EACC

Remarks by Mário Centeno following the Eurogroup meeting

Good afternoon, let me start by thanking our Finnish friends for hosting us here in Helsinki.
Today we welcomed two newcomers in our group. Christos Staikouras from Greece and Roberto Gualtieri from Italy. We heard their policy priorities for the near future and their commitment with policies that contribute to preserving the stability of the euro. I should note that Roberto is no stranger to the group as he attended the Eurogroup before in his previous capacity as ECON Chair in the European Parliament.
Today was not the moment to discuss details of their presentations. We will discuss Greece again in December when we look at the fourth enhanced surveillance report. Italy will only come up in the context of the Draft Budgetary Plans, together with all other countries.
Still on new names, I launched today the call for candidates for the upcoming ECB Executive Board vacancy. We want to ensure a smooth succession of Benoit Coeuré, whose term ends on 31 December. Countries should present their names until 25 September and we will aim to agree on a name in our October meeting.
For our first discussion item today we welcomed Dag Detter, who is an expert in the management of public assets. He joined us for one of our regular exchanges of best practices on spending reviews. Our discussion this time focused on boosting the efficiency of public investment. Euro area governments are making increasingly better use of spending reviews but investment spending remains a difficult area to review, due in part to the long timespans of projects.  
We moved on to a valuable discussion about how we work, in the Eurogroup, so that our proceedings are as transparent as possible. Last year I launched a review of the transparency arrangements that were put in place in 2016. Many good practices are already in place, such as the publication of draft annotated agendas, summing-up letters and relevant meeting documents, not to mention these press conferences. Following this review, we considered next steps today.
We need to strike a balance between sharing with the public what we discuss and decide upon and, at the same time, protecting candid and open discussions both at the Eurogroup and at our preparatory body, the EWG. I think we reached that balance and there was broad support to this initiative.
Let me outline some examples:
We agreed to the creation of an online repository of publicly available Eurogroup documents;
We will expand – whenever possible – the summing-up letters, which is a detailed description of our proceedings.
We will also increase the transparency of our preparatory work in the EWG, by publishing the EWG meeting calendar and improving its webpage.
Overall, this is another step in increasing the transparency of the Eurogroup. It will be important to review these arrangements at regular intervals to ensure they remain fit for purpose.
Next up, we discussed the post-programme surveillance of Ireland. The European Commission, the ECB, the ESM and the IMF debriefed us on the main findings of their respective missions.
Ireland continues to show a very strong economic and fiscal performance. We encouraged Ireland to keep pursuing sound policies to enhance protection against downside risks, such as Brexit.
I will let Valdis and Klaus expand on the outcome of the mission.
Back in July, I attended the G7 Finance Ministers’ meetings in Chantilly, France, and today I reported briefly to Ministers on these discussions. That led the way to a forward-looking exchange on the economic outlook, going into the autumn. I asked the ECB to present its staff macroeconomic projections from yesterday.
On the G7 agenda, ministers highlighted the risks of digital currencies and Libra in particular, calling for a reflection on how we can take advantage of technological developments to reduce the costs of international financing transactions.
Regarding the economic situation, we are following developments very closely and stand ready to act if risks materialise and things get worse. At the Eurogroup we will coordinate our response. I should add that overall, and despite all the uncertainty looking, we remain positive about the euro area economy, which is still growing, albeit at a slower pace.
In the last crisis, we were able to find a balance in our comprehensive response, combining fiscal policy, structural reforms at national and EU levels and also monetary policy. Going forward, in the face of a downturn, we need to find a new balance and fiscal policy will surely play a part on this.
Another important element of a new balance of policies is the need to reinforce our institutions. This is why we have been reforming the euro area. A key innovation in that debate is the Budgetary Instrument for Convergence and Competitiveness for the euro area, which by now we call BICC – yes, another acronym.
Last June we agreed on a term sheet describing the main features of this tool. Leaders asked us to further work on some open issues, specifically on financing, asking us to report swiftly on appropriate solutions. Swiftly means October, with a view to integrate the broader debate on the next EU budget that will ensue.
Today we reviewed all the open issues under the BICC on the basis of work developed by the Commission during the break: the governance aspects, the financing, the allocation methodology, the modulation procedure and arrangements for the non-participating Member States.
Let me go through, briefly, each of these issues one-by-one.
On the governance, what we want to achieve is a Euro Area governance framework for the BICC, which will be linked with our well-tested European Semester.
One distinctive feature of the BICC is the prominent role of the Eurogroup and the Euro summit in particular in providing strategic guidance and identifying the priorities for investment and reform . Further work will take place at technical level on this subject.
Second, the financing of the BICC. This remains a tricky issue. While some would like to use only the EU budget own resources for the time being, many others reiterate the importance of adding external assigned revenues via an intergovernmental agreement.
We would need to insert a specific enabling clause in the underlying BICC legislation to foresee the possibility of such additional revenues.
Today, I heard broad support to pursue this option of an enabling clause, without prejudging an agreement on the actual intergovernmental agreement.
Third, we also reviewed various options for the allocation key. By this I mean the way the money will be distributed among member states. Given the goal of the instrument, its legal basis and the guidance we got from Leaders, the allocation key must reflect the size and the income or the economic position  of each member state. We should be able to come to an agreement by October, following further technical discussions.
Fourth, we also discussed the idea of “modulation” – this is a process whereby national co-financing rates may be reduced. The specific cases where this could happen have yet to be agreed and clarified .
Finally, there is consensus that the BICC should not come at the expense of non-euro area members. We are exploring several options for making this possible, including a different and dedicated instrument.
We will come back to all this at our next meeting in Luxembourg in October to deliver solutions as was requested by Leaders. That means it will probably be a longer meeting.
Compliments of the European Commission

EACC

World Bank Group Debars Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U.

The World Bank today announced the 28-month debarment of Spanish engineering company Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U. in connection with corrupt, collusive and fraudulent practices in the World Bank-financed National Roads and Airport Infrastructure Project in Bolivia. At the time of the misconduct, the firm’s name was Acciona Ingeniería S.A., and it operated in Bolivia through a branch office.

