ensure everyone can do a traineeship regardless of their socio-economic background or disability, by:

improving learning content

ensuring fair pay

helping trainees claim their labour rights

recommending access to adequate social protection

combatting regular jobs disguised as traineeships

creating channels to report malpractice and poor working conditions

promoting equal access to traineeship opportunities
allowing for hybrid and remote working

offering career guidance and mentorship

covering all types of traineeships

The EU’s current framework for traineeships already sets out 21 quality principles to ensure high-quality learning and working conditions. These include clear vacancy notices, written traineeship agreements, clearly defined learning objectives, and transparent information on remuneration and social protection. The new rules will reinforce this existing framework once adopted, as called for by the Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Parliament.
Traineeships are an important way to gain practical experience, learn new skills and find a job. For employers, traineeships attract, train and retain people for jobs. A recent Eurobarometer survey showed that 78% of young Europeans did at least one traineeship, with 68% finding a job afterwards. More than half of these internships were paid and 61% of respondents had full or partial access to social protection.
For more information
Traineeships in the EU
Press release: Commission takes action to improve the quality of traineeships in the EU
Eurobarometer survey on traineeships
European Year of Skills
European Youth Portal
Commission’s Blue Book traineeship programme
 
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