Today, the European Commission has granted a conditional marketing authorisation (CMA) for the COVID‑19 vaccine developed by Moderna, the second COVID-19 vaccine authorised in the EU. This authorisation follows a positive scientific recommendation based on a thorough assessment of the safety, effectiveness and quality of the vaccine by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and is endorsed by the Member States.
The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said: “We are providing more COVID-19 vaccines for Europeans. With the Moderna vaccine, the second one now authorised in the EU, we will have a further 160 million doses. And more vaccines will come. Europe has secured up to two billion doses of potential COVID-19 vaccines. We’ll have more than enough safe and effective vaccines for protecting all Europeans.”
Stella Kyriakides, Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, said: “We are all in this together and united. This is why we have negotiated the broadest vaccine portfolio in the world for all our Member States. Today we are authorising a second safe and effective vaccine from Moderna, which together with BioNTech-Pfizer, will ensure that 460 million doses will be rolled out with increasing speed in the EU, and more will come. Member States have to ensure that the pace of vaccinations follows suit. Our efforts will not stop until vaccines are available for everyone in the EU.”
Moderna submitted on 30 November 2020 an application for marketing authorisation to EMA, which had already started a rolling review of the data in November. Thanks to this rolling review, EMA has been assessing the quality, safety and efficacy of the vaccine as data has become available. EMA’s human medicines committee (CHMP) has thoroughly assessed the data and recommended by consensus that a formal conditional marketing authorisation is granted. A conditional marketing authorisation is one of EU’s regulatory mechanisms for facilitating early access to medicines that fulfil an unmet medical need, including in emergency situations such as the current pandemic.
On the basis of EMA’s positive opinion, the Commission has verified all the elements supporting the marketing authorisation and consulted Member States before granting the conditional market authorisation.
The Moderna vaccine is based on messenger RNA (mRNA). mRNA plays a fundamental role in biology, transferring instructions from DNA to the cells’ protein making machinery. In an mRNA vaccine, these instructions produce harmless fragments of the virus, which the human body uses to build an immune response to prevent or fight disease. When a person is given the vaccine, their cells will read the genetic instructions and produce a spike protein, a protein on the outer surface of the virus which it uses to enter the body’s cells and cause disease. The person’s immune system will then treat this protein as foreign and produce natural defences — antibodies and T cells — against it.
Next steps
Moderna, with whom the Commission signed a contract on 25 November, will deliver the total amount of 160 million doses between the first and the third quarters of 2021. It will add to the 300 million doses of the vaccine distributed by BioNTech/Pfizer, the first vaccine to have been authorised in the EU on 21 December 2020.
Background
A conditional marketing authorisation (CMA) is an authorisation of medicines on the basis of less complete data required for a normal marketing authorisation. Such a CMA may be considered if the benefit of a medicine’s immediate availability to patients clearly outweighs the risk linked to the fact that not all the data are yet available. However, once a CMA has been granted, companies must provide within certain deadlines further data including from ongoing or new studies to confirm that the benefits continue to outweigh the risks.
Moderna submitted on 30 November 2020 an application for a CMA for their vaccine to EMA. EMA has already been assessing data on the vaccine’s safety, effectiveness and quality and results from laboratory studies and clinical trials in the context of a rolling review. This rolling review and the assessment of the CMA application allowed EMA to quickly conclude on the safety, effectiveness and quality of the vaccine. EMA recommended granting the conditional marketing authorisation as the benefits of the vaccine outweigh its risks.
The European Commission has verified whether all necessary elements – scientific justifications, product information, educational material to healthcare professionals, labelling, obligations to marketing authorisation holders, conditions for use, etc. – were clear and sound. The Commission also consulted the Member States, as they are responsible for the vaccines marketing and the use of the product in their countries. Following the Member States’ endorsement and on the basis of its own analysis, the Commission decided to grant the conditional market authorisation.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post European Commission authorises second safe and effective vaccine against COVID-19 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

A salient feature of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has been the sharp and deep decline in mobility, which has caused a slump in tourism, trade in travel services and consumption by non-residents. Lockdowns and social distancing measures led to strong declines in otherwise stable services consumption. This box takes stock of developments in the tourism sector, discusses how the impact of these developments on consumption has varied across countries and reviews the near-term prospects for a recovery in tourism and travel.
The slump in tourism and travel, reflecting restrictions and uncertainties related to people’s movement across borders (e.g. owing to quarantine measures), led to a collapse in consumption by non-residents. The effects of this collapse can be seen by looking at the difference between domestic consumption and national consumption (see panel (a) of Chart A). The former includes consumption of non-residents, whereas the latter only includes that of residents.[1] For example, in Italy and Spain, domestic consumption by non-residents plummeted by more than 90% year on year in the second quarter of 2020, and similar declines were recorded in consumption expenditure of residents of these countries abroad, significantly exceeding the fall in national consumption.
Because of the decline in cross-border travel, consumption gaps – the excess of domestic consumption over national consumption owing to net expenditures by non-residents – almost closed in the second quarter of 2020 (see panel (b) of Chart A).[2] In other words, tourism has worked as a shock amplification channel during the COVID-19 pandemic in countries which are net exporters of travel services (i.e. countries which receive a lot of tourists, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal), as they experienced a sharp contraction of domestic private consumption, and as a shock cushioning channel in countries which are net importers of travel services (e.g. Germany).[3] More specifically, in net creditors of travel services, the collapse of non-resident consumption expenditure caused domestic consumption to fall by more than national consumption, whereas the opposite occurred in countries which were net debtors of travel services before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This pattern is also reflected in the sharp deterioration of the travel trade balance of the countries which are net exporters of travel services and in the improvement of the balance of net importers (see panel (a) of Chart A). Available data for the third quarter of 2020 show a partial and incomplete return of consumption gaps to the levels seen before the pandemic.