The debarment makes Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U. ineligible to participate in World Bank-financed projects. The debarment is part of a settlement agreement under which the company does not contest the findings of the World Bank’s investigation. The firm agrees to meet specified corporate compliance conditions as a condition for release from debarment.
The project was designed to improve year-round use of the San Buenaventura–Ixiamas National Road, and the safety, security and operational reliability of the Rurrenabaque Airport in Bolivia. The World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) found that Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U. engaged in a corrupt practice to secure the award of a World Bank-financed contract for the supervision of a road construction under the project. The company engaged in a collusive practice when arranging to replace a bid form following bid submission. Finally, while executing the contract, the Bolivian branch engaged in a fraudulent practice by approving certificates inflating the progress of work.
The settlement agreement provides for a reduced period of sanction in light of the company’s extensive cooperation and voluntary remedial actions. These actions include conducting independent internal investigations, voluntarily restraining from bidding on new World Bank-financed projects, and taking internal action against responsible employees.
As a condition for release from sanction under the terms of the settlement agreement, the company commits to developing an integrity compliance program consistent with the principles set out in the World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines. To that end, Corporación Acciona Infraestructuras S.L., a related entity responsible for overseeing compliance at Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U., also signed the settlement agreement. Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U. commits to continue to fully cooperate with INT. 
The debarment of Ingeniería Especializada Obra Civil e Industrial S.A.U. qualifies for cross-debarment by other multilateral development banks (MDBs) under the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions that was signed on April 9, 2010.
Compliments of the Worldbank

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A Capital Market Union for Europe: Why It’s Needed and How to Get There

When savers and firms invest and borrow beyond their national borders, they enjoy opportunities to diversify their portfolios and lower their funding costs, respectively. In Europe, this idea—of an integrated financial system that offers a richness of financing choice—remains an elusive goal: capital markets are far from integrated.

Our recent research finds that European finance is still sharply segmented along national lines, with savers and investors depending heavily on national banking systems. Although the landscape is dotted with many different types of investors and intermediaries, their focus is mostly domestic—“home bias” is pervasive.
 
Our recent research finds that European finance is still sharply segmented along national lines, with savers and investors depending heavily on national banking systems. Although the landscape is dotted with many different types of investors and intermediaries, their focus is mostly domestic—“home bias” is pervasive.
An unlevel playing field
This is a problem because it results in an uneven playing field: the financing costs companies pay depend hugely on their country of incorporation, collateral-constrained startups find it hard to get any funding at all, and consumption is not shielded from local economic shocks.

Lowering barriers to a European Capital Markets Union offers the prospect of powerful macroeconomic benefits.

Firms in, say, Greece, pay a 2.5 percent higher rate of interest on their debt than similar firms in the same industry in France; Italian firms pay 0.8 percent higher interest on debt than comparable firms in Belgium. And Greek and Italian firms are not alone in fighting this uphill battle on funding costs—there is no level playing field.
In addition, firms with limited plants and machinery to offer as collateral—think of an IT start-up—face hurdles accessing bank loans. Such companies grow significantly faster in more developed capital markets, where venture capital funds with diversified portfolios thrive and are more willing to take the risk of providing unsecured financing to innovative players.
Finally, private cross-border risk sharing is severely limited, with local consumption being four times more sensitive to local shocks in the 28 EU countries than in the 50 US states. For every 1 percentage point drop in national GDP growth, consumption drops by 80 basis points, on average, if the country is in the EU, compared to only 18 basis points for the average US state.
Obstacles to capital market integration
Our study included a survey of national market regulators and some of the largest institutional investors in the EU, which identified important obstacles to greater capital market integration in Europe.
Responses flagged shortcomings in information on both listed and unlisted firms, in insolvency practices, and to a slightly lesser extent, in capital market regulation. Some countries were also seen to have weak audit quality, overly complex procedures for retrieving withholding taxes on investments in other countries, and unduly high tax rates.

Some of the benefits of lowering such barriers can be quantified. Using publicly available data, and guided by the survey results, we found that lowering identified barriers offers the prospect of powerful macroeconomic benefits: lower funding costs for firms, larger intra-EU portfolio capital flows, and more risk sharing across borders.
If Italy, for example, were to improve its insolvency practices to best-in-class standards, it could reduce its firms’ average debt funding cost by some 0.25 percentage points. Similarly, Estonia and Greece could see interest cost reductions of some 0.50 percentage points.
Bilateral portfolio asset holdings would double if insolvency regimes and regulatory quality in destination countries were to improve by 1 standard deviation—this is equivalent to Portugal improving its insolvency practices to the UK standard and improving its regulatory quality to that seen in Belgium.
Such improvements in regulatory quality and insolvency regimes would improve individual countries’ shock-absorption, halving the sensitivity of local consumption to local shocks.
Three targeted initiatives
Based on these findings—and building on the achievements of the EU’s Capital Market Union Action Plan—we would urge European policymakers to consider three targeted sets of initiatives in pursuit of greater capital market integration.
To improve transparency and disclosure, we propose introducing centralized, standardized, and compulsory electronic reporting for all issuers of bonds and equities, irrespective of size, on an ongoing basis. This would be a major change to the European reporting framework. And digital technologies can be used to streamline cross-border withholding tax procedures.
To contain systemic risk and improve investor protection where it lags, we propose a series of actions to sharpen regulatory quality, guided by a principle of proportionality. First, systemic entities such as central clearinghouses and large investment firms should be brought under centralized oversight. Second, the European Securities and Markets Authority can and should be strengthened by introducing independent board members. Third, the new pan-European pension product could be pepped-up with design changes to enhance portability and cost-efficiency. Fourth, recognizing the global nature of capital markets, the EU should aim for maximum regulatory cooperation with non-EU countries.
To upgrade insolvency regimes, the European Commission should, first, carefully collect data in an area where the existing information is unreliable; second, develop a code of good standards for corporate insolvency and debt enforcement processes; and, third, systematically follow up on EU member states’ progress toward observing such standards.
Larger intra-EU portfolio flows would help move the EU toward realizing its full economic potential. The relatively technical steps we recommend for removing identified barriers to such flows should be feasible without high-level political deliberations.
Compliments of IMF

EACC

Higher education needs to step up efforts to prepare students for the future

Demand for tertiary education continues to rise, but its further expansion will only be sustainable if it matches the supply of graduates with labour market and social needs and gives them the skills required to navigate the future, according to a new OECD report.
Education at a Glance 2019, which is part of the Organisation’s “I am the Future of Work” campaign, finds that 44% of 25-34 year-olds held a tertiary degree in 2018, compared to 35% in 2008, on average across OECD countries. The employment rate of tertiary-educated adults is 9 percentage points higher than for those with upper secondary education and they earn 57% more.

