EACC

NY Fed | Household Debt Rose Modestly; Delinquency Rates Remain Elevated

NEW YORK—The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Center for Microeconomic Data today issued its Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit. The report shows total household debt increased by $147 billion (0.8%) in Q3 2024, to $17.94 trillion. The report is based on data from the New York Fed’s nationally representative Consumer Credit Panel. It includes a one-page summary of key takeaways and their supporting data points.
The New York Fed also issued an accompanying Liberty Street Economics blog post examining the evolution in aggregate debt to income ratios and what that suggests about Americans’ ability to manage their debt obligations.
“Although household balances continue to rise in nominal terms, growth in income has outpaced debt,” said Donghoon Lee, Economic Research Advisor at the New York Fed. “Still, elevated delinquency rates reveal stress for many households, even amid some moderation in delinquency trends this quarter.”
Mortgage balances increased by $75 billion from the previous quarter and reached $12.59 trillion at the end of September. HELOC balances increased by $7 billion, representing the tenth consecutive quarterly increase since Q1 2022, and stood at $387 billion. Credit card balances increased by $24 billion to $1.17 trillion. Auto loan balances saw a $18 billion increase and stood at $1.64 trillion. Other balances, which include retail cards and other consumer loans, were effectively flat, with a $2 billion increase. Student loan balances grew by $21 billion, and now stand at $1.61 trillion.
The pace of mortgage originations increased slightly from the pace observed in the previous four quarters, with $448 billion of newly originated mortgages in Q3. Aggregate limits on credit card accounts increased modestly by $63 billion, representing a 1.3% increase from the previous quarter. Limits on HELOC increased by $9 billion, the tenth consecutive quarterly increase.
Aggregate delinquency rates edged up from the previous quarter, with 3.5% of outstanding debt in some stage of delinquency. Delinquency transition rates were mixed. Credit card delinquency rates improved, with 8.8% of balances transitioning to delinquency compared to 9.1% in the previous quarter.  Early delinquency transitions for auto loans and mortgages worsened slightly, rising by 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points respectively. About 126,000 consumers had a bankruptcy notation added to their credit reports this quarter, a small decline from the previous quarter.
Household Debt and Credit Developments as of Q3 2024

CATEGORY
QUARTERLY CHANGE * (BILLIONS $)
ANNUAL CHANGE** (BILLIONS $)
TOTAL AS OF Q3 2024 (TRILLIONS $)

MORTGAGE DEBT
(+) $75
(+) $580
$12.594

HOME EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT
(+) $7
(+) $38
$0.387

STUDENT DEBT
(+) $21
(+) $7
$1.606

AUTO DEBT
(+) $18
(+) $49
$1.644

CREDIT CARD DEBT
(+) $24
(+) $87
$1.166

OTHER
(+) $2
(+) 17
$0.546

TOTAL DEBT
(+) $147
(+) $778
$17.943

*Change from Q2 2024 to Q3 2024
** Change from Q3 2023 to Q3 2024
Flow into Serious Delinquency (90 days or more delinquent)

CATEGORY1

Q3 2023
Q3 2024

MORTGAGE DEBT
0.72%
1.08%

HOME EQUITY LINE OF CREDIT
0.41%
0.43%

STUDENT LOAN DEBT
0.77%
0.77%

AUTO LOAN DEBT
2.53%
2.90%

CREDIT CARD DEBT
5.78%
7.10%

OTHER
4.96%
5.50%

ALL
1.28%
1.68%

 
About the Report
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Household Debt and Credit Report provides unique data and insight into the credit conditions and activity of U.S. consumers. Based on data from the New York Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel, a nationally representative sample drawn from anonymized Equifax credit data, the report provides a quarterly snapshot of household trends in borrowing and indebtedness, including data about mortgages, student loans, credit cards, auto loans, and delinquencies. The report aims to help community groups, small businesses, state and local governments, and the public to better understand, monitor, and respond to trends in borrowing and indebtedness at the household level. Sections of the report are presented as interactive graphs on the New York Fed’s Household Debt and Credit Report webpage and the full report is available for download.
 
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EACC & Member News

Archipel Tax Advice: The Article 23 License and Fiscal Representation Explained

In this blogpost, we cover the Article 23 License and Fiscal Representation as an entry ticket to it. This framework unlocks ‘local treatment’ for non-Resident companies importing goods to Europe through the Netherlands, and allows them to defer VAT rather than pay it to Customs upon import. Great for cashflow.