Chart A

National and domestic private consumption expenditure (PCE) and trade in travel services
(panel (a): year-on-year changes as a percentage (left-hand scale) and as a share of GDP (right-hand scale) in the second quarter of 2020; panel (b): share of GDP)

Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.Notes: Euro area represents the euro area aggregate. In panel (a) the trade balance in travel services is shown as a share of GDP. In panel (b) PCE gaps are computed as the difference between domestic PCE and national PCE, which corresponds to the net balance of foreign residents’ expenditure domestically minus domestic residents’ expenditure abroad. In panel (b) the latest observations are for the third quarter of 2020, with the exception of Greece. For the euro area the third quarter of 2020 has been estimated based on partially available information for euro area countries, which does not include data for Greece and Luxembourg.

A partial rebound notwithstanding, the data show that the foreign tourism sector remained depressed in the third quarter of 2020. Data on tourist arrivals continued to show significantly low figures for foreign arrivals when compared with the situation before the outbreak of COVID-19 (see panel (b) of Chart B). By contrast, domestic tourism remained relatively resilient and was able to partially compensate for the loss of foreign tourism, despite remaining below the levels seen in 2019. During the summer, short-haul destinations were more in demand and several governments launched promotional initiatives.[4] However, the latest available data suggest a fragile and incomplete recovery. In the euro area, tourist arrivals were less than two-thirds of the levels seen a year earlier. Tourism in countries relying on foreign arrivals, such as Greece and Portugal (see panel (a) of Chart B), still remains far below normal levels. Likewise, turnover in restaurants, and less so in accommodation, recovered but still stood at very low levels, supported by domestic tourists and locals.

Chart B
Tourist arrivals and services turnover
(panel (a): percentage of total; panel (b): ratio relative to the same quarter in the previous year)

Source: Eurostat.Notes: Owing to data availability, the ratios for tourist arrivals refer to August and September for Greece. Ratios for food and accommodation services turnover are not available for Greece or Italy.

Following the widespread resurgence of COVID-19 cases, since October 2020 most euro area countries have been reimposing restrictions. Visitors are currently subject to testing or quarantine in most countries, and entry for visitors from non-EU countries is only allowed for countries considered safe.[5] In most euro area countries, governments reimposed curfews and closed tourist attractions and recreational facilities such as museums, theatres, bars and restaurants. The reintroduction of travel restrictions since October will likely imply that the substitution of foreign tourism with domestic tourism will continue to affect the dynamics of tourism services in the near term. The latest restrictions may also alter the geographical impact of the crisis on the sector, as winter tourism destinations will be more severely affected this time.
Forward-looking indicators point to a renewed deterioration of the tourism sector as restrictions are reintroduced (see Chart C). Owing to travel bans, restrictions and renewed lockdown measures (shown by the green line), travel decreased after the summer and confidence effects are weighing strongly on bookings. This is shown by a reversal in the recovery of flight capacity (red line) which occurred across euro area countries. According to the latest data, flight capacity currently stands at about 25% of pre-COVID-19 levels. Forward-looking indicators such as PMI new orders in the tourism and recreation sectors declined again in November, staying in contractionary territory. Confidence in the accommodation industry also remains depressed and well below its historical average, as suggested by the respective European Commission confidence indicator.

Chart C
Latest developments in tourism
(left-hand scale: standardised index; right-hand scale: percentage relative to the same period in the previous year)

Sources: Markit, HAVER, European Commission, OAG, Eurostat and Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.Notes: The PMI is for the EU. Accommodation is measured by the European confidence indicator. The data on flights are for Germany, Spain, France and Italy only. The stringency index is an average across euro area countries weighted by the share of tourist arrivals in 2019. Complements (100-value, where 100 is maximum stringency) of the stringency index are reported so that an increase in the series corresponds to easing and a decrease to higher stringency.