However, some sectors in high demand may struggle to find the skills they need. Less than 15% of new entrants to bachelor’s programmes study engineering, manufacturing and construction and less than 5% study information and communication technologies, despite these sectors having among the highest employment rates and earnings. Women are particularly under-represented, making up fewer than one in four entrants, on average, across OECD countries.
“It is more important than ever that young people learn the knowledge and skills needed to navigate our unpredictable and changing world,” said OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, launching the report in Paris. “We must expand opportunities and build stronger bridges with future skills needs so that every student can find their place in society and achieve their full potential.”
Many institutions are evolving to meet changing job market demands by promoting flexible pathways into tertiary education, balancing academic and vocational skills, and working more closely with employers, industry and training organisations. But they must also balance larger enrolments with the need to contain costs, while maintaining the relevance and quality of their courses, says the report.
Between 2005 and 2016, spending on tertiary institutions increased at more than double the rate of student enrolments to about USD 15 600 per student on average across OECD countries. Private sources have been called on to contribute more as countries introduce or raise tuition fees.
This year’s edition of Education at a Glance also assesses how youth are moving from education into work, as part of its ongoing analysis of where OECD and partner countries stand on their way to meeting the Sustainable Development Goal for education by 2030. It finds that some countries have made significant progress in reducing the numbers of out-of-school youth in the past decade. Rates fell by 20 percentage points in the Russian Federation, 18 percentage points in Mexico, 16 percentage points in Portugal and 10 percentage points in Australia and New Zealand between 2005 and 2017.
The report finds that, on average across OECD countries, about one in six 15-24 year-olds are enrolled in vocational programmes. The attainment gap among young tertiary-educated adults and those with upper secondary has narrowed. In 2018, the share of young adults with an upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary qualification, 41%, is almost equal to the share attaining tertiary education, 44%.
Education at a Glance provides comparable national statistics measuring the state of education worldwide. The report analyses the education systems of the OECD’s 36 member countries, as well as of Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
Other key findings:
Educational attainment and outcomes
 
The proportion of tertiary-educated 25-34 year-olds increased by 9 percentage points, on average, across OECD countries between 2008 and 2018, while the share of adults with less than upper secondary education fell from 19% to 15%. (Indicator A1)
The gender gap in earnings persists across all levels of educational attainment and the gap is wider among tertiary-educated adults. Women earn less than men, even with a tertiary degree in the same broad field of study. (A1)
On average across OECD countries, 14.3% of 18-24 year-olds are neither employed nor in education or training (NEET). In Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, South Africa and Turkey, over 25% of 18-24 year-olds are NEET. (A2)
 
Access to education
 
On average across OECD countries, around 70% of 17-18 year-olds are enrolled in upper secondary education and more than 40% of 19-20 year-olds are enrolled in tertiary programmes in almost half of OECD countries. (B1)
In almost all OECD countries, the enrolment rate among 4-5 year-olds in education exceeded 90% in 2017, with about one-third of countries achieving full enrolment for 3‑year‑olds. (B1)
Current estimates indicate that, on average, 86% of people across OECD countries will graduate from upper secondary education in their lifetime, and 81% of people will do so before the age of 25. (B3)
 
Education spending
 
Across the OECD, countries spend, on average, USD 10 500 per student on primary to tertiary educational institutions. Average spending is 1.7 times more per student at the tertiary level than other levels. (C1)
Expenditure continues to increase at a higher rate than student enrolments at all levels, particularly tertiary since 2010. Average spending per student at non-tertiary levels increased by 5% between 2010-2016 while the number of students remained unchanged. At the tertiary level, spending increased by 9% while the number of students rose by 3%. (C1)
Total public expenditure in 2016 on primary to tertiary education as a percentage of total government expenditure for all services averaged 11% in OECD countries, ranging from 6.3% in Italy to 17% in Chile. (C4)
In the classroom
Students in OECD countries and economies receive an average of 7 590 hours of compulsory instruction during their primary and lower secondary education, ranging from 5 973 hours in Hungary to almost double that in Australia (11 000 hours) and Denmark (10 960 hours). (D1)
The proportion of the compulsory curriculum devoted to mathematics at the primary level ranges from 12% in Denmark to 27% in Mexico; at the lower secondary level, it ranges from about 11% in Hungary, Ireland and Korea to 16% in Chile, Latvia and the Russian Federation (and 20% in Italy, including natural sciences). (D1)
On average across OECD countries, there are 15 students for every teacher in primary education and 13 students per teacher in lower secondary education. The average school class has 21 students in primary education and 23 students in lower secondary education. (D2)
The teaching workforce is ageing: on average across OECD countries, 36% of primary to secondary teachers were at least 50­ years old in 2017, up 5 percentage points from 2005. Only 10% of teachers are aged under 30. The profession is also still largely dominated by women, who comprise seven out of ten teachers, on average, across OECD­ countries. (D5)
Further information on Education at a Glance, including country notes, multilingual summaries and key data, is available at: http://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance/
Compliments of OECD

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A Role for Financial and Monetary Policies in Climate Change Mitigation

 

By William Oman

July 2019 was the hottest month ever recorded on earth, with countries across the world experiencing record-breaking temperatures. A prolonged drought is affecting millions of people in East Africa, and in August 2019 Greenland lost 12.5 billion tons of ice in one day.
A review of the literature by IMF staff aims to spur discussion of what policies to mitigate climate change could or should include. The review suggests that, while fiscal tools are first in line, they need to be complemented by financial policy tools such as financial regulation, financial governance, and policies to enhance financial infrastructure and markets, and by monetary policy.

