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EACC

Sluggish Global Growth Calls for Supportive Policies

In our July update of the World Economic Outlook we are revising downward our projection for global growth to 3.2 percent in 2019 and 3.5 percent in 2020. While this is a modest revision of 0.1 percentage points for both years relative to our projections in April, it comes on top of previous significant downward revisions. The revision for 2019 reflects negative surprises for growth in emerging market and developing economies that offset positive surprises in some advanced economies.
Growth is projected to improve between 2019 and 2020. However, close to 70 percent of the increase relies on an improvement in the growth performance in stressed emerging market and developing economies and is therefore subject to high uncertainty.
Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted. Dynamism in the global economy is being weighed down by prolonged policy uncertainty as trade tensions remain heightened despite the recent US-China trade truce, technology tensions have erupted threatening global technology supply chains, and the prospects of a no-deal Brexit have increased.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted.

The negative consequences of policy uncertainty are visible in the diverging trends between the manufacturing and services sector, and the significant weakness in global trade. Manufacturing purchasing manager indices continue to decline alongside worsening business sentiment as businesses hold off on investment in the face of high uncertainty. Global trade growth, which moves closely with investment, has slowed significantly to 0.5 percent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2019, which is its slowest pace since 2012. On the other hand, the services sector is holding up and consumer sentiment is strong, as unemployment rates touch record lows and wage incomes rise in several countries.
Among advanced economies—the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the euro area—grew faster than expected in the first quarter of 2019. However, some of the factors behind this—such as stronger inventory build-ups—are transitory and the growth momentum going forward is expected to be weaker, especially for countries reliant on external demand. Owing to first quarter upward revisions, especially for the United States, we are raising our projection for advanced economies slightly, by 0.1 percentage points, to 1.9 percent for 2019. Going forward, growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent, as the effects of fiscal stimulus taper off in the United States and weak productivity growth and aging demographics dampen long-run prospects for advanced economies.
In emerging market and developing economies, growth is being revised down by 0.3 percentage points in 2019 to 4.1 percent and by 0.1 percentage points for 2020 to 4.7 percent. The downward revisions for 2019 are almost across the board for the major economies, though for varied reasons. In China, the slight revision downwards reflects, in part, the higher tariffs imposed by the United States in May, while the more significant revisions in India and Brazil reflect weaker-than-expected domestic demand.
For commodity exporters, supply disruptions, such as in Russia and Chile, and sanctions on Iran, have led to downward revisions despite a near-term strengthening in oil prices. The projected recovery in growth between 2019 and 2020 in emerging market and developing economies relies on improved growth outcomes in stressed economies such as Argentina, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela, and therefore is subject to significant uncertainty.
Financial conditions in the United States and the euro area have further eased, as the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank adopted a more accommodative monetary policy stance. Emerging market and developing economies have benefited from monetary easing in major economies but have also faced volatile risk sentiment tied to trade tensions. On net, financial conditions are about the same for this group as in April. Low-income developing countries that previously received mainly stable foreign direct investment flows now receive significant volatile portfolio flows, as the search for yield in a low interest rate environment reaches frontier markets.
Increased downside risks
A major downside risk to the outlook remains an escalation of trade and technology tensions that can significantly disrupt global supply chains. The combined effect of tariffs imposed last year and potential tariffs envisaged in May between the United States and China could reduce the level of global GDP in 2020 by 0.5 percent. Further, a surprise and durable worsening of financial sentiment can expose financial vulnerabilities built up over years of low interest rates, while disinflationary pressures can lead to difficulties in debt servicing for borrowers. Other significant risks include a surprise slowdown in China, the lack of a recovery in the euro area, a no-deal Brexit, and escalation of geopolitical tensions.
With global growth subdued and downside risks dominating the outlook, the global economy remains at a delicate juncture. It is therefore essential that tariffs are not used to target bilateral trade balances or as a general-purpose tool to tackle international disagreements. To help resolve conflicts, the rules-based multilateral trading system should be strengthened and modernized to encompass areas such as digital services, subsidies, and technology transfer.
Policies to support growth
Monetary policy should remain accommodative especially where inflation is softening below target. But it needs to be accompanied by sound trade policies that would lift the outlook and reduce downside risks. With persistently low interest rates, macroprudential tools should be deployed to ensure that financial risks do not build up.
Fiscal policy should balance growth, equity, and sustainability concerns, including protecting society’s most vulnerable. Countries with fiscal space should invest in physical and social infrastructure to raise potential growth. In the event of a severe downturn, a synchronized move toward more accommodative fiscal policies should complement monetary easing, subject to country specific circumstances.
Lastly, the need for greater global cooperation is ever urgent. In addition to resolving trade and technology tensions, countries need to work together to address major issues such as climate change, international taxation, corruption, cybersecurity, and the opportunities and challenges of newly emerging digital payment technologies.