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Developments in the tourism sector during the COVID-19 pandemic first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

1 January 2021 |

Assets (EUR millions)
Balance
Difference compared with last week due to
i)transactions
ii)quarter-end adjustments

Totals/sub-totals may not add up, due to rounding

i)
ii)

1
Gold and gold receivables
536,542
0
−22,739

2
Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
347,179
1,313
−10,877

2.1
Receivables from the IMF
85,379
0
−1,700

2.2
Balances with banks and security investments, external loans and other external assets
261,800
1,314
−9,178

3
Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency
23,437
−373
−726

4
Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro
14,337
1,375
−4

4.1
Balances with banks, security investments and loans
14,337
1,375
−4

4.2
Claims arising from the credit facility under ERM II
0
0
0

5
Lending to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro
1,793,194
355
0

5.1
Main refinancing operations
468
206
0

5.2
Longer-term refinancing operations
1,792,574
0
0

5.3
Fine-tuning reverse operations
0
0
0

5.4
Structural reverse operations
0
0
0

5.5
Marginal lending facility
152
149
0

5.6
Credits related to margin calls
0
0
0

6
Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro
25,328
−6,592
0

7
Securities of euro area residents denominated in euro
3,890,916
−820
−9,126

7.1
Securities held for monetary policy purposes
3,694,642
−819
−9,397

7.2
Other securities
196,274
−1
271

8
General government debt denominated in euro
22,676
−2
−55

9
Other assets
325,715
6,558
6,374

Total assets
6,979,324
1,816
−37,152

Liabilities (EUR millions)
Balance
Difference compared with last week due to
i)transactions
ii)quarter-end adjustments

Totals/sub-totals may not add up, due to rounding

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post ECB | Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

On 22 December 2020, the European Commission confirmed its plan for bond issuances in 2021 under its existing borrowing programmes. These include the SURE instrument to support short-term employment schemes in the EU Member States, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) to refinance debt to two EU countries, as well as the Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) to help non-EU countries address the coronavirus crisis. In total, the EU is going to raise at least €62.9 billion under these three programmes. Of this, between €30 and €35 billion are expected to be raised in the first quarter of the year and between €25 billion and €30 billion in the second quarter.
In addition, the Commission will continue preparations for the first issuance under NextGenerationEU, the temporary recovery instrument. The Commission is due to start borrowing to finance the recovery under this tool as soon the legislative process is completed, with the horizon of mid-2021.For this to be legally possible, EU Member States need to ratify the Own Resources Decision in line with their constitutional requirements
Commissioner for Budget and Administration, Johannes Hahn said: “Between mid-October and mid-November, the Commission raised nearly €40 billion under SURE, while in parallel taking forward the rest of our operations. Our debut as a high-volume issuer capable of ensuring favourable conditions and passing them on to our Member States has been a vote of confidence to the EU as an issuer and a borrower. This has made us confident for the near future, when we will be rising to the challenge of successfully completing the implementation of SURE and launching NextGenerationEU.”
The borrowing and lending operations currently foreseen by the European Commission for the first half of 2021 include:

€50.8 billion under SURE

The Commission proposed the SURE programme “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” – in April 2020. By September 2020, the decision-making process was completed in a record-speed. So far, the Commission has raised a total of €39.5 billion via three transactions under SURE. The Commission has already disbursed this amount to 15 Member States, directly passing them the favourable funding conditions obtained.
In 2021, the Commission will proceed with further issuances under the SURE programme. These will continue to be issued under the social bond label in the form of large and liquid benchmarks. The Commission may also consider taps of the outstanding ones.
The Council has already approved a total of €90.3 billion in financial support to 18 Member States and the Commission’s current funding plans foresee issuances of €50.8, to complement the €39.5 billion already placed on the market. The respective disbursements will follow accordingly.
The Commission may proceed with further issuances under the EU SURE programme in 2021, up to the maximum available ceiling of €100 billion, depending on Member States’ demand.

€9.75 billion under the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)

The EFSM was created for the European Commission to provide financial assistance to any EU country experiencing or threatened by severe financial difficulties. Under the EFSM, the Commission provided assistance, conditional on the implementation of reforms, to Ireland and Portugal between 2011 and 2014, and to provide short-term bridge loans to Greece in July 2015.
To extend maturities of the support provided to Ireland and Portugal, the Commission will refinance €9.75 billion of maturing bonds in the first half of 2021. The Commission currently has €46.8 billion of outstanding borrowing under EFSM.

€2.35 billion under the Macro-Financial Assistance programme (MFA)