Financial and monetary policy tools can complement fiscal policies and help with mitigation efforts.

The stakes are high. There is a broad scientific consensus that achieving sufficient mitigation requires an unprecedented transition to a low-carbon economy. Limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius requires reductions of 45 percent in CO2 emissions by 2030, and reaching net zero by 2050. Despite the 2015 Paris Agreement, greenhouse gas emissions are high and rising, fossil fuels continue to dominate the global energy mix, and the price of carbon, remains defiantly low, reinforcing the need for complementary policies.
The case for policy action beyond carbon pricing
Our review of academic and policy studies suggests that, currently, there are insufficient incentives to encourage investment in green private productive capacity, infrastructure, and R&D. At the same time, investments continue to pour into carbon-intensive activities. These undesirable economic outcomes prevent the needed decarbonization of the global economy. Decarbonization requires a transformation in the underlying structure of financial assets—a transformation that, studies suggest, is hindered by several deficiencies in the way markets function.
First, financial risks may not reflect climate risks or the long-term benefits of mitigation, given many investors’ shorter-term perspectives. Moreover, financial risks are often assessed in ways that do not capture climate risks, which are complex, opaque, and have no historical precedents.
Second, there is a wide gap between the private profitability and the social value of low-carbon investments. High uncertainty around their ability to reduce emissions, as well as the future value of avoided emissions, makes low-carbon investments unattractive to investors, at least in the short run.
Third, corporate governance that favors short-term financial performance may amplify financial “short-termism,” while constraints in capital markets can lead to credit rationing for low-carbon projects.
The above review of previous literature suggests that, because they directly influence the behavior of financial institutions and the financial system, financial and monetary policies can play a key role in addressing these issues.
Possible policy tools suggested by studies
The table below summarizes financial and monetary policy options for climate change mitigation, based on the above review of previous studies.
Policies that have been proposed in the literature can be divided into two categories: climate risk-focused and climate finance-promoting.
Climate risk-focused tools aim to correct the lack of accounting for climate risks for individual financial institutions and support mitigation by changing the demand for green and carbon-intensive investments, as well as their relative prices.
On the monetary policy side, examples include developing central banks’ own climate risk assessments, and ensuring that climate risks are appropriately reflected in central banks’ collateral frameworks and asset portfolios. On the financial policy side, tools include reserve, liquidity and capital requirements, loan-to-value ratios, caps on credit growth, climate-related stress tests, disclosure requirements and financial data dissemination to enhance climate risk assessments, corporate governance reforms, and better categorization of green assets by developing a standardized taxonomy.
Climate finance-promoting policies seek to account for externalities and co-benefits of mitigation at the level of society—that is, to account for how economic activity harms the environment but could instead, in addition to mitigating climate change, generate social value through, for example, reduced air pollution or more rapid technological progress. These policies could help shift relative prices and increase investments. However, the fact that they add new goals to existing policies makes them more controversial.
Monetary instruments to promote climate finance include better access to central bank funding schemes for banks that invest in low-carbon projects, central bank purchases of low-carbon bonds issued by development banks, credit allocation operations, and adapting monetary policy frameworks.
Financial policy instruments to actively promote climate finance revolve around “green supporting” and “brown penalizing” factors in banks’ capital requirements, and international requirements of a minimum amount of green assets on banks’ balance sheets.

What’s the bottom line?
More work is needed. The literature remains limited on the desirable package of measures to address climate mitigation. Nonetheless, financial and monetary policy tools can complement fiscal policies and help with mitigation efforts. All hands are needed on deck, for, as Mark Carney of the Bank of England has warned, “the task is large, the window of opportunity is short, and the stakes are existential.”
Compliments of the IMF

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Illuminating Dark Corners of the Global Economy

By Gita Bhatt, Editor-In-Chief of Finance & Development Magazine and the Acting Chief of Policy Communications at the IMF
This issue of Finance & Development reminds me of a Sufi parable. A woman sees a mystic searching for something outside his door. “What have you lost?” she asks. “My key,” he responds. So they both kneel down to look for it. “Where exactly did you drop it?” she asks after a few minutes. “In my house,” he replies. “Then why are you looking here?” “Because there is more light.”
The lesson: we all search for answers where it is easiest to look.
That is why we decided to shine a spotlight on the dark web of secret transactions that enable tax evasion and avoidance, money laundering, illicit financial flows, and corruption.
Consider these estimates: bribes to the tune of $1.5–$2 trillion change hands every year. Tax evasion costs governments more than $3 trillion a year, and countless more is lost through other illicit activities. This is money that could go for health care, education, and infrastructure for millions worldwide. But the cost to society is far greater: corruption distorts incentives and undermines public trust in institutions. It is the root of many economic injustices young women and men also suffer every day.
The best disinfectant is sunlight. It all comes down to the core notion of governance, says David Lipton. Paolo Mauro and others explore how countries can combat graft by putting in place accountable institutions, improve government budget transparency, and exchange financial information across borders. Jay Purcell and Ivana Rossi propose ways to resolve the tension between the need for transparency and the right to privacy. Nicolas Shaxson argues that tax havens, too, have a stake in curbing evasion. And Aditi Kumar and Eric Rosenbach argue for closer cooperation among law enforcement, financial institutions, and regulators.
These hidden transactions are not one nation’s problem nor within one nation’s power to resolve. Tackling the problem requires strong domestic policies and cross-border collaboration. The payoff will be myriad other political, economic, and social benefits, not least reducing inequality.
All the more reason to shed light on the dark corners of the world economy.
Editor-In-Chief
Finance & Development
 

