With the right tools, policymakers can help to manage the climate risks impacting economies and financial systems

When it comes to the devastating impact of climate change, most people think of the harm inflicted on lives and livelihoods. Yet the effects of more frequent and extreme weather are just as consequential for the health of financial systems.
The physical impacts of climate-related shocks, such as hurricane damage to power grids, affect financial institutions and how they make decisions. So do the risks of transition to a low-carbon economy. Think of the costs of new carbon taxes or new laws that require phase-outs of fossil fuels before greener replacements are available.
To make well-informed decisions about future operations, banks, insurers, and others in the financial sector need tools to manage climate risks in their operations and balance sheets. At the same time, as financial supervisors monitor the resilience of the system, they need tools to adequately assess and supervise these risks.
Financial risk analysis
With the right tools, financial sector authorities can start to assess climate risks as a crucial input to gauging how to manage them with the right policies.
This is where the IMF comes in. The Fund’s Financial Sector Assessment Program already regularly examines the resilience of banks and other institutions, including with stress tests to better gauge systemic risks. These procedures are being retooled to incorporate climate risk analysis to better gauge financial stability risks from climate change.
Risk analysis typically entails development of scenario-based stress tests for assessing bank solvency. The process incorporates adverse macroeconomic scenarios specifically designed for the tests—including elements like economic contraction, rising unemployment, exchange-rate shocks, and falling asset prices.
These scenarios are then used as inputs when looking at relationships between these macro drivers and risk factors, such as credit risk and interest income, to estimate impacts on bank income and capital. Bank resilience is then assessed based on whether capital levels fall below regulatory thresholds.
Beyond the standard approach
Unlike conventional stress testing, climate risk analysis, at this stage, doesn’t focus on quantifying possible capital needs of financial institutions relative to the regulatory thresholds. Instead, the IMF approach focuses on measuring and raising awareness of risks. This reflects new challenges, including the complexities of modeling climate risk and its economic impacts over very long horizons and major data gaps.

While the consequences of climate change will play out over decades, risks that could arise in the next three to five years are considered in typical stress testing exercises. The incidence and impact of extreme events is rising and there is sizable uncertainty over policies. All these can potentially have large effects on the value of companies, and thus banks, as markets price in the effects of longer-term risks on business prospects.
The first step in the IMF’s climate risk analysis is to assess which hazards are the most relevant for a country. Where climate risks are important, the bank solvency stress testing framework incorporates the physical and transition risk.
This often starts with temperature and emissions scenarios based on figures from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and adapted by the Network for Greening the Financial System, a coalition of central banks working on climate change.
Climate scenarios then map emissions and temperature scenarios to physical risks, like extreme weather, and transition risks, such as future carbon taxes. These scenarios point to the trade-offs between physical and transition risk—the more orderly the transition, the lesser the increase in temperatures and the occurrence of physical climate risk.
Data and projections
The overall assessment of bank stability involves measuring how physical or transition risks impact the economy and bank capital. Physical risks are localized and require new approaches to understanding where storms and floods may strike. The analysis uses new data and projections of the likelihood and impact of different hazards on physical assets like buildings or infrastructure, and economic activity, such as extreme heat that reduces working hours. This approach was applied to consider risks to banks from typhoons in the 2021 Philippines FSAP.
Policies to support transition to a lower carbon world seek to shift resources from brown to green sectors, impacting the prospects for the brown sectors. For the purposes of analyzing how this impacts the financial sector, we assess the impact of carbon taxes (as a proxy for the wide set of policies to foster transition) on individual economic sectors and, where possible, directly on firms’ balance sheets and therefore to banks.
We also assess what happens if investors reassess the value of businesses because of the effect of unforeseen changes in policies on long term earnings. Such an outcome, sometimes referred to as a climate Minsky moment, could lead to increases in credit risk today, affecting bank capital. This was discussed in this year’s United Kingdom FSAP which gauged how firm valuations, and thus credit risk, could be suddenly affected by climate change.
Enhancing the policy framework
At this early stage, climate risk analysis can help raise awareness around the prudent management of climate risks and incentivize banks in improving their frameworks. At the same time, it will help to inform supervisors about the potential magnitude of climate-related risks in their jurisdictions and better understand transmission channels to the financial system.
Currently, several supervisors and central banks use climate stress tests to measure the exposures to related risks. This helps to understand the challenges to banks’ business models, the implications for the provision of financial services, and desired policy responses. Ultimately, climate risk analysis will help financial institutions disclose and manage related risks.
Authors:

Tobias Adrian
Vikram Haksar
Ivo Krznar
This blog reflects research by Pierpaolo Grippa, Marco Gross, Sujan Lamichhane, Caterina Lepore, Fabian Lipinsky, Hiroko Oura and Apostolos Panagiotopoulos.

Compliments of the IMF.
The post IMF | How Economies and Financial Systems Can Better Gauge Climate Risks first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Blog post by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB |

Trading in unbacked digital assets should be treated by regulators like gambling.

Last year marked the unravelling of the crypto market as investors moved from the fear of missing out to the fear of not getting out.
TerraUSD — a stablecoin that was stable in name only — was among the first to fall in a chain of collapses that brought down several lending platforms, a hedge fund, a leading crypto asset exchange and most recently a large US-listed crypto mining company. Other crypto companies are likely to be added to this list in the coming months.
These failures occurred in rapid succession, reflecting crypto players’ incredibly high leverage, their interconnectedness across the crypto ecosystem and their inadequate governance structures.
Yet remarkably, the crypto market rout has left the financial system largely unscathed. Many therefore think it preferable to let crypto burn rather than regulate at the risk of legitimising cryptos. Let me voice two important reservations about this view.
First, despite their fundamental flaws, it is not certain that crypto assets will ultimately self-combust.
Take unbacked crypto assets, for instance. They do not perform any socially or economically useful function: they are rarely used for payments and do not fund consumption or investment. As a form of investment, unbacked cryptos lack any intrinsic value, too. They are speculative assets. Investors buy them with the sole objective of selling them on at a higher price. In fact, they are a gamble disguised as an investment asset.
But it is precisely for this reason that we cannot expect them to disappear. People have always gambled in many different ways. And in the digital era, unbacked cryptos are likely to continue to be a vehicle for gambling.

This year’s crypto market meltdown caught millions of investors off guard.

Second, the cost to society of an unregulated crypto industry is too high to ignore. For one, this year’s crypto market meltdown caught millions of investors off guard. Uninformed investors were left with significant losses. It is not just cryptos that are being burnt.
In addition, unregulated cryptoassets can be used for tax evasion, money laundering, terrorist financing and the circumvention of sanctions. They also have high environmental costs.
That is why we cannot afford to leave cryptos unregulated. We need to build guardrails that address regulatory gaps and arbitrage and tackle the significant social costs of cryptos head-on.
This is easier said than done. Regulators must walk a tightrope. Like Ulysses, they must resist the beguiling crypto sirens to avoid falling prey to the industry’s intense lobbying. And on their journey, they must steer clear of the Scylla of poor regulation and the Charybdis of legitimising unsound crypto models.
The EU’s Regulation on Markets in Crypto-Assets is an important step. It is crucial that it is implemented as soon as possible. However, further work needs to be done to ensure that all segments of the industry are regulated, including decentralised finance activities such as crypto asset lending or non-custodial wallet services.
In addition, regulation should acknowledge the speculative nature of unbacked cryptos and treat them as gambling activities. Vulnerable consumers should be protected through principles similar to those recommended by the European Commission for online gambling. They should be taxed in accordance with the costs they impose on society.
To avoid the risk of regulation lagging behind because of the time needed for legislative processes, regulators and supervisors need to be empowered to keep pace with crypto developments.
And to be effective and prevent regulatory arbitrage, regulation must have a global reach. The recommendations of the Financial Stability Board for the regulation and oversight of crypto asset activities and markets should be finalised and applied urgently, as should the rules recently published by the Basel Committee for the treatment of banks’ exposures to cryptos.
However, regulation and taxation alone will not be sufficient to address the shortcomings of cryptos. To build solid foundations for the digital finance ecosystem, we need a risk-free and dependable digital settlement asset, which can only be provided by central bank money. That is why the ECB and central banks around the world are working on both retail and wholesale central bank digital currencies. By preserving the role of central bank money as the anchor of the payment system, central banks will safeguard the trust on which private forms of money ultimately depend.
Author:

Fabio Panetta, Member of the ECB’s Executive Board

Compliments of the European Central Bank.
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The European Commission launched the process towards the adoption of an adequacy decision for the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework, which will foster safe trans-Atlantic data flows and address the concerns raised by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Schrems II decision of July 2020.
Today’s draft decision follows the signature of a US Executive Order by President Biden on 7 October 2022, along with the regulations issued by the US Attorney General Merrick Garland. These two instruments implemented into US law the agreement in principle announced by President von der Leyen and President Biden in March 2022.
The draft adequacy decision, which reflects the assessment by the Commission of the US legal framework and concludes that it provides comparable safeguards to those of the EU, has now been published and transmitted to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) for its opinion. The draft decision concluded that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred from the EU to US companies.
Key elements
US companies will be able to join the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework by committing to comply with a detailed set of privacy obligations, for instance, the requirement to delete personal data when it is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected, and to ensure continuity of protection when personal data is shared with third parties. EU citizens will benefit from several redress avenues if their personal data is handled in violation of the Framework, including free of charge before independent dispute resolution mechanisms and an arbitration panel.
In addition, the US legal framework provides for a number of limitations and safeguards regarding the access to data by US public authorities, in particular for criminal law enforcement and national security purposes. This includes the new rules introduced by the US Executive Order, which addressed the issues raised by the Court of Justice of the EU in the Schrems II judgment:

Access to European data by US intelligence agencies will be limited to what is necessary and proportionate to protect national security;
EU individuals will have the possibility to obtain redress regarding the collection and use of their data by US intelligence agencies before an independent and impartial redress mechanism, which includes a newly created Data Protection Review Court. The Court will independently investigate and resolve complaints from Europeans, including by adopting binding remedial measures.

