Dear Charles,
dear Alexander,
I want to start by thanking you, dear Alexander, for an exceptionally successful Presidency of the Council. You have managed to reach political agreement on over 45 files spanning all of our major political priorities. It goes from the European Green Deal to digitalisation, from industry and the economy to enlargement. I think two proposals were exemplary, that is the Net-Zero Industry Act and the new Economic Governance Framework.
But you also steered the first ever agreement on a mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework. This enabled, because it included, the EUR 50 billion Facility for Ukraine. You delivered another highlight that was the adoption of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, certainly one of the most challenging sets of legislation this College put forward. I also want to emphasise that it is not only legislative files that you managed, but you also chaired the Industry Summit in Antwerp, the Social Partners Summit in Val Duchesse and the Pillar of Social Rights in La Hulpe.
During your Presidency, in fact just this week, we also adopted the 14th sanctions package against Russia. And also this week, we adopted new sanctions on Belarus that will align them with our Russian sanctions regime. This is a very strong sign of our continued determination to deprive Russia of the means to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine. And of course, there was a big event: On Tuesday, we launched the accession negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova. Today, in a further step, we have paid almost EUR 1.9 billion in pre-financing under the Ukraine Facility. So it was very fitting and good that we could discuss these developments in person with President Zelenskyy at the start of our meeting. I was particularly honoured to sign the security commitments between the European Union and Ukraine, on behalf of the European Commission. We also presented to the Leaders the G7 initiative, to provide Ukraine with loans of roughly USD 50 billion. Now we will work with our Member States, with the G7 partners and Ukraine, to put the necessary legislation in place. We are looking forward to providing Ukraine with the relevant funds before the end of the year.
We had many other topics, as you heard from my colleague, Charles Michel. I want to have a second look at the security and defence element that was discussed. We all know, and it was said already this evening, that we are facing unprecedented and growing security threats. High-intensity war has returned to our continent, and Russia is an aggressive and disruptive power. It has rapidly transitioned to a war economy. Just one figure: It will spend over 7% of its GDP on defence this year. So as we agreed in the Versailles Agenda, again last March, Europe as a whole, needs to step up on defence. Let me give you three figures that show the necessity: If you look at the combined EU spending on defence from 2019 to 2021, so in 3 years, it increased by 20%. In that same time frame, China’s defence spending increased by almost 600%, and Russia’s defence spending by almost 300%. And this is even before Russia massively increased its defence spending over the last two years.
We have taken various sources, from the Strategic Compass to the European Defence Industrial Strategy, to identify the defence capabilities that are required. We have on top, in addition, some Member States that have recently called for a European air defence shield, and others that called for the reinforcement of the Union’s eastern land border. And if we take all of this into account and based on non-classified sources, we estimate that additional defence investments of around EUR 500 billion are needed over the next decade. There are some sources in the MFF, close to EUR 11 billion, that could be topped up with another EUR 11 billion off budget by the European Peace Facility. We have created already a toolbox for defence. Just a reminder: We have the European Defence Fund, the Connecting Europe Facility, or the European Defence Industry Programme, that has, for example the Eurodrone as flagship. But overall, more is needed, and therefore, as the Council had asked for, there are options if you come to the defence spending possibilities. The first is: additional national contribution. The second option is: agreement on new own resources for the European level. The proposal for that is on the table of the Council. Then, of course, there is a second question, whether Leaders call immediately on those resources, or whether they use the borrowing power of the Union budget upfront and call on these resources later. None of these options are easy. All of them have to be looked at with the political will to decide what to do together, but they have to be looked at seriously.
Finally, a brief look at the Strategic Agenda. I welcome its adoption, because it prepares the next institutional cycle and sets the political priorities by the 27 EU Leaders for the next years. So this provides an important input for the Commission to develop the next Political Guidelines that I would have to put on the table when it comes to the vote in the Parliament. This Strategic Agenda starts with a very sober assessment of the new geopolitical realities. I will skip them because we have already discussed them tonight. The response to these challenges, are very clearly defined in the Strategic Agenda: scaling up the European defence, from the spending to interoperability, but also a very clear look at the climate threats that are out there, so the goal to become the first climate-neutral continent whilst strengthening the competitiveness of our social market economies – there is a very strong focus on the topic of competitiveness –, and of course, the endorsement of implementing our twin green and digital transitions and scaling up Europe’s manufacturing capacity for clean technologies. So there is a wide range of topics in the Strategic Agenda, an important input for the Political Guidelines for the Commission.
For more information, please contact:

Eric MAMER, Chief Spokesperson

Arianna PODESTA, Deputy Chief Spokesperson

 
 
Compliments of the European CommissionThe post European Commission | Opening remarks by President von der Leyen at the joint press conference with President Michel and Belgian President De Croo following the meeting of the European Council of 27 June 2024 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The Council today decided to impose restrictive measures against two individuals and four entities responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
The Council is listing Dmitry Beloglazov, and his company LLC Titul. Dimitry Beloglazov is responsible for setting up a complex circumvention scheme together with Oleg Deripaska, who is already subject to EU restrictive measures. His company LLC Titul created a subsidiary called Joint Stock Company Iliadis to acquire Oleg Deripaska’s share in the International LLC Rasperia Trading Limited. Rasperia owns €28,5 million shares in another European company, STRABAG SE, the assets of which have been frozen as a result of EU restrictive measures. Through this mechanism, Deripaska managed to sell his Rasperia frozen assets, and received an equivalent economic benefit. In view of this circumvention scheme, JSC Iliadis and Rasperia were also sanctioned by the Council.
Today’s new listings also include PJSC TransContainer and its General Director Mikhail Kontserev. PJSC TransContainer is a Russian transportation company and Russia’s largest railway container operator. Its revenues increased throughout 2023 also thanks to the flow of Belarusian cargoes, and the company’s participation in illegal weapon trade schemes with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in support of the Russian Government.
Altogether, EU restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine now apply to over 2 200 individuals and entities. Those designated today are subject to an asset freeze and EU citizens and companies are forbidden from making funds available to them. Natural persons are additionally subject to a travel ban, which prevents them from entering or transiting through EU territories.
The relevant legal acts have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.
On 24 June 2024, the Council adopted a 14th package of economic and individual restrictive measures targeting high-value sectors of the Russian economy, making it ever more difficult to circumvent EU sanctions, and adding 116 individuals and entities to the list of those responsible for actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
In its conclusions of 27 June 2024, the European Council reconfirmed the European Union’s continued support for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders and the EU’s unwavering commitment to providing continued political, financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support to Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes and as intensely as needed.
Russia must not prevail.
The European Council also welcomed the adoption of the 14th package of sanctions against Russia and the agreement on further restrictive measures against Belarus. It called for the full and effective enforcement of sanctions as well as for further measures to counter their circumvention, including through third countries. The European Union remains ready to further limit Russia’s ability to wage war and urges all countries not to provide any material or other support for Russia’s war of aggression.
For more information, please contact:

Maria Daniela Lenzu, Press Officer

 
 
Compliments of the Council of the EUThe post Council of the EU | Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU lists two individuals and four entities for circumventing EU sanctions and materially supporting the Russian government first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Blog post by Othman Bouabdallah, Ettore Dorrucci, Lucia Hoendervangers and Carolin Nerlich | Europe needs trillions of euros to manage climate change, become digital and defend itself. How can EU and national policymakers support these projects? This Blog post discusses the options in times of low growth and high public debt levels.
The European Union (EU) needs to move forward with the green transformation, the digitalisation of the economy and the strengthening of its military defence. This requires a lot more investment than in the past: using official estimates by the European Commission and NATO, we calculate additional €5.4 trillion for the period 2025-2031 (Figure 1)[1].
 
Massive investment needs…
Both private capital and governments will need to fill the financing gap. The lion’s share has to be borne by private firms, investors and households. But a substantial share – around €1.3 trillion euro, in our calculations – will have to be funded via public sources.[2]
Let’s focus on the public channel. Just under €400 billion can be expected to come from existing EU resources.[3] So, we are talking about a gap between available and needed public funding of more than €900 billion for the whole Union in the period 2025-2031, to be financed at national and EU level. While these are rough estimates, they provide an order of magnitude of the challenges ahead. To account for the high degree of uncertainty, we apply a range of +/- 20%. On this basis, the public funding gap would correspond to between 0.6% and 1% of EU GDP per year.
Figure 1
Additional cumulated EU private and public investment needs and its funding: Estimates for green-digital transitions and defence spending

(2025-2031; by funding entities and in billions of euro)

Sources: European Commission, 2023 Strategic Foresight Report. Sustainability and people’s wellbeing at the heart of Europe’s Open Strategic Autonomy; European Defence Fund (EDF); NATO; ECB staff own calculations.
Notes: For the assumptions used in this chart, see footnotes 1 to 3. The chart shows the additional investment which is the difference between total investment needs and historical averages. The funding of the cumulative additional investment needs is decomposed into what is expected to be financed by the private vs. the public sector.. Planned EU investment funding initiatives include the EU budget, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) of Next Generation EU (NGEU) until end-2026, the European Investment Bank and other EU funds, as defined in footnote 3.

Footing this bill will not be easy, especially for high-debt countries with large structural deficits.[4] This is illustrated in Figure 2, which focuses on the euro area where countries’ fiscal positions vary considerably. Government debt-to-GDP ratios ranged between 20% and 160% in 2023. On top of that, some of the high-debt countries suffer from large underlying fiscal deficits, captured in our chart by their government budget balances net of interest expenditure and adjusted for the business cycle (“structural primary balances”).
Figure 2
Government debt ratios and structural primary balances in the euro area countries (2023)

(in percent of GDP, percent of GNI* for IE and percent of GNI for LU)

Sources: European Commission, European Economic Forecast, Spring 2024, ECB calculations
Note: The horizontal line identifies the threshold – 60% of GDP – set in the EU fiscal governance to identify countries with high deficits. Ratios for Ireland and Luxembourg are expressed in percentage of GNI* and percentage of GNI respectively, which are considered better proxies of underlying economic activity in these countries.

Some help to the national governments comes from the new EU fiscal governance[5] adopted at the end of April this year, which lays more emphasis than in the past on combining fiscal consolidation needs with growth-enhancing investments and reforms. Compared with the previous governance, this may ease part of the national funding pressure for strategic investments. Two new rules may prove helpful:
First, during the budgetary adjustment phase that will start in 2025, the European Commission will give member states the option to take more time – up to seven years until 2031 – to implement their fiscal consolidation plans and put their debt trajectories on plausibly declining paths. This implies that governments would have to meet lower fiscal adjustment requirements each year. But it would be allowed only if the Commission finds that countries are implementing credible investment and reform plans. We estimate that this novel framework may create fiscal space for public investment in the EU for up to €700 billion over the period 2025-2031[6].
Second, once the fiscal adjustment phase is over, member states are allowed to keep structural public deficits at 1.5% of GDP, which are higher than in the past[7]. This would in principle give up to one percentage point more fiscal space for investment than under the previous rules.
This breathing space helps, but will it be enough?
There are reasons to believe that it may not be the case. The additional investment will foster potential growth, and therefore mitigate the risks to debt sustainability,[8] but only with a time lag. Implementation bottlenecks will emerge, such as limited administrative capacity in the public sector. Also, the estimates of the investment needs presented above are rather conservative; they do not consider other strategic investment required in areas such as health or education. For some countries, the fiscal space made available by the new fiscal rules may still not be sufficient. And even the countries which start from a comfortable fiscal position and can afford spending more than others should be concerned. No country, not even the richest, can stop climate change on its own. Strategic investments pursue shared goals and, as such, they also require common responses[9].
 