Read the magazine here.
With Compliments of the IMF

EACC

The Future of Bretton Woods

Keynote speech by IMF Acting Managing Director David LiptonAt the Bretton Woods: 75 Years Later – Thinking About the Next 75 ConferenceHosted by the Banque de France
Introduction
Good afternoon! Thank you, Governor Villeroy de Galhau, for convening such an eminent group to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Bretton Woods Institutions.
I know Christine Lagarde was looking forward to addressing you today. But once again the IMF is in a time of transition. Fortunately, we are accustomed to that.  A key theme of my remarks today is that the IMF is an institution built to adapt to change.
Don’t worry — in Christine’s honor, I will be sure to quote from one or two historical figures.  
I am especially pleased that two former IMF Managing Directors, Jacques de Larosière and Michel Camdessus, are with us today. I served under both early in my IMF career. Two men who know quite a bit about change at the IMF.
Despite 75 years of history, the Bretton Woods Institutions have aged gracefully. Our collaboration is as strong as ever. I would like to thank David Malpass and Roberto Azevedo for continuing our excellent relationships.
Speaking of famous partnerships, those of you who have seen the most recent edition of the IMF’s Finance and Development quarterly may have noticed a conversation Madame Lagarde had with John Maynard Keynes.
In this imagined meeting, Lord Keynes and Madame Lagarde enjoyed a chat about the Fund.
He was glad the Fund has successfully adapted to many challenges over the years and, most of all, that our commitment to pursuing economic and financial stability in a multilateral and rules-based setting has held firm.
What if we could hop in a time machine — perhaps borrowed from Keynes’ friend H.G. Wells — and leap forward 25, 50, or even 75 years ahead from the present? What would the world and the IMF look like?
I would hope that Lord Keynes would still recognize us — promoting global growth and stability and adapting to the needs of our members. That forward journey is what I would like to discuss with you today.
But first, let us briefly consider the past.
The Past 75 years
The architects of Bretton Woods were deeply influenced by events between the two world wars, when multilateralism and the liberal international order broke down amid protectionism, the malfunction of the gold standard, and competitive devaluations.
The implosion of world trade deepened the Great Depression and ultimately gave fuel to fascism, communism, and war.
But in the aftermath, lessons were drawn. There was a new-found appreciation of how much national and global economic interests were interconnected.
The founders at Bretton Woods resolved that economic development and global financial stability are necessary conditions for peace.
In the words of Queen Elizabeth II, they “built an assembly of international institutions to ensure that the horrors of conflict would never be repeated.”
It was the original multilateral moment.
We know the results. Tremendous gains in human wellbeing — life expectancy, educational attainment, child and maternal mortality. Global GDP per capita is five-fold higher than in 1945. Over one billion people breaking free of poverty. And billions more reaping the mutual benefits generated from trade.
I have been proud to spend much of my career at the institution that has been central to this story.
Over the years, there has never been a Bretton Woods II, yet we are a very different institution than at our founders’ time. So how did that happen?  It is because we continuously adapt to the changing circumstances around us.
Lord Keynes would have been pleased to see the IMF pivot from the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates to the era of flexible rates.
And how we addressed the Latin America debt crises, starting during the tenure of Jacques de Larosière. 
Then how we helped to transition economies emerging from communism and enabled many finally to join the Fund; and how we have addressed what Michel Camdessus dubbed the 21st century crises — those that arose from the explosion of cross-border capital flows.
As we look to the next 75 years, the IMF will need to continue to adapt. That is already well underway.
Let us consider what we may face in the decades ahead.
First, how shifting economic and financial power will affect the role of the Fund.
Second, how technological change will transform economies, creating new opportunities and policy challenges, including in financial services.
Third, how new threats to multilateralism will test whether the Bretton Woods Institutions remain relevant.
Major Shifts in Economic Activity
Let me first turn to the ongoing shifts in the global economic landscape.
Since those 44 country delegations met at Bretton Woods, the IMF has grown and now has 189 members, almost the entire world economy.
That means while we can address issues on a global scale, the roles and interests of our membership are also changing.
The rise of China and other economies fundamentally alters the global landscape. As emerging market and developing economies grow and incomes converge, the share of advanced economies in global output is expected to fall from more than one-half to about one-third over the next 25 years.
Aging populations in the advanced economies will gradually consume savings even as younger countries need to finance investments. And in the not-too-distant future, rising life expectancy and declining fertility rates likely will bring the issues of aging to the entire world.
This will have profound implications for global trade and capital flows.
The hubs of economic activity will shift over the coming decades. New financial centers will grow in importance. New reserve currencies may eventually emerge.
Throughout all that, it is our duty to maintain an international monetary system stable and robust enough to facilitate the economic adjustments accompanying these transitions.
Free trade, flexible exchange rates, and non-disruptive capital movements are essential ingredients for a thriving global economy. That is why the role of multilateral institutions — and especially the IMF — will be more relevant than ever. If we continue to adapt.
Fortunately, our founders had the wisdom to embed in our governance a quota-based system. They recognized the illusory logic of one-country one-vote for an organization like ours.  Over our history and on into the future, this approach allows governance to adjust to the rising prominence, interests, and responsibilities of fast-growing members. Many international organizations do not have this built-in flexibility and find that some members feel they lack the influence they deserve.
Yet the Fund’s governance must continue to evolve further. For that to happen we must remain a quota-based institution.  And we must reckon with the fact that our formulae have not fully kept pace. We cannot expect to retain the global reach and resources that we need unless countries gaining in economic importance and ready to take on commensurate responsibility gain appropriately in their say at the Fund.
Similarly, we have to continuously align the Fund’s tools and policies with these changing economic realities. The inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR basket a few years ago demonstrated our ability to change with the times.