With Compliments of the IMF

EACC

Top global firms commit to tackling inequality by joining Business for Inclusive Growth coalition

A group of major international companies has pledged to tackle inequality and promote diversity in their workplaces and supply chains as part of an initiative sponsored by the French Presidency of the G7 and overseen by the OECD.
The Business for Inclusive Growth (B4IG) coalition will be launched at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Biarritz, France, which took place from 24 to 26 August 2019. Spearheaded by Emmanuel Faber, Danone Chairman and CEO, the coalition brought together 34 leading multinationals with more than 3 million employees worldwide and global revenues topping $1 trillion. Members agreed to sign a pledge to take concrete actions to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are more widely shared.
B4IG coalition members will tackle persistent inequalities of opportunity, reduce regional disparities and fight gender discrimination. Companies have identified an initial pool of more than 50 existing and planned projects, representing more than 1 billion euros in private funding, to be covered under the initiative. The projects range from training programmes to help employees adapt to the future of work to greater investment in childcare, to increasing women’s participation in the workforce; to financially supporting small businesses, to encouraging greater participation in supply chains; and to enhancing the integration of refugees through faster integration to the workforce. Coalition members will seek to accelerate, scale up and replicate already existing projects, while significantly expanding their social impact.
The platform, chaired by Danone, consists of a three-year, OECD-managed programme. It aims at increasing opportunities for disadvantaged and under-represented groups through retraining and ups-killing, as well as promoting diversity on the companies’ boards and executive committees and tackling inequalities throughout their supply chains. They will also step up business action to advance human rights, build more inclusive workplaces and strengthen inclusion in their internal and external business ecosystems.
B4IG initiative will be presented to French President Emmanuel Macron during a meeting with business and civil society leaders at the Elysées Palace on Friday 23 August.
OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said: “Growing inequality is one of the biggest social challenges in the world today, perpetuating poverty, undermining social cohesion and trust. Sustainable economic growth means inclusive economic growth. It means giving every individual the opportunity to fulfill her or his potential, the chance not only to contribute to a nation’s growth but to benefit from it, regardless of their background or origins.”
Mr Gurría added: “I welcome this initiative by France to involve some of the world’s most important companies to work hand-in-hand with governments and the OECD to tackle inequalities. The OECD, for its part, will contribute with its policy analysis, research and expertise.”
A Business for Inclusive Growth (B4IG) Incubator of public-private projects will be created at the OECD. The facility will offer companies access to the latest policy research, to help them launch and develop projects, undertake impact assessments and eventually bring about meaningful change. The B4IG Incubator will be funded by both G7 governments and private donors. It will service innovative inclusive business projects that require strong collaboration between the private and the public sector. The Incubator will catalyse and disseminate knowledge around the business models with higher social impact.
An evaluation of the projects will be published after three years, alongside OECD guidance for promoting inclusive growth through joint public-private action and for measuring business performance.
OECD Chief of Staff and Sherpa Gabriela Ramos, leader of the OECD Inclusive Growth Initiative, said: “The OECD has been documenting and raising the alarm bell regarding the increased inequalities of income and opportunities in OECD countries for decades. They do not only undermine social cohesion and trust, but they also hamper growth, by preventing our economies to take full advantage of the talent of its people and businesses. We are delighted to partner with leading companies that are committed to take action. Our experience, evidence and best practices are at the service of the Business for Inclusive Growth Initiative.”
With compliments of OECD
 