The MFA is part of the EU’s wider engagement with neighbouring countries and intended as an exceptional EU crisis response instrument. It is available to the EU’s neighbouring countries experiencing balance-of-payments problems.
In 2020, the EU agreed to provide further €3 billion to ten enlargement and neighbourhood partners to help them to limit the economic fallout of the coronavirus pandemic. In 2020, the Commission already started providing funding under this package.
Further €2.35 billion will follow in 2021, both under the standard MFA assistance programme and the COVID-19 targeted issuance.
The outstanding borrowing under the MFA currently stands at €5.8 billion.
Background
The SURE and NextGenerationEU instruments are part of the European Commission response to the coronavirus and its consequences.
SURE is designed to assist EU Member States in addressing sudden increases in public expenditure to preserve employment. The funds raised under SURE are aimed at helping to cover the costs directly related to the financing of national short-time work schemes, and other similar measures they have put in place as a response to the coronavirus pandemic, including for the self-employed. The loans are underpinned by a system of voluntary guarantees from Member States committed to the EU.
The bonds issued under SURE benefit from a social bond label. This provides investors in these bonds with confidence that the funds mobilised will serve a truly social objective.
*The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) was created for the European Commission to provide financial assistance to any EU country experiencing or threatened by severe financial difficulties.
The EFSM was used to provide financial assistance conditional on the implementation of reforms to Ireland and Portugal between 2011 and 2014, and to provide short-term bridge loans to Greece in July 2015.
Today, euro area countries in need of financial assistance are expected to turn to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent intergovernmental institution. The ESM is set up by and for euro area countries.
The EFSM, however, remains in place and can be used if the need arises.
Macro-financial assistance (MFA) is a form of financial aid extended by the EU to partner countries experiencing a balance of payments crisis. It takes the form of medium/long-term loans or grants, or a combination of these, and is only available to countries benefiting from a disbursing International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme.
MFA is designed for countries geographically, economically and politically close to the EU. These include candidate and potential candidate countries, countries bordering the EU covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, in certain circumstances, other third countries.
MFA is exceptional in nature and is mobilised on a case-by-case basis to help countries dealing with serious balance-of-payments difficulties. Its objective is to restore a sustainable external financial situation, while encouraging economic adjustments and structural reforms. MFA is intended strictly as a complement to IMF financing.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post European Commission to issue €62.9 billion worth bonds under existing programmes in 2021 first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

NextGenerationEU is a €750 billion temporary recovery instrument to help repair the immediate economic and social damage brought about by the coronavirus pandemic. Post-COVID-19 Europe will be greener, more digital, more resilient and better fit for the current and forthcoming challenges.

The Recovery and Resilience Facility: the centrepiece of NextGenerationEU with €672.5 billion in loans and grants available to support reforms and investments undertaken by EU countries. The aim is to mitigate the economic and social impact of the coronavirus pandemic and make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared for the challenges and opportunities of the green and digital transitions. Member States are working on their recovery and resilience plans to access the funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU): NextGenerationEU also includes €47.5 billion for REACT-EU. It is a new initiative that continues and extends the crisis response and crisis repair measures delivered through the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus. It will contribute to a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy. The funds will be made available to

the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

the European Social Fund (ESF)

the European Fund for Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD)

These additional funds will be provided in 2021-2022 from NextGenerationEU and in 2020 through a targeted revision to the current financial framework.

NextGenerationEU will also bring additional money to other European programmes or funds such as Horizon2020, InvestEU, rural development or the Just Transition Fund (JTF).

NextGenerationEU breakdown

Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
€672.5 billion

of which, loans
€360 billion

of which, grants
€312.5 billion

ReactEU
€47.5 billion

Horizon Europe
€5 billion

InvestEU
€5.6 billion

Rural Development
€7.5 billion

Just Transition Funds (JTF)
€10 billion

RescEU
€1.9 billion

TOTAL
€750 billion

Source: Conclusions of the European Council of 21 July 2020
On this note, keep a eye out for programs hosted by the EACCNY on this topic. There will be much to discuss! Our upcoming events can be found here.

Compliments of the European Commission
The post Recovery Plan for Europe: NextGenerationEU first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