The bottom line is this: as economic power becomes more diverse and diffuse, retaining a focus on common challenges will become more difficult. So, the IMF’s fundamental role as global convener, trusted advisor, and financial firefighter will become even more important in the days ahead.
Adapting to New Technology
But what about the other changes in the global economy?
Technological advances offer enormous opportunities to accelerate productivity and lift incomes. But they also lead to structural changes — creating some jobs while displacing others.
Lord Keynes himself warned back in the 1930s about the possibility of “technological unemployment.” But he believed it would lead to a high-income world where people would choose more leisure time over work.  
This turned out differently. People are anxious that constant technological advances — think about artificial intelligence — will threaten their jobs and incomes. I will come to the future of work in a moment. Let me first address a different dimension of technology — innovation in financial services.
What we call ‘Fintech’ offers the potential to significantly increase efficiency and transparency in the financial sector. It poses challenges for established players, and regulators trying to address new sources of risk.
There are very real downsides to these developments, including significant threats from cyber-attacks and cyber-criminals. Yet, we are on the cusp of a transformation that could bring enormous benefits.
By fostering competition, we can help re-orient the financial services industry closer to better serve the real economy and foster job creation.
Look at Fintech’s capacity to end financial exclusion for the 1.7 billion people in developing countries who have no access to banking.
Much has been said about the impact of mobile banking in Africa, a continent that needs to create 20 million jobs a year in the decades to come, just to keep up with population growth.
That is why, together with the World Bank, we developed the Bali Fintech Agenda, a framework to help our member countries take advantage of innovation, but also better cope with the new risks.
One aspect of particular relevance has been the nascent development of central bank digital currencies, and the possible emergence of privately-backed “stablecoins” for digital payments. This was highlighted by the recent attention given to Facebook’s Libra. These new instruments aim to do for payments what the internet has done for information: make transactions secure, instantaneous, and nearly free.
Yesterday we published a new paper that highlights the benefits, risks, and regulatory issues that are likely to emerge in the years ahead with digital currencies.
The benefits are clear — ease of use, lower costs, and global reach. But what about the risks?
We have identified several: the potential emergence of new monopolies, with implications for how personal data is monetized; the impact on weaker currencies and the expansion of dollarization; the opportunities for illicit activities; threats to financial stability; and the challenges of corporates issuing and thus earning large sums of money — previously the realm of central banks.
So, regulators — and the IMF—will need to step up. We need to create an environment where the benefits of this technology can be reaped while the risks are minimized.
This is what I mean when I talk about an IMF that is always adapting. When a challenge affects our members’ economic well-being, we must be ready to be there.
Tackling Threats to Global Prosperity
While we adapt to technological transformations, we cannot lose sight of the other pressing concerns.
Our world is experiencing a broader set of changes that are contributing to a breakdown of trust and social cohesion, especially in the advanced economies. Trade and globalization — along with technology — have reshaped the economic map, and the fallout is front and center here in Europe, as well as in the United States:  rising anger, political polarization, and populism. We are at risk of what one could call a reverse Bretton Woods moment.
Part of the problem is the rise of excessive inequality. This is both a national and a global challenge. Although poverty rates have declined worldwide since 1980, the top-tenth of the top one percent worldwide has garnered roughly the same economic benefits that have accrued to the bottom 50 percent.
Moreover, for many developing countries, convergence with high-income countries has stalled. Just four years ago, we estimated it would take about half a century for low-income countries to reach advanced economy living standards. If global integration falters, it may take much longer.
Some see an inherent flaw in capitalism. I do not agree. Capitalism rewards risk-taking. It has been the engine behind so much of the success we have experienced. But it is an imperfect system in need of a course correction.
We must prove that the benefits of globalization outweigh the costs and that integration can help to address our shared challenges. But right now, in many areas, we are losing that argument. So, we need a roadmap. Where can we start?
First, we can use fiscal policy to help address inequalities. This has been a part of the economic toolkit for many years, but the Fund recently developed a framework for social spending to help our member countries in the years to come.
While we help countries raise the revenues needed for future spending, it is essential to ensure fairness and a level the playing field. That means that in the realm of global corporate taxation we must close loopholes, forestall profit shifting, and avoid a race to the bottom.
A related point. We need to fight against illicit financial flows and money laundering because corruption undermines trust in all facets of society.
Another important priority is modernizing the international trade system, including in services and e-commerce. This will help reduce the trade tensions that threaten to undermine global growth.
When it comes to global growth, every country should empower women. Back at Bretton Woods, the role of women was limited to secretarial support. Much has changed since then, thank goodness. But about 90 percent of countries still have legal barriers to female economic participation. Realizing the massive potential of women is an economic no-brainer and must be a priority.
And last — but certainly not least — we must accelerate our response to climate change. Climate change presents one of the greatest challenges of the century — as recognized in this city in 2015.
The economic consequences if we don’t act will be dire.
That is why we are increasingly engaging our membership on mitigating and adapting to climate change, advising on energy subsidies and carbon pricing. We are also helping countries to enhance their resilience to natural disasters.
Now, Lord Keynes might be surprised at some of this, but I think he would be pleased that the Fund is a forward-looking problem solver.
Conclusion
Now, I promised I would try to follow Madame Lagarde’s lead. So, in honor of our hosts, let me borrow from Alexandre Dumas, who wrote: “All human wisdom is contained in two words — wait and hope.”
If you will allow me a suggestion for this Bretton Woods moment:
Hope, yes. But this is not a time to wait.
In the years ahead, we must all act — and act together — staying true to the values of our founders while pursuing the goals of stability, prosperity, and peace.
Thank you very much.
With Compliments of the IMF