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EACC

ECB | Mind the gap: what it takes to finance a greener future

Complacency in fighting climate change and preserving biodiversity is endangering our economic survival. The longer we wait, the higher the costs will be. Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, warns of the growing gap between the commitments made and the investment needed.
We’ve all heard it time and again: either we tackle climate change and safeguard nature, or we face the steep price of our inaction. And that price is rising by the day. Just consider the recent flooding in Spain, the droughts in the Amazon basin or the storms in North America. These events are horrific in and of themselves, but they are also ruining the foundations of our economies and, ultimately, the basis of our economic survival.
Tackling the climate and nature crises demands urgent investment in three areas: climate change mitigation, adaptation and disaster relief. In other words: we must curb climate change to the greatest extent possible, prepare ourselves for what we cannot avoid and help those who are hardest hit. All of this is vital — and all of it is costly. But so far, we have mobilised only a fraction of the funding we need.
To stay on track to meet Paris Agreement goals, global annual investment in climate change mitigation designed to help transition our economies have to reach up to USD 11.7 trillion annually by 2035, according to estimates by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). That equals about 10 percent of global economic output. The energy transition alone requires investment in clean energy to triple by 2030. We urgently need to unlock all possible sources of capital, at speed and at scale, and to put in place the regulatory conditions to finance our green future and preserve nature.
Climate change and nature degradation will transform our societies irrespective of the actions we take. That means we must adapt and become more resilient – and we must do so in a manner that is fair and equitable.
Even in the most optimistic scenarios, governments will need to help, particularly those in the most vulnerable groups. Yet, looking at the investment for climate adaptation, the difference between what is needed and what is planned – what we call the “financing gap” – is widening. UNEP also estimates that those financing needs are growing. They are 50% higher than previously estimated and up to 18 times greater than current commitments.
Falling behind on climate change mitigation and adaptation increases the risk of natural disasters and, in turn, the need for disaster relief. It is especially a duty for the strongest countries to help the most vulnerable ones, for both humanitarian and economic reasons. But here again, our efforts are far from sufficient, and funding for climate disaster relief is a long way from where it needs to be.
This is in part due to the widening gap between insured and uninsured losses. According to Swiss Re, only 38% of the total USD 280 billion in global economic losses in 2023 was insured, and most of it was concentrated in the industrialised world. The agreement on the Loss and Damage Fund reached two years ago at COP 27 in Sharm el-Sheikh was a welcome step, and COP 29, which begins this week in Baku, is an opportunity for countries to equip it with the capital it needs. Given the unequal impacts of climate change, however, more developed countries should increase their contributions to it.
Climate change and nature degradation are threats to our economies. This is why the European Central Bank and other central banks take them into consideration when working to keep prices stable, banks sound and the financial system safe. It is our task to gather and analyse data on how climate change and the loss of nature have an impact on banks and the economy. This can help to guide already committed and future funding efficiently, so that the economy will align with the Paris goals.
But it is governments that are at the forefront of the fight against climate change. They are the ones with the means and the tools to tackle it. However, they cannot do so alone. Companies, capital markets and venture investors will also have a vital role to play in financing green innovation. And within the EU, structural policies, fiscal incentives (such as carbon pricing and abolishing fossil fuel subsidies), transition plans and progress on the capital markets union are all critical to removing investment barriers and accelerating the green transition.
Tackling climate change and safeguarding biodiversity fairly and equitably is not a task we can afford to leave to future generations – it is our duty to act now. To ensure our economic survival, we need to invest in our green and resilient future. This year’s COP marks the time to close the global climate finance gap.
This post was also published as an opinion piece in the Financial Times.
Check out The ECB Blog and subscribe for future posts.
 
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EACC & Member News

Loyens & Loeff: Dutch Tax Plans 2025: 4 key points to know for US multinationals – New York office Snippet

Loyens & Loeff New York regularly posts ‘Snippets’ on a range of EU tax and legal topics. This Snippet describes the recently published Dutch tax plans 2025, with a focus on four key elements for US multinationals (𝐌𝐍𝐄𝐬). This is our first Snippet in a series about the impact of the 2025 Dutch tax plans on US MNEs and fund managers.