December 28, 2020 | By HR/VP Josep Borell
Especially during the Covid-19 “infodemic”, we have seen how widespread and how damaging foreign interference and disinformation can be for our security, our democracy and our societies. Addressing disinformation is an urgent necessity.
In a recent blog post, I discussed the threats that our democracies are facing in the cyberspace. I have also spoken often about the on-going ‘battles of narratives’. Countries and political leaders are trying to explain their positions and to portray themselves in a favourable light. This is a normal way of acting: in democracies, political leaders have an obligation to communicate about objectives and values. This is why the EU put a lot of effort in explaining our policy approaches and the thinking behind our actions and proposals.
Beyond legitimate “public diplomacy”
However, some go much further than conducting legitimate ‘public diplomacy’. They present their way of addressing global challenges as the only effective one, while attempting to discredit others. Some foreign actors, be they state or non-state, even engage in disinformation campaigns, deliberately spreading false or misleading information. They do so to weaken us and to harm our ability to respond to crisis effectively.
“Some foreign actors, be they state or non-state, even engage in disinformation campaigns, deliberately spreading false or misleading information.”
For example, the Western vaccine developers are openly mocked on multi-lingual Russian state-controlled media, which has in some cases led to as absurd claims that vaccines will turn people into monkeys. Such narratives are apparently directed at countries where Russia wants to sell its own vaccine, Sputnik V. In the current pandemic, any attempt to instigate such unfounded doubts threatens public health. Terrorist organisations, such as Da’esh, have also used the confusion in the Corona-situation to spread their own propaganda.
Disinformation has been with us for a long time
This is not a new challenge: disinformation has been with us for a long time. However, with the possibilities offered by the Internet, it now spreads faster than ever, reaching citizens in their homes every day. Some state actors, like Russia and China, are actively involved in these activities, trying to undermine and delegitimise our democratic systems and the values of freedom, pluralism and checks and balances they are built upon.
“The EU has been working on tackling disinformation(link is external) for many years now and the EEAS has been a pioneer in monitoring pro-Kremlin disinformation.”
The EU has been working on tackling disinformation(link is external) for many years now. The European External Actions Service (EEAS) has been a pioneer in monitoring pro-Kremlin disinformation, and has then expanded its focus and toolbox. Today, EEAS taskforces focus on three different regions: the East, Southern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. We have recently published our 5th Special Report on COVID-19 disinformation, which shows again how much these activities can cause considerable damage during a global health crisis.
The intentional spread of false or misleading information is only part of the challenge(link is external). During the pandemic, the fight against mis- and disinformation has been also used by authoritarian regimes as a pretext to limit fundamental rights and especially freedom of expression and freedom of the media.
“We have seen attempts during the pandemic to use the fight against mis- and disinformation as a pretext to limit fundamental rights and freedoms.”
Measures range from the expulsion of foreign correspondents to online harassment and in some cases even threatening physical harm. We cannot accept this: freedom of speech and media freedom are a vital pillar of our democracies and we rely also on independent reporting from around the world. If the work of journalists is restricted, we need to take a strong stance.
The EU will protect these principles and respond effectively to disinformation. We often talk about silos that inhibit an effective approach to tackling problems in Europe. In the field of disinformation, we are working every day to increase cooperation across different EU Institutions and member states and develop the EU’s Rapid Alert System (RAS) against disinformation. A network of officials in the EU institutions and the EU member states that are dealing with disinformation related issues to enable common situational awareness and threat assessment and to strengthen coordination with researchers, civil society organisations and our international partners. 
Thanks to the cooperation with our international partners like the G7 and NATO, we can track also global trends and prepare for them. Fact-checkers, journalists, NGOs and think tanks are also contributing immensely to curbing the spread of disinformation.
On 2 December, the European Commission presented the European Democracy Action Plan, focussing on election integrity, media pluralism and tackling disinformation. In all of this, we must use a “whole-of-society” response, including civil society, media, academia and private sector (most importantly online platforms and advertisers) to protect our democracies from foreign interference.
We must also increase international cooperation. Europe is not an island: there are no borders in cyberspace. Our attempts to protect ourselves from these threats internally, risk being undermined by manipulative interference launched from countries with weaker regulatory and monitoring capacities.
“We know that we must increase international cooperation.”
The EU is offering technical support to authorities and civil society all over the world to build the capacities and oversight that we are developing inside the EU. We are providing assistance for election-related matters, for example helping others monitor online electoral campaigns and promoting initiatives on digital media literacy. The EU is also implementing a project to address COVID-19 disinformation in African countries and the Middle East. We are building partnerships with fact-checkers across Eastern Partnership countries and the Western Balkans, and we keep supporting independent journalism via the European Endowment for Democracy(link is external) in our neighbourhood and beyond.
As the world’s largest trade bloc, the EU’s normative and regulatory power extends globally. The rules and responses that we put in place within Europe to deal with interference in our democratic life and elections will play an important role in setting global standards. This is especially true for the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), proposed by the European Commission on 15 December 2020. In the fight against disinformation and foreign interference, an appropriate and transparent risk management by large platforms is a crucial step to curbing the spread of false or misleading information and safeguarding civic discourse from manipulative behaviour. In full respect of fundamental rights and freedoms, the DSA and DMA would provide the EU with necessary instruments for a better accountability, transparency and auditability of platforms’ actions.
“The Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA) package will bring us closer to better accountability, transparency and auditability of platforms’ actions.”
We still need to do more in the area of disinformation to prevent our adversaries to employ low-cost, low-risk and high-reward tactics to attack our societies and democracies. We must ensure that actors who intentionally disrupt and divide our societies with manipulative tactics will face appropriate consequences. Spreading disinformation must come at a price.
Compliments of the European External Action Service.
The post The essential fight against disinformation and manipulation first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

After intensive negotiations, the European Commission has reached today an agreement with the United Kingdom on the terms of its future cooperation with the European Union.
President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen said: “It was worth fighting for this deal because we now have a fair and balanced agreement with the UK, which will protect our European interests, ensure fair competition, and provide much needed predictability for our fishing communities. Finally, we can leave Brexit behind us and look to the future. Europe is now moving on.”
The European Commission’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, said: “We have now come to the end of a very intensive four-year period, particularly over the past nine months, during which we negotiated the UK’s orderly withdrawal from the EU and a brand new partnership, which we have finally agreed today. The protection of our interests has been front and centre throughout these negotiations and I am pleased that we have managed to do so. It is now for the European Parliament and the Council to have their say on this agreement.”
The draft Trade and Cooperation Agreement consists of three main pillars:
A Free Trade Agreement: a new economic and social partnership with the United Kingdom