…call for a coordinated approach in Europe
Our back-of-the-envelope calculations lay bare the tension between investment needs and fiscal space that Europe’s policymakers are facing.
There is no silver bullet one can count on. More investment-friendly EU fiscal rules go in the right direction, but disproportionate reliance on public investment at national level would not only encounter limits in terms of administrative capacity and risk crowding out private investment; it would also not be affordable from a public finance perspective. As Figure 1 suggests, the bulk of funding of strategic investment will need to come from private sources, and even this will not be enough if not supported and integrated by EU-level initiatives.
This calls for a coordinated, holistic, and multi-pronged approach to both private and public investment in Europe, involving a wide range of initiatives at both the Union and the national level. Without claiming to be exhaustive, in Figure 3 we provide examples of complementary policy avenues – some already existing but in need of being enhanced, others more innovative.
These initiatives would reinforce each other.
To mobilise private funding, a fully-fledged European capital market would need to be accompanied by a strengthened single market, better framework conditions for doing business, more investment-friendly corporate taxation, as well as more specific initiatives, such as those listed in the first column of the table.
In high-debt countries, growth and debt performances will depend on how successfully the governments implement the Recovery and Resilience Plans of Next Generation EU. Whether countries are able to comply with fiscal adjustment requirements in an investment-friendly way will be crucial here. This includes improving the quality of public finance by cutting less productive expenditure.
The public funding gap of €900 billion, however, cannot be closed without additional involvement of the Union. The next EU budget (2028-2034) could act as a catalyst by financing investment in genuine EU public goods,[10] ranging from joint procurement in defence to energy grids, from high power computers to EU cloud expansion. Budget reprioritisation, new own resources, and joint borrowing[11] are all avenues to consider.
Europe’s massive strategic investment needs and the policy options to address them can be identified, as we suggest in this blog. What matters now is that these options find their way into the political space of the Union and its member countries. And that a genuine public debate starts, so that Europeans collectively can make informed choices about their future.

The “additional investment needs” in the climate, digital and defence spheres are defined as difference between total investment needs and historical averages. Calculations are built on the following main assumptions: (i) we extrapolate the Commission’s estimates for green and digital investment to 2031 to account for the recent economic governance reform, which envisages the adoption by member states of fiscal-structural plans lasting up to 7 years (2025-2031); (ii) green investment needs include estimated investment under the Fit-for-55 package, RePowerEU (excluding fossil fuel investments), Net-Zero Industry Act and environment protection; (iii) defence expenditure refers to the NATO commitment to reach 2% of GDP, with this commitment being here assumed to be taken by all EU Member States, including non-NATO members; (iv) historical averages refer for green investment to the period 2011-2020, for digital investment to the period 2014-2020, and for military expenditure in the EU to 2022.
We account for different shares of public sector investment across categories (green, digital, defence) and sub-components of the green transition. We then apply a weighted share for each category, based on historical averages.
This includes (i) the EU budget, which is assumed to be extended beyond 2027 and to remain constant, (ii) the Recovery and Resilience Facility (until end-2026) of Next Generation EU (NGEU), (iv) the European Investment Bank, and (v) other EU funding initiatives such as InvestEU.
For a detailed analysis of sovereign debt in the EU, see European Commission (2023), Debt Sustainability Monitor 2023.
On 30 April 2024, the new EU fiscal legislation was published in the EU Official Journal, consisting of: (1) Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 ; (2) Regulation (EU) 2024/1264 ; and (3) Directive – 2024/1265.
Starting from the latest forecast of the European Commission for the 2024 budget balance, we calculate, for each euro area member state and for each year, the difference between the budget balance under the 4-year adjustment plan (higher) and the budget balance under the 7-year plan (lower). Cumulating the estimated fiscal room for manoeuvre over the period 2025-31 and across Member States, we obtain a figure of around €700 billion.
Under the previous fiscal framework, the medium-term objective was setting the structural public deficit threshold at 0.5% of GDP for countries with debt above 60% of GDP, and 1% of GDP for countries with debt significantly below 60% of GDP.
Robust economic growth is a key parameter for fiscal sustainability and provides a buffer against negative shocks. In the euro area, a drop by one percentage point per year of potential output growth would be more than sufficient to put the public debt ratio on unfavourable dynamics.
See M. Draghi (2023), “The Next Flight of the Bumblebee: The Path to Common Fiscal Policy in the Eurozone”, NBER, 15th Annual Feldstein Lecture.
A public good can be defined as a good from which everybody benefits and where the benefits for one individual do not reduce the benefits for others. It is argued that investments in the green/digital transition and defence require a response not only at national but also at European level, as underinvestment in some EU countries would produce negative externalities on the other countries and ultimately affect all EU citizens. The case for strategic investment in European public goods is made, for instance, in F. Panetta (2022), ‘Investing in Europe’s future: The case for a rethink’, speech delivered at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). For a discussion of European vs. national public goods, see e.g. G. Claeys and A. Steinbach (2024), “A conceptual framework for the identification and governance of European public goods“, Bruegel Working Paper (30 May).
Joint issuance would also enhance the chances of establishing a genuine European safe asset, which will be important for further developing the capital markets union.

The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.
 
Check out The ECB Blog and subscribe for future posts.

 
 
Compliments of the European Central BankThe post ECB | Mind the gap: Europe’s strategic investment needs and how to support them first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

The Commission is setting up a new Climate City Capital Hub, an international finance resource to further support cities participating in the EU Mission on Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities.
Thanks to the new hub, cities that have already received the EU Cities Mission Label will be able to:

Access financial advice in cooperation with advisory services of the European Investment Bank (EIB);
Structure their financial needs so they understand various ways of funding projects, including pooling of projects; and
Introduce projects to a range of capital providers, including lenders and investors from the public and private sectors (such as philanthropic and corporate capital, as well as innovative financing like crowdfunding and sustainability-linked bonds), and support the process to deal closure.