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EACC

European Commission | Commission receives seven proposals for AI Factories which will boost AI innovation in the EU

The first seven proposals for artificial intelligence (AI) Factories have now been submitted under the EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (JU), which manages the call announced in September 2024. These AI Factories will create a thriving European ecosystem for training advanced AI models and developing AI solutions. They will be built around the EU’s world-class network of  European High-Performance Computing (HPC) supercomputers and will be bringing together the key ingredients for success in AI: computing power, data and talent. The AI Factories will substantially increase the computing power available for AI in Europe. They will be interconnected and available to European AI startups, industry and researchers.
The seven proposals submitted in total by 15 Member States and two associated participating states demonstrate a very strong interest in this important initiative. Proposals to build an AI Factory around an existing or a new supercomputer adapted to AI needs were submitted by Finland (together with the participation of Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Norway and Poland), Luxembourg, Sweden, Germany, Italy (together with the participation of Austria and Slovenia), and Greece. Furthermore, Spain has prepared a proposal with the participation of Portugal, Romania and Turkey which is expected imminently.
The submitted proposals will now be evaluated by an independent panel of experts. The EuroHPC JU expects to announce the selection of the first AI Factories in December 2024 and launch them soon thereafter.
In addition to the above proposals, Cyprus and Slovenia have submitted letters of interest to either join or create an AI Factory at a later stage.  The next cut-off date for the subsequent proposals is the 1st of February 2025.
The EU is now one step closer to setting up the first AI Factories in early 2025, as announced in the political guidelines of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
 
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Council of the EU | EU adopts rules to better measure the environment’s contribution to the economy

Today, the Council formally adopted the amended regulation on European environmental economic accounts, the EU’s common statistical system which brings together economic and environmental information. The new rules extend the scope of the European environmental economic accounts, introducing forest accounts, ecosystem accounts, and environmental subsidies accounts. The amended regulation aims to provide better information for the European Green Deal, in order to support monitoring and evaluation of the EU’s progress in meeting its environmental objectives.
 
New account modules 
The current regulation on European environmental economic accounts sets out a common framework for collecting, compiling, transmitting and evaluating European environmental economic accounts. The regulation contains six modules, including air emissions accounts and environmentally related taxes.
Relevant and detailed data from member states is key to keeping the EU on track to meet the European Green Deal objectives. Therefore, the new regulation introduces three new environmental account modules for more comprehensive monitoring:

ecosystem accounts, which provide data on the extent and condition of ecosystems and on the services delivered to society and the economy by ecosystem assets

forest accounts, which specifically measure forest areas and the share available for timber extraction, and trace changes over time

environmental subsidies, which identify and quantify resources that support the Green Deal through economic activities and products, protecting the environment and safeguarding natural resources

Member states will start reporting these data to the Commission (Eurostat) in 2025 and 2026.
Statistical data portal 
The amended regulation introduces a new statistical data portal (statistical dashboard) for environmental economic accounts, which will summarise the key indicators and data from those accounts in an understandable and accessible way for all users. It will also contain data on climate change mitigation investments by member states.
The data portal will be operated by the Commission (Eurostat) from December 2024 and will be updated once a year. It will be publicly available on the Eurostat website.
Next steps
This formal adoption marks the last step in the ordinary legislative procedure. The regulation will now be published in the Official Journal of the European Union and will enter into force 20 days after its publication.
By 31 December 2024 and at least every two years thereafter, Eurostat will publish data and statistics on climate change mitigation, including on related investments.
Within two years from the date of entry into force of the regulation, the Commission will present a report on the quality of the data available on energy subsidies, including fossil fuel subsidies, on climate change adaptation and on water, and may submit a legislative proposal to introduce a further three new modules on these issues.
Background
The current regulation on environmental economic accounts already includes six modules: air emissions accounts, environmental taxes by economic activity, economy-wide material flow accounts, environmental protection expenditure accounts, environmental goods and services sector accounts, and physical energy flow accounts.
The existing rules provided for new modules to be introduced later based on Commission proposals; on 11 July 2022, the Commission adopted the relevant proposal.
On 15 December 2022, the Council agreed on its negotiating mandate. After one trilogue on 5 December 2023 and several technical meetings, the European Parliament and the Council agreed on the final shape of the regulation.
 