The agreement covers not just trade in goods and services, but also a broad range of other areas in the EU’s interest, such as investment, competition, State aid, tax transparency, air and road transport, energy and sustainability, fisheries, data protection, and social security coordination.
It provides for zero tariffs and zero quotas on all goods that comply with the appropriate rules of origin.
Both parties have committed to ensuring a robust level playing field by maintaining high levels of protection in areas such as environmental protection, the fight against climate change and carbon pricing, social and labour rights, tax transparency and State aid, with effective, domestic enforcement, a binding dispute settlement mechanism and the possibility for both parties to take remedial measures.
The EU and the UK agreed on a new framework for the joint management of fish stocks in EU and UK waters. The UK will be able to further develop British fishing activities, while the activities and livelihoods of European fishing communities will be safeguarded, and natural resources preserved.
On transport, the agreement provides for continued and sustainable air, road, rail and maritime connectivity, though market access falls below what the Single Market offers. It includes provisions to ensure that competition between EU and UK operators takes place on a level playing field, so that passenger rights, workers’ rights and transport safety are not undermined.
On energy, the agreement provides a new model for trading and interconnectivity, with guarantees for open and fair competition, including on safety standards for offshore, and production of renewable energy.
On social security coordination, the agreement aims at ensuring a number of rights of EU citizens and UK nationals. This concerns EU citizens working in, travelling or moving to the UK and to UK nationals working in, travelling or moving to the EU after 1st January 2021.
Finally, the agreement enables the UK’s continued participation in a number of flagship EU programmes for the period 2021-2027 (subject to a financial contribution by the UK to the EU budget), such as Horizon Europe.

A new partnership for our citizens’ security

The Trade and Cooperation Agreement establishes a new framework for law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal and civil law matters. It recognises the need for strong cooperation between national police and judicial authorities, in particular for fighting and prosecuting cross-border crime and terrorism. It builds new operational capabilities, taking account of the fact that the UK, as a non-EU member outside of the Schengen area, will not have the same facilities as before. The security cooperation can be suspended in case of violations by the UK of its commitment for continued adherence to the European Convention of Human Rights and its domestic enforcement.

A horizontal agreement on Governance: A framework that stands the test of time

To give maximum legal certainty to businesses, consumers and citizens, a dedicated chapter on governance provides clarity on how the agreement will be operated and controlled. It also establishes a Joint Partnership Council, who will make sure the Agreement is properly applied and interpreted, and in which all arising issues will be discussed.
Binding enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms will ensure that rights of businesses, consumers and individuals are respected. This means that businesses in the EU and the UK compete on a level playing field and will avoid either party using its regulatory autonomy to grant unfair subsidies or distort competition.
Both parties can engage in cross-sector retaliation in case of violations of the agreement. This cross-sector retaliation applies to all areas of the economic partnership.

Foreign policy, external security and defence cooperation is not covered by the Agreement as the UK did not want to negotiate this matter. As of 1 January 2021, there will therefore be no framework in place between the UK and the EU to develop and coordinate joint responses to foreign policy challenges, for instance the imposition of sanctions on third country nationals or economies.
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement covers a number of areas that are in the EU’s interest. It goes well beyond traditional free trade agreements and provides a solid basis for preserving our longstanding friendship and cooperation. It safeguards the integrity of the Single Market and the indivisibility of the Four Freedoms (people, goods, services and capital). It reflects the fact that the UK is leaving the EU’s ecosystem of common rules, supervision and enforcement mechanisms, and can therefore no longer enjoy the benefits of EU membership or the Single Market.  Nevertheless, the Agreement will by no means match the significant advantages that the UK enjoyed as a Member State of the EU.
Big changes coming: getting ready 1 January 2021
Even with the new EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement in place, there will be big changes on 1 January 2021.
On that date, the UK will leave the EU Single Market and Customs Union, as well as all EU policies and international agreements. The free movement of persons, goods, services and capital between the UK and the EU will end.
The EU and the UK will form two separate markets; two distinct regulatory and legal spaces. This will create barriers to trade in goods and services and to cross-border mobility and exchanges that do not exist today – in both directions.
The Withdrawal Agreement
The Withdrawal Agreement remains in place, protecting amongst other things the rights of EU citizens and UK nationals, the EU’s financial interests, and crucially, peace and stability on the island of Ireland. The full and timely implementation of this agreement has been a key priority for the European Union.
Thanks to intensive discussions between the EU and the UK in the Joint Committee and the various Specialised Committees, the Withdrawal Agreement – and the Protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland, in particular – will be implemented on 1 January.
On 17 December, the EU-UK Joint Committee met to endorse all formal decisions and other practical solutions related to the implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement. As part of these mutually agreed solutions, the UK has agreed to withdraw the contentious clauses of the UK Internal Market Bill, and will not introduce any similar provisions in the Taxation Bill.
Next steps
The entry into application of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement is a matter of special urgency.