Complementing EIB services, the Climate City Capital Hub will be created with the support of both the EU Mission on Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities Mission and the EU Mission on Adaptation to Climate Change. Its particular focus will be on engagement with private capital. For cities that signed both the Charter of the Mission on Climate Adaptation and have received the EU Cities Mission Label, the services will cover both mitigation and adaptation projects, taking a holistic approach to tackle climate change.
The hub will be run by the Commission’s Cities Mission implementation platform, which is currently managed by the project NetZeroCities. The Commission announced its creation at the 2024 Cities Mission conference held in Valencia on 25 and 26 June.
In addition, the EIB has earmarked a lending envelope of €2 billion dedicated to cities with the Cities Mission Label to support their plans to invest in energy, efficient buildings, district heating systems, renewable energy, sustainable mobility, urban renewal and regeneration, water and social infrastructure. It reinforces the EIB support to labelled cities and adds a dedicated finance facility to advisory services.
Next Steps
So far, 33 cities have been awarded the Label of the EU Mission for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities: 10 in October 2023 and 23 in March 2024. The label is an important milestone in the cities’ work. It acknowledges successful development of Climate City Contracts, which outline the cities’ overall vision for climate neutrality and contain an action plan as well as an investment plan. Cities co-create their Climate City Contracts with local stakeholders including the private sector and citizens. From the 33 Investment Plans that have been submitted so far, approximately €114.1 billion have been budgeted for climate actions – on average €3.6 billion per city. Currently, the Commission is reviewing another 23 Climate City Contracts.
In parallel, the EU Mission for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities has also collected more than 200 solutions that will help cities on their way to climate neutrality. The solutions cover from A – “Advanced Renovation Support” to Z – “Zero Emission Buses” and can be found in the Knowledge Repository.
Background
Cities account for more than 70% of global CO₂ emissions and consume over 65% of the world’s energy. Urban action is crucial for climate mitigation and can contribute significantly to accelerating the efforts to achieve the legally binding commitment to achieve climate-neutrality in the EU as a whole by 2050, as well as to the EU’s target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 and more generally delivering the European Green Deal. The EU Cities Mission aims to help European cities become climate-neutral, offering cleaner air, safer transport and less congestion and noise to their citizens.
In April 2022, 100 cities in the EU and 12 cities in countries associated to Horizon Europe, the EU research and innovation programme, were selected to participate in the Mission. They are testing innovative cross-sectoral approaches including for citizen engagement, stakeholder management and internal governance to accelerate their path to climate neutrality. This makes them experimentation and innovation hubs to enable all European cities to follow suit by 2050.
For more information, please contact:

Thomas Regnier, Spokesperson

Roberta Verbanac, Press Officer

 
 
Compliments of the European CommissionThe post European Commission | New finance hub to support ambitions of pioneering cities in climate mitigation and adaptation first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Biennial report assesses progress towards euro adoption in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden
Inflation above reference value seen as key economic obstacle in central and eastern European countries under review
Legislation in five of six countries under review not fully compatible with legal requirements for euro adoption
Economic activity expected to strengthen in 2024, but outlook clouded by geopolitical uncertainty

Limited progress has been made by non-euro area Member States of the European Union (EU) on economic convergence with the euro area since 2022, according to the 2024 Convergence Report of the European Central Bank (ECB). This is mainly due to challenging economic conditions.
Over the past two years, the countries under review have been hit by the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which led to a significant weakening of economic activity and soaring inflation. Countries with a history of higher energy dependence on and stronger trade links with Russia were the most affected. Looking ahead, economic activity is expected to strengthen in all of the countries under review, but geopolitical tensions and risks are clouding economic prospects.
As regards the price stability criterion, five of the countries under review – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania – recorded average inflation rates well above the reference value of 3.3%, while inflation was slightly above the reference value in Sweden (Chart 1). The reference value is based on the three best-performing Member States over the past 12 months, i.e. Denmark (1.1%), Belgium (1.9%) and the Netherlands (2.5%), taking their average inflation rates over the past 12 months and adding 1½ percentage points. One outlier, Finland, was excluded from this calculation.
Chart 1
HICP inflation
(average annual percentage changes)Source: Eurostat.
Chart 2
General government surplus (+) or deficit (-)
(percentages of GDP)Source: Eurostat.
The fiscal deficit in 2023 improved compared with its 2021 level in four of the countries covered in this report, owing to the post-pandemic economic recovery and the phasing-out of fiscal support measures. However, this improvement was in part curbed by the economic impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine, including weaker economic activity, and fiscal policy measures taken in response to high energy prices. In 2023 the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania exceeded the deficit reference value of 3% of GDP (Chart 2). The government debt-to-GDP ratio in 2023 was below the reference value of 60% in all of the countries under review except Hungary. In 2024 and 2025 the budget balance is expected to continue to exceed the reference value in Hungary, Poland and Romania.
Romania continues to be subject to an excessive deficit procedure, which was opened in 2020. On 19 June 2024 the European Commission found that Romania had not taken effective action to end its excessive deficit. The Commission recently also concluded that Hungary and Poland did not fulfil the government deficit criterion under the Stability and Growth Pact. The Commission will recommend to the EU Council to open excessive deficit procedures for these countries.
As regards the exchange rate criterion, only the Bulgarian lev is participating in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). Bulgaria joined ERM II with its existing currency board in place as a unilateral commitment in July 2020. This agreement on participation in ERM II was based on a number of policy commitments made by the Bulgarian authorities. Bulgaria is currently working towards completing these policy commitments, including by strengthening its anti-money laundering framework.
With regard to the convergence of long-term interest rates, three of the six countries under review (Poland, Romania and Hungary) recorded long-term interest rates above the reference value of 4.8%.
The strength of public and economic institutions is an important factor in the sustainability of convergence over time. With the exception of Sweden, indicators published by international organisations suggest that the quality of institutions and governance in the countries under review remains weaker than elsewhere in the EU.
As for the compatibility of national legislation with the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, five of the six countries under review were not fully compatible with the requirements for the adoption of the euro. With regard to Bulgaria’s legislation, the report concludes that its national legislation is consistent with the Treaty and the Statute, subject to conditions and interpretations set out in the relevant country assessment.
For media queries, please contact Eszter Miltényi-Torstensson, tel.: +49 171 769 5305.
Notes

The European Commission’s Convergence Report
The ECB’s Convergence Report reviews the economic and legal convergence of non-euro area EU Member States with a derogation every two years or at the request of a specific country. It assesses the degree of sustainable economic convergence with the euro area, whether the national legislation is compatible with the EU legal framework, and whether the statutory requirements are fulfilled for the respective national central banks. Given its “opt-out” clause, Denmark is not included in the assessment unless it so requests.
The cut‑off date for the statistics included in this Convergence Report was 19 June 2024. The reference period for both the price stability criterion and the long-term interest rate criterion is from June 2023 to May 2024. For exchange rates, the reference period is from 20 June 2022 to 19 June 2024. Historical data on fiscal positions cover the period up to 2023. Forecasts are based on the European Commission’s Spring 2024 Economic Forecast and the most recent convergence programmes of the countries concerned, as well as other information relevant to a forward-looking examination of the sustainability of convergence.