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EACC

Sluggish Global Growth Calls for Supportive Policies

In our July update of the World Economic Outlook we are revising downward our projection for global growth to 3.2 percent in 2019 and 3.5 percent in 2020. While this is a modest revision of 0.1 percentage points for both years relative to our projections in April, it comes on top of previous significant downward revisions. The revision for 2019 reflects negative surprises for growth in emerging market and developing economies that offset positive surprises in some advanced economies.
Growth is projected to improve between 2019 and 2020. However, close to 70 percent of the increase relies on an improvement in the growth performance in stressed emerging market and developing economies and is therefore subject to high uncertainty.
Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted. Dynamism in the global economy is being weighed down by prolonged policy uncertainty as trade tensions remain heightened despite the recent US-China trade truce, technology tensions have erupted threatening global technology supply chains, and the prospects of a no-deal Brexit have increased.

Global growth is sluggish and precarious, but it does not have to be this way because some of this is self-inflicted.

The negative consequences of policy uncertainty are visible in the diverging trends between the manufacturing and services sector, and the significant weakness in global trade. Manufacturing purchasing manager indices continue to decline alongside worsening business sentiment as businesses hold off on investment in the face of high uncertainty. Global trade growth, which moves closely with investment, has slowed significantly to 0.5 percent (year-on-year) in the first quarter of 2019, which is its slowest pace since 2012. On the other hand, the services sector is holding up and consumer sentiment is strong, as unemployment rates touch record lows and wage incomes rise in several countries.
Among advanced economies—the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the euro area—grew faster than expected in the first quarter of 2019. However, some of the factors behind this—such as stronger inventory build-ups—are transitory and the growth momentum going forward is expected to be weaker, especially for countries reliant on external demand. Owing to first quarter upward revisions, especially for the United States, we are raising our projection for advanced economies slightly, by 0.1 percentage points, to 1.9 percent for 2019. Going forward, growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent, as the effects of fiscal stimulus taper off in the United States and weak productivity growth and aging demographics dampen long-run prospects for advanced economies.
In emerging market and developing economies, growth is being revised down by 0.3 percentage points in 2019 to 4.1 percent and by 0.1 percentage points for 2020 to 4.7 percent. The downward revisions for 2019 are almost across the board for the major economies, though for varied reasons. In China, the slight revision downwards reflects, in part, the higher tariffs imposed by the United States in May, while the more significant revisions in India and Brazil reflect weaker-than-expected domestic demand.
For commodity exporters, supply disruptions, such as in Russia and Chile, and sanctions on Iran, have led to downward revisions despite a near-term strengthening in oil prices. The projected recovery in growth between 2019 and 2020 in emerging market and developing economies relies on improved growth outcomes in stressed economies such as Argentina, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela, and therefore is subject to significant uncertainty.
Financial conditions in the United States and the euro area have further eased, as the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank adopted a more accommodative monetary policy stance. Emerging market and developing economies have benefited from monetary easing in major economies but have also faced volatile risk sentiment tied to trade tensions. On net, financial conditions are about the same for this group as in April. Low-income developing countries that previously received mainly stable foreign direct investment flows now receive significant volatile portfolio flows, as the search for yield in a low interest rate environment reaches frontier markets.
Increased downside risks
A major downside risk to the outlook remains an escalation of trade and technology tensions that can significantly disrupt global supply chains. The combined effect of tariffs imposed last year and potential tariffs envisaged in May between the United States and China could reduce the level of global GDP in 2020 by 0.5 percent. Further, a surprise and durable worsening of financial sentiment can expose financial vulnerabilities built up over years of low interest rates, while disinflationary pressures can lead to difficulties in debt servicing for borrowers. Other significant risks include a surprise slowdown in China, the lack of a recovery in the euro area, a no-deal Brexit, and escalation of geopolitical tensions.
With global growth subdued and downside risks dominating the outlook, the global economy remains at a delicate juncture. It is therefore essential that tariffs are not used to target bilateral trade balances or as a general-purpose tool to tackle international disagreements. To help resolve conflicts, the rules-based multilateral trading system should be strengthened and modernized to encompass areas such as digital services, subsidies, and technology transfer.
Policies to support growth
Monetary policy should remain accommodative especially where inflation is softening below target. But it needs to be accompanied by sound trade policies that would lift the outlook and reduce downside risks. With persistently low interest rates, macroprudential tools should be deployed to ensure that financial risks do not build up.
Fiscal policy should balance growth, equity, and sustainability concerns, including protecting society’s most vulnerable. Countries with fiscal space should invest in physical and social infrastructure to raise potential growth. In the event of a severe downturn, a synchronized move toward more accommodative fiscal policies should complement monetary easing, subject to country specific circumstances.
Lastly, the need for greater global cooperation is ever urgent. In addition to resolving trade and technology tensions, countries need to work together to address major issues such as climate change, international taxation, corruption, cybersecurity, and the opportunities and challenges of newly emerging digital payment technologies.

With Compliments of the IMF

EACC

Top global firms commit to tackling inequality by joining Business for Inclusive Growth coalition

A group of major international companies has pledged to tackle inequality and promote diversity in their workplaces and supply chains as part of an initiative sponsored by the French Presidency of the G7 and overseen by the OECD.
The Business for Inclusive Growth (B4IG) coalition will be launched at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Biarritz, France, which took place from 24 to 26 August 2019. Spearheaded by Emmanuel Faber, Danone Chairman and CEO, the coalition brought together 34 leading multinationals with more than 3 million employees worldwide and global revenues topping $1 trillion. Members agreed to sign a pledge to take concrete actions to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are more widely shared.
B4IG coalition members will tackle persistent inequalities of opportunity, reduce regional disparities and fight gender discrimination. Companies have identified an initial pool of more than 50 existing and planned projects, representing more than 1 billion euros in private funding, to be covered under the initiative. The projects range from training programmes to help employees adapt to the future of work to greater investment in childcare, to increasing women’s participation in the workforce; to financially supporting small businesses, to encouraging greater participation in supply chains; and to enhancing the integration of refugees through faster integration to the workforce. Coalition members will seek to accelerate, scale up and replicate already existing projects, while significantly expanding their social impact.
The platform, chaired by Danone, consists of a three-year, OECD-managed programme. It aims at increasing opportunities for disadvantaged and under-represented groups through retraining and ups-killing, as well as promoting diversity on the companies’ boards and executive committees and tackling inequalities throughout their supply chains. They will also step up business action to advance human rights, build more inclusive workplaces and strengthen inclusion in their internal and external business ecosystems.
B4IG initiative will be presented to French President Emmanuel Macron during a meeting with business and civil society leaders at the Elysées Palace on Friday 23 August.
OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría said: “Growing inequality is one of the biggest social challenges in the world today, perpetuating poverty, undermining social cohesion and trust. Sustainable economic growth means inclusive economic growth. It means giving every individual the opportunity to fulfill her or his potential, the chance not only to contribute to a nation’s growth but to benefit from it, regardless of their background or origins.”
Mr Gurría added: “I welcome this initiative by France to involve some of the world’s most important companies to work hand-in-hand with governments and the OECD to tackle inequalities. The OECD, for its part, will contribute with its policy analysis, research and expertise.”
A Business for Inclusive Growth (B4IG) Incubator of public-private projects will be created at the OECD. The facility will offer companies access to the latest policy research, to help them launch and develop projects, undertake impact assessments and eventually bring about meaningful change. The B4IG Incubator will be funded by both G7 governments and private donors. It will service innovative inclusive business projects that require strong collaboration between the private and the public sector. The Incubator will catalyse and disseminate knowledge around the business models with higher social impact.
An evaluation of the projects will be published after three years, alongside OECD guidance for promoting inclusive growth through joint public-private action and for measuring business performance.
OECD Chief of Staff and Sherpa Gabriela Ramos, leader of the OECD Inclusive Growth Initiative, said: “The OECD has been documenting and raising the alarm bell regarding the increased inequalities of income and opportunities in OECD countries for decades. They do not only undermine social cohesion and trust, but they also hamper growth, by preventing our economies to take full advantage of the talent of its people and businesses. We are delighted to partner with leading companies that are committed to take action. Our experience, evidence and best practices are at the service of the Business for Inclusive Growth Initiative.”
With compliments of OECD
 