EACC

An Autobiography That Puts The Irish Backstop In Context

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
I have just finished reading Seamus Mallon’s autobiography, entitled a “Shared Home Place”.Boris Johnson, or one of his advisors, ought to read it if they wish to get an insight into the concerns that underlie the Irish backstop. They will learn that Brexit, and the Irish peace, are not events in themselves, but processes that will go on for years, and will either deepen or reduce division over generations to come.
 This is not a one off problem to be solved, but a choice between two courses of action that are fundamentally inimical to one another.
As the title of his book implies, Seamus Mallon makes the case that Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, must come to terms with the fact that they must share their home place with a million or so people (unionists) who see themselves as British, and who do not have, and will never have, an exclusively Irish identity.
The early part of the book deals with the author’s experience growing up, peacefully, as a member of a Catholic minority in the predominantly Protestant town of Market hill in Armagh.
 It then moves to the beginnings of the troubles, and the exclusive way in which local government operated to the benefit of the unionist majority, without regard to the wishes of the nationalist minority.
After a stint in local government, Seamus Mallon later was a member of the 1974 power sharing administration, led by the Unionist Brian Faulkner, and established on the basis of the Sunningdale Agreement between the Irish Taoiseach of the day, Liam Cosgrave and his counterpart, Edward Heath. 
This power sharing Administration was brought down by the Ulster Workers strikers, who objected to the whole idea of power sharing between the  two communities. 
Mallon believes the IRA also felt deeply threatened by power sharing, which may explain why Sinn Fein, despite all the efforts made by others to accommodate them, has so far been unable to work the Good Friday institutions even to this day.
Mallon was SDLP spokesman on Justice in the 1980’s and he made a point of attending all the funerals of victims of politically motivated violence in his area, which was an important, but very difficult, demonstration of his profound sense of fairness and,  of his opposition to all violence. 
The book is very explicit about the murderous collusion between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. He names names.
Mallon deals with the Hume/Adams talks, and makes clear that John Hume did not bring his party along with him in this solo endeavour, a failure that had deep long term consequences. 
As Mallon puts it,
 “peace was being brought about in a way that was bypassing democratic procedures”.
He is critical of Sinn Fein having been allowed into government in Northern Ireland without the IRA first  getting rid of their weapons. 
As he puts it, the IRA, continuing to hold weapons, after the Good Friday Agreement had been ratified in both parts of Ireland, was
“a challenge to the sovereignty of the Irish people”.
This was also my opinion at the time, both as Taoiseach and leader of Fine Gael. There are some principles that should not be blurred. It took the IRA 11 years to eventually put their arms beyond use, and Mallon says that this
 “led to huge mistrust and misunderstanding”.
 Mallon believes the British and Irish governments should have called the IRA’s bluff much earlier, and claims that it was the Americans who eventually forced the issue of decommissioning.
He gives a good account of the dramatic conclusion to the talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement, and of Tony Blair’s letter to David Trimble, promising that the process of decommissioning should start “straight away”, a promise Mallon says 
“Blair was either unwilling or unable to keep”.
Mallon understood Trimble’s problem, praises his courage, and believes he was ill used by Tony Blair.
But the artificially prolonged focus on decommissioning kept Sinn Fein as the centre of attention, and thus helped them to supplant the SDLP as the voice of Northern Nationalism. This was an error of historic proportions.
Mallon believes that the Trimble/Mallon( UUP/SDLP) power sharing Administrations  under the Good Friday Agreement achieved more that the Paisley/ McGuinness (DUP/SF) Administrations did. Mallon opposes political violence in all circumstances. 
As he says
“It is a universal lesson that political violence obliterates not only its victims, but all possibility of rational discourse about future political options”
I agree.
 The 1916 to 1923 period in Ireland also taught us that lesson too!
In the latter part of the book, Seamus Mallon talks about the prospects of a united Ireland. 
The Good Friday Agreement allows for referenda to decide the question. It posits a 50% + one vote as being sufficient to bring a united Ireland about. This is a deficiency in the Agreement.
 A united Ireland, imposed on that narrow basis, would be highly unstable. There would be a minority opposed to it that would simply not give up. 
As Mallon puts it
“I believe that if nationalists cannot, over a period of time, persuade a significant number of unionists to accept an Irish unitary state, then that kind of unity is not an option”
I agree.
The Irish and UK governments could find common ground here.
 But the two communities in Northern Ireland must first start talking to one another about what they really need and what they could concede to one another.
 There is no point blaming the politicians.  If the voters chose parties to represent them that are intransigent, then the voters themselves are ultimately responsible for the outcome.
This is something that Boris Johnson has to contemplate as he seeks a way to deal with the Irish backstop.
With compliments of John Bruton former Prime Minister of Ireland