The United Kingdom, as a former Member State, has extensive links with the Union in a wide range of economic and other areas. If there is no applicable framework regulating the relations between the Union and the United Kingdom after 31 December 2020, those relations will be significantly disrupted, to the detriment of individuals, businesses and other stakeholders.
The negotiations could only be finalised at a very late stage before the expiry of the transition period. Such late timing should not jeopardise the European Parliament’s right of democratic scrutiny, in accordance with the Treaties.
In light of these exceptional circumstances, the Commission proposes to apply the Agreement on a provisional basis, for a limited period of time until 28 February 2021.

The Commission will swiftly propose Council decisions on the signature and provisional application, and on the conclusion of the Agreement.
The Council, acting by the unanimity of all 27 Member States, will then need to adopt a decision authorising the signature of the Agreement and its provisional application as of 1 January 2021. Once this process is concluded, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK can be formally signed.
The European Parliament will then be asked to give its consent to the Agreement.
As a last step on the EU side, the Council must adopt the decision on the conclusion of the Agreement.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: protecting European interests, ensuring fair competition, and continued cooperation in areas of mutual interest first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

By John Bruton, former Taoiseach, Irish Prime Minister, and former EU Ambassador to the United States
The Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK is an exercise in damage limitation. The UK will face numerous obstacles because of its decision to leave the EU, including leaving the Customs Union and Single Market.
But it was in nobody’s interest to add to these obstacles. That was the spirit in which the EU approached the negotiation.
The Agreement may run to 1256 pages, but it boils down to some fairly simple and sensible ideas.
While no longer a member of the EU, the UK still wants to do business with the EU, and the EU members want to do business with it.
So, for the future, there needs to be a system for ensuring that there are no surprises, or unfair trading , that would disrupt mutually beneficial business. That is essentially what the Agreement is all about.
While the UK was a member of the EU, that goal was achieved by having a common set of business rules, made democratically and together, and interpreted in a consistent way by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These rules could be enforced in national courts. In other words the goal of predictable and fair business conditions between the UK and its fellow EU members was achieved directly by common action.
Under the new Agreement, the same goal will be pursued, but indirectly.
Common rules, made and interpreted in common, will be replaced, as far as trade between the EU and the UK is concerned, by understandings set out in the Agreement, which will be interpreted by arbitrators appointed under the Agreement.
These understandings will have legal force, but will generally only be enforceable under the procedures set out in the Agreement, rather than directly in national courts.
While the EU and the UK will each be free to determine their own policies on the environment, social and working conditions, and subsidy controls, Article 9.4 of the Agreement allows for “rebalancing” measures to be taken by the other side if it feels its own businesses are being put at a disadvantage. This is supposed to restore the level in the level playing field.
The Agreement contains principles, now to be enshrined in international law through the Agreement, that are shared by the EU and the UK. These cover environmental, social and subsidy issues. Arbitration Tribunals to be set up under the Agreement will interpret these agreed principles in specific cases. They will have a legal, but also a political, task.
Most of the text of the Agreement is taken up with procedures for resolving disputes.
Matters, currently resolved in national courts under EU law, will have to be resolved at inter state level between the UK and the EU, rather than in the national courts. This is inherently more cumbersome.
Sometimes the issue will be settled by political agreement in one of the myriad of committees set up under the Agreement.
ARBITRATION…. THE CORE IDEA
If the issue cannot be settled in this way, it will go the arbitration.
So, instead of the interpretation being done by Judges of the ECJ, they will be done by an Arbitration Tribunal set up under the Agreement.
An Arbitration Tribunal will consist of three people. There will be lists of qualified arbitrators from which the three may be chosen, one by the UK and one by the EU and the Chair of the Tribunal will be someone who is not from EU or the UK.
I think this idea that the chair must come from outside either the EU or UK may prove difficult. It will not  always be easy  to find suitable chairs who are not either British or EU citizens, especially as the work will have to be done at short notice and under tight time limits.
To qualify for appointment, an arbitrator will have to have “demonstrated expertise in law and international trade” .  They will all have to be people “whose independence is beyond doubt”. They will serve in their individual capacities, and not take instructions from anyone. They will have to be people who would qualify to be judges in their home countries.
I suspect there will be a lot of intense haggling over the composition of particular Arbitration Tribunals.  The nationality of the arbitrators and their past records will be scrutinised by the governments most affected by the issues in dispute.
There are detailed provisions in the Agreement to prevent stalling by either the EU, or the UK, in appointing Arbitrators. Once established, the Tribunals will have to deliver their ruling within 130 days . Within 30 days after that, the affected party will have to say how they will comply with the ruling.
This entire structure of dispute resolution will be presided over by a Partnership Council to be chaired jointly, by a UK Minister and an EU Commissioner. It will be assisted by over 20 specialised committees and a number of Working Groups, all of which are listed in Title III of the Agreement.
EVEN MORE MEETINGS THAN BEFORE!
I expect that there will, in the future, be even more EU related meetings for UK officials than in the past.  But the dynamic will be different.
Instead of being able to build alliances on particular topics with other EU member states, the UK will in future find itself alone in the room with the European Commission.
The Commission side will have instructions, negotiated in advance with the 27 member states, so there will be a high degree of rigidity in the process.
As the EU member state most affected by relations between the UK and the EU, this will be a particular challenge for Ireland. Irish officials in Brussels and will have to stay on top of all that is going on in the various EU/UK committees. Cultivating an understanding with the Commission officials serving on these committees will be a priority.
No longer in the EU, the UK will, notwithstanding the provisions of the Agreement, encounter significant extra bureaucracy and uncertainty in doing business with the EU.
PARTING COMPANY GRADUALLY
This will lead to a gradual divergence between the UK and all its European neighbours, including Ireland. That, in turn, will have cultural and political effects.
The UK, and the EU states including Ireland will, so to speak, be mixing in different company .They will increasingly be seeing the world from diverging angles of vision. Issues that were previously depoliticised will become more political.
Eventually, this may affect the way the UK sees its physical and military security. NATO is already under strain, and Brexit creates a new fault line within NATO.
While Ireland is not in NATO, we live in a part of the world which has sheltered under the NATO umbrella, and we are deeply interconnected with NATO’s biggest member, the US.
Brexit may be over and done with, but the forces which led to it…identity politics and suspicion of foreigners….have not gone away.The post What The Brexit Trade Deal Means by John Bruton first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