European companies will be able to rely on these safeguards for trans-Atlantic data transfers, also when using other transfer mechanisms, such as standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules.
Next steps
The draft adequacy decision will now go through its adoption procedure. As a first step, the Commission submitted its draft decision to the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). Afterwards, the Commission will seek approval from a committee composed of representatives of the EU Member States. In addition, the European Parliament has a right of scrutiny over adequacy decisions. Once this procedure is completed, the Commission can proceed to adopting the final adequacy decision.
The functioning of the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework will be subject to periodic reviews, which will be carried out by the European Commission, together with European data protection authorities, and the competent US authorities. The first review will take place within one year after the entry into force of the adequacy decision, to verify whether all relevant elements of the US legal framework have been fully implemented and are functioning effectively in practice.
Background
Article 45(3) of the General Data Protection Regulation grants the Commission the power to decide, by means of an implementing act, that a non-EU country ensures ‘an adequate level of protection’, i.e. a level of protection for personal data that is essentially equivalent to the level of protection within the EU. The effect of adequacy decisions is that personal data can flow freely from the EU (and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland) to a third country without further obstacles.
After the invalidation of the previous adequacy decision on the EU-US Privacy Shield by the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Commission and the US government entered into discussions on a new framework that addressed the issues raised by the Court.
In March 2022, following intense negotiations between the lead negociators, Commissioner Reynders and Secretary Raimondo, President von der Leyen and President Biden announced an agreement in principle on a new transatlantic data transfer framework. In October 2022, President Biden signed an Executive Order on ‘Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities’, which was complemented by regulations adopted by the US Attorney General. Together, these two instruments implemented the US commitments into US law, as well as complemented the obligations for US companies. On this basis, the Commission is now proposing a draft adequacy decision on the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework.
Once the adequacy decision is adopted, European entities will be able to transfer personal data to participating companies in the United States, without having to put in place additional data protection safeguards.
For More Information
Draft adequacy decision
Q&A
Factsheet – Transatlantic Data Privacy Framework
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Today, the EU’s work on its ‘digital DNA’ – the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles – has culminated: In the margins of the European Council, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signed the text together with the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola, and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala for the rotating Council presidency.
The Declaration, put forward by the Commission in January this year, presents the EU’s commitment to a secure, safe and sustainable digital transformation that puts people at the centre, in line with EU core values and fundamental rights. The Declaration shows citizens that European values, as well as the rights and freedoms enshrined in the EU’s legal framework, must be respected online as they are offline. Shaped around six chapters, the text will guide policy makers and companies dealing with new technologies. The Declaration will also steer the EU’s approach to the digital transformation throughout the world.
President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said: “The signature of the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles reflects our shared goal of a digital transformation that puts people first. The rights put forward in our Declaration are guaranteed for everybody in the EU, online as they are offline. And the digital principles enshrined in the Declaration will guide us in our work on all new initiatives.”
Rights and principles to guide the digital transformation
The digital transformation affects every aspect of people’s lives. It offers opportunities for greater personal wellbeing, sustainability and growth, but can also raise risks to which a public policy response is needed. With the Declaration on digital rights and principles, the EU wants to secure European values by:

 Putting people at the centre of the digital transformation;
 Supporting solidarity and inclusion through connectivity, digital education, training and skills, fair and just working conditions and access to digital public services;
 Restating the importance of freedom of choice and a fair digital environment;
 Fostering participation in the digital public space;
 Increasing safety, security and empowerment in the digital environment, in particular for young people;
 Promoting sustainability.

Concretely, these rights and principles mean: affordable and high-speed digital connectivity everywhere and for everybody, well-equipped classrooms and digitally skilled teachers, seamless access to public services online, a safe digital environment for children, disconnecting after working hours, obtaining easy-to-understand information on the environmental impact of our digital products, control about how personal data is used and with whom it is shared.
Next Steps
The signature of the European Declaration of digital rights and principles at the highest level reflects the shared political commitment of the EU and its Member States to promote and implement these principles in all areas of digital life, and to reach the objectives of the 2030 Digital Compass. The Declaration will also guide the concrete work on the Digital Decade Policy Programme, the monitoring and cooperation mechanism to attain the common digital objectives for the end of this decade. To achieve the 2030 goals, and for the Declaration to produce concrete effects, the Commission will monitor progress and report through the annual ‘State of the Digital Decade’ report. Furthermore, the Declaration will guide the EU in its international relations on how to shape a digital transformation that puts people and human rights at its centre.
Background
On 9 March 2021, the Commission laid out its vision for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030 in its Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade Communication. In September 2021, the Commission put forward a Path to the Digital Decade, a robust governance framework to reach these digital targets.
The Commission proposed the Declaration of Digital Rights and Principles in January 2022. The Commission, Parliament and the Council reached an agreement on the Declaration in November 2022. The Declaration adds to previous digital initiatives from Member States, such as the Tallinn Declaration on eGovernment, the Berlin Declaration on Digital Society and Value-based Digital Government, and the Lisbon Declaration – Digital Democracy with a purpose.
The Commission also conducted an open public consultation which showed broad support for European Digital Principles – 8 EU citizens out of 10 consider it useful for the EU to define and promote a common European vision on digital rights and principles – as well as a special Eurobarometer survey.
The declaration, and the rights contained within, is rooted in the treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It builds on existing digital policies, such as data protection, ePrivacy, workers’ rights and case law of the Court of Justice. It complements the European Pillar of Social Rights.
Compliments of the European Commission.
The post Digital Rights and Principles: Presidents of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council sign European Declaration first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.

Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference.
The Governing Council today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 50 basis points and, based on the substantial upward revision to the inflation outlook, we expect to raise them further. In particular, we judge that interest rates will still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target. Keeping interest rates at restrictive levels will over time reduce inflation by dampening demand and will also guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. Our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and follow a meeting-by-meeting approach.
The key ECB interest rates are our primary tool for setting the monetary policy stance. The Governing Council today also discussed principles for normalising the Eurosystem’s monetary policy securities holdings. From the beginning of March 2023 onwards, the asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio will decline at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem will not reinvest all of the principal payments from maturing securities. The decline will amount to €15 billion per month on average until the end of the second quarter of 2023 and its subsequent pace will be determined over time.
At its February meeting the Governing Council will announce the detailed parameters for reducing the APP holdings. The Governing Council will regularly reassess the pace of the APP portfolio reduction to ensure it remains consistent with the overall monetary policy strategy and stance, to preserve market functioning, and to maintain firm control over short-term money market conditions. By the end of 2023, we will also review our operational framework for steering short-term interest rates, which will provide information regarding the endpoint of the balance sheet normalisation process.
We decided to raise interest rates today, and expect to raise them significantly further, because inflation remains far too high and is projected to stay above our target for too long. According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, inflation was 10.0 per cent in November, slightly lower than the 10.6 per cent recorded in October. The decline resulted mainly from lower energy price inflation. Food price inflation and underlying price pressures across the economy have strengthened and will persist for some time. Amid exceptional uncertainty, Eurosystem staff have significantly revised up their inflation projections. They now see average inflation reaching 8.4 per cent in 2022 before decreasing to 6.3 per cent in 2023, with inflation expected to decline markedly over the course of the year. Inflation is then projected to average 3.4 per cent in 2024 and 2.3 per cent in 2025. Inflation excluding energy and food is projected to be 3.9 per cent on average in 2022 and to rise to 4.2 per cent in 2023, before falling to 2.8 per cent in 2024 and 2.4 per cent in 2025.
The euro area economy may contract in the current quarter and the next quarter, owing to the energy crisis, high uncertainty, weakening global economic activity and tighter financing conditions. According to the latest Eurosystem staff projections, a recession would be relatively short-lived and shallow. Growth is nonetheless expected to be subdued next year and has been revised down significantly compared with the previous projections. Beyond the near term, growth is projected to recover as the current headwinds fade. Overall, the Eurosystem staff projections now see the economy growing by 3.4 per cent in 2022, 0.5 per cent in 2023, 1.9 per cent in 2024 and 1.8 per cent in 2025.
The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website.
I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions.
Economic activity