EACC

Prime Minister Johnson’s Letter To Council President Tusk

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
This letter is important because it sets out the thinking of the new UK Government. It should be taken seriously and analysed. It contains a number of internal contradictions which should be, politely but persistently, probed by EU negotiators. I hope to explore some of these in this note.WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY?
Some of the terms used in the letter need to be defined.
For example, Mr Johnson claims the Irish backstop is inconsistent with the “sovereignty” of the UK as a state.
All international agreements impinge on sovereignty. But the ultimate sovereignty of a state concerns the states monopoly on the use of force within its territory. UK sovereignty in Britain and Northern Ireland is not interfered with by the backstop, in that basic understanding of state sovereignty.
WHAT IS JOHNSON OFFERING ON THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES FACING IRELAND?
Mr Johnson’s letter says
“ Ireland is the UK’s closest neighbour, with whom we will continue to share uniquely deep ties, a land border, the Common Travel Area, and much else besides. We remain, as we have always been, committed to working with Ireland on the peace process, and to furthering Northern Ireland’s security and prosperity. We recognise the unique challenges the outcome of the referendum poses for Ireland, and want to find solutions to the border which work for all.”
It continues
“ I want to re-emphasis the commitment of this Government to peace in Northern Ireland. The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, as well as being an agreement between the UK and Ireland, is a historic agreement between two traditions in Northern Ireland, and we are unconditionally committed to the spirit and letter of our obligations under it in all circumstances – whether there is a deal with the EU or not.”
Boris Johnson recognises what he calls the “unique challenges” Brexit poses for Ireland.It would be useful to ask him to set out in his own words 
what he thinks these “unique challenges” are, and to ask him to set out his own words
how he believes these can be met and
how his government might contribute to this.
I have the sense that neither he, nor his fellow Brexit advocates, have ever undertaken such a mental exercise.
Again, he says he is “unconditionally” committed to the “letter and the spirit “of the UK’s obligations under the Good Friday Agreement. 
It would be useful to ask Prime Minister Johnson to put in his own words what he considers these obligations to be, particularly as regards the “spirit “of the Agreement.
DIVERGENCE IS CENTRAL TO BREXIT, CONVERGENCE IS CENTRAL TO BELFAST AGREEMENT
Later in his letter, Mr Johnson says 
“When the UK leaves the EU and after any transition period, we will leave the single market and the customs union. Although we will remain committed to world-class environment, product and labour standards, the laws and regulations to deliver them will potentially diverge from those of the EU. That is the point of our exit and our ability to enable this is central to our future democracy.”
This is the most revealing paragraph of the entire letter.The whole point of Brexit, according to Mr Johnson, is to “diverge” from EU standards on environment, product and labour standards. This means Northern Ireland’s environment, product, and labour standards diverging from those of Ireland (as a member of the EU).
FROM WHICH EU STANDARDS DOES UK WISH TO DIVERGE?
Although it has been promoting Brexit for three years now, the UK government has yet to say which EU standards it wants to diverge from, and why it wishes to do so. Divergence, for its own sake, is what the UK wants, according to Mr Johnson. Given that the Good Friday Agreement is all about convergence (not divergence) between the two parts of Ireland, and between Britain and Ireland, there is a head on contradiction between these two parts of Mr Johnson’s letter. On the detail of the backstop, he says
“By requiring continued membership of the customs union and applying many single market rules in Northern Ireland, it presents the whole of the UK with the choice of remaining in a customs union and aligned with those rules, or of seeing Northern Ireland gradually detached from the UK economy across a very broad range of areas. Both of those outcomes are unacceptable to the British Government.”
This point has some validity in its own terms. If no alternative solution is found, and the backstop comes into effect, new EU rules, in the making of which the UK will not have had a hand, with apply either to the whole of the UK or to Northern Ireland.
So far the UK has been unable to come up with a credible alternative to the backstop, that would allow Brexit to go ahead, but also to avoid progressive divergence in regulations between the two parts of Ireland. 
That is the core problem, and Mr Johnson’s letter makes clear that “divergence” is the whole point of Brexit and “central to our future democracy”. It is important the UK public understand what their government is committing itself to.
IT IS BREXIT, NOT THE BACKSTOP, THAT UPSETS THE BALANCE
MrJohnson also claims that 
“ the backstop risks weakening the delicate balance embodied in the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The historic compromise in Northern Ireland is based upon a carefully negotiated balance between both traditions in Northern Ireland, grounded in agreement, consent, and respect for minority rights”
He is right to say that the Belfast Agreement is a carefully negotiated balance. But Brexit, of its very nature, upsets that balance. Brexit, as Mr Johnson’s letter says, is about divergence. If there is to be divergence between jurisdictions, there must be border controls between those jurisdictions. Brexit upsets the balance by forcing a choice between
having the divergence/border between North and South in Ireland (thereby favouring the  “unionist” position) or 
having the divergence/border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK (thereby favouring the “nationalist” position).
Brexit alone is responsible for forcing such a choice. And Brexit is a UK initiative, not something forced upon it. The only way to preserve the “balance”, to which Mr Johnson says he is committed, would be to dis-aggregate the regulations into categories, and have half the controls North/ South and half on an East/ West basis within the UK. This would be clumsy and would take years to negotiate. But so also is Brexit.
MINORITY RIGHTS AND BREXIT
Mr Johnson’s letter refers to
 “respect for minority rights”.
The majority of people in Northern Ireland voted against Brexit, but their wishes are to ignored because a majority in the wider UK voted for Brexit.  Brexit, as promoted by Mr Johnson, is a radical rejection of this minority rights aspect of the Good Friday Agreement.
Mr Johnson says
“The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement neither depends upon nor requires a particular customs or regulatory regime.“
It is true that the Agreement does not say this in terms. But, at the time the Agreement was negotiated, both the UK and Ireland were in the same customs and regulatory regime. That was taken for granted, and did not have to made explicit in the Agreement.
He goes on
“The broader commitments in the Agreement, including to parity of esteem, partnership, democracy and to peaceful means of resolving differences, can be met if we explore solutions other than the backstop.”
This is a strange sentence. It says the commitments “can” be met if we “explore” other solutions. An exploration by its nature is uncertain, and the use of this term contradicts the confident statement that solutions “can” be found. In any event, Mr Johnson ought to have come up with the solution himself by now.
DOES MR JOHNSON WANT TO BREAK UP THE EU SINGLE MARKET?
Mr Johnson goes on
“This Government will not put in place infrastructure, checks, or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland. We would be happy to accept a legally binding commitment to this effect and hope that the EU would do likewise.”
This reads to me like a straightforward attempt by a UK Prime Minister to destroy the EU Single Market. Controls on what goods and services may cross its borders are essential to the EU Single Market.  This is especially the case if the UK decides to make trade deals, with different rates of tariffs to the ones applied by EU. 
Given that “divergence” from EU rules is what Mr Johnson says Brexit is all about, inviting the EU not to enforce its own rules, raises the suspicion that, like his fan President Trump, Boris Johnson would like to dissolve the EU!
With compliments of John Bruton former Prime Minister of Ireland