 
 
Compliments of the European Central BankThe post ECB reports on progress towards euro adoption first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

More climate-friendly production of foods, clean fuels and chemicals in Europe is receiving a boost from the EU-Catalyst partnership, a joint initiative by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Commission and Breakthrough Energy Catalyst.
Energy equipment manufacturer Rondo Energy is receiving €75 million through grants and venture debt (subject to the satisfaction of funding conditions), so it can deploy in Europe a technology for turning intermittent renewable electricity into the continuous, high-temperature heat and power required by food, clean-fuel and chemical producers.
Rondo will use the funding to expand its European presence and build projects delivering low-cost, continuous, high-pressure, zero-carbon steam and power as a service.  This involves the construction of first-of-a-kind utility-scale long duration energy storage units with power-to-heat technology. The solution is based on a traditional heating of specially designed bricks by electric wires. The charging is done from dedicated renewable generation source or from the grid during the off-peak hours or hours of excess renewable production. The discharge ensures stable and reliable 24/7 heat supply in the form of steam, heated gas or cogeneration. This technology allows for decarbonization of industrial heat supply and can contribute to increased flexibility of the power system, therefore ensuring security of electricity supply, and for increasing the grid resiliency to intermittent power generation from renewable energy sources.
“The green transition requires massive investment for innovative technologies to replace industrial processes based on fossil fuels,” said EIB Vice-President Thomas Östros. “With today’s announcement, we are writing the next chapter of the EU-Catalyst partnership. We are delighted to support Rondo’s first-of-a-kind energy storage units. As the climate bank, we aim to finance many more net-zero technologies that will provide clean and affordable energy to power our industry and homes, while strengthening Europe’s competitiveness.”
“This project funding is a strong addition to our long-term relationship with Breakthrough, and puts Rondo firmly on the path to helping to eliminate the green premium for industrial heat electrification and to becoming a fully bankable technology which can be deployed at scale,“ said Eric Trusiewicz, CEO of Rondo Energy. “The grant from Breakthrough Energy Catalyst and the loan from the European Investment Bank together underpin Rondo’s development throughout Europe, where we see very strong tailwinds to the adoption of our technology.”
Commission Executive Vice-President for the European Green Deal, Maroš Šefčovič, said: “It is vital that Europe’s future green economy is built here. The EU-Catalyst Partnership is therefore an excellent blueprint for public-private support for large-scale green tech projects based in Europe. Thanks to the support provided by the Innovation Fund and Horizon Europe, this can help us step up funding levels, as the average investment needed for the EU to reach its 2030 climate target – to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – is equivalent to some 700 billion dollars per year. We also need to frontload this financing, and ease access to it to ensure a level playing field for smaller companies. These are make-it-or break-it conditions for the green transition.”
“Rondo’s technology offers industry a unique opportunity to decarbonize with inexpensive renewable electricity,” said Mario Fernandez, Head of Breakthrough Energy Catalyst. “Rondo’s deployment is crucial at a time when European manufacturers are urgently looking for ways to eliminate their dependence on natural gas. We’re proud to support these important projects across Europe and to work with such great partners in Rondo, the European Investment Bank, and the European Commission who bring the commitment and vision to commercialize this critical technology.”
The EU-Catalyst partnership creates a blueprint for public-private support for clean tech innovative technologies. It aims to accelerate the deployment of innovative low-carbon technologies while also reducing their green premiums, that is, bringing their costs to a level competitive with fossil fuels. EU funding for the partnership comes from EU’s research and innovation programme Horizon Europe and the Innovation Fund within the framework of InvestEU, according to the established governance procedures. Breakthrough Energy Catalyst mobilises equivalent private capital and philanthropic grants to fund the selected projects.
Background information
The EIB is the long-term lending institution of the European Union owned by its Member States. It is active in more than 160 countries and makes long-term finance available for sound investment in order to contribute towards EU policy goals.
The EIB, as implementing partner of the Commission under InvestEU, has been tasked to deploy for the benefit of this partnership up to €420 million, made available from both Horizon Europe, which has already committed €200 million, and the Innovation Fund, which has committed €220 million. The EU-Catalyst Partnership does not exclude potential additional contributions from EU Member States or other private partners that decide to further support the projects. Interested projects can apply for support through the Breakthrough Energy Catalyst website.
Horizon Europe is the EU’s key funding programme for research and innovation with a budget of €93.5 billion (2021-2027). The Innovation Fund is one of the world’s largest funding programmes for the deployment of net-zero and innovative technologies and sources its funds from the selling of EU Emissions Trading System allowances (estimated to amount to €40 billion from 2020-2030).
Breakthrough Energy is a global network of climate leaders committed to accelerating the world’s journey to a clean energy future. The organization funds breakthrough technologies, advocates for climate-smart policies, and mobilizes partners around the world to take effective action, accelerating progress at every stage.
Breakthrough Energy Catalyst is a novel platform that funds and invests in first-of-a-kind commercial projects for emerging climate technologies. By investing in these opportunities, Catalyst seeks to accelerate the adoption of these technologies worldwide and reduce their costs.
Rondo is purpose-built for industrial facilities: its Heat Batteries are constructed from proven, durable materials and are designed for seamless integration with existing industrial equipment and processes. Whether deployed as a drop-in replacement for retiring fossil-fueled heating equipment or as a resilient complement to existing systems, Rondo requires no disruptive changes to customers’ operations. Rondo currently operates the world’s highest temperature, highest efficiency commercial energy storage system, at Calgren Renewable Fuels in Pixley, California.
 
 
Compliments of the European Investment BankThe post EIB | Greener food, fuel and chemical production in Europe boosted by EIB, European Commission and Breakthrough Energy Catalyst support for groundbreaking energy- storage project first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