EACC

An Autobiography That Puts The Irish Backstop In Context

By John Bruton, former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach)
I have just finished reading Seamus Mallon’s autobiography, entitled a “Shared Home Place”.Boris Johnson, or one of his advisors, ought to read it if they wish to get an insight into the concerns that underlie the Irish backstop. They will learn that Brexit, and the Irish peace, are not events in themselves, but processes that will go on for years, and will either deepen or reduce division over generations to come.
 This is not a one off problem to be solved, but a choice between two courses of action that are fundamentally inimical to one another.
As the title of his book implies, Seamus Mallon makes the case that Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland, must come to terms with the fact that they must share their home place with a million or so people (unionists) who see themselves as British, and who do not have, and will never have, an exclusively Irish identity.
The early part of the book deals with the author’s experience growing up, peacefully, as a member of a Catholic minority in the predominantly Protestant town of Market hill in Armagh.
 It then moves to the beginnings of the troubles, and the exclusive way in which local government operated to the benefit of the unionist majority, without regard to the wishes of the nationalist minority.
After a stint in local government, Seamus Mallon later was a member of the 1974 power sharing administration, led by the Unionist Brian Faulkner, and established on the basis of the Sunningdale Agreement between the Irish Taoiseach of the day, Liam Cosgrave and his counterpart, Edward Heath. 
This power sharing Administration was brought down by the Ulster Workers strikers, who objected to the whole idea of power sharing between the  two communities. 
Mallon believes the IRA also felt deeply threatened by power sharing, which may explain why Sinn Fein, despite all the efforts made by others to accommodate them, has so far been unable to work the Good Friday institutions even to this day.
Mallon was SDLP spokesman on Justice in the 1980’s and he made a point of attending all the funerals of victims of politically motivated violence in his area, which was an important, but very difficult, demonstration of his profound sense of fairness and,  of his opposition to all violence. 
The book is very explicit about the murderous collusion between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. He names names.
Mallon deals with the Hume/Adams talks, and makes clear that John Hume did not bring his party along with him in this solo endeavour, a failure that had deep long term consequences. 
As Mallon puts it,
 “peace was being brought about in a way that was bypassing democratic procedures”.
He is critical of Sinn Fein having been allowed into government in Northern Ireland without the IRA first  getting rid of their weapons. 
As he puts it, the IRA, continuing to hold weapons, after the Good Friday Agreement had been ratified in both parts of Ireland, was
“a challenge to the sovereignty of the Irish people”.
This was also my opinion at the time, both as Taoiseach and leader of Fine Gael. There are some principles that should not be blurred. It took the IRA 11 years to eventually put their arms beyond use, and Mallon says that this
 “led to huge mistrust and misunderstanding”.
 Mallon believes the British and Irish governments should have called the IRA’s bluff much earlier, and claims that it was the Americans who eventually forced the issue of decommissioning.
He gives a good account of the dramatic conclusion to the talks that led to the Good Friday Agreement, and of Tony Blair’s letter to David Trimble, promising that the process of decommissioning should start “straight away”, a promise Mallon says 
“Blair was either unwilling or unable to keep”.
Mallon understood Trimble’s problem, praises his courage, and believes he was ill used by Tony Blair.
But the artificially prolonged focus on decommissioning kept Sinn Fein as the centre of attention, and thus helped them to supplant the SDLP as the voice of Northern Nationalism. This was an error of historic proportions.
Mallon believes that the Trimble/Mallon( UUP/SDLP) power sharing Administrations  under the Good Friday Agreement achieved more that the Paisley/ McGuinness (DUP/SF) Administrations did. Mallon opposes political violence in all circumstances. 
As he says
“It is a universal lesson that political violence obliterates not only its victims, but all possibility of rational discourse about future political options”
I agree.
 The 1916 to 1923 period in Ireland also taught us that lesson too!
In the latter part of the book, Seamus Mallon talks about the prospects of a united Ireland. 
The Good Friday Agreement allows for referenda to decide the question. It posits a 50% + one vote as being sufficient to bring a united Ireland about. This is a deficiency in the Agreement.
 A united Ireland, imposed on that narrow basis, would be highly unstable. There would be a minority opposed to it that would simply not give up. 
As Mallon puts it
“I believe that if nationalists cannot, over a period of time, persuade a significant number of unionists to accept an Irish unitary state, then that kind of unity is not an option”
I agree.
The Irish and UK governments could find common ground here.
 But the two communities in Northern Ireland must first start talking to one another about what they really need and what they could concede to one another.
 There is no point blaming the politicians.  If the voters chose parties to represent them that are intransigent, then the voters themselves are ultimately responsible for the outcome.
This is something that Boris Johnson has to contemplate as he seeks a way to deal with the Irish backstop.
With compliments of John Bruton former Prime Minister of Ireland