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EACC

ECB | Competition policy in a changing world

Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at an event to mark the 15th anniversary of the Autorité de la concurrence
Paris, 5 November 2024
 
It is truly a pleasure to be back here today to celebrate the 15th anniversary of the Autorité de la concurrence.
Competition policy in Europe has always played an important role in ensuring the functioning of our Economic and Monetary Union. The main objective of competition policy has been to preserve competition within Member States and within the Single Market.
At the political level, these policy objectives were sometimes challenged, as they were seen as an obstacle to the goal of creating national champions in some sectors.
This apparent contradiction has now been aggravated by profound changes in the global economic and political landscape.
New technologies are transforming markets, new competitors are emerging globally, and governments are facing a new set of priorities, including louder calls for state aid and industrial policy.
As a result, some argue that the supposed trade-off between competition and competitiveness is becoming more accentuated – in the sense that competition policy is limiting EU companies’ ability to compete against larger, in many cases state-backed, global rivals.
In my view, this trade-off is not inherent. We should avoid walking backwards into the future.
With a careful approach, Europe can preserve the benefits of competition while adapting to the changing world we are facing.
So, in these remarks, I would like to recall why competition is vital to our economies and the new challenges facing competition policy today.
I will then offer three key principles that can help us navigate this environment without sacrificing our competitive framework. These are consistency, complementarity and competence.
The benefits of a strong competition framework
There are well-founded reasons for strong competition policy and enforcement. Let me briefly mention three.
First, competition has positive effects on growth.
It leads to resources being reallocated to the most productive firms more effectively, managers running their businesses more efficiently, and greater innovation and investment.
As a result, a recent review by the European Commission finds clear and consistent evidence that industries which experience greater competition also experience stronger productivity growth, and that weaker competition undermines productivity growth.[1]
Second, competition leads to lower and less volatile prices.[2]
It not only prevents firms from charging excessive markups, but also ensures that companies quickly re-optimise production after cost shocks, keeping inflation subdued.
In France, for example, products subject to online competition displayed lower inflation during the period from 2009 to 2018.[3] The difference in inflation between a basket of supermarket products sold only offline and those same products also sold online was 2 percentage points.
Third, competition makes the economy more sensitive to interest rates, which supports macroeconomic management by the central bank and the transmission of monetary policy.
When markets are competitive, firms typically have lower profits and cash reserves. As a result, they are less able to fund investments internally and need to look outside for finance. This exposure to external financing makes them more sensitive to changes in interest rates by the central bank.
ECB research finds that the lower the concentration of the market in which firms operate, the greater the impact of monetary policy changes on those firms.[4] Conversely, a concentration of market power is found to reduce the responsiveness of the economy to interest rate changes.
So, as competition improves productivity, lowers inflation and strengthens policy transmission, it should be no surprise that the ECB has always supported a robust competition framework.
Since the start of the euro, there has been a relatively stable consensus in Europe about the approach to competition. This approach was built around implementing the Single Market, strong antitrust enforcement and a strict approach towards state aid. And, by and large, it was a success.
Single Market integration did not prevent markups from rising in Europe, but they remained well below the levels seen in the United States.[5]
The instances of extreme market concentration in the United States – in terms of firms and sectors – were far less of an issue in Europe.[6]
And state aid was controlled, averaging just 0.7% of EU GDP each year between 2000 and 2019.[7]
Overall, the system of shared competence – with the Commission and national authorities jointly enforcing EU law – was effective. In fact, 90% of all competition decisions taken under EU law are taken by national authorities.
New challenges for competition policy
But in recent times, we have seen increasing tension between the internal and external dimensions of competition.
With the United States being the home of tech giants and China producing at astonishing scale, the question is whether Europe needs to change its competition policy to compete globally.
In some sectors, like telecoms, there are proposals to redefine the relevant market to encourage larger European players that can invest more and match their international rivals.[8]
In other sectors, like tech, the Commission is being encouraged to give greater consideration to “innovation criteria” when considering mergers to facilitate large investments.
And in the defence and space sectors, for example, there are calls to give more weight to “resilience criteria” as geopolitical dependencies are at stake.[9]
This shift is also being reflected in a new attitude towards industrial policy and state aid.
In 2022, almost 1.5% of EU GDP was spent on state aid – more than double the pre-pandemic average. 65% of this spending took place in the three largest EU countries.[10] Much of this aid was related to the pandemic and the energy crisis. But there is also a clear trend among governments to provide more funding to “strategic” industries such as chips and batteries.
We cannot wish these changes away. We are facing a new global landscape.
But we must also be clear that, if we prioritise fending off external competition over preserving internal competition, it will mean sacrificing other goals that matter to us today.
It is now widely understood that Europe needs to boost its lagging productivity growth, and that a key driver of our weak productivity is a static industrial structure. Unlike in the United States, the same “middle tech” companies dominate R&D spending year after year, while too few innovative companies rise up in high tech sectors.[11] There is also broad agreement that the best way to facilitate the scaling-up of young firms is to complete the Single Market.
Allowing more state aid or industry consolidation might seem attractive to protect the competitive position of incumbent companies. But if the price we pay is a more fragmented Single Market or new entry barriers for young firms, we will end up losing more than we gain.
So, the key challenge for Europe will be to construct a framework through which we can deliver on governments’ new policy goals without sacrificing the benefits of competition.
Key principles to move forward
In my view, three principles will be key for success: consistency, complementarity and competence.
First, we need consistency in how we assess competition and deliver state support.
An unfortunate trend we are seeing today is the fragmentation of competition law at the national level, especially in new markets, like digital markets. Some countries are attempting to enforce their own rulebooks for large digital companies or adding national rules to EU legislation.
The singleness of EU competition law is what binds our whole competition framework together, so this trend must be stamped out to preserve the level playing field.
Likewise, if we are entering a world in which we systematically allow more state support for companies, it must be done, as much as possible, in a European way.
The optimal level for action is the EU budget, and I am encouraged by the Commission’s intention to refocus the next Multiannual Financial Framework on competitiveness and simplify access to EU financing. But I also recognise the limitations here. We need to reflect deeply on how we can embed European principles in state aid policy when it remains largely a national concern.
Second, industrial and competition policies must be seen as complements, not substitutes.
From the competition side, there is no inherent trade-off with industrial policy if competition authorities take into account innovation, resilience and sustainability in their decisions – which they can already do within the existing EU rules.
And from the industrial policy side, interventions can be designed in an innovation-focused way that is pro-competition – not to protect national champions or “pick winners”.[12]
As Philippe Aghion, Jean Tirole and Mathias Dewatripont recently argued, the mRNA vaccines introduced during the pandemic are a good example of how this approach can work.[13]
When COVID-19 emerged, the US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority concentrated its funding on three technologies, with two projects per technology. The authorities did not pretend to know which technologies would work and offered no incumbency advantage.
While all six projects ended up being approved, the two main winners, the US firm Moderna and the German firm BioNTech, were actually small biotechs. This experience provides a useful model for Europe for how to combine state-led goals with innovation and competition.
The third principle is competence, by which I mean both assigning responsibility appropriately and drawing on the best available expertise.
Specifically, competition authorities must remain in the driving seat in determining the appropriate level of concentration in different types of markets.
There may be circumstances where allowing consolidation is justified to achieve wider policy goals. For example, economists in the Schumpeterian tradition have suggested that, to promote innovation, there is an optimal intermediate level of competition that balances some market power – creating a surplus for firms to invest in R&D – and competition to leave room for new entrants.[14]
But it is difficult to judge where different sectors lie on this curve. Studies find opposing results on the impact of mergers on innovation activity, driven by factors like differences in market structure and the reduction in the number of competitors.[15]
So careful analysis, carried out on a case-by-case basis by experts with deep understanding, will be essential. Competition policy is a field where both lawyers and economists will have to closely interact.
Conclusion
On that positive note, let me conclude.
Competition policy is entering a new phase, with internal and external forces pulling in different directions. Should this lead to less competition, it would be bad for Europe. But I believe there is a path ahead that will allow us to achieve our wider policy goals in a way that is pro-competition.
We will only be able to take this path if we refuse to accept false trade-offs, and if competition authorities remain at the heart of the process.
As Frédéric Bastiat said, “Détruire la concurrence, c’est tuer l’intelligence”. Fortunately, the Autorité will be here for many years to come, keeping us on our toes.