By Giovanni Melina | Artificial intelligence can increase productivity, boost economic growth, and lift incomes. However, it could also wipe out millions of jobs and widen inequality.
Our research has already shown how AI is poised to reshape the global economy. It could endanger 33 percent of jobs in advanced economies, 24 percent in emerging economies, and 18 percent in low-income countries. But, on the brighter side, it also brings enormous potential to enhance the productivity of existing jobs for which AI can be a complementary tool and to create new jobs and even new industries.
Most emerging market economies and low-income countries have smaller shares of high-skilled jobs than advanced economies, and so will likely be less affected and face fewer immediate disruptions from AI. At the same time, many of these countries lack the infrastructure or skilled workforces needed to harness AI’s benefits, which could worsen inequality among nations.
As the Chart of the Week shows, wealthier economies tend to be better equipped for AI adoption than low-income countries. The data draw from the IMF’s new AI Preparedness Index Dashboard for 174 economies, based on their readiness in four areas: digital infrastructure, human capital and labor market policies, innovation and economic integration, and regulation.
Measuring preparedness is challenging, partly because the institutional requirements for economy-wide integration of AI are still uncertain. As the dashboard shows, different countries are at different stages of readiness in leveraging the potential benefits of AI and managing the risks.
Under most scenarios, AI will likely worsen overall inequality, a troubling trend that policymakers can work to prevent. To this end, the dashboard is a response to significant interest from our stakeholders in accessing the index. It is a resource for policymakers, researchers, and the public to better assess the AI preparedness and, importantly, to identify the actions and design the policies needed to help ensure that the rapid gains of AI can benefit all.
AI can also complement worker skills, enhancing productivity and expanding opportunities. In advanced economies, for example, some 30 percent of jobs could benefit from AI integration. Workers who can harness the technology may see pay gains or greater productivity—while those who can’t, may fall behind. Younger workers may find it easier to exploit opportunities, while older workers could struggle to adapt.
For policymakers, those in advanced economies should expand social safety nets, invest in training workers, and prioritize AI innovation and integration. Coordinating with one another globally, these countries also should strengthen regulation to protect people from potential risks and abuses and build trust in AI. The policy priority for emerging market and developing economies should be to lay a strong foundation by investing in digital infrastructure and digital training for workers.

For more on how artificial intelligence affects economies, see the December issue of Finance & Development, the IMF’s quarterly magazine, and the recent Analyze This! video.

 
Full post can be found here
 
 
Compliments of the IMFThe post IMF | Mapping the World’s Readiness for Artificial Intelligence Shows Prospects Diverge first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Blog post by Piero Cipollone | Freedom lies at the heart of the European Union’s principles. Every EU citizen is free to live, work, study and do business in any EU Member State.
The euro plays a key role in making this possible. We can use it to buy or sell goods and services anywhere in the euro area.
In providing euro banknotes, the European Central Bank (ECB) plays a crucial role in upholding these freedoms. Most Europeans want to have cash as a payment option and many view it as essential to their freedom: cash is easy to obtain, inclusive, universally accepted across the euro area and offers the highest level of privacy.
But we do not yet have a cash equivalent for making digital payments, which limits our freedom in an increasingly digital age.
Sometimes we can use national options, such as bank cards or digital wallets, to make electronic payments in shops. But in most euro area countries, these national solutions do not exist. And even when they do, they often do not work when shopping online, splitting bills among friends or travelling in the euro area. This forces us to rely on non-European cards or electronic payment solutions – although even these are not always accepted – and to use multiple payment methods.
To remedy these shortcomings, the ECB is working on a digital euro. We remain fully committed to cash, but we want to bring its benefits into the digital world. A digital euro would give consumers an additional payment option that complements cash. It would be up to them to decide whether to use it.
A digital euro would combine the convenience of digital payments with cash-like features. Like banknotes, it would offer Europeans the freedom to use a single public means of payment accepted throughout the euro area for digital payments in shops, on e-commerce websites or person to person. It could also be used offline, making transactions possible even when network coverage is limited or in the event of a power cut.
The digital euro would make it easier for euro area firms to offer pan-European digital payment solutions. This would strengthen competition in a market currently dominated by a few non-European players, thereby lowering costs for merchants and consumers. And it would reinforce Europe’s strategic autonomy and resilience. In a world that is increasingly divided and exposed to the dominance of large technology firms, we have a responsibility to ensure that Europeans are always able to make affordable and safe payments effectively.
The digital euro would offer greater privacy than that typically offered by existing commercial solutions. For offline payments, only the payer and the payee would have access to the transaction details. For online payments, we would use the latest privacy-enhancing technologies. All data would be pseudonymised and kept within the EU’s jurisdiction, thus enjoying the highest privacy standards in the world. And our compliance with data protection rules would be supervised by independent data protection authorities.
Free of charge for basic use, a digital euro would leave no one behind, including those with low digital and financial skills and vulnerable groups. An app would offer everyone an inclusive and accessible means of payment.
More than just a payment option, a digital euro would bring Europeans closer in an increasingly digital and unstable world. It would make our lives easier, while preserving our freedom of choice.
A year ago the European Commission put forward the Single Currency Package to protect cash payments across the euro area and to set out a framework for the possible issuance of a digital euro, which will only be considered once European legislators have adopted this framework. We welcome the ongoing democratic debate and we will continue engaging with all stakeholders.
As the world around us changes and geopolitical risks grow, we need to keep up the momentum. Together, we can ensure that the euro – our single currency – is ready for the digital era and continues to underpin the freedoms Europeans hold dear.
This article was published as an opinion piece in media outlets across the euro area.
 
Check out The ECB Blog and subscribe for future posts.
 