EACC

Worsening Water Quality Reducing Economic Growth by a Third in Some Countries: World Bank

The world faces an invisible crisis of water quality that is eliminating one-third of potential economic growth in heavily polluted areas and threatening human and environmental well-being, according to a World Bank report released today.

Quality Unknown: The Invisible Water Crisis shows, with new data and methods, how a combination of bacteria, sewage, chemicals, and plastics can suck oxygen from water supplies and transform water into poison for people and ecosystems. To shed light on the issue, the World Bank assembled the world’s largest database on water quality gathered from monitoring stations, remote sensing technology, and machine learning.
The report finds that a lack of clean water limits economic growth by one-third. It calls for immediate global, national, and local-level attention to these dangers which face both developed and developing countries.   
“Clean water is a key factor for economic growth. Deteriorating water quality is stalling economic growth, worsening health conditions, reducing food production, and exacerbating poverty in many countries.” said World Bank Group President David Malpass. “Their governments must take urgent actions to help tackle water pollution so that countries can grow faster in equitable and environmentally sustainable ways.”
When Biological Oxygen Demand – a measure of how much organic pollution is in water and a proxy measure of overall water quality – crosses a certain threshold, GDP growth in downstream regions drops by as much as a third because of impacts on health, agriculture, and ecosystems.
A key contributor to poor water quality is nitrogen, which, applied as fertilizer in agriculture, eventually enters rivers, lakes and oceans where it transforms into nitrates. Early exposure of children to nitrates affects their growth and brain development, impacting their health and adult earning potential. The run-off and release into water from every additional kilogram of nitrogen fertilizer per hectare can increase the level of childhood stunting by as much as 19 percent and reduce future adult earnings by as much as 2 percent, compared to those who are not exposed.
The report also finds that as salinity in water and soil increases due to more intense droughts, storm surges and rising water extraction, agricultural yields fall.  The world is losing enough food to saline water each year to feed 170 million people.
The report recommends a set of actions that countries can take to improve water quality. These include: environmental policies and standards; accurate monitoring of pollution loads; effective enforcement systems; water treatment infrastructure supported with incentives for private investment; and reliable, accurate information disclosure to households to inspire citizen engagement.
Note: The report, which was funded in part by the Global Water Security & Sanitation Partnership, a Multi-Donor Trust Fund based at the World Bank’s Water Global Practice, is available for download here: worldbank.org/qualityunknown
Compliments of the World Bank