European Commission (2024), “Protecting competition in a changing world: Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years”.
See, for example, Przybyla, M. and Roma, M. (2005), “Does product market competition reduce inflation? Evidence from EU countries and sectors”, Working Paper Series, No 453, ECB, March; and Andrews, D., Gal, P. and Witheridge, W. (2018), “A genie in a bottle? Globalisation, competition and inflation”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No 1462, OECD, March. However, other studies find that greater market power, as measured by markups, reduces the cyclicality of inflation. See Kouvavas, O., Osbat, C., Reinelt, T. and Vansteenkiste, I. (2021), “Markups and inflation cyclicality in the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 2617, ECB, November.
Dedola, L., Ehrmann, M., Hoffmann, P., Lamo, A., Paz Pardo, G., Slacalek, J. and Strasser, G. (2023), “Digitalisation and the economy”, Working Paper Series, No 2809, ECB.
Ferrando, A., McAdam, P., Petroulakis, F. and Vives, X. (2023), “Monetary Policy, Market Power, and SMEs”, AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 113, May, pp. 105-109.
European Commission (2024), op. cit.
Cavalleri, M.C., Eliet, A., McAdam, P., Petroulakis, F., Soares, A. and Vansteenkiste, I. (2019), “Concentration, market power and dynamism in the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 2253, ECB, March.
European Commission State Aid Scoreboard.
Letta, E. (2024), “Much More Than a Market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens”, Institut Jacques Delors, France, 27 April.
Eurostat and European Commission (2024), “The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe”.
European Commission State Aid Scoreboard.
Fuest, C., Gros, D., Mengel, P.-L., Presidente, G. and Tirole, J. (2024), “EU Innovation Policy: How to Escape the Middle Technology Trap”, EconPol Policy Report Series, April.
OECD (2024), “Pro-competitive Industrial Policy”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No 309, OECD Publishing, Paris, 27 September.
Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (2024), “Can Europe Create an Innovation Economy?”, Project Syndicate, 7 October.
Aghion, P, Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and Howitt, P. (2005), “Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, No 2, May, pp. 701-728.
For a review see Haucap, J. and Stiebale, J. (2023), “Non-price Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions”, DICE Discussion Paper Series, No 402, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, July.