Economic growth in the euro area slowed to 0.3 per cent in the third quarter of the year. High inflation and tighter financing conditions are dampening spending and production by reducing real household incomes and pushing up costs for firms.
The world economy is also slowing, in a context of continued geopolitical uncertainty, especially owing to Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and its people, and tighter financing conditions worldwide. The past deterioration in the terms of trade, reflecting the faster rise in import prices than in export prices, continues to weigh on purchasing power in the euro area.
On the positive side, employment increased by 0.3 per cent in the third quarter, and unemployment hit a new historical low of 6.5 per cent in October. Rising wages are set to restore some lost purchasing power, supporting consumption. As the economy weakens, however, job creation is likely to slow, and unemployment could rise over the coming quarters.
Fiscal support measures to shield the economy from the impact of high energy prices should be temporary, targeted and tailored to preserving incentives to consume less energy. Fiscal measures falling short of these principles are likely to exacerbate inflationary pressures, which would necessitate a stronger monetary policy response. Moreover, in line with the EU’s economic governance framework, fiscal policies should be oriented towards making our economy more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. Policies to enhance the euro area’s supply capacity, especially in the energy sector, can help reduce price pressures in the medium term. To that end, governments should swiftly implement their investment and structural reform plans under the Next Generation EU programme. The reform of the EU’s economic governance framework should be concluded rapidly.
Inflation
Inflation declined to 10.0 per cent in November, mainly on the back of lower energy price inflation, while services inflation also edged down. Food price inflation rose further to 13.6 per cent, however, as high input costs in food production were passed through to consumer prices.
Price pressures remain strong across sectors, partly as a result of the impact of high energy costs throughout the economy. Inflation excluding energy and food was unchanged in November, at 5.0 per cent, and other measures of underlying inflation are also high. Fiscal measures to compensate households for high energy prices and inflation are set to dampen inflation over next year but will raise it once they are withdrawn.
Supply bottlenecks are gradually easing, although their effects are still contributing to inflation, pushing up goods prices in particular. The same holds true for the lifting of pandemic-related restrictions: while weakening, the effect of pent-up demand is still driving up prices, especially in the services sector. The depreciation of the euro this year is also continuing to feed through to consumer prices.
Wage growth is strengthening, supported by robust labour markets and some catch-up in wages to compensate workers for high inflation. As these factors are set to remain in place, the Eurosystem staff projections see wages growing at rates well above historical averages and pushing up inflation throughout the projection period. Most measures of longer-term inflation expectations currently stand at around two per cent, although further above-target revisions to some indicators warrant continued monitoring.
Risk assessment
Risks to the economic growth outlook are on the downside, especially in the near term. The war against Ukraine remains a significant downside risk to the economy. Energy and food costs could also remain persistently higher than expected. There could be an additional drag on growth in the euro area if the world economy were to weaken more sharply than we expect.
The risks to the inflation outlook are primarily on the upside. In the near term, existing pipeline pressures could lead to stronger than expected rises in retail prices for energy and food. Over the medium term, risks stem primarily from domestic factors such as a persistent rise in inflation expectations above our target or higher than anticipated wage rises. By contrast, a decline in energy costs or a further weakening of demand would lower price pressures.
Financial and monetary conditions
As we tighten monetary policy, borrowing is becoming more expensive for firms and households. Bank lending to firms remains robust, as firms replace bonds with bank loans and use credit to finance the higher costs of production and investment. Households are borrowing less, because of tighter credit standards, rising interest rates, worsening prospects for the housing market and lower consumer confidence.
In line with our monetary policy strategy, twice a year the Governing Council assesses in depth the interrelation between monetary policy and financial stability. The financial stability environment has deteriorated since our last review in June 2022 owing to a weaker economy and rising credit risk. In addition, sovereign vulnerabilities have risen amid the weaker economic outlook and weaker fiscal positions. Tighter financing conditions would mitigate the build-up of financial vulnerabilities and lower tail risks to inflation over the medium term, at the cost of a higher risk of systemic stress and greater downside risks to growth in the short term. In addition, the liquidity needs of non-bank financial institutions may amplify market volatility. At the same time, euro area banks have comfortable levels of capital, which helps to reduce the side effects of tighter monetary policy on financial stability. Macroprudential policy remains the first line of defence in preserving financial stability and addressing medium-term vulnerabilities.
Conclusion
Summing up, we have today raised the three key ECB interest rates by 50 basis points and, based on the substantial upward revision to our inflation outlook, we expect to raise them further. In particular, we judge that interest rates will still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target. Keeping interest rates at restrictive levels will over time reduce inflation by dampening demand and will also guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. Moreover, from the beginning of March 2023 onwards, the APP portfolio will decline at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem will not reinvest all of the principal payments from maturing securities.
Our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and determined meeting by meeting. We stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation returns to our medium-term inflation target.
We are now ready to take your questions.
Compliments of the European Central Bank.
The post Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB first appeared on European American Chamber of Commerce New York [EACCNY] | Your Partner for Transatlantic Business Resources.