 
Compliments of the European Central BankThe post ECB | Maintaining the freedom to choose how we pay first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Remarks by Kristalina Georgieva, IMF Managing Director, to the Eurogroup on a Strategy for European Competitiveness, Luxembourg
As prepared for delivery
Thank you, Paschal, for your kind invitation to address ministers today on industrial policy, as part of your broader deliberations on competitiveness.
Last year, when I spoke here about the European capital market union, I started by saying it was a topic close to my heart, one we at the IMF deeply cared about. This year, a different tone: industrial policy is not something my colleagues and I cherish. And there are good reasons for it.
Let me note up-front that I plan to speak not just about industrial policy, but about how it fits in Europe’s strive for competitiveness. As I have argued many times, Europe’s core strength is the single market: fundamentally, Europe derives its prosperity, its competitiveness, and—yes—its market power from its cohesion.
With this basic truth in mind, today I will urge you to place discussions on the role and composition of industrial policy in the context an overarching, high-level strategy for productivity and competitiveness.
As I observed a short while ago as I presented the conclusions of the IMF’s annual consultation on euro area policies, the EU confronts a daunting list of challenges. Population aging; weak productivity growth; energy security; our common struggle against climate change; and, not least, the geoeconomic fragmentation that has, unfortunately, become our new global reality.
Preserving and sharpening Europe’s competitive edge in the face of such challenges requires not a reactive and piecemeal approach, but a well-thought out, multi-pronged strategy. Industrial policy may have a role to play as a small part of this strategy, but let me emphasize: in this case small—well-targeted and well-designed—is beautiful.
***
Of course, it’s a tough world out there—this much we know, I know. Last night I flew in from China, tomorrow I fly out to the United States. For me, this is a short stop at home—always very pleasant. Yes, Europe is geographically in the middle.
But is Europe caught in the middle too? To some extent, one can say Yes.
We see the major shifts underway. We know that many of the geopolitical concerns are real, that economic security actually matters. Across the globe, we see a resurgence in the use of industrial policy. In the US, the Inflation Reduction Act with its local-content requirements. In China, a history of support for various sectors.
Last year alone, we count over 2,600 industrial policy measures worldwide—with the US, China, and the EU making up roughly half of the total. These measures covered at least one-fifth of world trade. More than 70 percent were trade-distorting. Good economic rationale? Often not clear.
Still, some people like to say we live in a world of carnivores and that Europe behaves more like a herbivore. I am not so sure—at least not when I see last week’s tariff announcements on Chinese electric vehicles. You know that some form of retaliation will probably follow. My staff has given me a line on this matter, which I endorse. Let me quickly read it to you:
“The EU and China both benefit from an open trade system; we encourage them to cooperate to address the underlying concerns. Trade restrictions can distort the allocation of investment from where it is optimal, raising the cost of goods and services for final users. They can also slow the green transition and trigger retaliatory actions. We encourage all parties to work within the multilateral framework to resolve their differences.”
So there you have it: our cautionary position on the destructive potential of tit-for-tat protectionist measures.
As a general point, industrial policy can be a powerful tool, one that can, on rare occasion, be put to good use. But remember, history is littered with examples of industrial policy interventions gone wrong — the support for British Leyland in the UK, the ailing shipbuilders in Germany, Groupe Bull for computers made in France, BioValley in Malaysia, Solyndra in the United States, and the list can go on an on. In my personal experience looms large the former Soviet bloc: an entire economic system built around party functionaries deciding how to allocate the people’s savings. We know how that ended.
It is clear to see: technocrats picking winners and interfering in markets is a risky business—costly and distortionary. Design with care, handle with care. Use only when no better tools are available.
Full disclosure: this is personal for me. Having grown up on the other side of the Iron Curtain—the colder side of the Cold War—I much prefer the invisible hand of the market to the heavy hand of big government.
And a side comment: we know that with the pandemic shock and the energy shock governments everywhere have become much bigger. Debt and deficits are high, and now is the time to dial it back, not forward—we need front-loaded fiscal consolidation and lower debt, including to prepare for future shocks.
Coming back to industrial policy, let me briefly unpack when it can be appropriate. Two conditions must be satisfied. First, we must see a clearly identified market failure—the market not properly pricing or delivering a necessary thing. Second, we must assess that a broad-spectrum, less-distortionary, first-best policy approach is either unavailable or unable to deliver the desired outcome on its own.  Only when both conditions are satisfied can the use of an industrial policy intervention be appropriate—and then too, not always.
***
Three concrete examples of cases where industrial policy may have a role to play:

One, climate change. We know that the private sector alone will not deliver enough mitigation, and we know that our best tool—carbon pricing, vital as it is—cannot alone deliver rapidly enough to save us from calamity. There is simply no time to waste. This is existential. It is not something we can afford to take chances on. We at the IMF would argue that there may be a case to bolster mitigation efforts with industrial policy in support of the development and adoption of early-stage clean technologies. But let me be clear: we see no economic case for protecting mature clean tech—let this be produced wherever is least costly, globally. We all benefit from cheaper wind turbines and solar panels!
Two, supply-chain resilience. We saw during the pandemic the problems that arose from concentrated microchip supply. Diversification of the supply of critical goods like semiconductors is a real aim, and private firms may not have the incentive to do enough on their own—they weigh the benefits to themselves but not necessarily to the companies that rely on them further down. Does this mean we have a case for intervening to promote domestic chip production? Not necessarily, but perhaps in some circumstances—after careful analysis of the pros and cons, taking care to preserve a level playing field across firms.
Third, strategic public goods. Defense-related sectors are a classic example, where safeguarding the national security interest may be seen to require promoting domestic production and avoiding excessive reliance on foreign suppliers.

Let me offer a few words on industrial policy design when deployment is contemplated.
Three guiding principles:

First, know that picking winners and losers is inherently difficult. So, use industrial policy judiciously.
Second, as a European specificity, be sure to not undermine the single market. It is the EU’s greatest achievement. It is what gives the EU its economies of scale and scope, its heft on the global scene. Consider the externalities of state aid, for example: recent analysis by IMF staff finds that, while state aid may encourage the firms that receive it to hire more workers or invest more, it actually reduces, by a larger margin, jobs and investment in other firms in the same sector and in other EU countries that do not receive the aid. State aid may still be justified from a social perspective to redress a market failure and deliver benefits in the medium term but beware the potential for collateral damage. Thus, in Europe even more than elsewhere, use industrial policy with caution.
Third, let not industrial policy erect trade barriers that do more harm than good. Favoring domestic firms by relying on tariffs, discriminatory public procurement, or investment-screening controls is not only distortive, it tends to trigger retaliation, leading to less-efficient resource allocation globally. Recent history tells us that when one country introduces protectionist measures, there is about 75 percent probability of retaliation within a year. Ultimately, we get higher prices and fewer choices for consumers—self-defeating. When I think about the new tariffs on electric vehicles, I ask myself: to protect whom? Not today’s grass-roots consumer, who will probably pay more for green transportation. Not climate and the environment. Perhaps there is some intertemporal argument, but we at the IMF are unconvinced—watch out for some new analysis, coming soon.

Given the IMF’s role as guardian of the international monetary system, let me repeat the last point: a global escalation of tariffs can only make us collectively worse off while also undermining our existential struggle against climate change.
Finally, following on from the principles, a few specific recommendations for industrial policy interventions:

(A) Keep them temporary and try to preserve competition—in the free-market system, competition is what encourages firms to innovate, fostering a dynamic and resilient economy in the long run. Public policy interventions should endeavor to work with, not against, commercial incentives—for instance, by embracing public‒private co-investment where possible. And a clear exit strategy is imperative. Don’t just go in, know how you will get out!
(B) Keep them limited in scope to contain the fiscal costs and distortions, and coordinate at the EU level to protect the single market. Avoid national subsidies for national champions, complex and varied tax incentives, and divergent regulatory standards that lead to intra-EU fragmentation. Please: keep national politics out of it!
(C) Design and deliver national state-aid measures in ways that limit the adverse spillovers and fiscal strains on other member states. Your neighbor may not have your fiscal space!