EACC

World Bank Group Warns of Advance Fee Fraud Schemes Misrepresenting Its Name

In light of a resurgence of “advance fee fraud schemes” misusing the World Bank Group’s name, the institution is warning against investment deals and advance fee schemes that fraudulently invoke the institution’s name or claim to be affiliated with the World Bank Group.
Like many large organizations, we have seen increased use of sophisticated forms and letterhead that appear to be legitimate World Bank Group email correspondence or certificates. The World Bank’s name can be falsely invoked to give the scheme the appearance of authenticity and, in some cases, the wrongdoers may use the names of actual World Bank Group staff members to bolster the credibility of the scam.
Advanced fee fraud schemes involve solicitations that encourage potential victims to provide personal information such as signatures or bank account information, and to pay certain advance fees, often described as “processing fees” or “finder’s fees”. In return, the potential victim is promised sums of money which the scammer has no intention of paying.  Police estimate that thousands of these advance fee fraud solicitations – only a very small fraction involving the use of the World Bank Group’s name – are sent by e-mail every week and are addressed to individuals and companies around the world.
The World Bank Group has no involvement in such schemes, and we would like to caution the public to be wary of these and other similar solicitations that falsely claim to be affiliated with the World Bank Group or any member of the World Bank Group (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes).
You can find more information about fraudulent investment schemes that misuse our name here.
Compliments of the Worldbank

EACC

France : Financial System Stability Assessment

Important institutional and policy changes have taken place since the 2012 FSAP. At the national level, the authorities have strengthened the macroprudential framework by establishing the High Council for Financial Stability (HCSF), enhanced monitoring of financial stability risks, prepared to manage the Brexit fall-out, introduced macroprudential measures, and taken various financial reform measures included in Loi PACTE—Action Plan for Business Growth and Transformation—and initiatives on digital finance, crypto-assets, green finance, and combating cyber risk.
At the European level, significant changes include the Banking Union (BU), Capital Requirements Regulation/Capital Requirements Directive (CRR/CRD), Solvency II, and efforts towards a Capital Markets Union (CMU). The financial system is more resilient than it was in 2012. Capital positions and asset quality have improved. Banking business is better placed to handle cross-border contagion, including from exposures to high-yield EA economies. Insurers’ solvency ratios have been stable and have been bolstered by the effective implementation of Solvency II. Household savings and balance sheets are relatively sound and house prices presently appear broadly aligned with fundamentals.
Download the report HERE
Compliments of the International Monetary Fund

EACC

UK has Committed Itself to Radically Contradictory Positions on Brexit and The Belfast Agreement