NOTE: The Trade and Cooperation Agreement and other agreements below are provided for information only. No rights may be derived from them until the date of application. The numbering of the articles is provisional.

The United Kingdom and the European Union have agreed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement, an Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation and an Agreement on Security Procedures for Exchanging and Protecting Classified Information. These Agreements are designed to honour the instruction of the British people – expressed in the referendum of 2016 and the general election last year – to take back control of our laws, borders, money, trade and fisheries. It changes the basis of our relationship with our European neighbours from EU law to free trade and friendly cooperation.
Summary Explainer  [PDF, 460KB, 34 pages]

Foreword from the Prime MinisterThis Agreement with the European Union is designed to honour the instruction of the British people – expressed in the referendum of 2016 and the general election last year – to take back control of our laws, borders, money, trade and fisheries. It changes the basis of our relationship with our European neighbours from EU law to free trade and friendly cooperation.
And this ambitious Agreement – carefully judged to benefit everyone – is the first the EU has ever reached allowing zero tariffs and zero quotas. We will preserve the immense benefits of free trade for millions of people in the United Kingdom and across Europe.
At the same time, our Agreement means that the UK will fully recover its national independence. At 11pm on 31 December, we will take back control of our trade policy and leave the EU customs union and single market. We will take back control of our waters, with this treaty affirming British sovereignty over our vast marine wealth. We will take back control of our money by ending vast payments to the EU. We will take back control of our borders and will introduce our new points-based immigration system at the start of next year. Most importantly, the agreement provides for the UK to take back control of our laws, affording no role for EU law and no jurisdiction for the European Court of Justice. The only laws we will have to obey are the ones made by the Parliament we elect.
While we made our fair share of compromises during the negotiations, we never wavered from the goal of restoring national sovereignty – the central purpose of leaving the EU. I have always said that Brexit was not an end but a beginning: the start of a new era of national change and renewal, the next act in the great drama of our country’s story. We will regain the ability to wield powers that have for too long been the sole preserve of Brussels. We will now take up these tools to deliver the changes that people yearn for and, in so doing, we will restore faith in our democracy.
The UK is, of course, culturally, spiritually and emotionally part of Europe. This agreement provides for close and friendly cooperation with our neighbours in all the many areas where our values and interests coincide. It is my fervent hope that this Treaty, rooted in Britain’s sense of itself as a proudly European country, will help to bring people together and heal some of the divisions created by the referendum over four years ago.
The responsibility now falls on our shoulders to take full advantage of the freedom of action our country has regained. Next year will be our opportunity to show what Global Britain can do, reasserting ourselves as a liberal free trading nation and a force for good in the world.
More information
1. Introduction
2. Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Overview
3. Part 1 – Common and Institutional Provisions
4. Part 2 – Trade, Transport, Fisheries and Other Arrangements
5. Heading Five – Fisheries
6. Part 3 – Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters
7. Part 4 – Thematic Cooperation
8. Part 5 – Participation in Union Programmes
9. Part 6 – Dispute Settlement and Horizontal Provisions
10. Part 7 – Final Provisions
11. Other Agreements
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Trade and Cooperation Agreement (including Annexes and Protocols)  [PDF, 9.21MB, 1246 pages]

Declarations  [PDF, 711KB, 26 pages]

Nuclear Cooperation Agreement  [PDF, 279KB, 18 pages]

Agreement on Security Procedures for Exchanging and Protecting Classified Information  [PDF, 226KB, 8 pages]

Compliments of Her Majesties Government

The post Agreements reached between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Union first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.