 
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European Council | Council publishes 2023 international climate finance figures

In 2023, the European Union and its 27 member states contributed €28.6 billion in climate finance from public sources and mobilised an additional amount of €7.2 billion of private finance to support developing countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the impacts of climate change.
The Council published the figures today, in preparation for the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP29), which will take place from 11 to 22 November in Baku, Azerbaijan. The figures are based on the EU climate finance reporting rules laid down in the governance regulation.
According to data compiled by the European Commission, approximately half of the public climate funding for developing countries has been directed to climate adaptation or to cross-cutting action (involving both climate change mitigation and adaptation initiatives). Grant based finance represents a significant share (almost 50%) in the EU and member states public contribution. At the same time, the EU actively seeks to extend the range and impact of sources and financial instruments and to mobilise more private finance, all being major tools to support international climate action. This way, the EU will continue to help developing countries to implement the 2015 Paris climate change agreement.
The 2023 figures reconfirm the EU and its member states resolute efforts for delivering on their international climate finance commitments, particularly towards the developed countries’ collective goal of mobilising $ 100 billion per year, which is applicable through to 2025.
Background
The €28.6 billion in climate finance from public budgets includes €3.2 billion from the EU budget, including from the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus, and €2.6 billion from the European Investment Bank. The overall public figure is calculated based on commitments for bilateral and disbursements of multilateral finance reported for calendar year 2023.
The €7.2 billion figure regards the private financial support mobilised through public interventions (e.g., guarantees, syndicated loans, direct investment in companies, credit lines, etc.). It does not include any amounts of the public finance utilised for the mobilisation of this private financial support.
EU member states reported data on the 2023 climate finance pursuant to article 19.3 of regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 (‘governance regulation’) and article 6 and annexes III-V of Commission implementing regulation 2020/1208.
See original post here.
 
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European Commission | Climate report shows the largest annual drop in EU greenhouse gas emissions for decades

EU greenhouse gas emissions fell by 8.3% in 2023, compared to 2022, reveals the latest climate action progress report by the European Commission. The report states that net greenhouse gas emissions are now 37% below 1990 levels. Over the same period, EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 68%. This points to the fact that reducing emissions and economic growth are compatible. It also confirms that the EU remains on track to reach its goal of reducing emissions by at least 55% by 2030. 
Among the report’s findings are:

a record 16.5% decrease in 2023 emissions from power and industrial installations that are listed under the EU Emissions Trading System.
a 24% decrease in emissions from electricity production and heating, under the EU Emissions Trading System, driven by the growth of renewable energy sources, in particular wind and solar energy.
the EU Emissions Trading System generated revenues of €43.6 billion in 2023 for climate action investments.
around a 2% decrease in 2023 of overall buildings, agriculture, domestic transport, small industry and waste emissions. 

an 8.5% increase in 2023 in the EU’s natural carbon absorption, reversing the recent declining trend in the land use and forestry sector.

On the other hand, aviation emissions grew by 9.5%, continuing their post-COVID trend.
Despite the mostly encouraging findings of the report, recent extreme weather events in Europe underline the fact that continued action is needed.
During the past 5 years, the EU has led the way on tackling climate change and environmental degradation under its European Green Deal. It has adopted a set of proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, compared to 1990 levels. It is also working towards the goal of no net greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Work in this area will remain a priority under the new Commission mandate.
The EU will also continue its international engagement, starting with COP29 from 11-22 November 2024, to ensure that our international partners are also taking the necessary action.
 
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