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
WILL UK BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE MORE EASILY WITH EUROPE IF IT BINS THE WITHDRAWAL TREATY?
The new UK Foreign Secretary , Dominic Raab, has claimed on Radio 4 that the UK would find it “easier” to negotiate  a good long term deal with Brussels , if it had first crashed out of the EU , than if it ratified the Withdrawal Treaty.
Doing this would mean binning the entire content the Withdrawal Treaty, not just the backstop.
Settlements painstakingly reached in the Withdrawal Treaty  on transitional matters, like the rights of existing cross border workers, the recognition of existing professional qualifications, social security, mutual financial obligations, enforcement of contracts and judicial decisions, and a transition period up to the end of 2020, would all go into the waste bin.
If , after that, the UK then decided it wanted to negotiate a new Agreement with the EU, these issues would have negotiated all over again from scratch.
That extra workload would be on top of the negotiation of the future EU/UK Agreement, which, given the range of subjects to be covered and the intricacies of arrangements being replaced, would probably be the most complex trade negotiation ever undertaken in human history.
Binning the Withdrawal Treaty now, would delay the finalisation a future Agreement by several additional years because of this extra workload.
And that is just on the legal side of things.
The psychological damage to UK/ EU relations caused by a willful choice of “no deal” by the UK would have to be repaired. A prudent Foreign Secretary would consider these matters more carefully than Mr Raab appears to have done so far.
It is, of course, true that that the backstop in the existing Withdrawal Agreement constrains the UK’s negotiating options for a future Trade Deal, because it requires the UK to take account of its obligations under the Belfast Agreement as well.
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTRADICTION… THE RED LINES OF 2016
But that backstop is only there because Mrs May, in late 2016, drew three red lines for the  UK’s future relationship with the EU….
no customs Union,
no Single Market and
no ECJ jurisdiction….while still remaining a party to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.
As was pointed out at the time, these three red lines conflicted with the Belfast Agreement, into which the UK freely entered in 1998, with the approval of the Parliament.
The Belfast Agreement was the basis of which Ireland changed its constitution. No minor matter.
The three red lines, by their very nature, require the UK to “take control” of its borders. That means controls at the border, and the only land border the UK has with the EU is in Ireland .
BORDER CONTROLS WERE INHERENT IN ”TAKING BACK CONTROL”
Border controls were always the essence of Brexit.
Yet the man who led the Brexit campaign in 2016, Boris Johnson, is now saying the opposite, he is saying that the UK will not impose any border controls in Ireland, and that any controls there might be will be someone’s else’s fault.
In fact, under WTO rules, the UK itself will almost certainly have to have border controls of its own once it leaves the EU.
Meanwhile EU law, the EU customs code, requires any EU state, if has a border with any state that is not in the EU Customs Union and Single Market, has to have border controls . The UK knows this well, because its officials helped draw up the EU Customs code. They are familiar with every comma and full stop in it, and know all the customs obligations a no deal Brexit will impose on Ireland.
PRIME MINISTER JOHNSON SAYS HE RESPECTS THE BELFAST AGREEMENT……BUT HOW?
Last week in Belfast, Prime Minister Johnson said that he respects the “letter and the spirit “ of the Belfast Agreement.
The Belfast Agreement calls for close cross border cooperation on issues like the environment, health, agriculture, electricity, education and tourism. It stands to reason that this sort of cooperation will be made much more difficult, if the Northern Ireland and Ireland are no longer part of the same market for goods and services. The UK red lines will also lead to diverging professional qualifications, diverging quality standards for goods and services, and diverging standards of consumer protection, between North and South, and between the UK and Ireland.
Even without physical border controls, that divergence, by its nature, pulls the two parts of Ireland further apart from one another, and pulls Britain and Ireland apart too. It thus upsets the subtle balance between Unionist and Nationalist identities in Northern Ireland, that the Belfast agreement created.
Unfortunately Brexit, of its nature, contradicts the spirit of the Belfast Agreement, to which Boris Johnson says he is fully committed.
BACKSTOP WAS A BRIDGE BETWEEN TWO CONTRADICTORY COMMITMENTS MADE BY THE UK
The backstop was an attempt to build a bridge between these two radically contradictory British positions, Brexit and the Belfast Agreement.
It was not trap set to tie Britain to the EU, but rather an attempt to help the UK reconcile the two contradictory positions it itself had taken up, the one it took in 1998, and the one it took in 2016.
At first, the backstop was to apply to Northern Ireland alone, but it was the UK that requested that it be extended to island of Britain as well.
The fact that it was the UK that asked for this extension of the backstop to Britain, belies the idea that the backstop was some sort of Brussels conspiracy to keep Britain in the EU orbit, a theory promoted in pro Brexit circles.
The UK Parliament has now thrice rejected the Withdrawal Agreement and, with it, the Irish backstop. But the underlying conflict between Brexit and the Belfast Agreement, remains unresolved. The new UK government has no solid proposals of its own for reconciling the basic contradiction. Instead the UK wants to fix responsibility for its own dilemma on Dublin and Brussels.
Against this background, Dominic Raab is wrong to think that it would be easier for the UK to make a future Trade Agreement with Brussels, after it had walked away from the EU, without paying its bills, and without sorting out the details of the divorce it had initiated.
NO DEAL IS POOR BASIS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATION…
A crash out Brexit is bound to create ill will and could not possibly make the negotiation of a future Agreement easier.
Indeed a moment’s reflection would tell Mr Raab that it would not be in the EU’s interest to give better terms to a country, that had willfully crashed out, than to one which had stood by commitments made by its Prime Minister. To do so would set a dangerous precedent for the EU.
Mr Raab might also remember that any future EU deal with the UK will have to be approved by every EU Parliament, including by Dail Eireann, and by the European Parliament.
A No Deal Brexit now will not finalise anything on 1 November. It will just be the start of years of painful non productive negotiation. This negotiation will be unavoidable because geographically the UK is in the continent of Europe, rather than any other continent that it might prefer to be in. The UK will have to live with the EU and vice versa, because of geography.
A no Deal Brexit on 1 November will poison and prolong what will, in any event, be an essential, but incredibly difficult, negotiation between the UK and the EU on their future relationships.
Compliments of John Bruton

EACC

International community agrees on a road map for resolving the tax challenges arising from digitalisation of the economy