In a nutshell: minimize distortions to international trade, avoid protectionist measures, comply with WTO rules, and protect Europe’s most precious economic asset: the single market. Whenever and wherever possible, choose cooperation over conflict!
***
Before I end, let me go back to where I began: advocating for a high-level competitiveness strategy. Let me list some critical aspects of that strategy—not things you shouldn’t do, things you should do!
Fundamentally, as I noted, Europe’s competitiveness derives from its cohesion. Your strategy, therefore, must center on strengthening the single market.
Many parallel efforts will be needed—it brings me back to the concluding messages of our euro area policy consultation. You need to remove trade barriers within the EU. You need to strengthen the labor market by allowing workers to move more freely with skills that are continuously upgraded and recognized across the union. You need to invest in EU infrastructure, including cross-border electricity grids for energy security. And you need to mobilize unprecedented volumes of money for the green transition.
I have spoken separately about the need for a more-ambitious EU budget and the savings of centralizing some projects of common interest. Hugely important.
Finally, you need to build a single European financial system, comprising both a banking union and a capital market union. Ultimately, this is about improving the allocation of savings to enhance productivity and growth potential.
I have said this before: Europe is rich, but it suffers from what I call “lazy money”—across the Atlantic, savings work much harder. Total financial sector assets in the euro area amount to about 60 trillion euros, not far short of the US’s 80 trillion euros. But, whereas in the US only one-third of the total sits in banks, in the euro area the banking share is two-thirds. Two implications to highlight today as I close:

One, while it is vital to press forward on capital market union, Europe cannot afford to neglect banking union—banks are where most of the money is. Please work together, in a cooperative spirit, to resolve the home‒host issues—I’m sure we can all agree that it is unacceptable that people can cross borders within the EU more easily than bank liquidity and capital!
Two, with banks being inherently less-well-suited to financing innovation—startups need long time horizons, and they often have no physical collateral to offer—targeted capital-market interventions may be necessary. I alluded to this earlier: the possibility of focused actions to support innovation and early-stage clean-tech. One specific idea from us: more action to support Europe’s under-developed venture capital industry. Again, we have a paper coming out soon. Among other things, its authors find that the European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund play a very constructive role in supporting financing for innovative European startups.

We are all familiar with the narrative of bright ideas being born in Europe but then migrating away to grow up elsewhere—Europe as someone else’s innovation supermarket. Europe needs a stronger venture capital industry, better able to support the best European startups so they can scale-up at home.
***
To sum it up: be generous in protecting and building the single market. Be stingy in using industrial policy. Promote the ideas of the future, not the industries of the past. Have a comprehensive strategy for competitiveness.
Thank you!
 
Read the full remarks here.
 
 
Compliments of the IMFThe post IMF | A Strategy for European Competitiveness first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

€5 billion for high-speed rail, urban transport and upgrading ports
€2.6 billion for onshore wind, upgrading electricity grids, small scale renewables and biofuels
€2.9 billion for urban development, education, housing, health and water
€2.1 billion for corporate innovation, steel and semiconductor business financing

The Board of Directors of the European Investment Bank (EIB) today approved €12.8 billion of new financing to upgrade sustainable transport, increase renewable energy use, build new student housing, improve earthquake and flood protection, and help business to expand.
“Today we approved nearly €13 billion for flagship projects around Europe and beyond. From high-speed rail in Portugal, sustainable transport in Kyiv, Lille and Helsinki, renewable energy in Lithuania and support for small businesses. These investments will improve lives, and they signal the EIB Group’s commitment to continue supporting targeted investment that will boost European resilience, productivity growth and innovation.” said EIB President Nadia Calviño.
Investing in better transport
The Board backed €5 billion of financing to improve rail transport across Europe and port infrastructure in Cape Verde.
The EIB approved investment to build a high-speed rail line between Porto and Lisbon, upgrade trains in Germany and the Czech Republic, replace trams and buses in Lille, construct a light rail line in Helsinki.
Additional support for rail and urban transport investment in Ukraine was also agreed.
Scaling up renewable energy
€2.6 billion of new energy investment was approved by the Board. This includes new wind and solar power schemes, upgrading and expanding electricity distribution, financing small scale renewable energy use by industry and backing biofuel and biomethane production.
Amongst the new clean energy schemes agreed today are construction of a new onshore windfarm in Lithuania, district heating in the Netherlands and small-scale renewable energy projects across France and Greece.
Backing corporate innovation and business investment
The Board agreed €2.1 billion of new business financing, including support to expand semiconductor manufacturing, develop digital distribution technologies, back more energy efficiency steel production and convert existing industrial facilities to enable produce renewable packaging.
New schemes to improve access to finance by business in Ukraine and female entrepreneurs in Africa and the Caribbean were also agreed.
Improving health, education, water, and natural catastrophe preparedness
New investment to upgrade healthcare in Belgium and Malta, improve higher education in the Netherlands, expand student housing in Cyprus and tackle wastewater challenges in Germany were approved.
Backing for rehabilitation of buildings and infrastructure damaged by recent earthquakes and measures to address the risks of landslides and floods in Italy was also agreed.
Supporting business, transport and emergency response investment in Ukraine
Today’s board also approved investment to ensure that companies across Ukraine can access finance, upgrade urban and national rail links and to create a new 112 emergency call system in the country.
Background information
The European Investment Bank (ElB) is the long-term lending institution of the European Union, owned by its Member States. It finances sound investments that contribute to EU policy objectives. EIB projects bolster competitiveness, drive innovation, promote sustainable development, enhance social and territorial cohesion, and support a just and swift transition to climate neutrality.
The EIB Group, which also includes the European Investment Fund (EIF), signed a total of €88 billion in new financing for over 900 projects in 2023. These commitments are expected to mobilise around €320 billion in investment, supporting 400,000 companies and 5.4 million jobs.
 
 
Compliments of the European Investment BankThe post EIB Board of Directors approves €12.8 billion new financing for transport, energy and business investment first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.