The international community has agreed on a road map for resolving the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, and committed to continue working toward a consensus-based long-term solution by the end of 2020, the OECD announced.
The 129 members of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) adopted a Programme of Work laying out a process for reaching a new global agreement for taxing multinational enterprises.
The document, which calls for intensifying international discussions around two main pillars, was approved during the May 28-29 plenary meeting of the Inclusive Framework, which brought together 289 delegates from 99 member countries and jurisdictions and 10 observer Organisations. It will be presented by OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría to G20 Finance Ministers for endorsement during their 8-9 June ministerial meeting in Fukuoka, Japan.
Drawing on analysis from a Policy Note published in January 2019 and informed by a public consultation held in March 2019, the Programme of Work will explore the technical issues to be resolved through the two main pillars. The first pillar will explore potential solutions for determining where tax should be paid and on what basis (“nexus”), as well as what portion of profits could or should be taxed in the jurisdictions where clients or users are located (“profit allocation”).
The second pillar will explore the design of a system to ensure that multinational enterprises – in the digital economy and beyond – pay a minimum level of tax. This pillar would provide countries with a new tool to protect their tax base from profit shifting to low/no-tax jurisdictions, and is intended to address remaining issues identified by the OECD/G20 BEPS initiative.
In 2015 the OECD estimated revenue losses from BEPS of up to USD 240 billion, equivalent to 10% of global corporate tax revenues, and created the Inclusive Forum to co-ordinate international measures to fight BEPS and improve the international tax rules.
“Important progress has been made through the adoption of this new Programme of Work, but there is still a tremendous amount of work to do as we seek to reach, by the end of 2020, a unified long-term solution to the tax challenges posed by digitalisation of the economy,” Mr Gurría said. “Today’s broad agreement on the technical roadmap must be followed by a strong political support toward a solution that maintains, reinforces and improves the international tax system. The health of all our economies depends on it.”
The Inclusive Framework agreed that the technical work must be complemented by an impact assessment of how the proposals will affect government revenue, growth and investment. While countries have organised a series of working groups to address the technical issues, they also recognise that political agreement on a comprehensive and unified solution should be reached as soon as possible, ideally before year-end, to ensure adequate time for completion of the work during 2020.
For more information on the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, see: www.oecd.org/tax/beps/
Compliments of the OECD

EACC

US Business Investment: Rising Market Power Mutes Tax Cut Impact

By Emanuel Kopp, Daniel Leigh, and Suchanan Tambunlertchai | IMF
US business investment has been on the rise. Since the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act at the end of 2017, US businesses have bought more machinery, developed software, and created new intellectual property.
Some believe that the key to this growth in business investment has been the Act’s cut to the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent, which lowered the cost of capital. Lower capital costs could, at least theoretically, encourage business owners to increase investment.
But our recent study suggests a simpler reason: business investment has been rising because domestic demand and sales have been rising. We also find that rising market power—the ability of companies to charge prices above production costs—has dulled the impact of corporate tax cuts on business investment decisions.
Investment drivers
Growth in sales and optimism about future sales prospects are central forces influencing companies to invest more.
For example, if a business owner expects that she’ll continue to have strong sales in the next quarter, she is more likely to increase investment in her business and boost production.
According to our study—released in the lead up to our recent economic assessment of the United States—virtually all of the growth in business investment since 2017 can be explained by private sector expectations of the future demand for products.
To measure expectations of future product demand, we used private-sector forecasts of US growth in domestic consumption and net exports—that is, the non-investment part of output.
As future sales prospects played a key role in influencing business owners to invest more, what drove consumers to spend more?
The factors that boosted demand in 2018 included households’ higher disposable income due to the tax law’s cut in personal taxes, as well as higher government spending due to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018. Other factors, such as reductions in the cost of capital from the lower business tax provisions, appear to explain little of the rise in investment.
Rising corporate market power
Then, what could explain this relatively muted response of investment to a reduction in the effective corporate tax rate?
Our analysis suggests that the sensitivity of investment to tax changes may have declined over the past 30 years because of the rise in the market power of big companies, which, other studies suggest, has occurred across the economy—from airlines to pharmaceuticals to high-tech companies.
As companies gain market power and their respective industries become more concentrated, their profits are increasingly in the form of monopoly rents—well above the normal profits that prevail when there is more competition.
In such an environment, a cut to the corporate income tax rate should increase post-tax monopoly profits but induce a smaller behavioral response in companies’ production and investment decisions.
Therefore, as the chart shows, a tax cut today could be expected to have a smaller impact than in past decades due to the changing nature of the US corporate landscape.
Investment decisions
Enterprise-level data for 2018 also support the notion that rising market power is lessening firms’ sensitivity to tax changes. For listed companies across a range of different US industries,
their increase in investment in 2018 was smaller for firms that had higher markups (the difference between prices and marginal costs) before the tax cuts.
Other factors that have further subdued investment growth since 2017 include, we find, economic policy uncertainty, which has occurred in the context of escalating trade-related tensions between the United States and other countries.
The bottom line is this: strong demand since the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has been the principal driver behind corporate investment decisions—not the reduction in the cost of capital coming from the corporate tax cuts themselves.
Moreover, the rise in corporate market power in recent decades appears to have muted the effectiveness of corporate tax cuts as a means for boosting business investment.
Finally, policymakers can support further growth in business investment by reducing economic policy uncertainty, including by resolving trade-related tensions.
Compliments of the International Monetary Fund